

KAZI YA SHABA: CHOICE, CONTINUITY, AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN AN INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY
OF SOUTHERN ZAIRE

VOLUME I

BY

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Nakanisaka ozali amie na ngai ya motema
Mpo oyebi bae nayebi
Basekele na yo nionso

(I have always thought that you are an intimate friend because I know even the least of your secrets)

From the Lingala by Luambo Makiadi

As a consequence of their chosen profession, some social anthropologists are given to agonizing attacks of guilt; for in researching and describing human behavior, a rapport with informants which often becomes very intimate is seemingly cheapened and betrayed by the necessity of reporting. Friends are cultivated only to become "specimens," deep friendship compromised at the cost of building scientific credentials and in the commercialization of research results. While I fully understand this concern, and sympathize with those who feel it, field work gave me a substantially different perspective. Rather than guilt, the predominant emotions have been gratitude and a qualified pride: gratitude towards those many individuals who made this study possible, and pride that I was privileged to share their friendship and confidence. Hence, I must commence by acknowledging my profound debt to my informants, those citizens of Zaire, who shared so freely of their time,

their hospitality, their meager material possessions, their personal views, indeed, their very lives.

Second only to the contribution of informants was that of my Zairois research assistants, ultimately including a total of twenty individuals. (Two of these I had to fire for moral turpitude. But I can summon a measure of gratitude even here: the two scoundrels gave me a valuable lesson in the conduct and control of research.) Eighteen of my research assistants provided cheerful and conscientious service. Without their patience and hard work, this study would not have been possible. Let me pause here to remember particularly one assistant, Mutebwe Tshamudisu, who died of unknown causes during the conduct of field research. If he succumbed (as was widely suspected) to sorcery, I take this opportunity to condemn the despicable sorcerer.

This study also owes a considerable debt to scholars associated with the University of Lubumbashi. Foremost among these are Professors J. Jeffrey Hoover and Ellen T. Hoover of the Department of History, who generously took time from their busy schedules to provide advice, introductions, hospitality, encouragement, cultural insights and a hundred unremembered kindnesses. Likewise, Vice-Dean Matungulu Daa of the Faculty of Social Sciences took me under his wing, providing invaluable introductions to political and mining company authorities. He obtained essential (and otherwise almost unobtainable) research clearances, and followed the

progress of this research with a keen personal interest. He, too, was a constant source of encouragement.

I must also acknowledge my debt to Dibwe Dia Mwembu, a Chef de Travaux at the University of Lubumbashi, doctoral candidate, colleague and brilliant scholar, who generously shared his time and knowledge. He helped me organize research in Kolwezi and accompanied me as I sought to establish my credentials in the research community and gain the confidence of its leaders and residents. His firm, quiet demeanor, strong faith, professional competence and solid moral base impressed me immensely. I cannot imagine how I would have fared without his assistance, and treasure his friendship and memory.

Many individuals in Kolwezi provided encouragement and other assistance. I am grateful for them all, but will mention three here. "Papa" Mastaki, the Commissaire urbain assistant, deserves my special thanks. As an important local authority, he was under no obligation to treat me with particular favor. Yet his concern for my well-being and research, his hospitality, and his constant gracious manner made my research in Kolwezi far easier. I would also be remiss for failure to mention Henning Clausen and Laila Horby, Danish Methodist missionaries in Kolwezi, who were exceedingly generous of their hospitality. Their constant fellowship, friendship, strong faith, and unfailing good humor undoubtedly sustained my mental health during the

course of research which was at times frustrating and psychologically challenging.

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No single individual has been as important to the completion of this study as my wife, Eva. Her willingness to endure the domestic turbulence of family moves, to accept long periods of separation, to have less than a full-time husband, and to be the sole parent of two teenage sons during my fieldwork should certainly have qualified her for sainthood. But in addition to this, her counsel, love, and understanding were an indispensable support.

Finally, I must acknowledge the role of my parents, Wallace and Ruth Henk, missionaries and teachers for many

years in Zaire. Their lives of selfless service to others, and their obvious love for the people of Zaire, have been a profound inspiration to me. My interest in Zaire is a direct result of their calling and life's work. I would be honored to have exerted even a small portion of their influence on the lives of others. It is to them that I dedicate this work.

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Kolwezi, an industrial city on the Copperbelt of southern Zaire, achieved a passing notoriety in May 1978 when it was briefly seized by Marxist rebels seeking the overthrow of Zaire's President Mobutu. The rebels were soon evicted by French and Belgian paratroopers, but the dramatic events of that short conflict underscored the importance of this otherwise obscure central African town. Kolwezi is, in fact, the operational center of Zaire's huge copper-mining industry, and the most important source of the nation's revenues.

Yet, a century ago, there were no cities on what is now the Zairian Copperbelt. This dry, relatively infertile savanna area was, in fact, very sparsely populated. Forebears of today's urbanized industrial workers lived in small horticultural communities supervised by traditional chiefs or lineage elders. They represented a variety of

widely separated ethnic groups. Many lived hundreds of kilometers from today's Copperbelt.

Urbanization and industrialization occurred very rapidly in southern Zaire. Kolwezi itself was founded only in 1938, growing in size from 2,000 to 225,000 souls in fifty years. Mining company employees in today's city pursue an economy that has been transformed in three generations from subsistence cultivation to stabilized, urbanized, industrial wage-labor. The urban population forms, in other words, a fascinating natural experiment in social change.

This study briefly traces the history both of the region and of the Zairian copper industry, noting the physical and cultural environment of today's Copperbelt. It turns ultimately to an assessment of belief and social behavior in urban Kolwezi.

The primary unit of analysis is the married, male industrial worker living with his family in one of the six mining company camps in the Kolwezi urban area. Data for analysis were obtained by field work in Kolwezi in 1987 and 1988. Key objectives of the study are to assess significant patterns of social change and to identify the primary change agents. Domains of belief and behavior selected for particular analysis include religion, world view, the supernatural, ethnicity, male-female relations, language usage, kinship, urban-rural linkages, manners, status, and interpersonal relations.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Prologue

The town of Kolwezi burst upon the consciousness of the Western world in the late 1970s. In a spate of seemingly unanticipated violence, rebels invaded southern Zaire from neighboring Angola, routing Zairian army units and threatening Zaire's mineral rich industrial region of Shaba.¹ This happened twice: the first time in March 1977, the second time in May 1978. The rebels were alleged to be former gendarmes of the secessionist Katanga province (1960-1963) now trained and equipped by the government of Marxist Angola, and seeking the overthrow of Zairian President Mobutu.

The 1977 invasion (generally called "Shaba I") did not reach Kolwezi. It was of about 80 days' duration, consisted of an invading force of several hundred lightly armed rebels, and involved only a limited penetration of Zairian territory before the rebels withdrew back into their Angolan

¹Shaba, formerly Katanga, is Zaire's southernmost province (région), the location of Zaire's large copper mining industry and the country's only real industrial center. (The word "Shaba" means "copper" in Swahili.) The province's name was changed from "Katanga" to "Shaba" by the Mobutu regime in the late 1960s as one of a number of measures intended to bury the region's separatist and secessionist past.



Figure 1.1. Zaire in its African context.



Figure 1.2. Zaire's régions and key cities.




Figure 1.3. Shaba, its key cities and its Copperbelt.

bases in the face of Moroccan forces rushed to the scene in French military aircraft. The second invasion (Shaba II), which occurred almost a year later, was of shorter duration but achieved more spectacular success. It was this invasion (in the spring of 1978) in which rebel forces infiltrated through neighboring Zambia, appearing suddenly in Kolwezi (some 300 miles from the Angolan border) and dramatically seizing the town. (Characteristically, the Zairian Army crumbled before the rebels.) But after six days of rebel occupation, French and Belgian paratroopers conducted airborne operations into the Kolwezi area, driving off the rebels. French forces subsequently pushed westward to secure the Zaire-Angola border. The Zairian army followed, pillaging, raping and killing as it went. The U.S. played a key role in providing logistic support to French, Belgian and Zairian military forces.

The events of spring 1978 raise a number of interesting questions. Among these are "What attracted the rebels to Kolwezi?", and "Why were French, Belgian and U.S. military forces quickly committed to the support of an unpopular regime in the relief of an otherwise small and obscure town in central Africa?"

A detailed analysis of rebel intentions is outside the scope of this consideration, but Kolwezi was a logical rebel objective for several reasons. The rebels were invading Zaire from eastern Angola. The only direct road (and only rail line) from the Angolan border to the cities of Shaba

passes through Kolwezi. Then again, the town is the first significant urban area, major communications node, or significant resupply point between the Angolan border and any other population center in southern Zaire. The way to the regional capital, Lubumbashi, passes through Kolwezi. But more important, Kolwezi is the very heart of Zaire's copper mining industry, with more mines, refineries, workshops and other industrial facilities than at any other single location in Zaire. A very high proportion of Zaire's mineral production (and, hence, economic viability) is derived from Kolwezi. Rebel capture of Kolwezi was quite evidently a major humiliation to the regime of Zairian President Mobutu, and a significant blow to Zaire's precarious economy. Perhaps more significantly, the population of Kolwezi, drawn in part from ethnic groups of western Shaba, seemed likely to support the rebel cause. Many of Kolwezi's citizens appeared to have had advance warning of the rebel attack. To the rebels, Kolwezi must have represented a good locale to consolidate and recruit further manpower. And, in fact, the rebels seemed to have had little idea of how to further their aims beyond the capture of Kolwezi. (After the capture of the town and the execution of "traitors," the main preoccupation of the rebels was looting.)

At first glance, the reasons for the rapid European military involvement in the conflict may be somewhat less obvious. After all, the colonial era passed for Zaire in

1960. The notorious subsequent troubles of the early 1960s had long since ended under President Mobutu's increasingly personalized and authoritarian rule. Nor could leaders in western democracies applaud the regime for its economic or its social policies. The Zaire of 1977 was practically bankrupt, its leadership a paragon of corruption and venality, its redistributive capacities virtually nil. Yet the Mobutu regime (for all its well-documented graft, nepotism, human-rights abuses, and administrative mismanagement) has seemingly always found ready political support in the West. U.S. policymakers since the early 1960s have viewed Zaire in stark terms of East-West rivalry, a tendency only slightly attenuated in the Carter administration. It is now well known that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency played a key role in facilitating Mobutu's rise to power by coup d'état in the 1960s and has continued to enjoy a prominent role in Zaire.² As the former colonial metropole, Belgium maintains significant economic and military relations with Zaire. Since the early 1960s, France has also steadily constructed political, economic and military relationships with the country. And, except for a brief period in the early 1970s, Zaire has been generally supportive of Western interests in international fora. Western financial institutions have invested heavily

²Aspects of U.S. foreign policy relevant to Zaire have been thoroughly addressed elsewhere. The more useful treatments of C.I.A. involvement include Young and Turner (1985:50-53; 371-373), Weissman (1978), Kalb (1982), Stockwell (1978) and Pachter (1987).

in the country. Thus, it could be argued that the rebel attack had East-West ramifications, threatening both significant political relationships and Western investment.

Perhaps as significant was the sizable European population of Kolwezi in 1978 (about 4500).³ Of this, a very high proportion consisted of Belgian and French nationals working in the Zairian minerals industry. The uncertainty (in the West) of rebel intentions toward the European expatriates seems to have been a major incentive to (and a useful rationale for) European intervention.

Regardless of the various obvious and obscure incentives to foreign military involvement in the Shaba wars, Kolwezi is of great strategic and economic value to Zaire. This value stems in large measure from Kolwezi's role in the context of the Zairian minerals industry. Without that industry, it seems unlikely that there would be a town called Kolwezi. And indeed, without the minerals, the whole region would undoubtedly have evolved in a dramatically different manner, demographically, economically, and politically.

But the minerals industry is a fact of life--perhaps the most important--in southern Zaire. It is evident from the most cursory analysis that the Zairian mining industry

³Estimate provided in July 1987 by a European informant, a clergyman in Kolwezi at the time of the invasion who played a direct role in the evacuation of European residents upon recapture of the town by European military forces.

has an essential role in Zaire and a surprising influence upon Zaire's Western friends.

But of greater interest here is its impact on the people of western Shaba. It is our interest to trace what this means in the patterns of thought and behavior of selected citizens--specifically those who associate with the mining industry in the town of Kolwezi, and most particularly, those 14,200 workers in the Kolwezi area (with their 12,400 wives and 63,000 children)⁴ who provide the industrial labor upon which the Zairian economy so desperately depends.

It was a typical rainy-season evening in Kolwezi in mid November 1987. A thundershower had passed through earlier in the afternoon, and the weather was delightful--sunny and cool. We were sitting in the shade outside the European-style house of a minor mining company white-collar official, a Zairois.⁵ Our group included the official, his nephew (a university graduate student), the official's brother-in-law (a mining company blue-collar worker), two women from the brother-in-law's family and me. The forebears of both

⁴Data derived from automated files of the Gécamines Directorate Générale Kolwezi in late March 1988 and valid as of 17 March 1988.

⁵In subsequent discussion, I shall use the French noun and adjective to describe persons who are citizens of Zaire. A male citizen is a "Zairois," a female citizen is a "Zairoise." This accords with local usage.

families had been recruited from the Kasai a generation ago to work in the mining industry. We had consumed several bottles of the local beverage, and tongues had loosened considerably. The brother-in-law had become distinctly more voluble. The discussion was now centered on life in the mining company, dwelling on the negative. Finally, unable to contain himself, the brother-in-law blurted out, "The mining company is dead (inakufwa).\" His affines all nodded agreement. Pressed to explain themselves, they asserted that the considerable benefits and succour they had once enjoyed as employees (or dependents) of the mining company had all but dissipated. As in most such conversations, we were soon discussing the huge black market in stolen mining company equipment. It wasn't long before the conversation evolved into an excoriating denunciation of the national regime, which was blamed for the (very evident) economic ills inside and outside the industry.

A few days later, in the mining camp, I was seated in the small, one-room house of a low-ranking company laborer. It was a holiday (commemorating the coup d'état which brought the President to power in November 1965). We were initially a group of seven: five workers, my research assistant and I. Most of the men came from ethnic groups of western Shaba. When I first entered the home about 9 AM, the men were eating roasted fish and roasted manioc. They were also partaking liberally of a potent local home-brew, "lutuku"--a distilled liquor. This was a men's gathering in

the best village tradition. (As the morning progressed, we were joined by three other male workers.) Almost immediately after our arrival, the conversation had turned to the economic plight of workers: salaries were at starvation level, prices of goods far too high and constantly rising, work far too taxing. (To prove his point, one worker pointed to his "inadequate" footwear--his large feet were stuffed into what had once been an expensive pair of women's pointed shoes.) The decibel level increased noticeably as the morning progressed and the lutuku disappeared. Eventually, the group got around to the pro-forma denunciation of all authorities: "Gécamines is dead," "Zaire is dead," "The world is dead." "We are 'red' workers." The prevalent theft of mining company property was cited as a necessity for sheer survival.

Some time later, I was in the mining camp home of another man. His shaved head and long beard clearly marked him as a member of the Bapostole,⁶ a strict, syncretic religious sect founded in the 1930s by a Zimbabwean prophet. When I met him, his appearance seemed stern and forbidding--but my first impression was mistaken. He was in fact a gentle man with a cheerful disposition. He lived in his tiny three-room mining company house with his two wives and twelve children. (His polygyny was based not on ancestral tradition but on his understanding of the Old Testament

⁶Also called Vapostori, Bapostolo and Postolo in southern Africa.

scriptures.) This Bapostole elder was a rather low-ranked company laborer--a mason. But he was content with his lot in life and thanked God for His many blessings. Upon his retirement, if God willed, he would return to his native Kasai and build homes for a living.

What can possibly be said that will relate and explain the seemingly contradictory world views of the diverse mining company families in Kolwezi? Are there readily discernible social trends, themes or patterns? Which are the most important in the lives of Kolwezi's people? Do observed social patterns share general similarities with those of urban populations elsewhere? These are all questions which spurred and challenged this research in a Zairian mining community. I also wanted to know if life in industrial Kolwezi bore any resemblance to life in rural Zaire two or three generations ago--to find out what in the way of belief and behavior seemed to be changing, in what ways, and why. The results of the study were intriguing to this researcher. Perhaps the reader will share the same sense of discovery.

The work is divided into six chapters. This first chapter will describe how the research community was

selected and studied, what theoretical basis underpinned the analysis, and what sources were used for information. In the two subsequent chapters, I shall identify the research community in its historical, geographical, demographic and economic context. The fourth chapter will provide a brief description of the structure and composition of the copper mining parastatal. The fifth chapter will provide a definition of the research population and discuss patterns of belief and behavior, emphasizing the nature and process of ongoing change. Finally, in the sixth chapter, I shall analyze the major findings and draw overall conclusions, relating social change in Kolwezi to processes of change in similar contexts elsewhere.

Approach and Theoretical Perspectives

One sometimes finds in writings of this genre a claim to brilliant originality in theoretical perspective or theoretical synthesis. And occasionally (if only rarely) such claims do have merit. I make no claim of that sort. There is no conscious attempt here either to carry existing theories of human behavior to dazzlingly original new heights or to offer novel alternatives to the existing inventory of anthropological paradigmata. This is not a dissertation which makes marvelous advances in abstract theories of human behavior.

At the same time, such a work could not be constructed without theoretical underpinnings--either implicit or explicit. And, in the application of a theoretical base,

there are at least two equally undesirable extremes: one is perpetrated by the purist whose sole intention is to validate a particular paradigm or point of view. Obviously, despite the best of intentions, this approach will tend to emphasize the data which support the favored inclination and will tend to interpret the data in terms of the conclusions demanded by the paradigm. (This genre descends on occasion to the most simple-minded defense of empirically unverifiable but supposedly immutable social "laws.") At the other extreme is the work in which no coherent theoretical framework is specified: the reader is left to guess at the influences which constrained the author in the selection and interpretation of the given data.

Both extremes will be avoided. To be sure, this work is guided by a paradigmatic conception of human nature and of collective human behavior. But theory is here viewed (metaphorically, and in the aggregate) as an inventory of household servants suited to various tasks in the explication of behavior: each to be summoned for a particular role at the appropriate time. Over time, some servants prove multitalented, others rather useless. Following this analogy, I most explicitly do not see theory as a stern and exclusivistic master, demanding constant exegesis and specifying simplistic causalities. (Indeed, the preoccupation with interpreting the holy writ of departed 19th and 20th century scholar-saints seems both

banal and ludicrous.) At the same time, so many paradigms (some quite recent) lie on the garbage heap of discarded academic refuse that it takes no great reflection--or humility--to realize that a dissertation whose sole end is to validate a particular paradigm is likely to be of limited enduring value. Of much more use, of course, are the data themselves, reported as carefully and comprehensively as possible.

It is perhaps inevitable that careful and open-minded field research will profoundly affect the researcher's theoretical inclinations: perhaps to reinforce, more likely to modify or qualify those inclinations. The latter was certainly the case in my study of a community of industrial workers in southern Zaire. This study started with a grand, well-articulated schema of social reality. What emerged in analysis of the data was a mass of obscure (often conflicting) patterns and trends with perhaps at best only several clearly discernible themes. But let me begin by describing first the overall objective of the study, then how I viewed the quest from a theoretical perspective. Ultimately, of course, the theoretical ramifications of my data will also be addressed.

The general goal was to define a natural experiment in which a central African population, drawn from diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, was subjected to several generations of intensive socialization in an urban industrial environment. Within such a population, research

objectives would require the observation (and, if possible, measurement) of patterns of belief and behavior pertaining to a wide variety of social relations.

From my theoretical inclination, I anticipated that there would be a high degree of interrelation between the various patterns of thought and behavior observed. In fact, it seemed evident that an insistence on classifying these patterns into smaller, more discrete categories might be useful to the external analyst but relatively less meaningful to the observed community. Further, I anticipated that the patterns were not only interrelated but also mutually supporting: that religious belief, for example, would bear profoundly on patterns of marital behavior, friendship, disease management and reciprocal kinship obligations. At this level of analysis, the study would be addressed specifically to integrative mechanisms: what was sought here would be those commonalities of belief that seemed to provide community cohesion and stability. At the same time, the more salient and interesting correlations among my targeted variables would be assessed.

But of even more interest were those factors, pressures, personalities or events which were inducing significant change in patterns of thought and behavior. While I was open to the possibility that competition and conflict between individuals (or groups) could be the key mechanism of social change, it seemed that an overemphasis on this factor would limit recognition of more complex and

subtle forces of change. This is particularly true if the focus were solely restricted to a study of conflict over access to material resources. (Those who favor such foci in studies of industrial societies seem obsessed with the concept of "class," an abstraction which is for some reason singularly vulnerable to reification.)

That a single study would address both integrative mechanisms and forces or processes of change might seem ideologically preposterous. The two foci now tend to represent two antithetical poles, with proponents of the latter in seemingly complete ascendancy. Yet it is apparent that both general models of social reality--the "equilibrium model" and the "conflict and change model"--must each necessarily assume the relevance of the other paradigm. Here we are speaking metaphorically, of course, but our model is that of some mechanical system. For it to be in "equilibrium," the system must demonstrate a degree of systemic stability in the face of contrary pressures (if nothing else, against the pressures of entropy). For it to "change" would seem to both require and infer a process of transition from some measurable state to another. Hence, static states, be they ever so transitory, must be assumed (at least for purposes of measurement). Those states, however transitory, represent in this consideration the observed patterns of commonalities in community behavior. (It can be argued that some such patterns prove surprisingly long-lived.) On the other hand, I am very uncomfortable

with any approach which emphasizes only process, and infers that an interest in the enduring patterns is irrelevant. Such approaches are much too vulnerable to dogmatism and their adherents too contemptuous of ethnographic detail. But in any event, it seemed that my theoretical interest in this consideration would be best served by a framework which allows analysis both of existing patterns of behavior and of the nature and processes of change.

While not currently in vogue, an enlightened functionalist approach (as advocated by Gluckman, 1968) seemed appropriate for the former requirement. An analytical framework for the latter was somewhat more problematical, for as Poewe (1978:207) has noted, there is as yet no generally accepted overarching theory of social change. But this fact in no way inhibited my own preference for an approach based essentially on psychological assumptions, which will be briefly outlined here.

My view follows that of Homer Barnett (1953). In this perspective, behavior changes over time because ideas in individual minds change, a process described by Barnett as "innovation" and "acceptance of innovation." New patterns in social behavior emerge because of the development of new "ideas-in-common" as to which behaviors constitute an appropriate reaction to a given stimulus. Thus, following Barnett, a consideration of the nature of behavioral change is necessarily a consideration of innovation, and, the discussion will focus briefly upon that subject. I can do

no better here than to summarize those of Barnett's ideas which I find useful for my own analysis.

Innovation is, in Barnett's words, ". . . any thought, behavior or thing that is qualitatively different from existing forms." Technically, any innovation is an idea. "Some innovations, by their nature, must remain mental organizations only . . ." while others give rise to behaviors and even to material "representations" of the ideas (Barnett, 1953:7).

Innovation, moreover, is not the exclusive prerogative of gifted individuals. Everyone is an innovator for the reasons that "no two stimuli to which [individuals] react . . . are ever identical . . . [and] no one ever entirely or minutely duplicates his responses to what he regards as the same stimulus" (Barnett, 1953:19).

In this view, the process of innovation can only consist in recombinations of already existing ideas. Barnett says, "when innovation takes place, there is an intimate linkage or fusion of two or more elements that have not been previously joined in just this fashion, so that the result is a qualitatively distinct whole" (1953:181). The material for innovation comes from a culturally delimited "inventory" available to the innovator, and the latter is specifically constrained by the size and complexity of the "idea" inventory available to him. In Barnett's words, "all innovations have antecedents. All are therefore derived from others" (1953:9) and "there can be no direct

combinations unlike anything that has existed" (1953:243). (I like this notion. It seemed well supported by the data encountered in field research. It brings to mind the first law of thermodynamics--the law of energy conservation--but in the ideational sphere.)

This all leads naturally enough to an important aspect of any innovation: a substitution must occur within the "framework of some prototype." In other words, an innovation represents a new configuration which the innovator constructs "within the framework" of some configuration already existing in his mind. "The prototype gives a charter or warrant for the interpretation of new experiences" (Barnett, 1953:207).

The foregoing discussion has touched upon the "how" of innovation. It would be entirely incomplete without a discussion of the "why."

A first comment must naturally recall the earlier statement that everyone is an innovator, a fact which may be attributed to the dynamic nature of the physical universe. But there are specific incentives to innovation (and Barnett addresses these at length as "wants" [1953:127-180]). For the purpose of this study, I will here advance my view that individuals constantly seek to maintain and enhance their own social standing within their peer grouping. Let me return to this theme in a moment. But it may also be said that, as a general rule, individuals are constantly interested in providing for their own physical

needs and desires, some of which are explicitly material, others psychological, and still others a combination of both.⁷

Here, it is appropriate to take a brief detour in order to consider an approach to analysis of behavior which is particularly relevant to the research population in urban Kolwezi. Magnarella (1979:131-135) to whom I am indebted for this approach, refers to it in his own model of social change as "reference group and modeling," drawing his inspiration from Merton (1957), Form and Geschwender (1962), Sherif and Sherif (1969) and others. In brief, Magnarella (1979:131) argues that individuals in societies undergoing change often "aspire to statuses and identities which are not part of their membership groups," and thus "orient themselves to [new] values, norms, attitudes and behavior patterns." Following Schmitt (1972) Magnarella describes the individuals or groups upon which an informant models his behavior as the "reference other."

In a heterogeneous, "modernizing" society, an informant may well maintain an inventory of "reference others" whose norms and behavior vary substantially. In modeling his own behavior, the informant either "compartmentalizes" these differing "attitudes and behaviors into appropriate socio-cultural contexts" or risks alienation from groups to which

⁷Erasmus (1961:13) for instance, offers a list of three basic human motivations, describing them as desires to survive, to be sexually gratified, and to acquire prestige and social status.

he may belong. Hence, an industrial worker in Kolwezi may exhibit one persona with his colleagues at work in the mine, another with his fellow worshippers at mass, still another with a prostitute in a local disco, yet another with his paternal uncle in a remote rural village, and (unfortunately) another with the American anthropologist visiting his home.

Magnarella (1979:133) goes on to note the characteristically positive value attached to upward mobility by many individuals in modernizing societies. Those "who have strongly internalized this value" are particularly inclined to seek upward mobility in order to enhance their socio-economic status and prestige. For these individuals, "reference others" will tend to be individuals or groups whose socio-economic status is superior. Of the former (aspiring) population, he notes: "although their past gains may have been substantial and their current positions comfortable, their motivation to rise yet higher causes them to seek out 'superior' references and feel deprived by comparison." This, following Merton (1968:281-295), can be described as "relative deprivation."⁸ The relevant "reference others" need not be located in the same community, nor (for that matter) need they be real people. In Kolwezi, television, movies, magazines and even bill-

⁸Gurr (1970) has also provided the classic treatment of social mobilization for violent ends explained in terms of "relative deprivation."

board advertisements depict an impossibly opulent lifestyle which many nonetheless seek to emulate.

But let us return to the subject of innovation and its acceptance. Opportunities for innovation within any society or any ideational framework are rife, for

. . . tools are never as efficient as they might be, the properties of the physical environment await further exploitation . . . [and] nobody . . . fulfills all his social responsibilities willingly and carries out all his obligations to the complete satisfaction of all his companions. (Hogbin, 1958:13)

We could add that the environment rarely provides the lifestyle to which many individuals aspire.

So far, this discussion has addressed the individual innovator. Let us turn briefly to the subject of the acceptance of innovation, or, the process by which an innovation becomes observable as characteristic patterns of behavior within a group. Here, it is appropriate to note again a key tenet of the view being presented: the "materials that provide a basis for a new conception must come to a focus in the mind of some individual" (Barnett, 1953:41). Let me reemphasize this point. It is individuals (not abstractions like "classes" or "communities" or "societies") that make decisions and, thus, innovate. Even in the aggregate, behavioral change reflects the decisions of individuals.

This aside, the acceptance of innovation is itself innovation, and, indeed, Barnett (1953:292-293) notes that ". . . the problems of innovation and acceptance . . . join at many points . . .," and "acceptance operates within the same perceptual and conceptual framework as does innovation." Of particular importance here is that an innovation must, in the final analysis, have been "compatible." That is, it must from the innovator's or acceptor's perspective have posed "the possibility of a substitute in a particular situation" (Barnett, 1953:329). As Barnett (1953:3) says, "the real challenge for a general theory of innovation lies in the realm of behavior, belief and concept" and this is precisely the area of greatest concern to the study at hand. Barnett (1953:10) notes that

. . . innovators . . . treat human beings as they do other objects of nature. They invent by drawing upon the physical properties of man as they do by using the physical properties of iron and heat . . . They take, as their material, ideas and the ideas of ideas. They treat persons not only as objects, but as volitional, feeling, vacillating elements. The manipulation of these intangibles is indeed the height of innovative ingenuity.

Let me return briefly to the notion of equilibria in social relations, and relate that to pressures for innovation.

It is a necessary precondition to any social activity that individuals be able to predict the reactions of other individuals to given stimuli. Society, as Hoebel says, is

"possible only on the basis of order" (1954:12). This infers that the vast range of potential behavior must undergo some selection so that individuals manifest those more limited behaviors, in patterned sequences, which permit predictability.

The manifestation of the limited modes of behavior (or in an other's words, the "systematic ordering of social relations by acts of choice and decision" in "conformity with selected social ends") may be labeled "social organization" (Firth, 1951:36-40). "Social organization" is an abstraction which I find useful in describing the patterned behavior between members of a group. Such patterns are revealed as individuals react to stimuli in a social context. The complementarities and similarities of behavior patterns, here labeled "social organization" come about through a consensus of individual minds as to the propriety of certain responses (based, ultimately, upon a consensus as to the desirability of "order").

The patterns do, of course, vary in normal distribution. For, what is revealed in the patterns as "social organization" is based upon an ideational consensus of propriety. It is not, however, based upon a determination on the part of every individual to comply absolutely with some narrowly defined criterion of propriety. Nor is it compelled by some irresistible, unconscious force in the cultural firmament. Instead, I follow Leach and Boissevain in arguing that each individual

generally finds himself simultaneously in several distinct social systems, and any assessment as to what is right and proper will invariably provide inconsistencies between these systems. This affords individuals with opportunities for innovation described so well by Boissevain (1974:67):

Within [their] social, cultural and ecological framework . . . people decide their course of action on the basis of what is best for themselves. Man is thus . . . a manipulator, a self interested operator as well as a moral being. That is, he is constantly trying to better or to maintain his position by choosing between alternative courses of action . . . It is important to see [an individual] as an entrepreneur who tries to manipulate norms and relationships for his own social and psychological benefit.

The patterns of behavior observed among male industrial workers in Kolwezi were sensible in the context of this framework, as I shall take some pains to elaborate below. But in fairness to the data, it must be noted that the patterns of individual and collective behavior were seldom entirely consistent, and individual motivation for a given innovation was often at best very obscure.

Selection of the Specific Research Site

A word of explanation is in order on the process by which the particular focus and research site were selected. As is probably usually the case, the choice was influenced both by personal preference and by external constraints.

Having grown up in Zaire and Zambia as the son of missionary parents, and having travelled widely in Africa in years previous to my research, I was familiar with central Africa and had retained some remnants of speaking ability in several indigenous Zairian languages. This resulted in a predisposition to conducting the research in Zaire. Too, the time available for field research was severely constrained: with less than a year of available funding, I had to make efficient use of the time spent at the research site. The research time would not have been used to best advantage if it required learning a new language in the community being studied. Nor would the time have been best spent had it required a very long period to establish rapport with either the population being studied or with the local political authorities. And of course, the limit of time also constrained the size of the population which could be studied--or sampled--to yield an acceptable confidence interval.

Since my youth, I have been fascinated by mining industries--originally by the minerals themselves and technology associated with their extraction and refining, later by the human beings whose lives center around such endeavor. Of particular fascination to me as a child in rural Zaire was the seemingly monolithic and powerful minerals industry on the nearby Copperbelt, the organization known in colonial times as the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, or simply Union Minière.

It was evident that the cities of southern Zaire revolved around the minerals industry. The mines, refineries and factories were seemingly all owned by Union Minière. The economic opportunities afforded by that industry drew a heterogeneous immigrant population from afar, from the rural areas even in neighboring provinces and neighboring colonies. The lingua franca of the minerals industry--a Swahili dialect--was a language which seemed to connote the bright lights and fast pace of the big city, the essence of urban sophistication. In a word, I would have been hard pressed to find a research environment more interesting to me personally than a mining community in central Africa, and particularly in southern Zaire.

A mining community also seemed to be a particularly relevant environment for the study of social change. Few communities are as subject as mining communities to change-inducing pressures, a fact widely noted elsewhere.⁹ And the mining industries of central and southern Africa are unique in that modern western-style industrialization occurred very rapidly, in relatively recent times, among indigenous societies whose traditions, technologies and (pre-colonial) economies differed sharply from those of western Europe.

Obviously, a research site not already extensively investigated would be preferable. (It is typical of researchers to want to break new ground.) Southern Zaire

⁹See, for example, Powdermaker (1962:4).

seemed to offer an unbeatable combination of characteristics relevant to these various interests. Not surprisingly, Zaire was the ultimate choice of locale.

However, the choice of specific research locale, and selection of the appropriate unit of analysis, were still issues which required substantial thought. In the end, the choices hinged on the combination which seemed to provide the most easily observed (or measured) evidence of ongoing social change in a mining community environment. In comparing various alternatives, the most promising unit of analysis seemed to be the married, male blue-collar industrial worker living with his family in a mining company camp in southern Zaire.

In the end, I chose to research and report the patterns of cultural continuity and social change as seen primarily in the beliefs and behavior in this particular population. Upon reflection, it seemed that the Zairian industrial worker camps would provide not only the greatest social heterogeneity (since housing is assigned to workers by the company on the basis of need, without regard to ethnicity, religion, or age) but they also comprised the only communities populated exclusively by company blue-collar employees and their dependents. It was the male workers in the camps who seemed to offer the best opportunity to measure variations in belief and behavior across several generations of residence in the industrial urban area, while

research was "controlled" for other variables which might have been more difficult to assess in other populations.

Although the married, male worker was thus selected as the primary unit of analysis, it was still necessary to define his social context. Hence, part of the ultimate report would of necessity deal with the indigenous cultural background of the region, with the nature and processes of urbanization in southern Zaire, with the peculiar nature of the Zairian minerals industry and its various social policies, and certainly with general characteristics of life in the urban area containing the camp. Further, to better define and contrast the male worker, it seemed appropriate to measure somewhat the same variables in certain other related categories: notably spouses and dependent children of the workers, female workers, and white-collar company employees. I also elected to measure the same variables in very small samples of three other populations. These included first, white-collar company employees living in middle-class residential areas; then, industrial workers living in the urban area outside the mining company camps; and third, people living in the urban area outside the camp but not associated with the mining industry.

It still remained, however, to pick the actual mining company camp for research. This required a site survey, since my criteria of camp size and environmental factors could hardly be met by other than personal assessment. So in December 1986, I made a ten-day trip to Zaire. The trip

afforded opportunities to negotiate permission from the mining parastatal to perform research in its communities and facilities, and to obtain a position as Research Associate at the University of Lubumbashi. But the main purpose of the trip was to select a specific research community. This required a personal inspection of some dozen prospective sites.

There was a range of options. Each of the three "cities" in southern Zaire (Lubumbashi, Likasi, and Kolwezi), contain mining company worker camps. Several smaller towns also have such communities--Kipushi and Kambove as examples. There are also a number of locations in which the mining camp is the only urban center--though with a high density of surrounding villages. (A good example of the latter is the mining center of Kakanda.)

Ultimately, I chose one of the six mining company camps surrounding the town of Kolwezi. This was the camp known as the "Cité" of Kolwezi or the "Cité Gécamines Kolwezi."¹⁰ The Cité is the oldest permanent mining industry camp in Kolwezi and abuts the town itself (providing easy access from town to camp). The Cité also contains workers assigned to a very wide range of mining company activities in the Kolwezi area--unlike many other camps, which contain workers dedicated primarily to the function of a local mine or local refinery. Finally, the Cité seemed to be about the right

¹⁰From this point on, the term "cité" will refer to a mining camp. The larger area of urban Kolwezi will be called the "ville."




Figure 1.4. Copper mining communities in Southern Shaba.

size for the contemplated research effort. My itinerary during the 1986 site survey allowed one day for touring the camp, collecting related descriptive materials, and interviewing local officials.

The choice of a camp in the Kolwezi area ultimately proved fortuitous. The town of Kolwezi is the very heart of the Zairian minerals industry, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. There is no greater concentration of mining company personnel in Zaire. The whole urban area revolves around the mining company economically and socially. All of the activities and patterns observable in mining company communities in southern Zaire are present in intensified measure in Kolwezi. Nor had the community selected for the study already been intensively studied. I did not subsequently regret the choice.

The necessity of specifying a research location, and of defining its context, is perhaps evident. A community of industrial workers in an urban center is the obvious research focus. But this study is not about urbanization. The study will not better define abstract principles of recruitment into urban areas and cultural adaptation to the exigencies of urban life. Rather, it is a consideration of how people think and of how they act (in limited domains of life) in one urban environment of central Africa. It is, moreover, a study of how patterns of thinking and acting correlate with certain more or less independent variables,

such as generation of residence in the mining community, ethnicity, and religion.

I believe that all social science research should have, as its main end, the promotion of better understanding among peoples, and that this should not be limited to better understanding solely by scholars of the social sciences. If, after perusing this work, the average reader better understands how industrial workers in Kolwezi live, think and act, then I will have accomplished my most pressing objective.

Research Methodology and Primary Sources

The discussion now turns to an overview of the research methodology itself. The important questions here are, "What was collected?" and, "How was that done?"

At one point earlier in this century, a British or American social anthropologist doing field work might have had little difficulty choosing a general fieldwork methodology. That was already well defined. The real challenge revolved around personal capacities and strategies to elicit information from informants once the fieldwork had begun. While anthropologists still wrestle with the issue of eliciting accurate information, recent years have seen a proliferation of different research methodologies. Researchers now choose, combine or innovate to best address the environment and research interest at hand.

As is probably most often the case, I employed several different techniques in an effort to gain information from somewhat diverse categories of informants and to check my data for accuracy and relevance. This section will briefly identify the research methods and the degree to which they were used. Other sources of information which contributed significantly to this study will also be noted.

There are, of course, a number of hallowed traditions in anthropological field research, legacies of the great ancestors of the anthropological "tribe." Perhaps no tradition is as sacred to British and American anthropology as that of participant observation, at times almost the defining characteristic of the discipline--a research technique in which the researcher lives in the target community, collecting information in the rounds of daily life in which (to the extent possible) the researcher actively shares. This technique tends to require a long-term time commitment on the part of the researcher. Often it involves the learning (or perfecting) of the local language and the development of social competence in the new environment. The process also normally requires a slow cultivation of personal relations with members of the community, the gradual abatement of natural suspicions toward the (researcher) outsider and, hopefully, eventual acceptance and shared confidence.

The use of the participant observation method has enabled three or four generations of anthropologists to

provide profound and stimulating insights into the beliefs and behavior of various communities. However, like any research technique, it has its limitations.

Participant observation is perhaps at its most useful in circumstances in which the population under study is relatively small, stable and homogeneous and in which the "density" of individual networks is high. Such an accommodating environment would allow for a high incidence of face-to-face contact in the community.

Obviously, while many traditional "village communities" in the underdeveloped world afford such circumstances, the usefulness of participant observation is somewhat diminished among large populations in industrialized urban settings. This is particularly true if rates of residential mobility are high, populations are ethnically or religiously heterogeneous, and densities of individual networks are low. In such circumstances, the effective use of this research method generally obliges the researcher to restrict the focus to a smaller subgroup: a small suburb, for instance, or squatter camp, or several related families, or a religious group. But even here, if participant observation is done on any substantial scale, it requires an enormous expenditure of time. Not surprisingly, anthropologists and sociologists working in urban environments have often turned to other methods and techniques.¹¹

¹¹This fact is rather well identified and addressed by Epstein (1981:8-10) in his discussion of his own research on

I would have liked to use participant observation as my basic research method, being firmly convinced that it ultimately provides the careful observer with otherwise unobtainable insights into community belief and behavior. Unfortunately, several factors precluded its most effective application in my research in Kolwezi. First was the fact that I was not eligible to live in the camp itself (and the extreme overcrowding would have made it difficult to find even a small living space in any event). Then too, the community was large and heterogeneous. It was certainly not a small village environment characterized by high densities of kinship relations. In fact, density of personal networks within the camp was quite low. It would have taken at least two years of participant observation to gather the data and experience required for the study. Then, as a "European," I would probably not have been fully accepted into the community or into the confidence of its residents regardless of the duration of residence. And participant observation in the camp alone would not have furnished the data with which to compare workers in the camp and cadre in the town (ville).

As it was, I tried to employ participant observation to the extent possible, commencing by finding a place to live right outside the main entrance to the camp. This was followed by extensive visiting in workers' homes at all

the Zambian Copperbelt in the mid 1950s, and Plotnicov (1967:8-27) in his study of a Nigerian mining community.

hours of the day and evening, sharing meals and general hospitality. Research also involved attendance at religious, mourning, sports, and other cultural events with camp residents and "hanging out" with workers both in the camp and in town.¹² I visited with (and interviewed) workers in offices, workshops, mines, refineries, schools and hospitals. (This was done on a much smaller scale with selected mining company white-collar workers.)

After a year in Kolwezi, it would be foolish for me to believe that I was accepted as just another member of the community. My identity to camp residents probably went something like this: A professor from America, a white man who has the blessing of officials but is no threat, likes to be with us, seems to hang out here a lot, and always asks lots of questions. A fellow Zairian industrial worker I was not. But Zairois are generally friendly and hospitable, and many informants became personal friends. (Undoubtedly, a number of my companions in Kolwezi hoped that cultivating the friendship of a visiting researcher would eventually result in a tangible material return; that is a very Zairois approach. After all, the researcher himself was already profiting from the relationship.) But in any event, while I tried to employ the method to the extent possible, my

¹²Though to be precise, my "hanging out" was almost exclusively with male workers between the ages of 18 and 35. My direct contact with older male workers and camp females was mainly in worker homes.

technique was not really participant observation in the traditional sense.

Perhaps I should add here that two analytical approaches which could have been effectively used--and which seemed appealing--were those of network analysis and situational analysis.¹³ Employment of either of these analytical techniques would have provided fascinating insights into social patterns. Their use would also have profoundly affected the data collection methodology and focus. However, I concluded that I wanted a broader focus--a coverage of a wider range of belief and behavior (though perhaps at the expense of analytical depth) than either of these techniques would have afforded, and reluctantly decided against pursuing either.

Some anthropologists long for the precision afforded by research in the physical sciences: the ability to quantify and control for carefully defined variables under replicable conditions, to eliminate subjectivity, speculation and analysis by "guesstimate." While any effort in the social sciences to improve accuracy in collection and certainty of findings warrants commendation, it is wise to maintain a healthy skepticism of efforts to precisely quantify variables having to do with beliefs. Probing the views and opinions of human beings, and attempting to correlate these

¹³For cogent discussions of the network analysis technique, see Mitchell, 1969; Lauman, 1973; Boissevain, 1974; Lomnitz, 1977. For the best recent description of situational analysis, see Mitchell (1986:7-18).

with observed behavior, is surely much more art than science.¹⁴

Yet having said this, there are clearly many circumstances in which readily quantifiable data can be collected and analyzed with profit in a study of culture change: those data which can be subjected to statistical analysis cover a very wide range of human behavior.

After much thought, I decided to use the interview schedule as the basic collection device to measure both belief and behavior. It would, of course, provide much information in a format well-suited to statistical treatment. But (to resort to a metaphor) the interview schedule is a very blunt instrument--perhaps analogous to a large hammer, useful in its place, but not suited for applications requiring a surgeon's scalpel. Much social science inquiry requires the research analogue to the scalpel. The real value of the interview schedule was its use as a device to gain access. The access could then be exploited by other research. In other words, the completed interview schedule was the start, not the final product, of in-depth collection.

To pursue this collection technique, I designed several series of interview schedules, including a census survey. The census survey was used at the start of the field

¹⁴Part of the problem here is contextualization. Like Epstein on the Copperbelt of neighboring Zambia, I observed differences in seemingly fundamental beliefs not only from one individual to another, but also at different times in the same individual.

research and was intended to obtain demographic data from every household in the Cité. (As it was, this phase of research provided information on 1725 of the Cité's 1817 households.¹⁵)

The follow-up to the census consisted of four series of interview schedules, each series containing questions of increasing sensitivity and subjectivity. Within each series, a different instrument measured data for the married male worker, the unmarried male worker, the spouse of the married male worker, the female worker, the male cadre and the female cadre. (There were minor variations in each interview schedule to suit the specific category of informant.) There were also two separate series interview schedules for dependent minors.

For interviewing informants, I employed Zairois researchers. Ultimately, there were eighteen such assistants: ten males and eight females. (These were much better able than I to detect subtleties and evasions in answers. They also had language skills and a natural rapport with informants that a foreign researcher could never match. Nor would it have been possible (without this rather large team) to interview the desired number of

¹⁵Of the 92 households in the Cité for which data were not obtained, 2 refused to provide information; in one other, the husband had died and the family was moving. The remaining 89 were cases in which collection occurred, but the documents were either lost or disallowed because of serious error on the part of individual researchers. Fortunately, the "missing households" were randomly distributed within the Cité. I concluded that their lack did not bias my results.

informants in the time available.) I did, of course, accompany all of my researchers on a rotating basis.

While the initial census survey measured demographic data in households across the Cité, the follow-on interview schedules were intended for sampling. In this latter case, individuals were the units of analysis. The sample consisted of the following:

- 99 married male workers in the Cité
- one spouse of each of the 99 married male workers in the Cité
- 35 unmarried male workers in the Cité
- 34 unmarried female workers in the Cité
- 35 male dependents of the married male workers in the Cité
- 35 female dependents of the married male workers in the Cité
- 20 married male cadre in the ville
- one spouse of each of the 20 married male cadre in the ville
- 5 male dependents of the married male cadre in the ville
- 5 female dependents of the married male cadre in the ville
- 30 male workers living in urban Kolwezi outside a mining company camp
- 30 female dependents of male workers living in urban Kolwezi outside a mining company camp
- 30 married males living in two Kolwezi suburbs, not associated with the mining industry
- 30 adult female dependents of married males living in two Kolwezi suburbs, not associated with the mining industry



Figure 1.5. Some of the Zairois and Zairoise research assistants who collected data for this study. Photo by the author.



Figure 1.6. The author interviewing a political authority in Kolwezi, June 1988. Photo by author.

To describe the sample a bit differently, individuals in 168 worker homes in the Cité and 20 cadre homes in the ville were interviewed. Ninety-nine worker homes contained married male workers, sixty nine contained male or female unmarried workers. We interviewed the ninety-nine workers, one each of their wives and seventy of their dependent minors selected at random. We also interviewed the 69 unmarried male and female workers in their separate homes in the Cité. In the 20 cadre homes, we interviewed 20 married male cadre, one each of their wives, and ten of their children selected at random. Finally, another sample was selected, consisting of 30 households of mining company workers living in the Kolwezi urban area but not living in a camp, and 30 households of families in Kolwezi not connected with the mining industry. In these two latter categories, we interviewed the head of the household and one spouse. To obtain this sample, a census was performed of households along several long streets in the Kolwezi residential areas of Manika and Kasulo. Based on this census data, an initial sample was selected at random, then adjusted to reflect proportional distribution of the variables of age, ethnicity, religion, and generation of residence in urban Zaire. It should be emphasized again, however, that the primary unit of analysis was the married, male blue-collar worker in the Cité. Other categories of individuals were interviewed so as to obtain a reasonable basis for

comparison. The sampling in the Cité itself warrants some description.

My initial inclination was to select the Cité (worker) sample entirely at random. And, in fact, the "first cut" prior to starting research consisted of the development of a random sample. However, in comparing the households in the random sample against the demographic data obtained in the census of the Cité, it became clear that the random sample had insufficient coverage of certain important variables. So at this point, the census data were used to guide selection of households in the Cité: the random sample was readapted to assure representative coverage of each street, and to provide more or less proportional coverage of the variables of ethnic origin, religion and generation of mining company employment. It was also necessary to assure at least some coverage of the smaller ethnic and religious groupings.¹⁶ (Fortunately, the census data provided a good amount of quantifiable demographic information which could be later correlated with findings in the follow-on interview schedules.)

Selection of the cadre sample was more problematical. There were no initial census data upon which to define the cadre population and to determine proportions of key

¹⁶Ultimately, of course, other adjustments were necessary. Several families had moved since the census. In a couple of other cases, the husband or the wife (or both) were on extended leave and were thus not available for interview. In a couple of other cases, the prospective informant was so difficult to find for interviewing that I selected replacements meeting the same criteria.

variables. This forced a reliance on several personal networks of my Kolwezi contacts in order to find informants. But here, an effort was made to obtain the widest possible coverage in the variables of rank in the mining company, type of work, religion, age, ethnic origin and background, and to assure that the cadre homes were more or less randomly distributed within the cadre residential areas of the ville.

The research itself was conducted in five phases centered around the census and follow-on interview schedules. The first phase, beginning in October 1987, consisting of the recruitment and training of a team of twelve researchers, and the performance of a census of the Cité. This phase was completed in early December.

The second phase began in February 1988. This time, I assembled sixteen researchers, employing them in teams of two--a male and a female researcher per team. (Males interviewed males, females interviewed females.) Seven teams researched among our sample of worker families in the Cité, one team researched among the sample of cadre in the ville. During this phase, each team employed interview schedule series 1, 2, and 3 consecutively.

The third phase, conducted from April to June 1988, used the same basic set of questions as in our first three series of interview schedules, but we interviewed blue-collar worker families in Kolwezi which lived outside a

mining camp. Also interviewed were families in Kolwezi not associated with the mining parastatal.

The fourth phase was conducted in June 1988 with interview schedule series 4. This was used only among worker families in the Cité and among cadre in the ville.

The fifth and final phase (in July 1988) was essentially follow-up. I used this time to explore interesting leads and to answer continuing questions. (In this phase I briefly visited Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia to permit limited comparisons of Zairian industrial workers with similar populations elsewhere in Africa.)

Several additional comments about the interview schedules themselves are warranted here. Each of the four series probed more deeply and into more sensitive areas than the preceding series. (An informant was interviewed by the same researcher for each of the four.) The first series was little more than an expanded version of the census. The fourth series was very subjective and very personal. It was, of course, my hope that my researchers would develop increasingly greater rapport with their informants as the interviewing progressed, and that by the time they got around to the fourth questionnaire, informants would feel free to share very sensitive information.¹⁷

¹⁷It should be noted here that every effort was made to protect the confidentiality of information. We never asked for personal names. Codes rather than names were always used for informants. We stressed the anonymity of informants in all interviews. So far as I could tell, we were reasonably successful in convincing informants that their individual views would not be compromised. However,

Responses to questions in the interview schedules provided a great deal of basic demographic information and many useful insights into belief and behavior. However, as noted earlier, the real value of the schedules was their indication of interesting patterns which could be explored in much greater detail with trusted informants and in casual conversation with Cité residents. There were several reasons for this. As can be expected, the research assistants varied greatly in their competence as researchers. Some of the questions in the interview schedules were very difficult to communicate. Other questions touched such sensitive areas that many informants did not provide the truth. It sometimes took careful probing in other contexts to arrive at what I concluded to be the most accurate description of a given common belief or behavioral pattern. But I could usually start with a lead furnished in the formal interviews of our informants.¹⁸

 the degree to which informants responded to the most sensitive questions in the interview schedules varied. In general, I felt that my best information on the most sensitive subjects came from small group discussions with informants in contexts other than formal interviews. This perception seems to be shared by Epstein (1981:7-8) whose research in a similar environment likewise required considerable sensitivity and subtlety.

¹⁸It should be added here that the interview schedules served two other essential purposes. First, the various authorities whose favor we sought were, of course, vitally interested in what it was we were after. We cheerfully provided full sets of our blank forms. For most, the eye-glazing detail of the many rather mundane questions probably sated curiosity and diminished suspicion. However, several officials actually read the interview schedules thoroughly and found them intriguing--I had the impression they would

This brings us to my next major collection technique--reliance on trusted informants (another hallowed tradition in anthropological field research). Given that the researcher will probably never gain unrestricted access to the personal views of all the members of the group under study, a small number of particularly accommodating informants will probably provide a considerable amount of a researcher's insight into local social dynamics. Unless the researcher is very adept (or fortunate) in adapting to the researched community, some reliance on a select group of trusted informants seems inevitable. Nor is this reliance necessarily unfortunate. While it is true that the informants are often somewhat marginal to their society, and may provide the researcher with information distorted by atypical attitudes, it is equally true that the information provided by trusted informants is often the only access by an outsider to the values of the community. A half-loaf is always better than no loaf at all.

But in my case, the trusted informants were drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, nor could most have been considered particularly "marginal" to their society. Let me comment on them briefly. There were two levels: the larger

 have liked to have been interviewed themselves. The other purpose served by the formal interviewing was its redirection of attention away from the researcher during interviews. Our informants were already familiar with surveys. A researcher completing an interview schedule could be viewed more as a detached scientist than as an unnaturally curious youth with a yen for the morbid and exotic.

consisted of about 35 people (all Zairois) with whom I regularly interacted and to whom I regularly turned for information and advice. Within this group was the second level, a smaller contingent of about 6 people with which I was in daily contact and felt free to discuss any issue at any time. In this latter case, there was also a personal bond based on "compatible chemistry."

Perhaps not surprisingly, the larger group contained all my research assistants,¹⁹ as well as a number of people I met as a result of the personal networks of my assistants (including mining company cadre and blue-collar workers), several people I met by chance encounter in the course of research, and several people drawn from the Methodist and Roman Catholic religious communities--which I met in my interaction with those communities. The personal qualities and characteristics of members of my trusted informants varied widely: ages ranged from 17 to about 60; almost one third were female; at least 6 different ethnic groups were represented; occupations ranged from housewife, to university instructor, to minister of religion; educational levels ranged from six years of primary school to a Ph.D. in Engineering; a wide range of religious backgrounds was represented; over half of the group had some affiliation with the mining company; one male informant was overtly polygynous. In short, I felt at liberty to explore almost

¹⁹For a summary overview of the backgrounds of my research assistants, see Appendix A.

any issue from a very wide potential range of individual perspectives.

In addition to data collection in participant observation, interview schedules, and conversation with trusted informants, useful information came from several other sources. These included formal interviews with mining company officials in Lubumbashi and Kolwezi and with local political authorities in Kolwezi. (I was also granted access to files in the main political headquarters in Kolwezi--that of the sous-région. This was a source of demographic data pertaining to the entire sous-région and of insights into Zairian political process.) Further, I was able to research in the archives of the Gécamines-Exploitation main office in Lubumbashi. Additional useful material came from research in the library of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Lubumbashi, in the libraries of the University of Zambia in Lusaka, the University of Zimbabwe in Harare and the University of Botswana in Gaborone. In Zambia, the Institute for African Studies and in Botswana, the National Institute for Development Research and Documentation (both associated with the respective national universities) provided useful data as well. Mining company officials in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe were generous with their time and information and provided me highly useful insights on the nature of mining communities in those countries. Likewise, Dr. Rudo Gaitzanwa of the Department of Sociology, University of

Zimbabwe, graciously shared numerous insights from her own ongoing research in a Zimbabwe mining community.

Finally, I made some effort to analyze both written compositions of school children in Kolwezi schools and the popular music current in the Kolwezi area for general indications of popular tastes and trends.

When it came to matters of belief or opinion, regardless of the original source of the information, I made a concerted effort to gauge patterns by asking the same question in at least five or six different contexts, ultimately, obtaining what I believed to be a sound assessment, (offered below as a finding) or an ambivalence which I take some pains to define.

Considerations in Research in Urban Zaire

Selection of any research environment brings to bear a number of unique local challenges. A brief description of the more salient of these may help the reader better understand the choices made by a researcher. This section will outline several unique local circumstances which applied to research in urban southern Zaire.

First, it is important to acknowledge that research was not conducted under conditions of great personal danger, stress, or material hardship. Rather, it was performed in an urban area, with amenities more or less similar to those of Western cities, among supportive and accepting people. The environment was familiar from previous experience.

Competent assistants were readily available. These (in most cases) provided particularly good service. Funding was adequate for the research goals. Aside from the continuing minor inconveniences posed by petty officialdom in Zaire, I was not unduly harassed by, nor was the research blocked by any authority. My only illness was a mild case of hepatitis, a loss of about two weeks. However, there were circumstances that required care and personal adjustment.²⁰ These are listed here in order of relative importance.

First, assuring that local authorities would be favorably disposed to the research was a critically important task, and one to which I was obliged to devote much time and energy. There were, moreover, officials at several different levels which had to be accommodated.

An initial requirement was to gain the formal permission of the mining company to conduct research in its facilities and communities. (There is a well established procedure for obtaining such permission, and once an affiliation with the local university was obtained, the mining company permission was relatively easy to obtain.) However, this was just a start.

The next requirement was to cultivate the top political and mining company officials in Kolwezi itself. To assist in this, a senior administrator in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Lubumbashi wrote several

²⁰At least one other researcher (MacGaffey, 1987:6) has characterized urban Zaire as a "stressful" location for research, due to the political and economic environment.

letters of introduction on my behalf to personal contacts in Kolwezi: to the second-ranked mining company official in Kolwezi, to a top local political authority (the Commissaire urbain assistant) and (most importantly) to his own brother-in-law, a senior mining company white-collar employee, whose church ties provided considerable access to elites in Kolwezi.

The importance of this personal network cannot be overstressed. The brother-in-law was very solicitous. He entertained and fed me. He personally took me to meet other authorities, and he introduced me to various persons likely to help or hinder my work, including the local head of the Agence Nationale de Documentation (A.N.D.)--one of the several varieties of national secret police.²¹

Further introductions included those to the senior mining company officials most concerned with the research I wanted to do. These, in turn, provided introductions to the administrative authorities of the cité--the mining camp which would ultimately be studied, and then to the lower-echelon authorities responsible for small sections of the community. Since I was bearing the obvious approval of

²¹See Schatzberg (1988:30-51) for descriptive detail. The chief of the A.N.D. in Kolwezi, a thick-set, suspicious and brusque man of about 50 seemed by appearance well suited to his job. He would presumably be receiving regular reports about my activities from his network of informers, so it was important that I appear (from the beginning) as innocuous as possible. The A.N.D. chief was the only authority who did not appear gracious and genial. I learned later that his agency had checked with the University of Lubumbashi to verify my bona fides.

senior authorities, the junior authorities received me very willingly. In all cases, however, I explained the proposed research in great detail, providing copies of interview schedules and solicited the advice of each authority in turn. This process required about a month of effort before research could even begin.

Once research had begun, I made it a point to contact authorities at each echelon at regular intervals to provide progress reports. At the end of each research phase, I held meetings with Cité officials to discuss the overall findings. (In these meetings, bottles of brew were provided for all in attendance. The meetings were very well attended and invariably ended in a warm glow of mutual congratulations.) Without the cultivation of various authorities, the research could not have gone as well as it did.

The next major challenge had to do with what might be called the "political climate." It is important to point out here that the Zaire of 1988 was a dictatorship and a police state. There was one legal political party to which all Zairois belong by birth. The party and the state were regarded as one and the same.²² Absolute loyalty is demanded to the party and President. (Although, as noted

²²Billboards along roads in Zaire often bear the slogan "Parti = Etat" (the party is the state). Many other billboards bear fawning allegiance to President Mobutu himself: "notre seul guide," "notre sauveur" (our sole guide, our savior, etc.). See Schatzberg (1988) for a recent and detailed analysis of the régime.

below, what is demanded and what is provided are two very different things.) Orders, perquisites and permissions come from above. Initiative on the part of subordinates is generally not encouraged. Obtaining permission for seemingly minor requests is often a long, arduous process.

The state apparatus in its various forms also maintains extensive networks of informers and agents-provocateurs. Some report to the Agence Nationale de Documentation (A.N.D.) or Centre Nationale de Documentation (C.N.D.) whose agents comprise a portion of the national secret police. Others report to various other party or political authorities. Some work directly for mining company authorities. There are also numbers of young thugs--unpaid "party militants"--who eke out a precarious existence patrolling the city streets and alleys, requiring citizens to produce a host of required documents and demanding bribes for missing, incorrect or tattered papers. These young thugs, too, maintain sporadic "surveillance" of the populace. (Zairois in Shaba complained to me that they are "surveilled" at all times by multiple authorities.)

Yet despite the surveillance, informants were often very frank in their opinions on controversial, "political" issues--shockingly so at times. These informants included the unemployed poor, mining company workers and managers, and even (occasionally) local state officials. Their willingness to talk frankly was particularly evident after dry throats had been whetted with alcohol. Small groups of



Figure 1.7. Billboards in Shaba display a fawning adulation of the President and political party, in sharp contrast to local sentiment. Photos by author.

close friends or relatives offered a good lieu for exploring views on controversial issues. But caution was always necessary. On many occasions I felt constrained to rein in my aroused curiosity so as not to compromise myself or my informants. (Some informants may well have been agents-provocateurs.) There were also undoubtedly times when informants, fearing repercussions, provided less than the whole truth in answer to questions.²³ And, in fact, in designing research, I deliberately avoided dwelling on themes which were likely to provoke official sanctions.

It should also be noted that the Zairois authorities are perhaps more sensitive to events in and around Kolwezi than is true of most other locations in Zaire. In 1988, the city still carried the military designation of "operational area," a legacy of the rebel activity in the late 1970s. The economic importance of the region was undoubtedly a key factor in the régime's concern. But more to the point is

²³Not all "sensitive" questions were directly related to political opinions. The mining company was very touchy, for instance, about the issue of salaries. (Though rather well paid by Zairian standards, blue-collar workers earn much less than white-collar workers --by a factor of 4 or 5 to 1.) There had been some labor unrest over the issue of fairness in salaries just prior to my arrival. Another controversial issue in Zaire is the subject of AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus disease). Though obviously a severe medical problem in Zaire, officials in the country have tended to deny its existence and restrict access by foreigners to AIDS-related information. Likewise, photography is always a touchy activity in Zaire, with attitudes of virtually all officials bordering on paranoia. I was arrested by the secret police on one occasion for photographing activities of passersby just outside the door of my residence, and had to be rescued by a friendly official in the urban administration.

the continuing anti-regime sentiment of many Shaba residents, particularly those of the western Shaba ethnic groups related to the Lunda. (This sentiment was only too clearly manifested in the rebel invasions of Shaba in 1977 and 1978). One obvious result of the regime's sensitivity is the considerable military presence in and around Kolwezi.²⁴

Besides the necessity to adapt to political circumstances, any research methodology was also subject to the pressure of a number of peculiar local circumstances. Perhaps the most significant challenge was my initial ignorance of the often exotic nitty-gritty details of life in a mining camp, and of the complex organizational structure of the mining parastatal. In this, I was very fortunate to obtain the assistance (for a couple of months) of a faculty member and Ph.D. candidate from the University of Lubumbashi. He had grown up in a mining camp in Kolwezi and was related by blood or marriage to several key mining company officials. His knowledge of details of life in the mining community was unsurpassed. He was also a brilliant, serious scholar whose own doctoral research had focused upon historical issues surrounding mortality in the mining

²⁴Another indication of the regime's attitude towards Shaba is the process, currently underway, to redivide the country into a larger number of régions (provinces). As of this writing (mid 1988) the final decision on boundaries is scheduled for 1989. Shabans see the whole process--with considerable justification, in my view--as an effort to prevent the continuing development of a "Shaban" identity.

parastatal. (It would be an serious understatement to say merely that his help was essential in my personal adaptation to my research milieu.)

Another challenging aspect of research in urban southern Zaire hinged around the use of language. The country itself has a national language (French) and four "official" languages (Lingala, KiKongo, Tshiluba and KiSwahili). These "official" languages are regional linguae francae which, separately, cover most of the country. In Kolwezi (as elsewhere in urban southern Zaire) the lingua franca is Swahili. However, Copperbelt Swahili is a peculiar dialect, in many ways quite unlike East African Swahili or, for that matter, the Swahili spoken elsewhere in Zaire.²⁵ But use of Swahili alone would not have permitted adequate research.

Virtually all Zairois speak at least some French. It is currently the only language of instruction in the schools. And indeed, many urban Zairois speak it reasonably well, though with distinctly Zairian intonations. French is clearly the prestige language in Zaire. While all of our informants also spoke Swahili, and most used Swahili as their primary language in the home, some insisted on using French in the interviews as an indication, no doubt, of their education and sophistication.²⁶

²⁵See p. 523 (below) for a discussion of language usage in Shaba. In subsequent discussion, I shall refer to KiSwahili ("the Swahili language") as simply "Swahili."

²⁶Embarrassing experience taught me to be careful in choice of language in everyday situations. My initial

Shaban Swahili was used as the basic language in our research, but its lack of standardization and considerable variation of form assured that a great amount of French also appeared in both queries and responses. Nor was it possible to always pose the same question in the same way, although we tried to do so whenever possible.

Realizing well in advance that a speaking ability in both French and Swahili would be needed in the course of my work, I undertook a year of French tutoring and a year and a half of Swahili language study before moving to the field. (I had spoken both French and Shaban Swahili as a child, but my French was never very refined and I had lost most of the Swahili in 25 years' lack of practice.) Upon beginning the fieldwork, I felt an initial inadequacy in French, but that soon passed.

The Swahili I had studied in preparation for field work had been East African Swahili; and after 18 months of study, I felt quite comfortable with it. I had known that Shaban Swahili was different, but was not really prepared for the degree of difference. And different it definitely was! Adequate communication in Copperbelt Swahili was difficult at first. But after two months of intense local tutoring and practice, I could follow local Swahili conversations

 inclination was to greet people in Swahili and to use it in preference to French. This was usually well received, but on a number of occasions an individual responded in French, appearing obviously aggrieved that I did not accord him his due respect. I soon learned to greet well-dressed males (and all officials) in French.

fairly easily. It took another two months before I could express myself in local Swahili with any degree of competence.

Still another aspect of life in urban Kolwezi which bore heavily on research was the economic desperation evident in Kolwezi (and in urban southern Zaire generally). While dire poverty is certainly not unique in the underdeveloped world, and most researchers in such environments are obliged to cope with its effects, certain local features of the Zairian economy of the late 1980s combined to intensify the strong feeling of economic deprivation among Zairois in Kolwezi.

Perhaps the primary factor was the continuous devaluation of Zaire's currency since about 1983 (under IMF pressure). In mid 1984, for example, the official exchange rate was about 35 zaires to the U.S. dollar. By late 1987, it was roughly 125 zaires to the dollar. By April 1988 it was some 165 zaires to the dollar and by July 1988 about 195 zaires to the dollar. (In July 1988, the black market rate in Shaba was about 240 zaires to the dollar.) For the average Zairois, this translated into a constant and bewildering escalation of prices. Wages did not even begin to keep pace.²⁷

²⁷To give some idea of the disparity, in March 1988, a primary school teacher in a state school earned a monthly salary of about 1950 zaires (+\$13). A secondary school teacher with a 5-year university degree (licence) earned up to about 3800 zaires (+\$25). A fortunate "domestic" working for a European family might earn 5000 zaires (+\$33) a month. Many of the underemployed earned salaries of about 400-600

What made the inflation particularly painful was the very evident decline in the standard of living since the better times of the mid 1970s. People remembered the earlier boom years and seemed to have little hope that they would return. Too, the top economic and political elite in Kolwezi still lived very well--enjoying lavish homes, cars, color televisions, stereos and other Western consumer goods. Readily available television, video movies and magazines portrayed a very consumer-oriented Western lifestyle to Kolwezi's population. The comparison was excruciating to those who would elsewhere have been "comfortable" middle class, but were now having great difficulty making ends meet from month to month. The comparison was even more painful to many of Kolwezi's poor.

Jobs, moreover, were very scarce. A large and increasing number of primary and secondary school graduates could find no employment at all. The unemployed included a substantial number of young males with considerable technical skills, graduates of the mining company technical

zaire (\$5-9) a month. A sack of the staple maize or manioc flour, just sufficient to feed a family of four for a month, cost about 2200 zaires (\$15) in Kolwezi in March 1988. I was told that many poor families in the Kolwezi area subsisted on one major meal every other day. Nutritional deficiency diseases were quite common in the urban area, as indicated by a well-attended kwashiorkor clinic for infants run by the Methodist church. The problem was not that food was scarce. The markets and stores had plenty, ranging from inexpensive locally grown vegetables to expensive European and South African refrigerated goods. The problem was that many urban families could barely afford the least expensive fare.

schools. Men were desperate for work. Many were involved in stealing and smuggling. The informal economy was very important, highly developed and very dependent on ripoffs of the mining company. Nonviolent theft of personal property was also a very common condition of Kolwezi life.

Nor did the state provide very well for public servants. Salaries were low and pay often sporadic. (In March 1988, the telephone company employees had not been paid for months. They were desperate to "sell" discount overseas phone calls to Kolwezi Europeans, without the knowledge of the national phone company, of course.) It seemed at times that everyone was "on the take," anything or anyone available for a price.²⁸

²⁸A commonly heard term describing any money-making effort and any nefarious economic business was "se débrouiller"--to make do somehow. (This aspect of life in Zaire has been noted in detail elsewhere. See Young and Turner [1985:116, 245-247]; Gould [1980]; Schatzberg [1980:54-82] and especially MacGaffey [1987:111-164]). That responsible officials participated in petty thievery was illustrated by an incident in January 1988. A Zairian army lieutenant, in uniform, was found electrocuted beside an electric transformer in a suburb of Kolwezi, his feet smoking. He had apparently been attempting to steal transformer materials and had (literally) made a wrong step. A mysterious rash of transformer failures ceased immediately thereafter. But, it would be a serious omission for me not to mention that I did find apparently uncorrupted and caring officials. Though perhaps not common, such individuals do exist in Zaire's political system. Here, I should cite the case of the Commissaire-urbain-assistant in Kolwezi (perhaps somewhat the equivalent of a deputy county commissioner in the U.S.). He had formerly been the Commissaire de zone of a Lubumbashi suburb. He was a strong Roman Catholic, a true believer in the Party and President, and an outstanding administrator. He was also (so far as I could tell) utterly honest in all his dealings. He had not only been respected but actually loved by citizens in his care in Lubumbashi and Kolwezi.

The state's economic problems and mismanagement also accounted for highly predatory security forces. Soldiers and police preyed on the local populace. When I arrived in October 1987, incidents of brutality perpetrated by the military were everyday occurrences: victims included a man whose leg was broken by soldiers' rifle butts for no apparent reason, a twelve-year old girl shot accidentally by a soldier as he scuffled with her father, etc. Frequent roadblocks were used by police mainly to collect money and property from hapless travellers. The ordinary citizen hated and feared the military.²⁹ But in fairness, the security forces were dependent on such theft for their sustenance. The frequency and severity of depredations by the security forces did seem to diminish in my time in Kolwezi. Whether this was a temporary phenomenon, or presaged a general amelioration, is difficult to say.

The venality and constant "hustling" were factors that anyone in Kolwezi--including this American anthropologist--had to endure as a condition of life. But perhaps as significant for my research was the fact that economic conditions were the major topic on peoples' minds, even among people who were comparatively "well off," by local

²⁹Occasionally, the rage of the citizenry boiled over. In December 1987, a soldier guarding a warehouse in the Cité tried to stop a young thief. The thief attacked the soldier, who (in turn) shot the thief in the leg. A large crowd quickly gathered and began to assault the soldier (one man was pounding him on the head with a ball-peen hammer). The soldier was critically injured before Cité authorities could intervene to rescue him. See also Schatzberg (1988:55-70).

standards. No matter how it started, almost any conversation ultimately got around to this subject. It often took considerable effort to keep informants talking about other subjects. While the mining company workers fared much better than the average Zairois in Kolwezi, they were as bitter about economic conditions as any.³⁰

Yet at the expense of seeming callous, it appeared to me that many of my informants were reacting to a sense of deprivation rather than to an absence of the necessities of life. With careful management of their resources, all of the mining company employees should have been able to feed and clothe a large family adequately. Likewise, I noticed a perceptible economic reinvigoration in Kolwezi during the year I spent there: the number of privately owned vehicles increased dramatically, a number of new stores opened, building of new houses on Kolwezi's outskirts was continuing on an impressive scale. What my informants wanted was to be economically "at ease" (a l'aise), a condition which they imagined others to have attained. It was their inability to achieve this that seemed to embitter many.

In concluding the discussion of local research conditions, a comment is warranted on the subject of archival resources. These are particularly hard to research

³⁰In March 1988, a modal monthly salary for mining company blue-collar workers was about 10,000 zaires (+\$47) and for white-collar employees about 22,000 zaires (+\$147). The mining company personnel also received free housing, medical care, electricity, water, and food rations which substantially increased the value of their total salary.

in Zaire itself: guardians of resources and records tend to exhibit what can only be described as paranoia toward "outsiders"; seemingly fearful that important national secrets will be compromised by the scrutiny. Access to even the most mundane records often requires considerable negotiation with relevant authorities. Whether in university libraries or government repositories, written authorization is a minimum requirement. Often, access requires both written authorization and a visit by a higher authority.

But even with the appropriate authorization, research is difficult. Libraries and archives are almost invariably in disarray. Locating a single important document is usually frustrating: it can often be excruciatingly difficult.³¹ Many of the more useful resources in any repository have vanished without trace.³²

Then, too, a considerable amount of the statistical data in official records must be treated with great caution. (Two of my research assistants had been assigned, as university students in the mid 1980s, to a city

³¹I am reminded of my search for a sous-région Rapport Annuel (Annual Report) in Kolwezi. There was one available copy. It was locked up in the desk of a travelling authority. Despite my best efforts over the course of a month, I never did get to see it.

³²To be sure, much of this theft is perpetrated by Zairois. But foreign researchers have also disappeared with key documents. This has, of course, increased local suspicion of the motives and good faith of other foreign researchers.

administrative headquarters in Lubumbashi. Their stories of wholesale fabrication of "official" statistics were almost too wild to believe; until I began to compare official statistics with the realities I measured in my research.)

Unfortunately, it has been necessary to quote data from Zairian government documents at several points in this study, but this is done with some hesitation. I would certainly not stake my life or my professional reputation on such sources.

Relevance of the Study

Studies of urban populations in modern central Africa are by no means rare. And, for that matter, neither are studies of communities of African industrial workers. Hence it more than behooves the author of a study such as this to be explicit in identifying the particular end served by the study, and the essential contribution of the work to the inventory of literature already at hand.

Contemporary urban communities have been studied from the unique perspectives of a very wide and diverse range of disciplines, each discipline with its peculiar interests, approach and foci. Different researchers have sought widely differing ends, and it is pointless to distinguish these in detail here. Rather, this discussion will commence with the broadest questions relevant to the study, then go on to note the subsets of those broad questions which are actually

addressed in the study. It is at the latter point that a brief consideration of the relevant literature is warranted.

Among the questions of interest which are amenable to generalization, the broadest are but two: "What are urban people like?" and "Why do urban people think and act the way they do?" Of course, comprehensive answers to these questions can only come from a comparison of the accumulated efforts of a world-wide multitude of researchers.

My own contribution is limited to three subsets of these questions which may be phrased as follows: "What are industrialized, urban workers in southern Zaire like?", "Why do they think and act the way they do?" and "What limited generalizations can be drawn that are applicable to similar people elsewhere?"

But having once determined the key questions at the broadest level, the challenge to an individual researcher is still that of selecting an approach which permits the identification and operationalization of measurable variables. A substantial selectivity is implicit: there is little prospect that a single researcher can account for all behavior in a research population. Inevitably, the research will focus on selected domains of behavior which happen to be of particular interest. To assure coherence, this requires the selection (and pursuit) of an appropriate unit of analysis, a consideration inherently constrained by the research methodologies and foci of particular academic disciplines and by the theoretical inclinations of the

researcher. It hardly needs to be said that the study of collective behavior in urban contexts has resulted in a vast and diverse literature.³³ Time and space do not permit us to review that literature here, even cursorily.

What is of concern in this study, however, is the nature and behavior of urban populations in industrial contexts in 20th century central Africa.³⁴ These, too, have been extensively (though not necessarily comprehensively) studied. A brief discussion of this literature is warranted here in order to place this study in its appropriate niche. I shall here note what this study does not do, before concentrating briefly on its particular emphasis and contribution.

It is appropriate to start by noting that the definition of "urban" in Africa has stimulated considerable interest. Though perhaps the forte of the urban geographer,³⁵ identification and typology of African "cities" has been attempted by scholars from other

³³Guyer (1981), for instance, provides a comprehensive review of community studies in Africa.

³⁴It appears to me that there is an implicit assumption in portions of the Africanist community that generalizations regarding social patterns are widely applicable throughout contemporary sub-Saharan African. I am very skeptical of this notion, for reasons to be discussed later. My interest here is in central Africa particularly. However, in this discussion, I will suppress my inclinations and cite results from certain studies of urban populations in west Africa, east Africa and southern Africa as I deem relevant.

³⁵Note, for instance, O'Connor (1983) as one of the best recent examples.

disciplines.³⁶ I am not particularly concerned with this issue in the study at hand.

While most credible studies of African urban behavior provide at least a brief historical context, scholars have provided a number of historical studies in which they have analyzed the development and growth of individual central African urban centers.³⁷ We need not dwell on that theme, other than to say that coverage in the existing literature is at best spotty. Even so, this is not a historical study of the development of an urban center.

Historians and political scientists have also addressed more abstract processes associated with the growth of urban populations in central Africa; as for example, western capitalist penetration, growth of industry, and social change associated with labor relations and class formation (Burawoy, 1972; Van Onselen, 1974, 1976; Higginson, 1979; 1988; Perrings, 1979; Parpart, 1983, 1987).³⁸ While I consider a historical context a necessary backdrop to an understanding of belief and behavior in modern Kolwezi, that is not a primary focus of this study. Further, I am very uncomfortable with grand historicist schemes and (like Mitchell, 1986:8) not particularly enamored with the

³⁶Notably including Southall (1961).

³⁷One of the better ones, which happens to be specifically relevant to Zaire, is Fetter's (1976) study of the creation and growth of Lubumbashi to 1940.

³⁸Zimbabwe's mining industry and related populations of industrial workers have been perhaps the most intensively addressed of those countries which could be at least

analysis of "large-scale structural phenomena." While such work no doubt has its merits and can provide stimulating explanations for social patterns, I dislike the empirically unverifiable nature of its many base assumptions. Hence, this is not a study which will begin or end with a deeply abstract theoretical base of macro-scale international phenomena. Nor will it seek profound historical processes to account for behavior in modern Kolwezi.

Much of the study of urban populations in sub-Saharan Africa has centered around the related issues of labor migration, urban-rural linkages, and adaptations of rural people to urban life. There is considerable literature pertaining to these subjects, which need not be cited here. But, we could perhaps note the signal contributions of scholars once associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (now the Institute for African Studies of the University of Zambia). Literature in this latter category is of considerable relevance to this study since it has addressed itself in large measure to mining communities on the Zambian Copperbelt, and thus depicts processes, cultural contexts, and urban populations which are in some ways similar to those on the Copperbelt of neighboring Zaire.

 peripherally considered "central Africa." The historical treatments of Phimister (1975) and Van Onselen (1974; 1976) provide this detail.

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We might cite here, as representative, the studies of Niddrie (1954) and Mitchell (1954b, 1973a) in terms of labor migration, Mitchell (1954a), Harries-Jones (1969) and Van Velsen (1960) in terms of urban-rural relationships, and

I will offer the view here that it was sociologists and anthropologists associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute who both pioneered methodologies of urban research in central Africa and furnished much of the data and analysis which inform current understanding of central African urban populations. Unfortunately, the most brilliant contributions in this genre comprise studies performed between the 1940s and mid 1960s. Central Africa of the late 1980s is a vastly different social reality.

Beyond the contributions of the Rhodes-Livingstone scholars are many other studies of central African urbanization which address themselves in whole or in part to the issues of labor migration, urban-rural linkages and adaptation of rural people to urban life in central Africa. Noteworthy among these are studies which address colonial-era labor migration in such restricted central African contexts as southern Zaire (Vellut, 1977) and such broad areas as Zaire, Zambia and Malawi (Fetter, 1983). Urban-rural linkages and urban adaptation have been addressed, often among other issues, by a variety of scholars in a multiplicity of disciplines. But let me be explicit about my own interests. This study, is not concerned with the issue of labor migration, and address it only in passing.

 Wilson (1941-42), Gluckman (1961), Mitchell (1954a, 1956, 1966a, 1973a) and Epstein (1958, 1967, 1978, 1981) in terms of adaptation of rural peoples to urban life. All of these categories are addressed in comprehensive fashion by Mitchell's recent contribution on central African urbanization (1987).

On the other hand, the subject of rural-urban linkages is but one of many of interest here.

Many of the studies cited so far comprise an analysis of urban behavior which is based on the assumption of an ongoing adaptation of essentially rural peoples to an urban way of life. While I am very interested in changing patterns of belief and behavior, this study is not based on that premise. To be sure, there has been a substantial rural-urban migration into Kolwezi over the past thirty years. However, for reasons to be discussed later, I commence with the premise that I am studying a relatively stable urban population. Thus, the general question regarding Kolwezi's residents is not, "How do they adapt?" but rather, "What are urban Zairois like?"

Since the early 1970s, studies of social patterns in urban central Africa have tended toward a narrowing of focus. Let us briefly note the contrast. Pons (1969), for instance, obtained the bulk of his research data along Stanleyville's (now Kisangani's) Avenue 21. However, he could readily generalize to a rather wide range of belief and behavior in the greater Stanleyville urban area.

Likewise, Powdermaker (1962) could focus on a similarly wide range of belief and behavior in her study of the Zambian Copperbelt town of Luanshya. But contributions in more recent years have seen a concentration on more restricted domains of urban behavior. These are exemplified by such studies as those of Schuster (1979) and La Fontaine

(1974) who addressed themselves to the roles and behavior of selected categories of urban women, or by scholars who sought explanations for indigenous responses to urbanization in the realm of healing cults (Van Binsbergen, 1981) or charismatic, syncretic, Christian-based religion (Fabian, 1971). Others have pursued urban reality in the study of class formation (Mwabila, 1973, 1979; J. MacGaffey, 1981), or of articulation of modes of production (Van Binsbergen, 1981, 1985; W. MacGaffey, 1986) or urban elites (Schatzberg, 1980) or the development of indigenous entrepreneurial activity (J. MacGaffey, 1981, 1986; Vwakyankazi, 1982), or of the informal sector in urban centers (Hansen, 1980; Kapferer, 1978). Still others have pursued the issue of ethnicity as a key issue in the explanation of central African urban behavior (Garrison, 1976).⁴⁰

I do not cast aspersions on studies with a narrow focus. They can achieve a considerable analytical depth. They are well suited to a variety of applications inside and outside the academic community. But this study is not of that genre. I see it more in the tradition of Mayer (1961),

⁴⁰The concern here is with central Africa, but the same trends are evident in studies performed elsewhere in subSaharan Africa. Mayer (1961) could generalize rather broadly about belief and behavior of black South Africans in East London, as could Marris (1962) in regard to residents of Lagos, Nigeria. However, by the late 1960s, the same narrowing of focus in analysis of urban behavior saw a concentration on such issues as urban elites in Jos, Nigeria (Plotnicov, 1967), or the ramifications of ethnicity in urban Kenya (Parkin, 1978), or the persistence of traditional notions of fertility in urban Uganda (Thompson, 1978), or the resilience in South African urban environments of traditional notions of health and healing (du Toit, 1980).

Marris (1962), Powdermaker (1962), Pons (1969) and (perhaps) of Epstein (1981) than of the bulk of recent scholarship on urban central Africa. It is my hope that upon reading this work, the reader is left with a broad understanding of belief and behavior among industrial workers in urban southern Zaire. This study avoids an in-depth treatment of more narrowly-defined issues. I would also hope that the reader obtains an appreciation for the general historical, economic, geographical and cultural context of the city of Kolwezi and is able to assess the behavior of its residents in that context.⁴¹

The question still remains, however, "Why Kolwezi?"; or perhaps more precisely, "Why study the population of an industrial community in southern Zaire?" The answer can be very unambiguous: there is currently no English-language study which addresses itself to a broad assessment of belief and behavior in a Zairian Copperbelt community of the 1980s. In other words, the literature lacks a Zairian analogue to Powdermaker's (1962) study of Luanshya or Epstein's (1981) study of Ndola, both in neighboring Zambia.⁴²

⁴¹Yet having said all of this, I am not offering a community study per se. Nor am I defining a society in an ethnographic sense: the study will not address itself thoroughly and comprehensively to the totality of institutions (domesticity, economy, law, government, education, religion) which characterize the residents of urban Kolwezi (W. MacGaffey, 1983b:16-18).

⁴²We could go a great deal farther in this comment. Powdermaker's and Epstein's data are derived from research in the mid 1950s (Epstein) or early 1960s (Powdermaker). Zambia did not achieve national independence until 1964, and

But while there is no broad-based, English-language study of belief and behavior in a modern Zairian Copperbelt community, it would be a serious omission to infer that such communities have not been studied. Let me briefly describe some of the relevant literature.

Colonial-era scholars, generally Belgian, contributed a rather extensive literature on the social ramifications of Zairian industrialization and urbanization. Noteworthy among these were, in order of their dates of publication, de Briey (1952), Comhaire (1956), Forthomme (1957), Denis (1958),⁴³ Dethier (1961a, 1961b) and Verhaegen (1962).

Since national independence, Zairian scholars have continued this study, though on a reduced scale. Examples are the works of Mwepu-Kyagbutha (1967) and Sabakinu (1984).⁴⁴

there have been vast social changes in the country since that time. Hence, it could be argued that these broad-based studies of behavior in urban Zambia are now significantly dated. Nor are there comparable English-language studies of urban Zaire. For example, Pons' (1969) study of Stanleyville (now Kisangani) is based on data collected in the 1950s, and Kisangani is very far distant from the Copperbelt. Shatzberg's (1980) study of Lisala is both narrower in focus than this work, and addresses itself to a Zairian community which is very remote from the Copperbelt. Other studies of urban Zaire (i.e. Kajika, 1972; La Fontaine, 1970; and Nzongola, 1975) tend also to be of narrow focus. Of these, only Kajika's study addresses a Copperbelt city.

43

The two latter authors published after the advent of national independence, but their data reflected the circumstances of the colonial era.

44

We could cite here those studies whose prime focus was upon the mining industry (and its social policies) but which also provide insights into regional urbanization. Such works include those of Mottoule (1946), Fetter (1973) and Higginson (1979).

Specific Shaban urban centers have also been studied, with a marked preference for Lubumbashi, the regional capital. In the colonial era, the Belgian scholars Denis (1956), Grevisse (1956) and Vannes (1959) studied aspects of the social organization of Lubumbashi's indigenous residents. Since the 1960s, Zairian scholars at the national university campus in Lubumbashi have contributed a substantial literature on social patterns and social change in urban Lubumbashi. Noteworthy in the English-language literature is Fetter's (1976) history of that city to 1940, although English-language studies by other scholars include subjects ranging from Lubumbashi language usage (Polomé: 1963, 1968a, 1971a, 1971b) to housing distribution in the city's suburbs (Turner, 1985).

Shaba's two other cities have received considerably less attention than Lubumbashi. In the colonial era, the urban geographer Chapelier (1956) provided a wide-ranging and authoritative study of all three of Shaba's cities: Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi. Likewise, a mining company history (UMHK:1956), published in 1956, traced the development of each of Shaba's main urban centers. But an interest by scholars in the town of Kolwezi itself was a feature only of the post-independence period, and the most concerted scholarly focus has occurred only in recent years. Let us turn to that focus briefly.

Houyoux and Lohletart (1976) studied the population of urban Kolwezi in the early 1970s with particular interest in

household income and budgets. Muteba (1976) provided a licence mémoire analyzing historical processes of industrialization and urbanization in Shaba based on a study of Kolwezi. But it remained for an urban geographer, Mansila (1984), to write what is probably the definitive study of Kolwezi's urban morphology in historical perspective, a most impressive work. Nsiniti (1985), a historian, has provided, as a mémoire, a study of Kolwezi's origin and growth to 1960.⁴⁵ Each of these studies is written in French. All can be obtained only with difficulty outside of Zaire. None specifically addresses the broad base of belief and behavior of interest to this study.

In sum, the purpose of this study is to provide an assessment of belief and behavior among an industrial worker population in the urban southern Shaba of the 1980s. Based on the foregoing discussion, it should be evident that the study fills a currently vacant niche.

⁴⁵The licence mémoires are long research papers required of university students who are completing the level of education called "licence." This level is normally attained after five years of university study in Zaire, and is the second level of "enseignement supérieur" education. The licence degree is essentially equivalent to the Baccalaureate in the U.S. system.

CHAPTER 2 KOLWEZI IN REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

General

Kolwezi, an urban area of some 225,000 souls, is Zaire's eighth largest city and (arguably) its second most important in economic terms. Located in the dry, rather infertile and sparsely populated highland savanna of southwestern Zaire, it is only fifty kilometers from the Zambian border and three hundred kilometers from the Angolan border. Kolwezi is one of three cities in Zaire's Shaba province (région), each of which is located on Zaire's Copperbelt. While the Copperbelt had been ruled in pre-colonial times by large indigenous states, the modern cities are all recent creations, owing their origin and growth to the minerals industry of the colonial era.

Like other cities in Zaire, today's Kolwezi can be accurately described as a "parasitic island of privilege in a sea of rural poverty" (Schatzberg, 1979:186) drawing manpower and other resources from its undeveloped hinterland, and providing very little infrastructural development in return (Schatzberg, 1979; Fetter, 1976, 1983; Vellut, 1977). Modern Kolwezi is, in fact, culturally distinct in many ways from its immediate hinterland. To understand this urban-rural distinctiveness, and the better

to appreciate vast and recent social changes which resulted in the urban culture of present-day Kolwezi, we shall briefly note key aspects of the region's natural and rural cultural environment. We will then turn to a brief historical overview of the region, of the minerals industry and of the town itself.

The Natural Environment

The Zairian Copperbelt region lies on the high savanna (1200-1600 meter elevations) just north of the watershed separating the Zaire and the Zambezi River systems. The typical vegetation here is dry, tall-grass savanna woodland with large areas of treeless grassy plains. Several chains of high hills intersect the region. Rivers drain northward into the Zaire basin.

Located at the western end of Zaire's Copperbelt, and within a large bend of the Lualaba River, Kolwezi straddles the rolling terrain of the Manika plateau, at an average altitude of 1480 meters (4810 feet). In fact, the town was constructed on a series of low hills in open woodland savanna.

Kolwezi's weather is typical of that in highland southern Zaire. The six-month rainy season generally commences in October and ends in late March. The dry season is usually underway by mid April and continues through September. Rain is extremely rare in the months of May, June, July and August. Average annual rainfall is about 1150 mm (45 inches). Precipitation falls mainly between



Figure 2.1. Cultivated hillsides in southwestern Shaba, near Fungurume. Photo by author.



Figure 2.2. Open grassland in western Shaba. Photo by author.



Figure 2.3. Open-forest savanna in southern Shaba, after dry-season burning. Photo by author.



Figure 2.4. Typical rural road through the west-Shaba savanna. Photo by author.

late October and mid to late March, with the heaviest rainfall (typically over 50% of the annual total) in the months of November and March. However, rainfall can be quite variable; with the rainy season starting as late as early November, ending as early as mid March, and failing to provide rain at all for periods of weeks at a time.

Although Kolwezi is only about 1200 kilometers south of the equator, the elevation exerts a considerable influence on temperatures. Highest daytime temperatures occur in October and November, with occasional highs of about 32°C (90°F). Lowest temperatures occur in June and July, with average nighttime lows of about 6°C (43°F). By North American standards, Kolwezi enjoys a very temperate climate (Mansila, 1984:13-15).

In the areas surrounding Kolwezi, the typical lateritic soils are generally of limited fertility. Because of this and the relatively arid climate, the agricultural carrying capacity of the land is not great and pre-colonial population densities were very low. The large urban and peri-urban population today is a direct result of local industrialization and labor migration (Fetter, 1983:129,147; Boyd, 1982:20 and Siegel, 1983:27-28).

The most significant natural feature of the Copperbelt for our interest is, of course, the presence of minerals, so a brief discussion of the relevant geology is warranted here.

The rock bed underlying the Copperbelts of Zaire and (neighboring) Zambia is of Precambrian origin. Within this base are strata of differing age. It is in the Katanga System stratum that the Copperbelt ores are found.

We might ask at this point how the mineral-bearing rock happens to appear in the Copperbelt region. Bisson (1976:14-15) provides a concise summary:

There is general agreement that the ores are in sedimentary rocks originally deposited in a large geosyncline centered south and west of the Copperbelt. An incursion of the sea into this basin resulted in the deposition of aqueous sediments including the copper ores which lie around the edges of the basin . . . These beds have subsequently undergone significant deformation and metamorphosis. They are now exposed in a geological structure known as the Lufilian Arc, a 500 mile long crescent of folded Katanga beds which arches from the Zambian Copperbelt in the east through southern Zaire and down into northwestern Zambia and Angola near Mwinilunga.¹

At those points along the Lufilian Arc where significant deposits of copper (and related) minerals occur, the composition of the ore bodies can be categorized as follows: surface minerals tend to be carbonates and oxides (the most

¹The ores, in fact, appear in a more limited category of Katanga System rocks now often called the Mine Series, which consist of widely varying, complex formations including "mineralized conglomerates, quartzites, sandstones, shales, argillites and dolomites." The mine series itself is classified into related but different formations found at different points on the Copperbelts of Zaire and Zambia: the Upper Roan, the Lower Roan and the Mwashia (Bisson, 1976:14). See also Mendelsohn (1961), and

common copper ores being malachite, azurite, cuprite and chrysocolla²). The oxide ore zone extends downward from the surface to a typical depth of 50-60 meters. Underlying the oxide ores are sulfide ores (as, for instance, bornite and chalcocite) and complex sulfide/sulfate compounds of copper and iron (Herbert, 1984:49).³ By the standards of mineral content found in ores elsewhere in the world, the Copperbelt copper ores are very rich, a fact recognized in the early colonial era phrase "scandale géologique."

Within Zaire itself, the "Copperbelt" extends from Lubumbashi in the south to Kolwezi in the northwest. The mineral-bearing formations are found at various places in a local fold called the Système Kundulungu, a formation spread over a 400 km by 100 km area.⁴ Mining activity undertaken so far has been restricted to three general areas: the area -----
Cahen (1952) for a more detailed discussion of the Copperbelt geology.

²Malachite, a carbonate [$(\text{Cu}_2(\text{OH})_2\text{CO}_3\text{Cu}(\text{OH})_2)$], is by far the most common of the oxide ores. It has a copper content of about 55%. Azurite is another carbonate ore. Cuprite is an oxide with a very high copper content (89%). Chrysocolla is a hydrated silicate (Herbert, 1984:49).

³Precolonial central African miners lacked the technology to refine the sulfide ores, using charcoal reduction techniques to refine the surface deposits of carbonate/oxide ores. See Bisson (1976) for a detailed discussion of indigenous central African mining and refining technology. Herbert (1984) provides an excellent study of the extraction and use of copper in precolonial Africa.

⁴The Kundulungu fold is a complex of mineral-bearing dolomites and schists which actually originates in Zambia and extends from Zambia's Copperbelt to Kolwezi. In addition to copper-bearing ores, the system contains cobalt, zinc, silver, gold, cadmium, paladium, platinum and uranium (Chapelier, 1956:2-4).

around Lubumbashi, a rather large area around Likasi (which includes the smaller sites of Luishia, Kambove, Kakanda and Fungurume) and the area around Kolwezi. The ore-bodies immediately adjacent to Kolwezi are found in pockets spread over an area of about 160 square kilometers (Mansila, 1984:10).

The Rural Cultural Environment

The Copperbelt region falls directly within a "belt" of matrilineal peoples stretching from east to west across central Africa. Most of the traditional peoples of the Copperbelt hinterlands trace descent in the matriline.⁵ Key exceptions to this general rule are the Luba and several closely related groups who are strongly patrilineal,⁶ and the nuclear Lunda, whose kinship system is perhaps best described as "bilateral."⁷ The rural demographic foci of

⁵There are many variations in local ethnographic detail. Siegel (1983:88) follows Richards (1951) in noting that Bemba and related peoples on the Zambian Copperbelt have a matrilineal kinship system with a strong bilateral emphasis. It must be emphasized here that we are addressing rural populations. In the Zairian urban centers, there has been a distinct shift to patriliney.

⁶Reefe (1981:72-73; 1983:166) and Mukenge (1967) offer useful insights into Luba social organization. The patrilineal peoples include the culturally and linguistically related Luba-Kasai, Luba-Shaba, Lulua, Kaniok, Songye and Lomotwa. Reefe argues on linguistic grounds that these peoples were predominantly matrilineal in the distant past.

⁷See Hoover (1978:85, 92-95, 118, 122-123, 360-363). Hoover argues, based on linguistic evidence and oral histories, that the nuclear Lunda were once matrilineal and possessed corporate matrilineages, but that this changed under the influence of patrilineal neighbors or settlers (presumably Luba or Kaniok). He concludes that this shift

both the Luba and nuclear Lunda are somewhat outside the Copperbelt itself. Interestingly, neighboring peoples to both the Luba and nuclear Lunda, who appear to be linguistically and culturally related to each, remain⁸ strongly matrilineal.

Other than among the Luba (and related groups) and nuclear Lunda, descent in the region is calculated matrilineally within the context of minimal lineages. There are larger, more amorphous descent groups which might be best termed "clans." These are, in turn, generally named after legendary progenitors, but sometimes after plants or animals. (No special prohibitions seem to apply to the named items, however, and the clans are not now exogamous,⁹ though they seem to have been at one time.)

Except among the peoples north of the Copperbelt and east in the Luapula valley, the effectiveness of clans as an integrative mechanism is highly questionable. None of the clans functions as a corporate descent group. Rather, the significant regional descent group would seem generally to ----- occurred prior to 1600, before the expansion of a Lunda state.

⁸ Turner (1965:91), for instance, calls matrilineal descent an "irreducible principle" of Ndembu [southern Lunda] social organization" and says that matriliney gives to this Lunda group "a specific form and stamp to a morality which would otherwise be imprecise and general."

⁹ McCulloch, 1951 and S. Yoder (1981:40-41) both provide useful discussions of the ramifications of clans among matrilineal peoples in the region. On the other hand, among the Luba groups north of the Copperbelt, clans have retained a corporate nature and are strongly exogamous. See particularly McLean (1962:34-35, 45-50).




Figure 2.5. Indigenous peoples of the Shaba Copperbelt and its immediate hinterlands.

be the minimal lineage--a condition exacerbated by
 fisiparious tendencies inherent in matrilineal descent as a
 structural norm, the low population density, and the paucity
 of such inheritable wealth as cattle (Siegel, 1983:90-91 and
 Turner, 1957:169-233).

Throughout the whole region, regardless of the
 principles of descent, the minimal lineage associated with a
 local village and its proximate hamlets is probably the most
 important kin grouping in the day to day life of the rural
 peasant. The basic residential units of traditional, rural
 Copperbelt peoples are the extended family and local
 settlement (village). Villages tend to consist of some ten
 to thirty mud brick or mud and wattle thatched houses built
 in household clusters around a central thatched meeting
 shelter. In contrast, those villages built directly along
 roads tend to be spread lineally along both sides of the
 road. The typical rural community can number up to several
 hundred persons.¹⁰

Among the rural Copperbelt peoples, new villages are
 founded when an individual gathers a group and "breaks away"
 to establish his own settlement. In many cases, this
 behavior would seem to be anticipated, ritually endorsed,
 and amicably accomplished serving both to vent ambition and to

¹⁰For more detail on rural residential patterns in
 Shaba and adjacent areas (ranging in time from the 1950s to
 the late 1970s), see Schecter, 1976:4; Hoover, 1978:81-91;
 Turner, 1957:17-30; Cunison, 1959:122-133; Douglas,
 1963:28; Siegel, 1983:93-110.

maintain community size within the constraints of the carrying capacity of convenient arable land. And, as a usual practice, new settlements tend to be founded within several kilometers of the parent community.

Rural villages tend to be small and somewhat temporary, under the immediate authority of village headmen and rarely exceeding 200 persons, except for the larger, more permanent villages along the major roads.¹¹ (The latter could perhaps be best described as peri-urban communities related to the market economy extending through the local transportation nodes.)

It is important to emphasize that the significant nodes of Copperbelt population are now found in or near the urban centers, and along (or near) the major roads. Elsewhere in the region, population density is very low.

In the immediate area of Kolwezi, villages of rural populations are drawn primarily from three ethnic groups: the Lunda-Ndembu, the Sanga and the Kaonde. (The demographic focus of the Ndembu ethnic group is actually further west and southwest, that of the Sanga further east, and that of the Kaonde further south. In other words, Kolwezi is located at something of a border area for these groups.) Each of the three groups trace descent in the matriline and share many other cultural features. The

¹¹Each village does, however, have a political party infrastructure of sorts parallel to the administrative authority (and in most cases comprising the same individuals).



Figure 2.6. A Sanga village east of Kolwezi. Photo by author.



Figure 2.7. An Ndembu village west of Kolwezi. Photo by author.



Figure 2.8. Peri-urban communities along the Kolwezi-Lubumbashi road. Photos by author.

Ndembu are linguistically and historically linked to the nuclear Lunda (Aruund). The Sanga and Kaonde speak languages more related to the Luba linguistic grouping, but were dominated by Lunda-installed overlords after the mid 18th century.¹²

Rural Copperbelt peoples are subsistence farmers who work land which is (in local tradition) corporately owned by local descent groups. Agricultural land is typically allocated for use by lineage elders or village chiefs.¹³ Manioc and maize are the primary food staples. Older indigenous cereals (millets and sorghums) are occasionally grown, and a wide range of other vegetables are cultivated, including various legumes, greens and cucurbits.¹⁴ There

¹²The Ndembu (southern Lunda) are well known in the anthropological literature from the studies of McCulloch (1951) and especially Victor Turner (i.e. 1957, 1967, 1968). The Sanga and Kaonde have received much less attention by ethnographers.

¹³In national legislation, the Zairian state has abrogated to itself the ownership of all land. This and related "development schemes" have resulted in eviction of some cultivators from their traditional lands on the Copperbelt. See W. MacGaffey (1982a, 1985) and Schoepf and Schoepf (1984).

¹⁴Schnieder (1981:48-57) provides a discussion of the dynamics of agricultural innovation in central Africa. Manioc cultivation had spread into the Copperbelt region by about the 17th century. Vellut (1972:78) and Hoover (1978:331-336) argue that adoption of manioc was a key factor in the subsequent growth of the Lunda empire. Maize seems to be a comparatively recent addition to the diet of Copperbelt populations, promoted largely by its use as a European-distributed staple. Millets and sorghums are now grown primarily for use in making beer. All of the staples are consumed, traditionally, as a thick mush, or porridge, which is eaten with a relish of vegetable, meat or (more commonly) fish stews.

are fishing communities at a number of Copperbelt river and lake sites. While Copperbelt people keep goats and chickens, there is no local tradition of large livestock herding.¹⁵

Until the mid 20th century, hunting of large game was an important (if somewhat occasional) source of protein for most Copperbelt peoples. Large game is now quite scarce on much of the Copperbelt.

Sustained subsistence horticultural activity among the central Africans tends primarily to be the role of women. The agricultural contribution of men is generally limited to initial preparation of the virgin land. (Men do, however, characteristically perform the labor in the cultivation of modern cash crops such as truck-gardening vegetables, groundnuts and cotton. However, a tour of rural villages in the Kolwezi hinterlands would undoubtedly highlight the predominance of women in traditional agriculture. And, in fact, rural villages in the Copperbelt have very low proportions of men in the 18-30 age group.)¹⁶

¹⁵Cattle are now raised as commercial ventures at several Copperbelt sites, but the shifting boundaries of Tsetse fly belts extend into portions of the Copperbelt. This seems to have precluded cattle-raising by precolonial populations of the region.

¹⁶For more detail on the division of labor by sex among rural Copperbelt peoples, see Siegel (1983:122-131), P. Yoder (1981:29-35) and Schoepf (1985). While there are considerable variations in local ethnographic detail, the prerogatives of women in rural Copperbelt societies seem distinctly greater than those of women among patrilineal societies (i.e. Luba and Songye) further north.

Having, then, touched on the natural environment and current cultural context of Kolwezi's hinterlands, the discussion turns to a brief historical overview of the region. This should enable us to understand with greater clarity the ultimate development and cultural complexion of Kolwezi itself.

The Historical Base

In the Beginning

Kolwezi as an urban area dates only to the mid 20th century, but the Zairian Copperbelt has been inhabited for millenia. Based on the archaeological record, the earliest human inhabitants of central Africa appear to have been hunter-gatherers, who pursued their livelihood for millennia in the game-rich forests and grasslands. The hunter-gatherers have been extinct on the savanna of southern Zaire for centuries.¹⁷ In their place are essentially sedentary, horticultural Bantu-speaking peoples who have strong traditions of centralized political institutions. It is their culture history which is of interest here.

Shortly after the commencement of the Common Era, cultivators arrived on the savanna lands of the central

¹⁷While pygmy and pygmoid hunter-gatherers are still found in the equatorial rain forest, savanna hunter-gatherers are now restricted primarily to the dry areas of western South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. That similar groups once occupied much of the subequatorial savanna is attested by artifacts and other historical evidence. Some savanna hunter-gatherers may have persisted in the Copperbelt region to about the 17th century A.D. See Phillipson (1969, 1975), Clark (1950), S.F. Miller (1969), Vansina (1984) and Ehret (1982).

African plateau, apparently in a gradual spread from the north. The cultivators brought (or acquired) cereal crops, originally domesticated in the Sahel. These were adaptable to the central African environment, and permitted fairly sedentary community living. Cultivating and fishing communities with relatively high population densities seem to have coalesced rather early in the first millenium in such favorable environments as the Upemba depression and Luapula flood plain.¹⁸ We can assume that among the early horticulturalists and fishermen in central Africa were ancestors of most of the people now found in urban Kolwezi and nearby Copperbelt hinterlands.

It is widely assumed that the early cultivators spoke a group of very similar dialects which are now included in the "Bantu" language classification. Today, peoples speaking

¹⁸The archaeological record depicts the arrival and spread of village settlements of clay and pole huts. The new cultures included hoe agriculture, pottery making, animal husbandry and (by about 100 A.D.) iron metal-working. Skeletal remains depict a people of essentially negroid phenotype. See Derricourt (1985) for detailed archaeology of Zambian sites and De Maret (1985) for an assessment of archaeology in south central Zaire. Based on continuities in the archaeological record extending to the present time, we assume a cultural connection to modern populations. For a very readable overview of the process, see Curtin *et al.* (1978:20-25), and Birmingham (1983:8-19). Reece (1983:163) cautions that "flood-plain fishermen rather than savanna farmers may have been the first people forced to experiment with forms of social and political life which extended beyond the hamlet and village level." The "agricultural revolution" in central Africa did not eliminate hunting or gathering as important economic activities, of course. These persisted in varying degree well into the colonial era.

Bantu languages occupy a large portion of subsaharan Africa from Cameroon and Kenya in the north to the southern tip of the continent in the south.¹⁹

At least two "early Iron Age" streams of settlement, presumably comprising Bantu-speaking peoples, seem to have spread south through subequatorial Africa in the first three or four centuries of the Common Era. A "western stream" moved into and through (what are now) Angola, southwestern Zaire and western Zambia. An "eastern stream" moved down the rifts associated with the great east African lakes, through (what are now) eastern Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and Mozambique.²⁰ Populations from both "streams" undoubtedly

¹⁹The "Bantu" point of origin, and sequence of the subsequent spread of "Bantu-speaking" peoples have been much disputed by archaeologists and linguists; and, in fact, the assumption of a single ancestral group of "proto-Bantu" speakers has been challenged in recent years (Vansina, 1984). For more detail, see Greenberg (1955, 1963, 1972), Guthrie (1962), Oliver (1970) and Ehret (1982). A consensual view tends to place the original "proto Bantu nucleus" in what would now be south central Cameroon perhaps 4000 years ago. In the most widely accepted current taxonomy, the Bantu language grouping is classified as a subgroup of the Benue-Congo language family and Niger-Congo language phylum. Der-Houssikian (1972) provides a discussion of relevant taxonomic considerations and Vansina (1984) offers a useful discussion of the spread of Bantu-speaking cultivators into central Africa.

²⁰It is not yet entirely clear when these populations adopted a metal working technology, nor how and from where the knowledge of metal working spread. However, it is clear that iron (and probably copper) were being worked by 400 A.D., and probably for centuries prior to that date (see de Maret, 1977, 1985; and Vansina, 1984). Iron provided an obvious (but not necessarily an immediately employed) improvement in the ability to exploit a variety of environments: the iron hoe and iron axe are characteristic tools of Late Iron Age central Africans. Copper was used primarily as a luxury and ornamental commodity.

found themselves in contact with each other at numerous points in central and southern Africa. Presumably, the aboriginal hunter-gatherers over the entire region were gradually displaced, absorbed or eliminated. We can speculate that social and political cohesion of the central and southern African cultivating peoples in the first millenium A.D. was built around corporate kinship groupings, probably at the level of clan or lineage.

By about the end of the first millennium, another major population movement occurred in the Copperbelt region and beyond, its associated material culture has come to be called "Late Iron Age." Archaeological evidence suggests a nuclear area in south-central Zaire and a subsequent spread east, west and (especially) south. Phillipson (1975:99) suggests population growth and population pressure as a primary causes of this expansion.

We can assume a mixing of existing Iron-Age populations as a result of the various population movements. The results included, probably, the settlement of peoples ancestral to modern ethno-linguistic groupings in regions proximate to familiar modern locations. Cultural and linguistic similarity within regions did not, of course, infer political cohesion.²¹

²¹The modern peoples of central Africa cannot be tied with any certainty to specific traditions within the Early Iron Age. Late Iron Age traditions, on the other hand, are somewhat easier to associate with ancestral populations of modern peoples although connections remain ambiguous at best. Reece (1983:164) provides an appropriate warning: "earlier views about the colonial past [of the region] have

Most of the modern indigenous languages of the Zairian Copperbelt region fall into two major groupings: those apparently related to Luba on one hand, and those more closely related to the Lunda languages on the other. Within these two groupings are number of separate languages of varying mutual intelligibility.

Studies of the extant languages in the Copperbelt region suggest language group separations of considerable age. For instance, using the data and analysis of Hoover (1978) and Coupeze, Evrard and Vansina (1975:153-154), we can speculate that the Luba and Lunda language groupings

 been shaped and misshaped by issues of contemporary ethnicity. The pre-colonial past is not . . . best explained as ethno-history. Ethnicity is a concept to be used with caution, for the nouns, nicknames and pejorative epithets by which groups identified one another constantly changed before the European conquest. Only in the late 19th century were people locked into formal ethnic identity . . . by colonial agents." See also de Maret (1977) and Vansina (1984). J.C. Miller (1983:124-126) provides a brief but useful discussion of likely social dynamics in local communities of the early savanna cultivators,

22

There have been a number of recent efforts to provide a classification of Bantu languages. These include studies by Henrici (1973), Heine (1973), Coupeze, Evrard and Vansina (1975) and Hoover (1978). Henrici's work comprised a detailed statistical analysis of very comprehensive data collected by Guthrie (1968, 1969, 1971). Heine used a lexicostatistic word list on the Swadesh pattern, but created his own list in an effort to accommodate unique Bantu communications and environmental patterns. Coupeze, Evrard and Vansina employed the standard Swadesh word list, but employed a highly sophisticated statistical methodology, and collected much of their own data. Hoover was particularly concerned with the Ruund (nuclear Lunda) language, but employed available grammars and word lists for thirty-two other savanna languages in order to perform his own analysis using lexico-statistics and the comparative method.




Figure 2.9. Proposed relationships of surveyed Bantu languages. Information derived from Hoover (1978:49).

(Hoover's proto-Luba versus proto-Lunda/Moxico) separated over three thousand years ago. Within each of these two groupings themselves, some distinctions are also quite ancient. For instance, within the Luba grouping, CiBemba may be differentiated from TshiLuba/KiLuba by about 2000 years; TshiLuba from Kiluba by about 1200 years. Within the

Lunda grouping, the Ruund and Tshokwe languages may be separated by about 2000 years.²³

The Rise of the Savanna States

The advent of the late Iron Age (about 800-1000 A.D.) corresponded with an increasingly vigorous and widespread trade in central and southern Africa. By the 13th century, the Indian Ocean coastal trade (linking the Persian Gulf, the Orient and East Africa) had reached (at least indirectly) into what is now central Zimbabwe.²⁴ In 1483, the Portuguese arrived at the mouth of the Zaire (Congo) River on the Atlantic coast and encountered large, well-organized kingdoms in (what are now) coastal Congo, Zaire and Angola. These polities were served by highly sophisticated regional economic linkages. While our ability to reconstruct political events in the interior prior to the 19th century is limited (the Portuguese did not penetrate the central African interior until the 19th century) similar political complexification had undoubtedly occurred by this point in the interior as well.

State-building in pre-colonial central Africa reflected two major processes: one being the subjugation of smaller

²³TshiLuba and KiLuba are mutually intelligible, though with difficulty. CiBemba shares many cognates and a similar syntactical pattern with both, but intercommunicability by monolinguals is at best highly limited. Likewise, Ruund and Tshokwe share cognates and other structural similarities, but mutual intelligibility is limited.

²⁴Curtin, et al. (1978:286) provide a succinct and useful summary of these processes.




Figure 2.10. Key ethnic groups in southern and central Zaire.

autonomous communities into expanding states, another the "hiving-off" and establishment of new subordinate communities from a nuclear area. These processes were probably well advanced throughout central Africa by 1000 A.D. Regardless of the subordination mechanism, political subordination to the center was typically expressed by the rendering of tribute to a central chief or a central court.²⁵

While scholars still debate the root causes of state-building, it is evident that a number of large kingdoms--actually empires in several cases--coalesced in central Africa in the half-millennium between about 1200 and 1700.²⁶ In fact, by the time of the arrival of European colonial

²⁵Reefe (1983:177-178) comments upon tribute as follows: "Courts pulled in resources at rates not previously seen . . . rulers were tribute-mongers of prestige goods, and royal courts became vital consumption and redistribution centres for iron, salt, copper and beads . . . court life was energized by the coming and going of tribute bearers."

²⁶The most comprehensive, integrated description of these states to date is provided by Vansina (1966) in his ground-breaking history of the savanna kingdoms. Reefe (1983:175-202) provides a recent and succinct overview. Other work by historians has provided some excellent histories of major individual kingdoms, as for instance, the Lunda (Hoover, 1978 and Schecter, 1976), the Luba (Reefe, 1981), the Kuba (Vansina, 1978) and the Kaniok (Yoder, 1977). Historians face formidable challenges in their efforts to reconstruct the prehistory of the region. The states were preliterate prior to the colonial period. Archaeological evidence remains sporadic and the material culture vulnerable to a destructive climate. Much of the existing historical reconstruction is based upon analysis of oral histories--which are notoriously "shallow" and pose other problems of historiography. The origins of the indigenous states remain at best obscure, and the current histories can provide only the barest outlines of events in central Africa prior to about the 17th century.


agents (in the late 19th century) a number of the major indigenous polities had long passed their apogee and were in an accelerating decline.

In the mid 19th century, central African societies were organized on a scale of political complexification ranging from great indigenous multiethnic empires of perhaps hundreds of thousands (the Lunda Empire) to smaller-scale chiefdoms of several thousand people spread over several score villages (as, for instance, the Kaniok) to the unique city-states of the Songye, to acephalous populations politically organized only up to the village level (as, for instance among Sala Mpasu and similar peoples).²⁷

By the early 19th century, a variety of processes in the international capitalist economy had also begun to exert an accelerating influence on central Africa. Both the Atlantic coast trade and Indian Ocean trade had long since reached well into the central African interior. A vigorous trade in ivory and slaves was directed to Portuguese ports in coastal Angola, and to a lesser extent, coastal Mocambique.²⁸ As the 19th century progressed, slave and

²⁷There were, of course, institutions which provided contact and some cohesion among peoples over broad areas. Clans, for example, often overlapped political (and, in some cases, even ethnic) boundaries. Religious cult groupings and various trading relationships were other features of local life which generated networks among otherwise culturally differentiated societies. For historical and cultural data on the Kaniok, see Yoder (1977), for that on the Songye, see Merriam (1975) and for that on the Sala Mpasu, see Pruitt (1974).

²⁸The Angolan trade into the Copperbelt interior was largely monopolized initially by the kingdom of Kasanje and



NOTE: Modern national borders are displayed for illustrative purposes only. These were not fully defined until the early 20th century.

Figure 2.11. Major states in the Copperbelt region, ca. 1850. Sources: Ade Ajayi and Crowder (1981:47), author's analysis.

ivory trading directed from the East Coast sultanate of Zanzibar, and involving both East Coast entrepreneurs and local middlemen, also accelerated.²⁹

The period between 1860 and 1900 was a time of traumatic change in central Africa. It saw the rapid decline of the older indigenous states, the intensification of local conflicts, a quantum increase in raiding and slave trading, and, ultimately, the advent of European colonial dominion. There were a large number of local variations in these processes. Hence, the focus will now turn more specifically to the Copperbelt region and its immediate hinterlands. In this area, the four major states of the late 19th century were those of the Luba, the nuclear Lunda, the Lunda of Kazembe and the Kingdom of M'siri. We will briefly consider each in turn.

later by (indigenous) Ovimbundu entrepreneurs from the Angolan highlands. By the late 19th century, large caravans of well-armed Ovimbundu were raiding and trading at will in (what is now) central and southern Zaire. The Portuguese colonial entity was essentially coastal and the Portuguese proved unable to extend their political control over (what is now) central and eastern Angola until the end of the 19th century. Birmingham (1966), J. Miller (1972, 1976 and 1983) and Soremekun (1977) provide additional detail.

²⁹This was significant for our interest here, among other reasons, because it introduced the Swahili language of the Arabized East Coast into central Africa as an important lingua franca. This probably did not occur before the mid 19th century, and Swahili was subsequently only one of several linguae francae in the region in the precolonial era. Besides Swahili-speaking East Coast traders, indigenous entrepreneurs of Bisa, Yao and Nyamwezi origin were also prominent in slave raiding and trading on the 19th century Copperbelt. See Bennett (1986) for a study of Arab and European interaction in 19th century east-central Africa.

The Luba Kingdom grew from a Luba nucleus in what is now the north-central Shaba Région of Zaire, beginning a substantial expansion sometime after about 1500. This growth continued unevenly until about the 1870s, when an interregnal period of civil war, and an intensification of slave raiding from Angola, pushed the state into decline and disintegration which lasted until it was subdued by the Belgians in the early 1900s.³⁰

The Belgian colonial administration subsequently constrained the central Luba (Luba-Shaba) to coalesce into two major chiefdoms, whose dynasties have remained mutually hostile. Colonial authorities permitted other Luba peoples on the periphery of the heartland area to remain in their own autonomous chiefdoms, a situation which continues until the present.³¹ (Any discussion of the Luba peoples in modern Zaire must make a clear distinction between the Luba of Kasai and the Luba of Shaba--peoples who are historically

³⁰By far the most authoritative account of Luba history to the colonial period was constructed by Reefer (1981), from which this account is summarized. Vansina (1966) provides an older but highly useful summary of Luba history, relating it to that of other savanna kingdoms. Womersley (1984) offers additional historical and cultural detail

³¹One characteristic of the succession to the Luba imperial throne was a period of warfare between claimants and their followers. Europeans arrived as colonizers during one such interregnum and prevented the two remaining contenders from fighting to the finish, effectively dividing the nuclear Luba into two political entities.

and culturally related, but who now differ in a number of important respects.)³²

Turning now to the major Lunda polity, this empire developed from a nuclear area in what is now northwestern Shaba after about 1600.³³ It, too, spread in fits and starts over the next two and a half centuries. However, by about 1850, it had developed into the largest of the central savanna states with at least some claim to a huge region blanketing (what is now) southern Zaire and portions of (what are now) northwestern Zambia and northeastern Angola. (The area around Kolwezi had fallen under Lunda dominion by about 1700.³⁴) The Lunda political system proved

³²Unlike the Luba-Shaba, who formed the nucleus of the Empire, the Luba-Kasai seem to be to a large extent the descendants of "Luba-ized" slaves and displaced persons left in the southern Kasai area in the wake of the violent events of the late 19th century. They were early recipients of Christian missionary attention and relatively well placed to take early advantage of the developing infrastructure of the colonial state. See particularly Young (1976:175-176). Although the heartland of the traditional Luba ethnic area is north of the Copperbelt, portions of the Luba Shaba and Luba-Kasai regions have historically sustained a relatively high population density. Since the 1920s, the industrial enterprises on the Zairian Copperbelt have recruited heavily among both the Luba of Shaba and the Luba of Kasai, and a very high proportion of the modern urban population in southern Zaire is of Luba origin.

³³The seminal Lunda are perhaps more accurately designated the Ruund people (or, in their language ARuund, singular KaRuund), and their language URuund. The word Lunda, though an obvious cognate of Ruund, has come to apply to a broader ethnic category than that of Ruund. The title of the Lunda king is Mwant Yav. It is perhaps best to refer to his state as the kingdom of the Mwant Yav so as to avoid confusion with the "other" Lunda kingdom, that of Kazembe, described below. Hoover (1978) has written the authoritative history of the Ruund people and the empire of the Mwant Yav.

³⁴See Hoover (1978:249-270) and Reeve (1983:191-192).

particularly adept at integrating conquered peoples and leaders on the periphery of the state, and it was ultimately much more ethnically heterogeneous than the Luba polity.³⁵

One major outgrowth of the nuclear Lunda state was the "Kazembe" kingdom. This polity was ultimately established in the resource-rich Luapula River valley (east of the Copperbelt), whose inhabitants were conquered by Lunda imperial adventurers in the mid 18th century. By the early 19th century, the "Kazembe" kingdom had become essentially independent of the Mwant Yav. It comprised a major autonomous state in its own right, ruled by a "Lunda" aristocracy.³⁶ Its court eventually rivalled that of the central Lunda state, and profited from the east coast

³⁵The Lunda political system built upon the social institutions of "positional succession" and "perpetual kinship" to provide durable ties between chiefs of conquered polities and the Lunda emperor. Further, a foreign origin seems not to have been an impediment to high responsibility in the empire. See Vansina (1966:82-83), Hoover (1978:244-287; 317-326) and Cunison (1956). For these reasons, the empire was multiethnic and multilingual from at least the beginning of the 18th century. Some regional courts may have maintained use of the Ruund (seminal Lunda) language into the 19th century, but the non-Ruund chieftancies of the former empire do not use the Ruund language today. The "Lunda" system displayed a high order of political innovation leading to very impressive social and political cohesion over a vast area of central Africa. However, it is easy to overstate the degree of centralized control which a royal court exerted on distant peripheries of the "state."

³⁶For an overview of the "Kazembe" kingdom in historical perspective and a more detailed (though now somewhat dated) study of the lifeways and institutions of the Luapula valley populations, see Cunison (1951, 1956 and 1959). "Kazembe" is the title of the chief officeholder in this Lunda polity.

commerce emanating from Portuguese Mozambique and the Zanzibar sultanate.³⁷

Both the Mwant Yav and the Kazembe polities underwent profound disintegration in the late 19th century. Let us briefly address each in turn.

In the 19th century, Atlantic-coast trade gradually undermined the control of the Mwant Yav's court over chiefs on the empire's western periphery. The central court itself seems to have become increasingly rapacious, and the empire's internal cohesion began to crumble. The increasing Atlantic coast trade in slaves, ivory and (later) wild rubber seems to have been an important factor in launching the formidable Tshokwe peoples on a slow, 50-year infiltration of the western marches of the empire.³⁸ By the 1870s, Tshokwe mercenaries had become an important factor in succession struggles between Lunda political factions. Ultimately, in an interregnal period of strife in the Lunda empire, Tshokwe raiders overran the very heartland of the empire and burned the imperial capital in 1885.

³⁷St. John (1970) provides a useful discussion of Kazembe's trade with the East Coast in the 19th century.

³⁸The Tshokwe were a grouping of matrilineal peoples originating in east-central Angola and loosely organized in small chieftancies. They were linguistically and culturally akin to the nuclear Lunda from which some of their oral tradition claimed an origin. Their prowess as traders, hunters and (ultimately) raiders in the chaotic 19th century enabled them to dominate a vast area in a short period of time. Much of their success stemmed from an ability to rapidly incorporate captured people--particularly slave women--into the Tshokwe social system. Vansina (1966:216-227), J.C. Miller (1969, 1970:175-201 and 1983:155-156), Hoover (1978:303-316) and Birmingham (1966) provide good summaries.

While small groups of Tshokwe subsequently occupied much of the nuclear Lunda region, they could not quickly assimilate the Lunda people. Between 1888 and 1898, several Lunda nobles organized an increasingly successful anti-Tshokwe insurgency. In 1898, the Lunda rose en masse and routed a major Tshokwe army.

Unfortunately for the Lunda, their resounding victory occurred virtually at the moment that a European-led colonial army arrived in the area.³⁹ As a result of subsequent European colonial operations, the Lunda Empire of the Mwant Yav itself was, by the early 20th century, partitioned between the Congo Free State of Leopold II, the British South Africa colony (now Zambia) and Portuguese Angola.

The Copperbelt's western range extends into the nuclear Lunda area. The colonial era town of Kolwezi was later established in an area accustomed to Lunda political control.⁴⁰

³⁹This was of course, a military force of the Congo Free State, belonging to the Belgian king, Leopold II. For a detailed study of the early history of Leopold's colonial army (and its legacy), see Shaw (1984). For detail on early colonial military operations in Katanga (now Shaba), see Boyd (1982).

⁴⁰Because of its proximity, the Copperbelt has consistently drawn Lunda (and closely related peoples) into the urban industrial work force. See Fabian (1971:213), Bustin (1975:177) and Boyd (1982:261). The Lunda were initially not attracted in large numbers to the industrializing Copperbelt and despite its proximity to the Lunda heartland, a surprisingly small proportion of the mining company workforce is of Lunda extraction today.

We turn now to the eastern "Lunda" kingdom of Kazembe. Founded as a Lunda tributary state in about 1740, this polity in the Luapula River valley controlled one of the most resource-rich regions in this part of central Africa, with highly fertile soil and a lucrative fishing industry. By the 18th century, population density was accordingly high, and several separate but culturally related peoples lived in the region. As we have seen, Lunda conquerors installed themselves as an aristocracy over this ethnically heterogeneous valley and its surrounding area.⁴¹

After 1862, the Kazembe Kingdom entered a 30-year period of intermittent civil war over rival claims of succession. During this period, a Nyamwezi trader-adventurer named M'siri established himself on the western periphery of the Kazembe polity, and eventually built a predatory trading kingdom that dismantled the western half of that state.⁴² M'siri's power was based on access to

⁴¹The original "Lunda" conquerors may actually have been of Luba, Kaniok or even Sanga origin as "Lunda-ized" adventurers in service of the emperor (Hocver, 1978:249-267; and Reeve 1983:191-192). It is difficult to reconstruct their origins with precision, however, their state combined both Lunda and local features. By the late 19th century, the court language was the local "Shila" which is now generally viewed as a dialect of Bemba.

⁴²The Nyamwezi are a grouping of former trading peoples (of diverse origin) who once monopolized much of the East Coast (Indian Ocean) trade to the central African interior. Their home area is (what is now) west central Tanzania. For a discussion of Nyamwezi trade in pre-colonial central Africa, see A. Roberts (1970). M'siri was also called Ngelengwa, Mushid or Mwenda depending on context. The name "M'siri" seems to have been a title derived from the Ruund name "Mushid" (Hoover, 1978:355).


firearms, and upon trade with the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts.

M'siri settled on (what would later come to be called) the Zairian Copperbelt. He imposed his rule initially on the local Sanga peoples who worked the rich local copper deposits. Eventually, he extended his state over other peoples in proximate chiefdoms and became the dominant power in the region, trading with both east and west coasts. His capital (Bunkeya), near the modern Zairian town of Likasi, was a very cosmopolitan center.⁴³ The regime became increasingly oppressive, however, and by the mid 1880s, a number of tributary chiefdoms were in revolt.

M'siri's rule coincided with the advent of extensive European intrusion in the region. British missionaries arrived in the kingdom in the mid 1880s, maintaining a more or less permanent presence from that point on.⁴⁴ In 1891, both Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company and

⁴³M'siri's ethnically heterogeneous military aristocracy was called the Yeke (plural Bayeke) and his kingdom, Ngarenganze. While M'siri and his closest entourage were of Nyamwezi origin, it seems likely that the most common language in his kingdom was the local KiSanga. In M'siri's day, the intimate court apparently spoke a Nyamwezi dialect which has since died out. Trading languages in the region at the time possibly included a simplified Luba, as well as Mbundu, Portuguese and (perhaps) Swahili. See Boyd (1982:35-68), Curtin, *et al.* (1978:433-435) and Fabian (1986:6-8) for more detail. Arnot (1969), Cornet (1946), Verbeken (1956), Verdick (1952), Vansina (1966:227-235) and Boyd (1982:36-62) provide useful discussion of the life and times of M'siri.

⁴⁴See particularly Arnot (1969 and 1914). The British missionaries at M'siri's court were of the Plymouth Brethren persuasion, initiating a religious group which has remained prominent among Protestant churches in Shaba to the present.



NOTE: Modern national borders are displayed for illustrative purposes only. These were not fully defined until the early 20th century.

Figure 2.12. The major indigenous states, ca. 1890.
Sources: Ade Ajayi and Crowder (1981:47) and author's analysis.

(Leopold's) Belgian-led columns arrived in M'siri's capital. A serious European misjudgment soon occurred in a very tense situation---a Free State lieutenant shot and killed M'siri at the cost of his own life.

The new king, not surprisingly, was quite amenable to the authority of his new European masters. However, it required almost a decade for colonial armies to bludgeon M'siri's rebellious subjects (of various ethnic groups) into a grudging acceptance of European rule.

Most of M'siri's kingdom proved ephemeral--it did not survive his demise, but reverted politically to the autonomous small-scale indigenous chiefdoms upon which it had been built. Virtually the entire modern-day Zairian Copperbelt region falls within at least the outer limits of M'siri's once grand kingdom. (The Kolwezi area seems to have been on the western border of this state.) However, beyond the small Yeke chiefdom of modern Zaire, there is little remaining legacy.

Meanwhile, the "Lunda" Kazembe empire in truncated form continued through the M'siri era. Kazembe was still a powerful local authority on the Luapula River with a strong trading network built upon East Coast Arab and Afro-Arab ties.

Between 1897 and 1898, the British South Africa Company militarily humbled Kazembe's neighbors, the powerful Bemba

chiefdoms in the plateau country east of the Luapula River.⁴⁵ Kazembe apparently concluded that resistance was futile and, facing a British expeditionary column, negotiated his own submission in 1900. Ultimately, his kingdom was divided along the Luapula River. The west bank became part of the Congo Free State (later, Belgian Congo). The east bank was retained by the British South Africa Company as part of (what became) the Northern Rhodesia colony. Kazembe remained the recognized authority over a large territory in both colonies.⁴⁶

The period between about 1885 and 1905 saw the consolidation of at least a tenuous European control over all of central Africa. The advent of European control ended a particularly turbulent and unsettled period in central African history. The Copperbelt area itself, probably never very densely populated, was by 1900 almost denuded of people as a result of war, famine, slave-raiding, and punitive colonial expeditions. It is difficult to escape the

⁴⁵A. Roberts (1973, 1976) provides both an authoritative history of the Bemba and a succinct account of British colonial intrusion and consolidation in (what is now) Zambia. The Bemba peoples in their several different chiefdoms shared a wide range of social and political institutions and were undergoing a process of political consolidation around the Citimukulu chieftainship in the 19th century. They did not, however, form as unified a political entity as the Luba or Lunda kingdoms. Bemba oral traditions claim a Lunda origin, but this has been disputed by modern scholars on various grounds (A. Roberts, 1973:38-50).

⁴⁶Since the Luapula valley was a close and relatively densely populated area, it was an early site of European recruitment for the industrializing Copperbelts of both the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia).

conclusion that external economic and (later) political factors produced much of the 19th century turbulence, a point eloquently argued for the Copperbelt hinterlands by Hoover (1978:354), Vellut (1977:296) and others.

European occupation fundamentally altered the indigenous political structures of the region. The great central African states had lost their autonomy. In several cases, they had all but disappeared, irreparably fractured into smaller entities. Indigenous chiefs now functioned, to greater or lesser degree, as servants of the larger colonial state, their prerogatives much reduced. We can now turn to a brief consideration of manner in which the Copperbelt was reduced to the control of European powers.

Arrival of European Colonialism

European penetration of the Copperbelt hinterland is a very recent phenomenon. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Luba and (two) Lunda polities were economically and militarily powerful. The royal courts were the terminus of a considerable and growing trade from both the east and west coasts. The coastal trade to the interior was controlled at this point by indigenous African traders.

However, at the end of the 18th century, Portuguese commercial agents began to appear in the interior courts, and by the mid 19th century, Portuguese traders were maintaining permanent trading missions.⁴⁷ The Portuguese

⁴⁷Although here it should be noted that indigenous Africans in Portuguese employ and mulatto pombeiros preceded

were, thus, the first Europeans to penetrate the Copperbelt hinterlands, and their presence (in very small numbers) occurred on a regular basis only in the 19th century.⁴⁸

Besides the Portuguese traders, European penetration of the Copperbelt hinterlands was a late 19th century phenomenon, initially prosecuted by explorers and adventurers. David Livingstone passed somewhat to the east in 1867-8. The British Royal Navy officer and explorer, Verney L. Cameron, travelled through the area between 1873 and 1875. (It was Cameron whose writing stirred a key interest in the mineral wealth of the region.) Next came a series of expeditions by German explorers (Pogge and Lux, 1875; Schutt, 1877; Buchner, 1878-1881; and Reichard, 1884).

The intensity of European exploration coincided with increasing European interest in African territory. These efforts were given a more defined form in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which specified guidelines for territorial annexation and colonial claims. (In the early 1880s, Belgian King Leopold II had begun to pursue

the European Portuguese merchants at the royal courts (Bustin, 1975:21).

⁴⁸Vellut (1972), Hoover (1978:347-355), and Bustin (1975:20-40) provide good general discussions of Portuguese commercial activities in the region. For a discussion of indigenous commercial networks, see Miller (1972; 1976) and Birmingham (1966). The Portuguese tried in 1888 to convert their commercial connection into an effective colonial claim, but lacked the political capital to overcome (Belgian King) Leopold II's claim to (what is now) the Shaba Région of Zaire.

sovereignty over African territory in the Zaire [Congo] River basin.⁴⁹⁾

By the mid 1880s, the Copperbelt area was nominally within Leopold's Congo Free State claim, but the boundaries of the claim were vague, and the region had not been occupied by any colonial power. Rumors of mineral riches stimulated both British and Belgian interest, and by about 1890 a substantial competition developed between Leopold's Free State and the British South Africa Company.⁵⁰ This resulted in a number of British and Belgian-led expeditions into the Copperbelt region, with primary interest centering around M'siri's court.

A British expedition arrived first (in November 1890) followed closely by four Free State columns (led by Le

⁴⁹Gann and Duignan (1979) offer an overview of Leopold's background, constraints, ambitions and colonial enterprises.

⁵⁰The Berlin Conference (1884-85) had recognized Leopold's claim to the Congo Basin region as the "Etat Independent du Congo" (Congo Free State) but the borders remained ill defined and depended for legitimacy on effective occupation. The British South Africa Company (BSAC) was founded by the British arch-imperialist, Cecil Rhodes, in 1889. It was chartered, as a British imperial surrogate, to acquire and administer African lands north of the Boer Republics of South Africa. In the early 1890s, the BSAC occupied what is now Zimbabwe and administered that colony until 1924. After 1890, BSAC agents also operated north of the Zambezi River in what is now Zambia. The general borders of that colony were delimited by about 1894 based upon agreement between Great Britain, Germany, Portugal and Belgium (acting on behalf of the Belgian Chartered Company). The BSAC also administered (what is now) Zambia until 1924, when authority was transferred to the British Colonial Office.

Marinel, Delcommune, Stairs and Bia respectively). These arrived between 1891 and early 1892.

As we have seen, M'siri was assassinated in 1891 by a member of a Free State expedition, and the Free State was ultimately able to establish its claim to most of M'siri's former domain. Perhaps more significantly, in 1891, Leopold chartered a new commercial enterprise--the Compagnie du Katanga (CK). This entity was modeled after the British chartered companies (like the BSAC) and was commissioned, in essence, to occupy and administer the Katanga (Shaba) region.⁵¹ In return, the company was apportioned about a third of the land area and granted lucrative rights to minerals discovered in the region.⁵²

It was the Compagnie du Katanga which actually administered the Free State expeditions into Katanga, and after 1891 assumed the responsibility of reducing the region to Free State control. However, between 1891 and 1900, Free State forces remained very small, consisting essentially of a limited number of European officers with small garrisons

⁵¹While the name "Katanga" is of uncertain origin, it was the title of the Sanga chief whose territory was usurped by M'siri at the beginning of the latter's career of territorial aggrandizement. Eventually, the name came to be applied to the whole region and was adopted by the Free State administration as a provincial designation of a large area. "Katanga Province" survived as a political division into the era of independent Zaire. In the late 1960s, the province was redesignated "Shaba" (the Swahili word for copper), as one of many measures to bury the region's separatist and secessionist past.

⁵²Boyd (1982:57-62) provides more detail on the founding and early activity of the Compagnie du Katanga.

of African troops. These conducted "pacification" operations in a somewhat sporadic, and marginally effective, but very lethal manner.⁵³

The Compagnie du Katanga operations were mainly centered north and northeast of M'siri's former empire and conducted from a series of small posts. The company was able to impose little coherent administration or development, so in 1900, Leopold commissioned a new organization, the Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK) to administer the Katanga region in the place of the ineffective Compagnie du Katanga.

The CSK, in turn, lost its exclusive mandate to govern Katanga in 1910. In that year, far-reaching administrative reforms saw the imposition of a Belgian (rather than Free State) colonial administration on the region.⁵⁴ The CSK

⁵³Boyd (1982:94) speculates that "there were probably fewer than fifty whites administering Katanga at any one time until 1900, either as commercial agents or as agents of the Free State."

⁵⁴The Congo Free State was the private fief of Belgian King Leopold II. In the late 1890s, atrocities perpetrated by his concessionary companies and Free State agents were so pervasive and well documented that they provoked an international outcry. Perhaps most memorable were reports of baskets full of smoked human hands, severed and preserved by concessionary company agents, as punishment of local villagers for failure to meet production quotas of wild rubber. Mutilation and even execution of indigenous people for small infractions were apparently commonplace. In the face of a growing international furor, Leopold stalled with minor concessions until 1904, when pressure forced him to appoint a commission of inquiry. The commission recommended sweeping administrative changes, and some reform was initiated in 1906. However, a variety of factors now obliged Leopold to relinquish his personal sovereignty over the Congo to the Belgian government. In November 1908, the Congo Free State ceased to exist, the huge territory was

continued, however, as a quasi-official agency until the era of Zairian independence.

The development of a European mining industry in Katanga was an outgrowth of the CSK.⁵⁵ By December of 1900, the CSK had granted a British-owned company, Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. (TCL), a prospecting charter in Katanga. In 1902, Free State and British money was committed to a joint railroad venture to link the Katanga Copperbelt with the railroad being built northward from South Africa (through British territory). That railroad arrived (in late 1910) at what was becoming the main Katanga administrative center of Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi).

By 1905, considerable deposits of various minerals had been located by Tanganyika Concessions on the Zairian Copperbelt. Small extraction efforts were already underway near Kambove and (what would later be) Kolwezi and

annexed by Belgium as the Belgian Congo colony. However, Katanga had always had a separate status, and Belgian colonial reorganization of that province's administration did not occur until 1910.

⁵⁵Fetter (1976:18-22) argues that the creation of the CSK was actually a reaction by Leopold II to increasing British interest in Katanga, and an attempt to counterbalance the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. The Free State (and later the Belgian colonial administration) were highly suspicious of British imperial motives in the region. Though much British money and considerable numbers of Britons (and South Africans) were involved in the Katanga mining industry in its early years, they were suspected, feared and subjected to various forms of harassment and discrimination by the Belgian administration. Belgian fears of the British, though exaggerated, had perhaps some substance. The Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., headed by Robert (later Sir Robert) Williams, was an outgrowth of Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company. As such, it had strong ties to leading British imperialists in both London and British Africa.

Lubumbashi, and these were being worked by Tanganyika Concessions laborers housed in a network of temporary camps connected by bicycle paths. Copper, gold and tin were the initial minerals of interest. By 1906, the company had a supervisory force of some 18 Europeans in Katanga (Fetter, 1976:22).

So with this background, let us turn now to a brief overview of the growth of the Zairian minerals industry, tracing its history and noting its current features.

The Development of a Copper Industry

The Roots of the Modern Shaban Copper Industry

The Copperbelt region has been the locus of a copper "industry" for perhaps two thousand years. The remains of ancient indigenous copper workings and refining furnaces are found in a number of Copperbelt locations. However, the precolonial industries were very small-scale by modern standards, and tended to be the exclusive preserve of small, ethnically-defined craft elites living near the exploitable surface ore deposits.⁵⁶

The modern copper industry of Zaire dates only to the early years of the present century. For the first sixty

⁵⁶See Coleman (1971) for a particularly good discussion of indigenous copper-working sites on the Zambian Copperbelt. Bisson (1976) has written what is probably the authoritative account of pre-colonial, indigenous copper industries on the Copperbelts of Zaire and Zambia. Herbert (1984) provides a useful overview of the precolonial copper industry in Africa as a whole.

years of its existence, the industry was the exclusive preserve of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), the giant Belgian concessionary company which, along with the Roman Catholic Church and Belgian colonial administration, came to form the triadic governing structure of colonial Katanga.

The year 1906 was critical for Belgian King Leopold II, the Congo Free State and the Katanga mining industry. By that year, a considerable and growing international outcry against Free State concessionary company atrocities seemed to portend a possibility of international intervention in the Congo and, possibly, Free State dismemberment. Funding remained a difficulty. The Belgian parliament itself was increasingly restive over Free State management (in which, of course, it had no role, since the Free State belonged to the Belgian monarch, not the Belgian nation). The king undoubtedly believed he needed political and financial assistance to retain his Congo holding. As part of a strategy to accommodate the various problems, Léopold launched three major new Free State enterprises in 1906 to be financed by both Belgian and (hopefully, sympathetic) foreign investors. Two of the three enterprises were specifically relevant to the mineral industry: a railroad company, the Compagnie du Chemin de fer du Bas-Congo au

Katanga (BCK); and a mining company, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK).⁵⁷

After 1906, the UMHK assumed the prospecting rights-- and the active mining sites--previously operated by the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. in southern Katanga. Also inherited were the personnel and labor camps. Up to this point, most of the management personnel were of British or South African origin. Perhaps as many as half of the indigenous labor force (of 600-700 men) had been recruited from British Africa, a situation which persisted until about 1910 (Boyd, 1982:171).⁵⁸

The first significant mine in European Katanga was developed at Ruashi (just east of modern Lubumbashi) between about 1902 and 1908. By 1909, the UMHK had commenced construction of a copper refinery a few miles west of the mining site.⁵⁹ In mid-1910, the new Belgian regional government, under the auspices of Major Emile

⁵⁷The most useful sources providing a general historical overview of the southern Zaire mineral industry during the colonial period are Mottoulle (1949), UMHK (1956), Cornet (1946; 1950), Fetter (1973; 1976; 1983), Higginson (1979), Perrings (1979) and Boyd (1982). This account is a summary of information provided by these sources, except as noted. It is important to note that other (smaller scale) mineral industries were developed elsewhere in the Belgian colony during the colonial period. A good overview is provided by Vellut (1983).

⁵⁸Interestingly, the vehicular languages of the Katangan mining industry at this point were English, Fanagalo (so-called "Kitchen-Kaffir," a Zulu-based pidgin used on the industrialized Rand of South Africa) and Karanga (a Shona dialect) native to (what is now) Zimbabwe.

⁵⁹The refinery became operational in 1911 and produced about 1000 tons of copper in that year (UMHK, 1956).

Wangermée, established the regional administrative center between the mine and the refinery. The site was named Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi) it soon became--and has remained--the key city of the region.⁶⁰ As we have seen, the railway from South Africa also arrived in Elisabethville in late 1910.

By the mid 1930s, the mining industry had assumed its familiar role as a key element in the local power triad of colonial administration, Roman Catholic Church and UMHK.⁶¹ This governing structure lasted until Zaire achieved its independence in 1960.

Early Copper Industry Labor Recruitment

Until about 1906, the colonial requirements for labor in Katanga were met either by importing (mining industry) laborers from British Africa or by levies imposed on

⁶⁰Fetter (1976 and 1983) has argued convincingly that the new urban center was highly predatory, consuming human and material resources from otherwise underpopulated hinterlands and providing very little in infrastructural (or other) benefits to the rural hinterland. The new urban center consumed European goods imported through South Africa and denuded the hinterland of food, money (in the form of taxes) and manpower. This relationship has been scarcely attenuated in the intervening 75 years.

⁶¹The role of the church centered in great degree around the prelate, de Hemptinne (died 1957), a Benedictine whose autocratic personality and aristocratic connections suited him well to the extensive political role he played in southern Zaire for almost 40 years. Fetter (1976:103-107) provides more detail. The "colonial trinity" is a formulation introduced by Crawford Young (1965:10). Fetter (1976:166) argues that the church had fully established its authority by about 1926, while the UMHK and colonial government fully consolidated theirs over colonial society only in the mid 1930s.

proximate local peoples. After 1906, the need for labor escalated, local villagers became increasingly adept at avoiding the coercive labor recruitment, and European employers were obliged to devote considerable efforts to obtaining low cost African labor from increasingly remote locations.⁶²

A primary colonial mechanism used to spur labor recruitment was the "hut tax," a feature of both Belgian and British African colonial administration. The Congo Free State established this requirement in 1891, payable in coin or kind. By 1910, the hut tax was payable in coin only, reflecting the colonial policy of deliberately forcing able-bodied men into European wage-labor employment (Fetter, 1983:146-148 and Boyd, 1982:256-257).

The actual recruitment of Africans for European employment was performed largely by semi-official colonial agencies which worked in collusion with indigenous

⁶²See particularly, Higginson (1976:87-130). Ironically, the Belgian administration had recognized as early as 1913 that more than sufficient local labor would have been available had European employers been willing to provide adequate working conditions and fair compensation (Boyd, 1982:270-271). It should perhaps be noted here that a portion of the mining company work force was of European or (white) South African extraction. From the beginning, of course, all managerial positions were filled by whites. However, a substantial number of skilled and semi-skilled workers were also Europeans or South Africans. In the 1920s, the UMHK undertook to reduce the English-speaking white work force, ultimately substituting short-term contract laborers from Belgium, and training indigenous workers to perform a number of low-level managerial, skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Salaries of indigenous workers remained considerably lower than those of Europeans (Fetter, 1976:24,95-97,101; and Perrings, 1979:48-54).

authorities in Katanga and (British) Rhodesia to provide manpower to the growing industrial areas. Until the 1920s, this recruitment in Zaire was very coercive.⁶³

In the early years, workers in the Katanga mining industry were hired for contracts of three to twelve months, renewable for three additional months (Perrings, 1979:21). Their presence in the urban area was expected to end with the termination of their work contracts. As was true of other African employees of European activities, the workers lived as bachelors in crowded and unsanitary labor camps, were subjected to a highly structured, rigorous, often dangerous and invariably unfamiliar work regimen, were often treated with considerable brutality by overseers and were issued unfamiliar and inadequately varied staples as rations.⁶⁴ Not surprisingly, death rates from accident and

⁶³In essence, local chiefs were paid to designate expendable local manpower for recruiters to haul off to the Copperbelt. The major employers were the UMHK and the two railroad companies (BCK and CFK), but smaller employers also absorbed some of the recruited manpower (See Boyd, 1982:253-271). Perrings (1979:19-20) notes that until 1910, a considerable amount of food for the industrializing sector was purchased from indigenous farmers, indicating an early capability (given the opportunity) for indigenous peasants to avoid urban wage labor, and participate effectively in the European cash economy.

⁶⁴The manioc, sorghum and millet staples consumed by local peoples in the Copperbelt hinterlands at the beginning of the 20th century were difficult for colonial authorities to obtain and store in sufficient quantity. Maize (mealies) meal from South Africa was more convenient to handle and became the issued ration. Likewise, indigenous preference for fruits, vegetables, palm oil and fish could not be accommodated in the early colonial period. Rather, the mining industry issued beef and peanuts. The UMHK could afford--and did provide--rations of more than adequate caloric value for the rigorous life of the miners. However,

disease were very high,⁶⁵ and desertion rates were correspondingly high.⁶⁶

The increasing demand for Copperbelt labor and the relative unavailability of local laborers meant that from the early 1900s, Belgian colonial enterprises were obliged to obtain indigenous laborers from British Africa.⁶⁷ In the

unfamiliar and nutritionally imbalanced rations contributed to the problems of adjustment and probably accounted in some measure to the high incidence of gastro-intestinal diseases in the camps. This was compounded by the long, demanding work regimen which discouraged adequate preparation of traditional fare, and absence of women who almost invariably prepared the food in rural central African households. See Dibwe (forthcoming), Fetter (1976:35) and Boyd (1982:269).

⁶⁵The African death rate in Lubumbashi in 1911 may have been as high as 24 percent. Annual death rates in UMHK camps in 1914 were 6.5 percent, in 1917, 10.6 percent and in 1918, 20.2 percent (the latter figure reflecting the local impact of the worldwide influenza epidemic of 1918). By the 1920s, the annual death rate in the UMHK camps was hovering between about 3 percent and 5 percent (Fetter, 1976:33-37). See also Higginson (1979:121-130, 191-202) and Dibwe (forthcoming).

⁶⁶Fetter (1976:35) cites as illustrative a desertion rate of 45 percent for a three-month levy of UMHK workers in 1912. See also Boyd (1982:267-270) and Higginson (1979:165-167, 187-202). Perrings (1979) argues that desertion often had an essentially economic motivation--workers concluding that they had sufficient accumulated money to accommodate their economic objectives or seeing greater economic opportunity in alternative activity in the modernized sector.

⁶⁷In a significant example of the industry/state collaboration, there were two major colonial recruiting agencies, the (Belgian) Bourse de Travail du Katanga (BTK) founded in 1910 and reformed in the 1920s, and a subsidiary of Tanganyika Concessions (TCL). See Higginson (1979:165-187). The BTK could only operate in Belgian territory, and its inability to obtain enough workers forced a (reluctant) Belgian reliance on TCL until 1924 (see Fetter, 1976:39-42; Boyd, 1982:252-262 and Perrings, 1979:13-14). The government in Northern Rhodesia obliged TCL to assume a measure of responsibility for Rhodesian workers in Belgian employ, who also obtained better remuneration. While the

years just prior to World War I, a very large proportion of this labor was recruited in the relatively densely populated Luapula valley region among peoples associated with the old Kazembe Kingdom. (Their language, CiBemba, became an important early language in the worker camps.) The colonial border bisected the Luapula valley, so some of the workers from the region were from "Belgian" Africa, some from "British" Africa. Fetter (1976:41) estimates that prior to World War I, at least half of the African labor force on the Belgian colony Copperbelt had been recruited in British Africa.⁶⁸

In the World War I years, the UMHK dramatically expanded its production and its labor force, the latter from about 2,000 in 1914 to 12,000 by 1919 (UMHK, 1956:214-216).⁶⁹ The corresponding demand for laborers spurred a

British demands irritated the Katangan Belgians, it did significantly enhance the position of indigenous "Rhodesians" (see Fetter, 1976:41-42). By no means all of the labor force was procured by the official recruiting agencies, despite the poor working conditions and low compensation. A variety of factors spurred a certain amount of voluntary employment from the early years of the industry into the 1920s. Perhaps a major attraction of rural Zairian men to the Copperbelt industries was the impoverishment of the countryside under a harsh colonial regime and the desire to avoid forced recruitment by the railroad companies, whose working conditions were particularly arduous and remuneration especially poor (Fetter, 1976:85-87; Perrings, 1979:155-157; and Higginson, 1979:203-219).

⁶⁸See also Higginson (1979:152). The high proportion of company workers from British Africa lasted until the Great Depression, when total employment was significantly curtailed. By about 1932, most of the British colony workers had been eliminated from the UMHK work force.

⁶⁹Increased production did not, of course, benefit the African work force, whose compensation was continually

significant increase in recruiting. Robert William's company sent agents as far as (what are now) Botswana and Angola as well as the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (now Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi) in a search for labor. At the same time, the Belgian agency (BTK) was granted authority to recruit further north in (what are now) the Kasai regions of central Zaire, well north of the Katanga provincial border. One result of this expanding recruitment was a Copperbelt labor force consisting increasingly of workers of non-Katangan origin. The component of the labor force drawn from the Kasai increased steadily from that point on. Workers of Songye and Luba-Kasai ethnic origin were most heavily represented in this recruitment.⁷⁰ The Luba-Kasai language, TshiLuba, became a widely used tongue in the mining camps (De Craemer, 1977:41-48; Higginson, 1979:303-314).

Buying power of copper industry wages fell in the early 1920s (Fetter, 1976:84). Working conditions remained deplorable, and abuses continued. In the aftermath of World War I, the Copperbelt underwent another labor crisis, with

eroded by inflation and escalating wartime prices. Living and working conditions deteriorated as death rates rose. At the same time, reports of conditions on the Copperbelt encouraged rural residents to avoid recruitment, exacerbating the labor "problem" of the war years (Fetter, 1976:57-58).

⁷⁰By the end of the colonial era, the Luba-Kasai came to dominate that portion of the Copperbelt formal sector economy allotted to Africans. See particularly Young (1976:175-181).

the UMHK particularly hard-hit. This was exacerbated by the mid 1920s decision in neighboring British-ruled Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) to develop a major copper industry: British colonial authorities severely restricted recruitment for the Katangan mines after 1925. The situation was alleviated for the Belgian mining industry only by the colonial government, which authorized Copperbelt labor recruitment further north in the Belgian colony and in the newly mandated (former German) territories of (what are now) Rwanda and Burundi.⁷¹

The Stabilization Policy

Availability of industrial labor remained a substantial problem for the mining industry, and after the mid-1920s the UMHK undertook a significant effort to increase the stability of its labor force.⁷² The key features of the effort involved long-term worker contracts accompanied by a

⁷¹In 1926, for instance, a full two thirds of the UMHK's annual recruitment (1400 out of 2100) was obtained in the mandated territories (Fetter, 1976:91).

⁷²This resulted from a wide-ranging managerial reorganization in 1926 associated with Leopold Mottoulle and Ernest Toussaint (Fetter, 1976:110-113; Perrings, 1977:44-71; and Mottoulle 1946). While humanitarian considerations cannot be dismissed, the key objectives of the personnel reforms were to reduce labor force fluctuations and increase worker productivity. The reforms followed various UMHK decisions over the 1920s to liberalize labor policies, as, for instance to train Africans to assume some semi-skilled and skilled positions formerly reserved for Europeans. The basis for the major reforms, however, were decisions made by the Labor Commission (representing public and private sector interests) of 1924-1925 (Perrings, 1979:64-71 and Dibwe forthcoming).

dramatic improvement of the quality of life in the mining camps. This included much better housing, improved rations, improved medical care, enhanced educational and recreational facilities and wage differentials for length of service. In 1927, the company had established the basic workers' contract at three years. By 1928, workers were being strongly encouraged to bring their dependents with them, and in 1930, for the first time, live births exceeded deaths in the UMHK camps (Fetter, 1976:113). Industry policy had evolved to the point of seeking to develop a "detrribalized" labor force of essentially permanent urban residents.⁷³

In the years after 1927, UMHK achieved what it sought: a stable, self-reproducing work force. The mining company attempted to train virtually all male children of its indigenous employees for future mining company employment. Perhaps more directly relevant to management concerns, the stabilization of the work force significantly reduced death

⁷³The UMHK actually undertook to subsidize worker reproduction with improved housing and various bonuses to families which produced children (Perrings, 1979:82-83). The mining company even undertook to find wives for its workers in their home districts and provide necessary bride-price payments (Higginson, 1979:313-314). Dependents were also permitted to provide some household income to a mining family. Wives were allowed to cultivate plots adjacent to the mining camps, and their produce was purchased by UMHK. Likewise, dependents were permitted to brew indigenous beer under license and sell it locally (Perrings, 1979:187-199). Although the amenities of camp life were impressive by colonial standards, the camps themselves were run in a very authoritarian manner by the mining company hierarchy. Indigenous mineworkers were subjected to an almost military style of discipline (Fetter, 1973; and Fabian; 1971:60-63).

rates, absenteeism, desertion and accident rates (Perrings, 1979:85).

The worker "stabilization" policy was designed to build a long-term relationship between the company and the worker, with a continuing and growing development of workers' skills and (presumably) identification with the company well beyond the initial three-year contract. However, the company continued to rely on short-term unregistered or contract workers for perhaps a quarter to a third of its labor requirements (Perrings, 1979:122-129). By the late 1950s, a significant proportion of the company work force had, in fact, been recruited from families having a long-term association with the copper industry. But let us defer consideration of conditions within the workforce for a moment and briefly trace the growth of copper industry production up to the time of national independence.

The Copper Industry from the 1920s to the 1960s

The early 1920s marked a major expansion in the Katangan copper industry. Despite poor immediate prospects for copper sales on the world market, the (Belgian banking consortium) Société Générale elected in 1921 to finance a considerable increase in UMHK capabilities. Several statistics provide a good indication of the trend. Between 1922 and 1929, African employees of the UMHK increased from 7,500 to 17,300 (Fetter, 1976:80,92). Copper production in 1920 was 19,000 tons. By 1924 it had risen to 86,000 tons

and by 1931 to 120,000 tons (Fetter, 1976:80). At the same time, the UMHK corporate structure itself expanded through the creation of partially-owned subsidiaries. These included a local coal industry, a chemical company, an electricity generating company and even a milling company (Fetter 1976:79). A variety of factors (including increasing efficiency in refining, low extraction costs, astute investment and highly competent marketing) continued to assure the profitability of UMHK minerals.

By the mid 1920s, the center of copper mining had moved northward to mines near the town (now called) Likasi, which had been founded in 1917. (See Figure 1.1, page 2.) In the aftermath of World War II, the key mines were those further to the west, near Kolwezi (founded in 1938). Active mining sites remained (and still remain) at several sites in the whole Copperbelt area. We noted the original refinery which commenced operations in Lubumbashi in 1911. Another refinery was completed in Likasi in 1924 and still another in Likasi in 1929. (The latter refinery began producing cobalt as well as copper in 1947.)

The Great Depression had a predictably traumatic, if surprisingly temporary, impact on the copper industry. Its effects were probably first felt in 1930, with a major decline in world demand for commodities. The UMHK had by this point joined an international copper cartel--the Copper Exporters, Inc. The cartel forced a dramatic reduction in UMHK output--from 120,000 tons in 1931 to 54,000 tons in

1932. The UMHK quit the cartel in 1933 (Fetter, 1976:122-123).

The reduction in copper output in the early 1930s was accompanied by wholesale layoffs of European and African employees,⁷⁴ considerable economic retrenchment, and substantial financial hardship in both the European and urbanized African populations. However, by the late 1930s, the industry had been able to initiate a gradual expansion, which accelerated during the war years.

By the late 1930s and into the 1940s, annual copper production had increased dramatically, averaging over 150,000 tons (Whitaker, 1979:218). The war years brought a considerable increase in demand for a wide range of commodities, and UMHK mineral production expanded significantly, to include (besides copper), cobalt, tin, zinc, various rare minerals and (eventually) uranium.⁷⁵ By 1952, annual copper production had reached 200,000 tons.

Commodity prices remained surprisingly high in the decades after World War II and until about 1957. One predictable result was the continued growth of the minerals industry under UMHK auspices. By the eve of national independence in 1960, annual copper production had reached

⁷⁴The reduction saw a decrease in the labor force between 1930 and 1932 from 16,000 to 5,000 Africans and from 1800 to less than 600 Europeans (Fetter, 1976:123).

⁷⁵UMHK-produced uranium provided the fuel for U.S. nuclear munitions employed in World War II. The key mining center, producing high-quality pitchblende ore, was at Shinkolobwe.

300,000 tons and cobalt 12,000 tons. By now, three major copper refineries were operational--one at Lubumbashi and two at Likasi. A major new refinery at Kolwezi was nearing completion. Mining camps and industrial worker compounds were distributed along a belt of southern Shaba some 400 kilometers long and 100 kilometers wide.

The UMHK labor force in 1960 was nominally about 20,000; however, a very large additional urban population was involved in activity directly related to (and dependent upon) the mining industry.

In the years between 1906 and 1960, the copper industry, in the form of the UMHK, had transformed the dry, relatively infertile and lightly populated savanna highlands of southern Zaire into a major industrial region centered around the three large urban centers of Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi. These centers reflected, by central African standards, very high concentrations of people and infrastructure, although surrounding hinterlands remained relatively undeveloped and lightly populated. The minerals industry had very early come to dominate the colonial economy, a condition which persists to the present in independent Zaire.

But let us pause now for a moment to reflect upon conditions of the mining company labor force in the years between 1928 and 1960.

While the "stabilization" policy adopted by the mining company in 1928 ultimately resulted in greatly improved

working conditions for indigenous employees, it cannot be said that conditions subsequently ameliorated to European standards, or that indigenous personnel were equitably compensated for their labor. To be sure, many of the excesses and much of the arbitrary brutality of the early company "straw bosses" had ended. But the life of an indigenous industrial laborer was at best dreary and grueling, with long hours in an unhealthy (sometimes very dangerous) and uncomfortable environment. Pay was meager. Supervision on the worksite was stringent. Particularly after the early 1930s, the company came gradually to control (in a very authoritarian manner) all aspects of the lives of its employees, exercising a considerable and constant oversight not only at the worksite but also in the mining camp. Moreover, company policy required most workers to live in the tightly controlled camps under the constant eyes of the Belgian Chef de camp, his "malonda" (company spies who were stationed on every street to maintain order) and the "pères," the Catholic clergy who ran the school system and the only churches allowed in the camps (Perrings, 1979:121-129).⁷⁶

⁷⁶Perrings (1979:129) comments on other ramifications of mining company policy between 1936 and 1941 as follows:

Thus in practice the UMHK labour policy involved the discretionary stabilization of a limited proportion of the total labor force on the mines or works for a limited period varying between three and eighteen years; while essential social security in the event of disability, redundancy or retirement continued to be provided by the rural areas.

The mining company's compensation of its employees can only be described as manipulative and exploitative: the company undertook to provide its employees and their families with food rations, low-cost toiletries, free housing and medical care. It sought to keep wages as low as possible, partly by continuing to hire certain categories of unskilled employees at low wages for relatively brief periods. Moreover, the company was able on occasion to use pay differentials among groups hired from different regions to force acceptance of work by all employees at lower wages (Higginson, 1979:316-319; Vellut, 1983:134-135).

Workers' responses to these conditions varied. Some responded by absenteeism, desertion or sabotage. Up to the early 1930s, many mineworkers responded by joining indigenous (often ethnic-based) voluntary associations or by joining cells of the vigorously proselyting Kitawala (Watchtower) religious group.⁷⁷

In the wake of massive layoffs in 1931, and the financial hardships growing out of the Great Depression, mining company employees rioted in late 1931 in Ruashi, Lubumbashi and Kipushi and sabotaged equipment in various locations. Workers also organized a boycott of merchants in Lubumbashi (Higginson, 1979:320-329). Labor unrest broke out again in 1937, but it remained for the great general

⁷⁷Higginson (1979:435-466) offers a particularly detailed discussion of Kitawala in Shaba during the 1930s and 1940s. Not surprisingly, the colonial administration and the mining company management viewed Kitawala as a threat and endeavored to suppress it.

strike in 1941 to present company management with the most significant colonial era challenge. The strike was suppressed with considerable brutality by colonial authorities.⁷⁸

In the aftermath of the unrest of the early 1940s, the mining company undertook to bring selected members of the indigenous workforce into advisory bodies set up by the colonial government. In the years after World War II, mining company wages gradually increased and conditions in the mining camps improved. There was no repetition of labor unrest on the scale of the great strike of 1941.

The Copper Industry in Independent Zaire

The Belgian Congo was granted its independence from Belgium in 1960, becoming the Republic of Congo in June of that year.⁷⁹ Independence came after about four years of

⁷⁸Perrings (1979:224-228) offers a succinct overview and Higginson (1979:480-500; 1988) provides more detail. The chief complaint of the strikers seems to have been inadequate pay. There was very little centralized organization to the protest, and very little worker solidarity seemed to emerge from it. Jewsiewicki (1976) has argued that this and other major strikes in the colony during the war lacked an ethnic base and were evidence of a growing class consciousness and class mobilization. However, it is hard to see much legacy of such class consciousness in the Zaire of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. See particularly Mwabila (1973 and 1979) for the most concerted efforts to trace class consciousness in industrial contexts in Zaire.

⁷⁹The country's title was changed to the "Democratic Republic of the Congo" in the mid 1960s, apparently to avoid confusion with the former "French" Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) which in 1960 had also become the "Republic of Congo." In 1971, Mobutu renamed the country "Zaire," selecting an old regional name derived from a Portuguese corruption of the Kikongo word "nzadi" (river). Mobutu also unilaterally renamed the Congo River, which became the "Zaire" River.

substantive agitation by Congolese themselves, and in the wake of frantic short-term Belgian efforts to prepare the nascent colonial elite for its new responsibilities.⁸⁰ Perhaps not surprisingly, the first years of independence were chaotic.

The country's troubles remained front-page news from 1960 until about 1968, and included rampant regional and ethnic competition, continuing brigandage and chaos throughout the interior, several regional secessions (1960-1963), a major rebellion against the weak central government (1964-1965), various army mutinies, infighting within the

⁸⁰While Belgian infrastructural development in the colony had been impressive in a number of respects, the colonial administration had not until about 1957 seriously considered the prospect of imminent independence. The colonial education programs had been designed to produce workers, clerks, and clergymen, not political leaders. (The highly paternalistic administration retained Belgian colonial officials in all executive positions until the advent of independence.) Out of an indigenous population of about 18 million in 1960, there were only some twenty indigenous college graduates. MacGaffey (1987:39) sums up the colonial educational performance rather well:

. . . at independence in 1960, Zaire suffered from a gross lack of qualified and experienced personnel for government, administration, management and the professions. This situation was directly attributable to Belgian policy which created an efficient colonial administration to ensure a well-run system to serve Belgian interests, but which blocked access to administrative responsibility for Africans . . .

Young and Turner (1985:30-41) offer a cogent overview of the nature of Belgian colonial administration, and Young (1965:33-58; 140-161) provides a discussion of the precipitous decolonization process.

political elite and extensive foreign military intervention. The vast majority of the expatriate community fled in the early years of troubles, leaving an infrastructure which all but collapsed in most of the country. The immediate post-independence period has come to be characterized in Zaire as la pagaille, or "the shambles" (Young and Turner, 1985:41-43).⁸¹

In late 1965, the army Chief of Staff, General Mobutu, seized control of the country, ending a political deadlock between President and Prime Minister. He was approved by Parliament as President of the country in November 1965, a post he has retained ever since.⁸²

In the subsequent two decades, the Mobutu government has evolved into a quintessentially patrimonial regime in a highly centralized, authoritarian, one-party state centered around the person of Mobutu.⁸³ While foreign policy has been occasionally erratic, the regime's political and

⁸¹For more detail and an analysis of the various competing issues and factions, see also Young (1965 and 1976:163-215) and Willame (1972).

⁸²This was Mobutu's second coup. The first, in 1960, had resulted in the arrest of Zaire's prime minister (Patrice Lumumba) who was eventually flown to Shaba (then a secessionist state) where he died under mysterious circumstances. Mobutu, however, had no apparent desire to rule the country in the wake of his first coup, and a new civilian prime minister was soon installed.

⁸³Young and Turner (1985:165-184) provide analysis and detail. See also Callaghy (1984) for a stimulating comparison of Mobutu's regime to the consolidation and personalization of monarchical power in France under Louis XIV.

economic ties (and, naturally enough, its foreign support) have been firmly centered in western Europe and the United States.

Domestic economic and social policies have undergone considerable change in the Mobutu years. These changes can be perhaps best seen in a series of general stages.⁸⁴

A period of state expansion which lasted from the late 1960s to the early 1970s was marked by a relative and increasing economic well-being and increasing foreign and domestic confidence in the regime. However, a serious downturn in world commodity prices in the 1970s, the oil crisis of 1973, vast economic overcommitment by the regime in the early 1970s, and serious mistakes in domestic policies all critically undermined the regime's credibility. By 1976, Zaire was on the brink of economic catastrophe, a condition that persisted until about 1983, when Mobutu, under pressure from the international financial community, grudgingly agreed to undertake the drastic economic reform prescribed by the International Monetary Fund. Since 1983, the Zairian economy has avoided catastrophe, though at the cost of considerable and continuing economic hardship for the majority of Zairois.

The Zairian economic crisis of the mid 1970s also coincided with political crises provoked by Zaire's disastrous participation in the Angolan Civil War (1975-

⁸⁴Young and Turner (1985:47-77) offer a list of five such stages. We need not be so specific here.

1976) on the side of the losing factions (FNLA and UNITA) supported by the U.S. and South Africa. The regime's misadventures in Angola seem to have contributed to the (Angolan-sponsored) rebel invasions of Shaba in 1977 and 1978.

By the mid 1970s, it had become depressingly clear that the Zairian government's regulatory and redistributive capabilities were also seriously deficient. The growth of a predatory, indigenous "politico-mercantile" elite, profiting enormously from its position in the patrimonial state, combined with systemic corruption to the point of "kleptocracy," stripped the state of any coherent ability to undertake major internal development or, for that matter, effectively maintain existing infrastructure.⁸⁵ At the same time, preferential treatment for foreign corporations involved in commodity production reduced below the point of reasonable equity the revenues which the state could expect. These conditions have persisted to the present.⁸⁶

In all of the turbulent events in Zaire between 1960 and 1988, the copper industry has had an important role. It

⁸⁵For a detailed discussion of corruption in Zaire, see Gould (1980), for a careful study of Zaire as a "textbook" case of a dependent economy (from a dependency theory perspective) see Katwala (1979). For a detailed study of Zairian failures in rural development, see Bianga (1982).

⁸⁶Young and Turner (1985:77) have characterized the Zairian state accurately and eloquently as "... consum[ing] the national wealth without producing justice, welfare, or security, to the helpless and demoralized bewilderment of its populace."

has, in essence, remained the backbone of Zaire's economy. We turn now, briefly, to its history in that period.

The advent of independence in 1960 had surprisingly little immediate effect on the UMHK. Within two weeks of independence, Katanga Province (now Shaba) had seceded from the Congo Republic. Katanga, under the leadership of the pro-west Moise Tshombe (himself of noble Lunda extraction and scion of a rich merchant family), had little alternative other than to accommodate both the copper industry and its Belgian connections. The political chaos in the country as a whole in the early 1960s had minimal impact on the mining facilities and structures of southern Katanga. Not surprisingly, Belgians in Katanga, and financial circles in Belgium, tended to be ardent supporters of the Tshombe regime. The Katanga secession lasted until early 1963, when Tshombe's small gendarmerie was defeated in the course of United Nations' military intervention.⁸⁷

The UMHK essentially financed the Katanga secession. Its holdings and influence were so great in the Copperbelt region that it was not readily susceptible to manipulation by weak governments, and it operated with considerable autonomy. However, the establishment of the Mobutu regime in Zaire in 1965, boded ill for the autonomy of UMHK. Mobutu suspected it, with justification, of being pro-

⁸⁷For more detailed discussion of the Katanga secession and its ramifications, see Gerard-Libois (1966) and Young (1966).

Tshombe.⁸⁸ Even so, the country remained heavily dependent on the copper industry, which provided, at the time, some 70 percent of Zaire's foreign exchange (Young and Turner, 1985:289).

The events which precipitated the showdown between the UMHK and the Mobutu régime occurred in early 1966: a government tax hike was followed by a UMHK decision to raise copper prices (without consulting the government).⁸⁹ Over the course of 1966, a series of government negotiators sought a middle ground between the Mobutu government and the copper industry, but in late 1966, rising tensions seemed to preclude the prospect of an amicable settlement. When the UMHK refused (in December 1966) to transfer its headquarters from Belgium to Zaire, the Mobutu regime responded by

⁸⁸Tshombe had fled into European exile after his secessionist regime had been dismantled in 1963. However, in the wake of an increasingly successful rebellion by Marxist groups in 1964, he had returned to Zairian politics from exile as Prime Minister, suppressed the rebellion, and had won the national presidential election in 1965. In the aftermath of the Mobutu coup in 1965, Tshombe fled once more into European exile and was heavily involved in conspiracies to return to power in Zaire, including a major mercenary mutiny in Zaire in 1967. However, in that year, while on a visit to mercenary training sites in the Mediterranean, his aircraft was hijacked to Algiers under mysterious circumstances, and Tshombe was imprisoned in Algeria, where he died (also in mysterious circumstances) in 1970. For more detail on Tshombe and his state, see Colvin (1968).

⁸⁹Up to this point, the had UMHK remained an important affiliate of the Belgian Société Générale. The UMHK had also acquired extensive financial interests and holdings external to Zaire, primarily in Belgium, the location of corporate headquarters. Any contest over company assets would necessarily challenge the status of UMHK holdings in Europe.

freezing company operations. In January 1967, the regime established a new corporation to assume UMHK functions: the Générale Congolais des Minerais.⁹⁰ The Mobutu government also nationalized UMHK shares in thirteen subsidiary companies.

The UMHK structures in Zaire remained intact, however, and within two months, the UMHK's Belgian management and the Zairian government had reached an accord. A mineral enterprise of the (Belgian) Société Général, the Société Général des Minerais (SOGEMIN) was issued a three-year contract to handle minerals management and marketing, receiving 6 1/2 percent of sales revenues (the bulk of which would be paid to UMHK as compensation). Most of the UMHK management in Zaire, and virtually all of the UMHK mineral industry itself, was essentially undisturbed by this arrangement.

The SOGEMIN contract was renewed in 1969, with a further refinement of the compensation to UMHK. Demand for commodities on world markets remained high into the early 1970s, and revenues were so generous that an agreement in 1974 terminated the compensation obligation after an additional payment, which seems to have been fully paid by about 1977 (Whitaker, 1979:219). In 1971, the Zairian copper mining parastatal was renamed the Générale des Carrières et

⁹⁰The Zairian government determined to retain a 60% controlling interest, but tried to find private sector investors for the remaining 40%; when no private sector response developed, the government became sole owner.

des Mines, or Gécamines, a name it has retained to the present.

The short-term benefits to Zaire of the nationalization of the copper industry were substantial. At the insistence of the regime, copper production expanded dramatically after 1967 (from an annual production of about 300,000 tons in the mid 1960s to a high of 464,000 tons in 1975) and the state exacted substantially higher tax revenues. The nationalization also considerably (if temporarily) enhanced the regime's political credentials in the third world. However, the long-term benefits were much more questionable. Both the mid 1970s downturn in the international commodities market and an accelerating internal entropy in Zaire had seriously undermined the coherence and profitability of the Zairian copper industry by the early 1980s.

In 1974, world copper prices fell sharply, and remained depressed for over a decade. By this point, Zaire had lost the "risk insulation" provided in commodity sales by multinational corporations,⁹¹ and an attempted third-world copper cartel subsequently failed miserably. After the mid 1970s, Zaire's economic malaise discouraged foreign investment, precluding substantive and needed infrastructural financing.

This was accompanied by other developments which impacted negatively on the copper industry. The war in

⁹¹Shafer (1983) offers an illuminating discussion of the ramifications of nationalization for countries like Zaire.

Angola (1975-76), and its continuing aftermath, cut the critical Benguela Railroad from southern Zaire, across Angola, to the Atlantic. As we shall see, this rail line had played a key role in the development of mining industry activity around Kolwezi. It had remained by far the most efficient route for bulk commerce between Shaba and overseas locations. Its loss significantly increased the expense of both exports and imports in the Copperbelt region. The two rebel invasions of southern Zaire in the late 1970s resulted in limited damage to the key mining center at Kolwezi, and substantial damage to Zaire's reputation as a sound investment risk. Nor could all the industry's problems be blamed on developments external to Zaire.

The "indigenization" of the copper industry was a key goal after 1967. By 1973, a Zairian engineer had been appointed as the chief executive of Gécamines, and by 1974 over half of the company's white-collar managers were Zairois (Gécamines Rapport Annuel, 1974:32).⁹² At the same time, the labor force grew substantially, from 23,000 in 1967 to about 38,400 in 1980. Management increased in this period from 2166 to 3259 (Young and Turner, 1985:295). While some of this increase may be attributed to expanded

⁹²In an obvious effort at Gécamines administrative reform, in 1983 the Zairian chief executive was replaced for two years by a Belgian. Expatriates have continued to perform some essential roles in the most demanding engineering and technological capacities, although Zairian nationals are gradually assuming these roles.

production, the numbers of employees increased at a rate far greater than that of production. Nepotism and "feather-bedding" had come to characterize the industry. One obvious result has been a marked increase in personnel costs. Nor was this the only drain on company profits.

In 1974, the state attempted to gain control over the marketing of minerals by chartering a new parastatal, the Société Zairoise pour la Commercialisation de Minerais (SOZACOM), eliminating the Belgian (SOGEMIN) role in Zairian minerals marketing. Zaire's new minerals marketing agency soon became a paragon of corruption. Its first two directors were imprisoned for graft in 1977, and were probably scapegoats for much wider corruption. A very large proportion of state revenues generated by the minerals industry disappeared entirely. Under the considerable pressure from the international financial community, Zaire was obliged to liquidate SOZACOM in 1985 (American Metal Market, 1985:1-8). The function of minerals marketing was assumed by a reorganized Gécamines, although the SOZACOM structure itself seemed to survive intact in (what amounted to) its resubordination to Gécamines. If rampant corruption were not enough, Gécamines was confronted with local competitors in the early 1970s.

In an effort to expand production and diversify its minerals industry, the Mobutu government granted Copperbelt mining concessions to two other consortia in 1971: one in

which Japanese firms held an 85 percent interest⁹³ and one in which a combination of American, South African, French and Japanese firms held an 80 percent interest.⁹⁴ The "Japanese consortium" initiated production in 1972, producing about 36,000 tons of copper per year by 1976, but the original investors had backed out of the arrangement by 1983. The second consortium was unable to produce minerals at a profit and halted further development in 1976 (Young and Turner, 1985:301-304). In the mid 1980s, this latter organization became defunct and its concession was turned over to Gécamines.

By the early 1980s, Gécamines itself was displaying serious problems in management, infrastructural upkeep and, above all, financing. These problems stemmed from a host of causes, and were clearly related to the overall national economic malaise. To a considerable extent, the Gécamines problems in the late 1970s and early 1980s were due to an appropriation, on an incredible scale, of mining industry profits by senior government officials. The rapaciousness of this theft was matched only by its brazenness. There was, of course, little interest in the top political circles in devoting funds to needed maintenance of the physical plant,

⁹³This was the Société de Développement Industriel et Minière du Zaïre (SODIMIZA) with a concession somewhat southeast of the Gécamines holdings.

⁹⁴This was the Société Minière de Tenke-Fungurume (SMTF) with a concession just north of the Gécamines area.

in technological upgrading, or (for that matter) in better compensation of the labor force.⁹⁵ The economic reforms of 1983 included, not surprisingly, a shakeup of Gécamines and increased reinvestment in the copper industry, resulting in a gradual and modest reinvigoration.

After noting the key features of the development of Zaire's copper industry, we can now turn briefly to the history of the mining company work force in Kolwezi, a town whose origin, growth and current economy are all inextricably tied to that industry.

Kolwezi: A Brief History

The town of Kolwezi is relatively young--even by central African standards--having been first incorporated as a colonial urban center in 1938. However, that incorporation essentially recognized a small but growing agglomeration of colonial enterprise which was already present in the area by the 1930s. We turn now to a brief overview of the origin and growth of the town.⁹⁶

As should be obvious by now, there would most likely not be a town of Kolwezi were it not for rich local mineral

⁹⁵See particularly Bézy et al. (1981:186).

⁹⁶Except as noted, information provided in this section is summarized from five major sources: a doctoral dissertation by a Belgian urban geographer (Chapelier, 1956), a master's thesis by a Zairois urban geographer (Mansila, 1984), the licence mémoire of an urban historian (Nsiniti, 1985), a somewhat self-serving history published by the colonial mining company (Union Minière) on the fiftieth anniversary of its founding (UMHK, 1956), and interviews conducted by the author among long-time residents of the Kolwezi urban area.

deposits, so it is entirely appropriate to begin our consideration with a sketch of mineral exploitation in Kolwezi's vicinity.

The first such activity was conducted by indigenous peoples in precolonial times, perhaps dating to the early years of the present millenium. Local craftsmen mined rich oxide ores in surface deposits near the present cité of Kapata (southwest of Kolwezi's present urban center). They refined the ore in simple charcoal smelters and produced the small copper crosses used in precolonial trade throughout central Africa (Mansila, 1984:18).

The earliest European survey of Kolwezi's mineral wealth occurred as a result of a Free State expedition in Katanga between 1891 and 1893,⁹⁷ in which the Belgian geologist Cornet sampled the copper deposits just west of Kolwezi's present urban center. The British engineer Holland, on another expedition in 1901, discovered an additional series of deposits. Between 1903 and 1904, the whole Kolwezi area was more extensively surveyed by personnel of Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd. By 1904, gold had been discovered in the area just northeast of Kolwezi's present urban center. (The gold was exploited from 1904 to

⁹⁷This was the expedition led by Bia and Franqui, which arrived in Bunkeya (Msiri's capital) in June 1892. It was this expedition which traced (for the first time) the general locations and extent of Shaba's mineral deposits, and reported the "scandale géologique"--the copper ores of the region so rich as to be "scandalous" (Chapelier, 1956:7,299; Nsiniti, 1985:18).

about 1909.) Between 1905 and 1908, European mining company engineers also constructed rudimentary smelters to test the on-site refining of copper, but all of this activity was abandoned in 1909. The Kolwezi area was just too far from the primitive colonial transportation infrastructure of the time for effective transportation and resupply. Union Minière elected instead in the early years to concentrate its efforts in southern Shaba, near the line of rail.⁹⁸

Ten years later, in 1919, Union Minière returned to the Kolwezi area and commenced a much more concerted effort to identify the extent of local mineral resources. The mining company was interested primarily in the mineral deposits in (what are now the mines of) Musonoie and Mutoshi. There was some intention on the part of the mining company at that point to create an urban center in the area. And in fact, a small commercial sector with several European-owned stores was opened in Dilala (just north of Kolwezi's present urban center and between the two existing mining centers) in 1921. However, transportation continued to be a major problem, and Union Minière halted its Kolwezi-area activities in 1922. The small mineworking community was transferred elsewhere and the small commercial district largely disappeared.

⁹⁸The mining company made a memorable one-time attempt to ship copper and tin from the Kolwezi mines to the coast, across Angola by oxcart. The convoy started at the Atlantic coast in 1907. It took the convoy about a year to get from the coast to the Kolwezi area and another year to get back across Angola with 40 ingots of copper and tin (UMHK, 1956:82).

By the late 1920s, however, it was evident that the "Benguela" railway being constructed eastward through central Angola would ultimately connect the rail lines in southern Zaire with the Atlantic coast. The line of rail would pass through the Kolwezi area, solving the transportation problems which had heretofore impeded significant exploitation of local minerals.⁹⁹ So, in 1927, Union Minière recommenced the preliminary work necessary to place local mines in production. In 1928, the colonial administration began granting building concessions to European merchants at Musonoie (just west of what is now Kolwezi's urban center). By 1929, the colonial government had begun to plan the construction of an actual town which would bring a coherent urban plan and administration to the several small, temporary residential clusters in the area.¹⁰⁰

At this point, the Great Depression intervened. As we have seen, the mining company went through a brief period of wrenching retrenchment. Work in the Kolwezi area was abandoned, mining company personnel were transferred or fired, and most of the European merchants moved elsewhere.

⁹⁹Katzenellenbogen (1973) provides a detailed discussion of the political and economic ramifications of this railway construction. The rail lines from southern Africa and from the Atlantic coast were finally connected in western Shaba in March 1931.

¹⁰⁰The new town was apparently to be named after the Belgian engineer and administrator, Jadot. But his name went instead to the mining town founded about 140 km northwest of Lubumbashi in 1917. That town retained the name "Jadotville" until the late 1960s, when it was renamed with an earlier designation, Likasi (Mansila, 1984:20).

However, by the mid 1930s, the mining company had once again recovered its economic equilibrium. In 1935, Union Minière recommenced work in the vicinity of Musonoie.¹⁰¹ By 1937, local copper ore was once again being mined, and in the same year, construction of a nearby ore concentrator was completed. Also in 1937, the company began building a permanent camp for indigenous laborers. (The camp was built on a hillside near the mine, next to the concentrator, and near a stream called the Kolwezi. In time, the stream gave its name to the initial open-pit mine, to the nearby worker camp and to the whole urban area established nearby. However, the name itself was not used for the general urban area until 1938.) We turn now to the founding and growth of the town of Kolwezi.

The development of the Kolwezi residential morphology had three fundamental aspects: one affecting Europeans; two affecting Zairois. We shall address each in turn. In December 1938, the mining company, the Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK) and the Compagnie Foncière du Katanga (the latter two organizations representing essentially the colonial administration) agreed upon a plan to create a new European residential and business center on the same hill as

¹⁰¹ By the end of the year, there were small, temporary mine worker camps at several scattered locations, and a little cluster of houses for European mineworking personnel in (what is now) Kolwezi (Nsiniti, 1985:21).

the newly built mineral concentrator and indigenous mineworkers' camp.¹⁰² December 1938 thus became the effective date of the founding of the town of Kolwezi.

Beginning in late 1939, the colonial administration began to sell lots in the newly designated area to Europeans.¹⁰³ The area was zoned for residences, businesses, schools and churches. (The Catholic religious missions were given land for schools and churches. Such concessions were quite generous, and the central area of urban Kolwezi still features a number of very prominent religious schools and several large, impressive Catholic churches.) The mining company, the railroad company and the state organizations undertook to build housing for their European employees in the new European quarter. This area is currently called the "Quartier Biashara" (Business Quarter).

By 1946, all available lots in this initial European quarter had been allocated; and in 1948, the urban administration was obliged to open several square kilometers on the next hilltop to the east (the "Ruwe Plateau") to

¹⁰² The hill is called the "Kolwezi" plateau. On this site, the planned European concessions were carefully separated from the mining camp by a "cordon sanitaire" of space and fencing, a fact that can still be partially seen in the Kolwezi of 1988. The "European" quarter was reserved for whites only, and was not available for general residence by Zairois until after independence in 1960. Chapelier (1956:308) observed that it was the mineral concentrator which essentially determined both the location of the town and its economic complexion.

¹⁰³ Except for the few pre-existing homes built for European employees of the mining company, construction of urban Kolwezi actually commenced in 1940 (Nsiniti, 1985:22).

European residence and commerce. This residential area is currently called the "Quartier Mutoshi."

These two areas, now called "Biashara" and "Quartier Mutoshi," were originally designed for occupancy by Europeans only.¹⁰⁴ They remained the "white" areas of urban Kolwezi until national independence, and still contain the largest and most expensive housing in the Kolwezi urban area, as well as virtually all of Kolwezi's small European population.

The next two major aspects of Kolwezi's growth have to do primarily with colonial accommodation of Kolwezi's African population. We have already seen that a permanent mining camp preceded the founding of the town of Kolwezi itself. That mining camp, first constructed of temporary materials in 1926, and then of durable in 1937, is now called the Cité Kolwezi or Cité Gécamines Kolwezi. (This is, of course, the community of greatest interest to this study.) Periodic construction continued in this camp until the early 1960s.

Five other permanent camps for industrial workers were constructed near Kolwezi in the twenty-five years after 1937.¹⁰⁵ Beginning in 1945, the more or less temporary

¹⁰⁴ Although here we should note that colonial law (established in Shaba in 1922) did allow a European employer to lodge two male African servants (with their wives and children) on his property in the European quarter (Chapelier, 1956:18).

¹⁰⁵ The worker camp at Musonoie, too, preceded the founding of the town of Kolwezi. It was first built of temporary materials in 1928 and of permanent materials in




Figure 2.13. Early features of Kolwezi's urban morphology.

worker camp at Musonoie was rebuilt as a permanent camp. In the 1950s, permanent worker camps were built near the mine at Mutoshi (northeast of Kolwezi's central urban area) and near the zinc refinery north of Kolwezi's urban center.¹⁰⁶ Another camp, finished about 1960, was built near Kolwezi's new (Luilu) copper and cobalt refinery, northwest of Kolwezi's urban center. A final camp (Kapata) finished in 1962, was built southwest of urban Kolwezi near a large, new complex of open pit mines. Except for the Cité Kolwezi, the worker camps were (and are) located some distance from Kolwezi's urban center, as we shall see.

The year 1941 saw the initiation of the third major aspect of Kolwezi's growth. In that year, the colonial authorities authorized the establishment of a Centre-Extra-Coutumier (CEC).¹⁰⁷ A CEC was a residential area set aside for those urbanized Africans not living in a worker camp but involved in the urban economy and determined to pursue at

the 1940s. (See particularly Nsiniti, 1985:26). In 1941, the mining company could only lodge 32% of its Kolwezi area workers in company housing. By 1948, this had risen to 93% (Mansila, 1984:69).

¹⁰⁶At the time, the zinc refinery (and its labor force) belonged to a concessionary company which was separate from (though dependent on and affiliated with) the copper mining company. The zinc company was merged with the copper company after independence.

¹⁰⁷The area did not officially become a CEC until 1952 (Chapelier, 1956:308). Grevisse (1956) and Fetter (1975:72-73; 132-134) provide illuminating discussions of this administrative arrangement in Belgian colonial usage.

least a somewhat Europeanized life-style.¹⁰⁸ (Those associated with the mining industry were, of course, obliged at this point to live in the mining-company camps.) The CEC (now called the Cité Manika), was established somewhat southeast of the European center of Kolwezi, on another low hill. As was true of worker camps, it was laid out to assure an appropriate space between European and African residential areas. Lots in the new CEC were small: initially of 20 m x 30 m dimensions. In an expansion of the CEC after 1948, the size of the lots was further reduced to 15 m x 20 m. There were provisions in the colonial dispensation for indigenous Zairois to obtain loans necessary for the financing of the lots and the construction of dwellings.¹⁰⁹

The CEC was carefully bounded, and its growth strictly controlled throughout the colonial era. However, in the aftermath of national independence, such restrictions were essentially annulled. Since 1960, the former CEC has expanded in all directions, gradually enlarging into the central urban nucleus of what had been "European" Kolwezi. But, in any event, the morphology of urban Kolwezi still reflects the three fundamental differences in residential allocations: the central (former European) nucleus, the

¹⁰⁸Prior to the establishment of the CEC, such persons found it necessary to find lodging in the pre-existing local villages, a solution which was highly unsatisfactory to the individuals themselves, to the colonial authorities and to village authorities.

¹⁰⁹See particularly Mansila, 1984:28-30.

mining camps, and the old CEC. Since the 1960s, these have been supplemented with less controlled growth to the north, south and east.

But let us return for a moment and briefly note several major economic and political events which bore profoundly on Kolwezi's growth. We can start with the mining company decision in 1935 to resume the development of mineral resources in the Kolwezi area. This led directly to the initiation of significant mineral production by 1937 and the completion of a mineral concentrator in the same year. Establishment of the town of Kolwezi itself occurred a year later, in 1938.

By 1938, Union Minière was exploiting two open pit mines in the Kolwezi area--the Kolwezi and Musonoie mines. In 1942, a new mine (Kamoto) was opened just west of the first two, and a mineral washing facility (to concentrate ore) was completed in 1950. Work also commenced in 1942 on another open pit mine at (what is now) Mutoshi, although the mine did not produce ore until 1944. By 1944, the railway company had electrified the rail lines from Lubumbashi to Kolwezi, and by 1945 the mining company was employing electric locomotives in its Kolwezi operations. New open pit mines were subsequently opened in the Kolwezi area in 1956, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1982 and 1985. (The original open pit mine, that of Kolwezi, was abandoned in the 1950s, but there are plans to reopen it in the indefinite future.) In the 1960s, work commenced on a major new mineral




Figure 2.14. Key industrial facilities in the Kolwezi area.

concentrator complex just west of Kolwezi--its various sections were completed between the late 1960s and early 1980s. A zinc refinery was completed just north of urban Kolwezi in 1953, and a major electrolytic refinery complex (that of Luilu) was completed northwest of Kolwezi in 1960. In that year the new refinery began producing refined copper, and in 1961 it began producing cobalt. Since the 1960s, mining operations and refineries in Kolwezi have operated on a round-the-clock, seven-days-a-week schedule.¹¹⁰

In 1952, a major hydroelectric project was completed on the Lualaba River at Nzilo, about 30 km north of Kolwezi. In 1957 another was completed at Nseke, some 80 km north of Kolwezi. The large quantities of hydroelectric power subsequently available were necessary for Kolwezi's continued industrial growth. Current was also supplied to an electric grid across southern Shaba. (The mining company operations in Kolwezi have come over the years to require a vast amount of inexpensive electrical energy.)

In 1983, electrical current from the Inga-Shaba power system began to arrive in Kolwezi. ("Inga-Shaba" is a monumental hydroelectric project begun in the heady days of

¹¹⁰This information is summarized from UMHK, 1956:190-192, from Description des Installations de la Gécamines, 1982:1-17, and La Générale Des Carrières et Des Mines-Exploitation (Gécamines publicity pamphlet) published in 1985. There are minor inconsistencies in these various sources regarding the specific year in which a given activity was completed and/or commenced production.

the early 1970s. It starts with two major dams on the lower Zaire River at Inga, not far from Zaire's major port of Matadi, and ships power through a massive 2000-kilometer direct-current line across Zaire, which terminates at Kolwezi.) The huge converter station, necessary for converting the direct-current to locally usable alternating current, is located north of Kolwezi's urban center (Mansila, 1984:39).¹¹¹

As should be relatively evident at this point, the development of Kolwezi as an urban center has been profoundly tied to the minerals industry. That industry in Kolwezi has survived the transition to national independence (1960), a subsequent regional secession (1960-1963), the consolidation of control by the current regime (in the early 1970s) and the Shaba invasions (1977 and 1978). Likewise, Kolwezi has prospered with the fortunes of the mining company. Like a number of urban centers in central Africa, the town has seen phenomenal growth since its founding. Table 2.1 depicts Kolwezi's population growth since 1940.

A number of significant features of Kolwezi's population growth are worthy of brief note here. For these,

¹¹¹Young and Turner (1985:298-301) provide a useful discussion of the political and economic ramifications of this project. While "Inga-Shaba" is widely criticized as a monument to grandiose national chauvinism, I was told by its supervisory staff in Kolwezi that the system is very profitable: Inga-Shaba power is sold to consumers in Shaba and to neighboring Zambia. Unfortunately, by 1988 most of the profits were being diverted by political authorities at various echelons, and the system's maintenance had been so dangerously neglected over the years as to threaten the system's viability.

I am indebted to Mansila (1984:44-83), who remains the authoritative urban geographer of the city.

Kolwezi's mining industry origins are very evident in the demographic record. In 1940, 82% of Kolwezi's population consisted of mining company families. (And, in fact, over 50% of the urban population at the time consisted of male mining company workers). In the subsequent 48 years, the proportion of mining company personnel to Kolwezi's total population has generally decreased (with exceptions in several brief periods). By 1960, mining company employees and their families made up only 56% of Kolwezi's population, by 1970 about 45% of the population, and by 1987 about 40%. Likewise, the percentage of the actual Gécamines employees themselves relative to the total urban population has decreased dramatically (from over 50% in 1940 to about 6% in 1987).

Yet despite the decreasing proportion of mining company employees and their families in Kolwezi's total population, the mining company has steadily augmented its workforce in Kolwezi since the mid 1930s. This is evident in Table 2.2, which presents the percentages of mining company personnel increases in designated periods between 1934 and 1980. However, the augmentation of mining company personnel in Kolwezi has been dwarfed by rural-urban migration. Again, Mansila provides some interesting statistics. Table 2.3 depicts the proportion of Kolwezi's growth in selected years due solely to immigration.

We could ask ourselves (at this point) what percentage of Kolwezi's current population has immigrated into the urban area from elsewhere. Mansila (1984:55-56) cites his own sampling of heads of households in Kolwezi in 1983. He found that some 83% of these were born outside of Kolwezi. Within this group, almost half (43%) had arrived in Kolwezi since 1970. Over half (56%) of those household heads born outside of urban Kolwezi had migrated to Kolwezi directly from a rural area.¹¹²

Kolwezi has grown at a rate well above the national mean. Between the two censuses of 1955 and 1975, Kolwezi grew by an incredible 870% (as opposed to a Zairian average of 470% for other towns with populations exceeding 13,000). Only two other cities in Zaire had greater rates of growth than Kolwezi during this period (Mbuji-Mayi and Kikwit). By 1975, Kolwezi had become the 8th largest city in the country. (Mansila, 1984:45).

We have, in brief, traced Kolwezi's origin and growth as an urban center. This followed an overview of the regional environment and the regional historical background.

¹¹²Rural-urban migration in Zaire, and its various causes, are outside the specific scope of this study; however, the subject has been addressed by various authorities. Young and Turner (1985:78-99) provide a good overview. Mansila (1984:56-60) found the search for economic opportunity to be the dominant "pull factor" attracting immigrants to Kolwezi. But he found other factors to be important, including various "push factors" experienced by young Zairois, who increasingly find village life "repulsive."

Table 2.1. Kolwezi's population growth, 1940-1987.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>
1940	2,600
1945	2,137
1946	7,350
1950	16,499
1960	59,888
1986	225,020

Sources: Nsiniti 1985:29,39A; Mansila, 1984:75; Carte Postale de la Ville de Kolwezi, 1987.

Table 2.2. Increases in the UMHK/Gécamines workforce in Kolwezi, 1934-1980.

<u>Between:</u>	<u>Mining company personnel in Kolwezi increased by:</u>
1934 and 1945	438%
1945 and 1955	170%
1955 and 1960	37%
1960 and 1970	18%
1970 and 1980	73%

Source: Mansila (1984:52).

Table 2.3. Proportion of annual population increase in urban Kolwezi due to immigration, selected years between 1955 and 1960.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Percentage of Kolwezi's population increase due to migration</u>
1955	59%
1960	76%
1962	72%
1967	38%
1975	21%
1978	79%
1979	84%
1980	17%

Source: Mansila (1984:49).

We can now turn to the urban area itself, considering its morphology and defining its cultural context.

CHAPTER 3 THE RESEARCH MILIEU

Political and Administrative Distinctions

Before we define urban Kolwezi, it is necessary to provide a quick sketch of the administrative echelons of the Zairian state, as they relate to our community. Without this, much of the terminology pertaining to local political organization would be at best confusing.

The Republic of Zaire is divided into nine provinces locally called "régions." (See Figure 1.2. These include the "région" comprising the national capital of Kinshasa.) The régions are administered by governors appointed by (and serving at the pleasure of) the President. Kolwezi is located in Zaire's southernmost région, that of Shaba. A région in Zaire could perhaps be viewed as an administrative echelon more or less similar to a state in the United States, though of course without the federal structure and relative autonomy of a U.S. state government.

The régions are in turn subdivided into sous-régions, administered by commissaires sous-régionales. (If Zaire's régions could be roughly compared to the individual states of the United States, then the sous-régions would correspond roughly to an echelon between the levels of state and county.) The town of Kolwezi is the administrative center of one of Shaba's seven sous-régions. In fact, the whole

sous-région is officially designated the "Ville de Kolwezi," although of course the Kolwezi urban area itself is only a small part of the whole sous-région.

The commissaires in charge of sous-régions are also appointed directly by the President of Zaire, and serve at his pleasure. They may be drawn from any région in the country. (There are seven sous-régions in Shaba alone. That the President controls appointments at this level conveys some notion of the tightly controlled, centralized political process in Zaire.)

The sous-régions are divided into smaller units called zones, each administered by a commissaire de zone.¹ Even these officials are appointed by the (national) Department of Territorial Administration in Kinshasa, with the approval of the President. (A regional governor might suggest several possible candidates, but the decision is made "at the top.") There are some 35 zones in Shaba alone. This provides additional insight into the degree of centralization in the county's political dispensation.

The Zairian state distinguishes two types of zones:
urban zones (zones urbaines) and rural zones (zones

¹The zone office is, in my estimation, the political authority that has the greatest continuous impact on the lives of Kolwezi's residents. It is at this level of urban administration that the Zairian state has concentrated a variety of executive, judicial and economic functions bearing heavily on the daily lives of Zairois. Such functions are more widely diffused in the American political establishment. I would be inclined to describe the zone as an echelon more or less equivalent to a county in the U.S. system.





Figure 3.1. Shaba Région with its sous-régions and rural zones. The urban zones are not reflected on this map.

rurales). It is at this level that significant administrative differences begin to appear. The urban zones are further broken down into "quartiers" (which we might roughly equate to city suburbs.) The rural zones are broken down into what are called "collectivités." A collectivité is typically a traditional chieftainship (chefferie), preserving in some small measure the authority of indigenous traditional chiefs. Some zones contain so many chefferies that an intermediate echelon is imposed between the zone and the collectivité. This is called a "secteur" and is administered by a state official.

That sous-région which is called the "Ville-de-Kolwezi" is an area of some 41,282 square kilometers (16,126 square miles) and contains a population of about 432,000 persons.²

The Kolwezi sous-région is divided into four zones--two urban zones (which comprise, in essence, the town of Kolwezi) and two rural zones. The town of Kolwezi (made up of its two urban zones) is located more or less in the center of the sous-région, and is surrounded by the two rural zones.

Urban Kolwezi, as previously noted, is administered in two urban zones. The discussion can now briefly address each in turn. We will start with the zone of Dilala, which

²This and the following data are extracted from working papers in the files of the Commissaire urbain, Ville de Kolwezi and reflect data as of December 1987. All official statistics must be viewed with some reservations: data often conflict and the precision of the data collection processes is at best highly questionable. See also J. MacGaffey (1987:7) for similar observations in other categories of Zairian official documents.

Table 3.1. Administrative echelons in Zaire.

Administrative echelons in <u>Zaire</u>	Approximate equivalent echelon in U.S.
Région.	State
Sous-région	(None)
Zone	County/parish
<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Quartier	Secteur/collectivité
Cellule/bloc	
Avenue/rue	

encompasses both the western end of the Kolwezi urban area and the Gécamines worker communities off to the northwest and southwest. This zone is rather large in area for an urban zone, containing much uninhabited space between the residential areas. It is some 154 square kilometers (60 square miles) in size and contained a population of about 89,700 in late 1987.³

The other urban zone, Manika, encompasses the eastern end of the Kolwezi urban center and the Gécamines worker communities to the north and northeast. This zone is relatively more compact in size and heavily populated. It encompasses some 59 square kilometers (23 square miles) and contained a population of about 135,300 in late 1987.⁴

³Carte Postale de la Ville de Kolwezi, Bureau du Président urbain du M.P.R. et Commissaire urbain, 1987, p. 2.

⁴Ibid.

Thus, if we use the Zairois administrative approach to calculating population, urban Kolwezi is some 213 square kilometers in size and had a population of about 225,000 in December 1987. We should perhaps note here that the population of the town of Kolwezi is well over half that of the entire sous-région. Without the town itself, population density in the sous-région would be about 5 persons per square kilometer (13 persons per square mile). In fact, a very high proportion of the remaining population in the sous-région lives in or near the other small towns. Very large tracts of the countryside, remote from the main roads, are essentially uninhabited, having population densities of approximately 2 persons per square kilometer.⁵

But what about Kolwezi's urban administration? As previously noted, the urban zones are broken down into "quartiers," which are distinct sections of the Kolwezi urban area (reflecting for the most part separate sections laid out under Belgian colonial administration). Quartiers are administered by chefs de quartier, who are salaried state officials appointed by the commissaire de zone.

The Zone of Dilala (comprising the west end of Kolwezi) consists of six "quartiers." Four of these are Gécamines worker camps (including the community described in this study). One of the quartiers is the main business district

⁵The depopulation and impoverishment of rural Zaire has been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere. Bustin (1975), Vellut (1977), Fetter (1983) and Young and Turner (1985:78-99) provide useful insights.

of Kolwezi (and associated residential area) and one quartier is a relatively new "suburb" of urban sprawl located south of the urban center, and consisting of simple mud brick homes without electricity or running water.

The second urban zone, that of Manika (forming the east end of Kolwezi) consists of eight "quartiers." Two are Gécamines worker camps. Three are residential areas with utilities (electricity/water), and three are relatively newly developed residential areas of mud brick homes without utilities. So much for Kolwezi's zones and quartiers: let us continue to "unpeel" the levels of political administration.

There is, of course, a further political/administrative structure within each quartier. Quartiers are divided into "cellules" administered by "chefs de cellule." A typical cellule might consist of up to two hundred residence structures and perhaps a couple of thousand people.

The cellules in turn are divided into "avenues"--administrative divisions based around the major thoroughfares and under the supervision of "chefs d'avenue." Finally, at the end of the administrative chain are the "chefs de rue"--responsible for five to fifteen houses along a minor side street.⁶ The "chefs" at each echelon below the quartier are appointed by the chef de quartier assisted by functionaries of the political party (the MPR). The

⁶There is also a division called a "bloc"--generally used for areas in which streets and avenues are poorly defined.

positions themselves (below that of chef de quartier) are unpaid party positions.

It is very important to stress that the executive at each administrative level is both a state official and a party official. The two functions are supposedly complementary but separate. In fact, from the national level to the level of the quartier, each chief executive has a separate salaried staff for the administrative function and another for the party function. To illustrate this distinction, a commissaire sous-régionale (the head of a sous-région) is also the "président du M.P.R." for the sous-région. A commissaire de zone is also "président du comité populaire du M.P.R." for his zone. The "presidential" titles indicate a responsibility for party functions and activities. The "commissaire" titles indicate an administrative or executive role in the formal state structure. Even at the level of the cellule, the avenue and the rue, the "chef" is assisted by an unsalaried "special bureau" of party "militants." This small staff contains the typical roster of party secretaries: those for CONDIFFA,⁷ for JMPR,⁸ and for MOPAP,⁹ and (depending on the echelon) several others.

⁷Condition Feminine et Familiale (responsible for womens' and family issues).

⁸Jeunesse de Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution--the party's youth wing.

⁹Mobilization and Propaganda.

The political/administrative structure is deliberately designed to exert a tight state (or party) control over all citizens. The "chefs" at each level are expected to keep track of (and to report) all that goes on in their areas (including the movements of residents and presence of visitors) and to promulgate state directives quickly and thoroughly. They are also expected to mobilize their charges (when required) for "spontaneous" manifestations of adulation toward a high state official or to perform other directed labor. These functions are the same in the rural hinterlands and in the mining camp or elsewhere in the urban area.¹⁰

It was my observation that the salaried executive positions (down to and including that of chef de quartier) are highly sought. It appeared that these positions were political plums. The incumbents I encountered varied in moral fibre and competence. Below the level of quartier (i.e. at the level of cellule, avenue and rue) the "chefs" are supposedly selected for their good character, leadership

¹⁰While there is, of course, a vigorous informal sector in Kolwezi (much of it based on theft, fencing and resale of stolen mining company property) and there are areas of very unimposing mud-brick homes, it would not be accurate to say that there are essentially unregulated "squatter settlements" such as one finds in Nairobi or Mexico City. This is due to the very comprehensive political party structure (and, ironically, the venality of party officials who maintain effective surveillance of neighborhoods). Land for housing in new development areas is purchased at zone headquarters. Party agents constantly check to assure various taxes are paid. A newly arrived immigrant can move in with a friend or relative, but he does not escape notice. Nor can he build a new home at will in urban Kolwezi.

qualities, maturity and participation in community activities. In fact, those that I encountered seemed to be natural community leaders. So far as I could determine, they were generally respected by the residents of their communities. The "chefs" below the level of quartier occupy positions which are locally prestigious, though unpaid. These officials do benefit from limited party-sponsored travel and other modest perquisites.¹¹

The specific research community (the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi) is, of course, only one of a number of communities in the Kolwezi urban area. It, like the other mining camps, forms a separate quartier. As is true elsewhere in urban Kolwezi, the Cité has a well-defined administrative infrastructure. In its general outline and function, this infrastructure is the same as that found in the non-mining company urban community. However, because of its origin as a mining camp, there are several minor differences in detail. Let us briefly consider the administrative structure of the Cité, noting at the same time a couple of variations from the general urban administrative pattern.

The Cité's top administrative official is the Chef de cité. Since the Cité is one of the quartiers of the town, this official is also called a Chef de quartier. Like any such chef, the Chef de cité is responsible for the orderly function of "his" quartier. However, unlike his "chef de

¹¹ It was only among the Gécamines cadre in the ville that I heard informants speak disparaging of the inconvenience of being selected a "chef de rue."

quartier" counterparts elsewhere in urban Kolwezi, the Chef de cité is also a mining company employee, salaried not by the state but by the mining company. (He is, in fact, a mid-level cadre.¹²) Thus, the Chef de cité answers to two higher echelons: to the mining company hierarchy on one hand; and to the Commissaire de zone (a state official) on the other. In his mining company role, the Chef de cité functions (among other things) as chief housing official for his Cité, as manager of the community's utilities, as chief paymaster, and as the supervisor of local mining company activities and programs, and as judge of community disputes.

But like other chefs de quartier, the Chef de cité has another major area of responsibility: he is the Cité's chief party official: the "Président populaire" of the local MPR. He supervises community meetings and activities in party-related contexts. He also tries to assure compliance with party demands and expectations including, particularly, "demonstrations" of adulation for the party and for important state and party officials.

The Chef de cité has two small staffs to help him; one consisting of salaried mining company employees concerned with day-to-day administration of the Cité, the other

¹²As a cadre, the Chef de cité does not live in the Cité he supervises, but in a cadre residential area of urban Kolwezi.

consisting of party "militants," unsalaried volunteers from the Cité who perform the normal MPR staff functions.¹³

The Chef de cité and his administrative staff maintain their offices in the Bureau de camp, a small building at the west end of the Cité. They are the only Cité officials who are paid for their community administrative function.

Like Kolwezi's other quartiers, the Cité is further divided into cellules, each under the supervision of a chef de cellule. There are six such cellules in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi. The chefs de cellule are selected by the Chef de cité from among community residents, and are responsible for general order within their cellules. In fact, much of their function centers around arbitration of community disputes. The chefs de cellule are themselves Gécamines workers who live among the populations they supervise. (Their rank in the company itself does not necessarily correlate with their political role and status in the community.) They are officials both of the Cité and of the party. These positions as "chef" are not salaried, but do have considerable prestige. (Chefs do, in fact, receive some party-related perquisites such as occasional travel, and occasional free transportation.) The chefs de cellule have a small "party" staff of unpaid volunteers from their cellules, consisting of the usual secretaries of JMPR, MOPAP, CONDIFFA, etc. In my observation, chefs de cellule

¹³These include the secretaries for the JMPR (party youth wing), MOPAP (mobilization and propaganda), CONDIFFA (condition of women and families), etc.

averaged about 50 years of age--they were in fact, substantially senior in age to the average worker. They also seemed to be natural community leaders and were (based on findings in our research) generally respected in the communities they supervised.

Each of the Cité's six cellules are further divided into two "blocs,"¹⁴ for a total of twelve blocs in the Cité as a whole. Blocs are supervised by chefs de bloc appointed by the relevant chef de cellule. (I was told that the purpose for this administrative echelon was to assist the chef de cellule by reducing the number of his direct subordinates.) The general responsibilities and functions of the chef de bloc were the same as for the chef de cellule. Like the latter, the chef de bloc is an unpaid party functionary and has the usual staff of volunteer party members. "Chefs de bloc" also seemed substantially older than the average worker. In 1988, one interim chef de cellule in the Cité was a female, the only female administrator among the chefs at the bloc and cellule level.

The next echelon under the "bloc" was that of "avenue", administered by a chef de avenue or a "rue," administered by a chef de rue. These administrative distinctions at the lowest level are based around the long avenues that run the length of the camp and the rues (streets) that branch off from the main avenues. In the Cité, there were a total of -----

¹⁴This is a difference from the administrative echelons found elsewhere in urban Kolwezi, where "blocs" and "cellules" seemed to be an equivalent echelon.




Figure 3.2. The Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, showing its six cellules.



Figure 3.3. The Chef de cité in his office. Photo by author.



Figure 3.4. Male residents of the Cité at their leisure, a chef de rue in the foreground. Photo by author.

70 chefs d'avenue and chefs de rue. These officials are appointed by chefs de bloc, and perform essentially the same functions as the other chefs, but in their reduced contexts. In each case, the "chef" has the usual staff of unpaid party volunteers. In 1988, several of the chefs de avenue and chefs de rue in the Cité were women.

Having, then, discussed the relevant political structures, we can now turn to a consideration of the Kolwezi urban area itself.

The Urban Center at First Glance

A description of Kolwezi should commence with comment on how one gets there. As is true of other locations in Zaire's interior, access is at best slow and inconvenient.

Almost inevitably, the visitor starts by flying first to the regional capital of Lubumbashi (formerly Elisabethville), a town of perhaps one million (depending on how the urban area is defined).¹⁵ Lubumbashi is as far as

¹⁵As elsewhere in Zaire, the Lubumbashi airport is crowded, dirty and decayed. Processing of personnel and baggage is hopelessly inefficient. Hosts of desperate young men badger visitors for the privilege of carrying bags and "processing" paperwork. Customs officials typically wait for bribes to pass luggage. A medical official studies each Red Cross inoculation card to find missing or outdated inoculations: he then demands a bribe to fill in the appropriate entry. Sponsored visitors are whisked quickly through this activity, as "expeditors"--paid local nationals--collect the baggage and annotations on official documents. (An uninitiated, unaided European, unfamiliar with local custom, would have a difficult time.) Demographic data for Lubumbashi statistics are drawn from the Rapport Annuel de la Division Régionale d'Administration Territoire du Shaba, 1987.

we can get by scheduled airlines. (Although Kolwezi has an official airport, there was no scheduled passenger service in 1987 and 1988, so the visitor had to travel the 340 km [212 miles] from Lubumbashi to Kolwezi by road.¹⁶) We leave Lubumbashi, heading north. The first 120 km (75 miles) of road is an excellent, well maintained, two-lane asphalt route that leads to Shaba's third largest city, Likasi (formerly Jadotville), a town of about 220,000. As in Kolwezi, life in Likasi revolves around the mining parastatal.

Beyond Likasi, the road becomes a one-lane asphalt route with long stretches of huge potholes. The asphalt roadway is poorly maintained and extensively patched, with steep drops along the side (where rain erodes away both the asphalt and the soil bordering the asphalt). Here, we pass oncoming traffic with one side of our vehicle on the dirt shoulder, one side on the asphalt. (Because of the badly eroded shoulders, this can be a considerable adventure.) The narrow, deteriorated road continues for 200 km (125 miles) until we arrive in Kolwezi.¹⁷ Despite the bad road, we are occasionally

¹⁶We could also travel by train. In 1988, one passenger train a week was scheduled from Lubumbashi to Kolwezi, though service was unpredictable. The train ride takes about 24 hours, is slow, crowded and rather uncomfortable.

¹⁷As of this writing (mid 1988) there are plans to overhaul the Likasi-Kolwezi road in 1989. However, many Zairois are skeptical. They reminded me constantly of the 100 zaire road-repair tax which all Zairois are required to pay (and which many Shabans now refuse). The money is collected and maintained by the sous-région. When the previous incumbent in Kolwezi was transferred elsewhere, he



Figure 3.5. The main road between Likasi and Kolwezi (1988). Photos by author.



Figure 3.6. Transport is a problem in Zaire, and vehicles are often badly overloaded. Photos by author.

passed by drivers in French-made cars whose minimum speed seems to be about 120 km/hour. Fortunately, traffic on the road is light.

Due to Zaire's notorious transportation shortage, most of the vehicles we see are badly overloaded, with people perched in precarious and dangerous positions on the backs and sides. Accidents are frequent and often very bloody.

If we are fortunate, the trip from Lubumbashi to Kolwezi will take only about four hours. Also, if we are fortunate, we will not encounter any road blocks ("controles") manned by gendarmes. (If we do find ourselves stopped at a controle, the shabbily dressed, often inebriate gendarmes at the road blocks will typically check all our vehicle documents and all safety features of the vehicle until they find something out of order. At this point they will demand a bribe. The gendarmes are poorly and sporadically paid--they steal from travellers in order to eat.)

Ultimately, we arrive in Kolwezi. But Kolwezi is not a dense urban area like Lubumbashi, or even Likasi, the towns we have just left. In fact, urban Kolwezi resembles nothing so much as a "T"-shaped central nucleus of residential and business areas with other widely scattered satellite communities to the northeast, north, northwest and

apparently took all of several years' road tax with him, a total of several million zaires. None of the money seems to have been used for road repair. People in Kolwezi are still bitter.

southwest. The central nucleus itself is stretched out along an east-west axis of about five kilometers and a north-south axis of about five kilometers. Looking at Kolwezi from the air gives the impression of a host of small communities that have not quite fused together.

As we approach Kolwezi from the southeast, we pass a large military camp, then a military cemetery and the former state hospital, now run by the Methodist church. Rusting billboards proclaim undying loyalty to the President ("the chief love of Zaire," "the author of national peace," etc.) and to the party. Newer billboards advertise cigarettes and soap.

We drive on into the city. To our right is a suburb called the "Quartier Mutoshi."¹⁸ Administratively, it forms two quartiers. It consists of about four square kilometers of European-style homes once occupied by European employees of the mining company. Most of the homes are still owned by the mining company and are now occupied by its largely Zairois cadre. Other homes in this area are owned (or rented) by government or military officials and by the small number of remaining Europeans.¹⁹ Once very attractive and

¹⁸This suburb is also popularly called just "the quartier." It is easy to confuse with the nearby mining company cité also called "Mutoshi." The duplication of names in the Kolwezi area can make description of the urban space very confusing to the uninitiated.

¹⁹I use the term "European" here in conformity with local usage, and as a cultural category. Actual nationality ranges from American to Belgian to Cypriot with a host of in-between nationalities.




Figure 3.7. The Kolwezi area.



Figure 3.8. A residential neighborhood in the "quartier" of Mutoshi. Photo by author.



Figure 3.9. Typical residence of a mining company white-collar employee in the "quartier" of Mutoshi. Photo by author.

comfortable, many of the homes are now worn and shabby in external appearance. All are heavily barred and surrounded by walls or thick hedges. A small part of the west end of this suburb, called "Industriel," contains the light industry for which it was named: a brewery, a lumber yard, a grain mill, a cement factory and a number of other modest enterprises. The population of the "Quartier Mutoshi" was 12,595 in late 1986.²⁰

If we were to drive due north of the "Quartier Mutoshi," we would find ourselves in two consecutive areas of modest Zairois homes. These are one- or two-room, mud-brick structures with metal roofs. Here, urban utilities of water and electricity do not extend to individual homes. Some 34,198 people lived in these two "cités" in late 1986.²¹ Together, they form the quartiers of Kasulo and Kakifuluwe.

If we were to drive northeast of the "Quartier Mutoshi," we would pass essentially open bush for about one kilometer before arriving at the Gécamines complex of the "Cité Mutoshi." Here, we would find a mining company school complex, a worker camp of durable, mining-company housing, and a large open-pit mine. There is also a large community in this area which is not part of the mining camp. In late 1986, 3,968 people lived in Mutoshi, about one-third of which were associated with the mining

²⁰Rapport Annuel 1986, Zone urbaine de Manika, p. 59.

²¹Ibid.



Figure 3.10. A residential neighborhood in the Cité Manika. Photo by author.



Figure 3.11. Typical dwellings in the Cité Manika. Photo by author.



Figure 3.12. Scenes in the Cité Manika market. Photos by author.



Figure 3.13. Merchants in the Cité Manika; dried fish sales (top) and miscellaneous medicines (bottom); photos by author.

parastatal.²² Like all the mining camps, Mutoshi is called a "cité." It is administered as a quartier.

But let us return to the road entering Kolwezi. The "Quartier Mutoshi" was on our right. On our left is a large and growing residential area generally known in Kolwezi as the "Cité Manika."²³

Originally founded in the 1940s as the "centre-extra-coutumier" (the segregated residential area for those "Europeanized" Africans working in Kolwezi but not living in a mining camp), Manika is now an irregularly-shaped area of about three (densely populated) square kilometers, containing schools, churches, shops, a major outdoor market and rows of closely spaced houses of widely differing construction. Some are simple one-room, mud brick, metal roofed. The better houses are built on a European model and constructed of durable materials. Urban utilities (water and electricity) are available in Manika, but not shared by all homes. In late 1986, some 80,470²⁴ people lived in the Cité Manika, and this residential area was growing to the east and southeast. For administrative purposes, the "cité"

²²Rapport Annuel 1986, Zone Urbaine de Manika, p. 59.

²³The Manika residential area is also referred to commonly as "the cité." (When Kolwezi residents speak of the "cité," they usually mean Manika.) Here again, the duplication of names in the Kolwezi area can be confusing: the "cité" of Manika must be distinguished from the "zone" of Manika--the latter being the large area that includes most of the eastern end of urban Kolwezi, including the "cité" of Manika.

²⁴Rapport Annuel 1986, Zone Urbaine de Manika, p. 59.

of Manika actually consists of three distinct quartiers: Mununka, Kayeke and Dilungu.

But let us return to the main road through urban Kolwezi. We now continue westward beyond the two suburbs of Mutoshi and Manika. We now find ourselves passing the sous-région (governmental) administrative headquarters, then the train station, then the one European-style hotel in Kolwezi (the Impala).

But we drive on and are immediately in the "business" quarter, (the "Quartier Biashara") the far end of Kolwezi's central urban nucleus. This is a rectangular-shaped area of about one and a half square kilometers. At the far southwest end of this area is the actual business district of Kolwezi--one long street (about half a kilometer in length) and some six short streets, each faced by modest, one- or two-story shops. (The architectural style can perhaps best be described as "central African colonial.") Here, the deteriorated streets and sidewalks, the decayed and peeling shop exteriors, and rotting garbage seem incongruously out of place in the bustle of business-hour crowds and the relative plenty of merchandise in the stores. We note also the open drains throughout this section of Kolwezi. Fortunately, because of the rolling terrain (the business district straddles a hilltop) drainage is very efficient.



Figure 3.14. Kolwezi street scenes in the main business district. Photos by author.



Figures 3.15. Appearance of the Kolwezi urban center:
business district scenes. Photos by author.

Most of the stores here are owned by Zairois, although expatriates still own and operate some shops.²⁵ However, the greater portion of the "business" quarter consists not of shops but of European-style housing. (This is, after all, the oldest "European" residential area of Kolwezi. As in "Mutoshi," most of the houses were originally built for European mining company personnel.) Residents of this area now include Europeans and affluent Zairois, many of which are mining company officials. Here, too, the once attractive homes now seem dirty and decayed on the outside. Iron bars, walls and hedges assure privacy and security. According to official Zaire

²⁵I counted some 123 stores open for business in Kolwezi's central business district in March 1988. (There were some sixteen additional store buildings which were closed and empty.) Operating stores consisted of the following:

<u>Type of store</u>	<u>Number</u>
General food	33
Bakery goods	4
Meat products	4
Bottled drink sales	6
Restaurants	5
Fresh food/European-style groceries	4
Fresh farm goods	6
Pharmacies	7
Hardware	3
General clothing	40
Shoes	4
Books and paper supplies	5
Video sales and rentals	2

Store owners were of Zairois nationality except for a small number of expatriates, which included the following:

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Number of Store-Owning Families</u>
Belgian	1
French	1
Greek/Cypriot	11
Italian	1
Malian	1
Pakistani	1
Senegalese	1

government statistics, 7,885 people lived in the "business" quartier in 1987.²⁶

The "Quartier Biashara" also features several Catholic churches, several large state and Catholic schools, two banks, the local gendarmerie and the local headquarters of both the A.N.I. (national immigration agency) and The A.N.D. (national secret police).

We are now at the west end of Kolwezi's central nucleus. The main road continues past Kolwezi's business section, leading into mining company facilities. To our left is the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi (the worker community of particular interest to this study). Along the road itself is the large Gécamines hospital complex--the worker hospital on the left, the cadre hospital on the right. Past the hospital complex is the Directorate-Générale Kolwezi (DGK) the main local Gécamines administrative office.

Just beyond the Gécamines headquarters is a huge complex of mineral concentrators, workshops, repair facilities, motor pools and warehouses known as "Atelier Ouest" (essentially the workshop for all Gécamines activities in the Kolwezi area). And, immediately beyond the workshop complex is the start of an immense series of open pit mines.

We have now arrived at the west end of Kolwezi's central urban nucleus. Roads leading to the other

²⁶Source: Rapport Annuel, 1987, Zone Urbaine de Dilala, p. 44.



Figure 3.16. A residential neighborhood in the quartier of Kanina. Photo by author.



Figure 3.17. Typical mud-brick dwelling in Kanina. Photo by author.

communities that are part of urban Kolwezi pass through uninhabited bush, mine dumpings or open-pit mines.

About one kilometer due south of the business section of Kolwezi is a newer area of very modest housing: mud brick, metal roofs, no electricity or running water. This area, called Kanina, contained some 5,255 residents in late 1987, and was rapidly expanding.²⁷

The remaining four satellite communities in the greater urban area are Gécamines camps for blue-collar workers. Each was built near a key mining company facility, and contains company housing of durable materials (with running water and electricity), markets, schools, recreational facilities, churches and other infrastructure.

The first satellite community, about 2 kilometers west of Kolwezi's business district (across open brush and mines), is the Gécamines Cité of Musonoie. This was originally built for workers employed in the nearby open pit mines. Musonoie is the third largest mining company camp in the Kolwezi area, about two square kilometers of tightly packed buildings. Camp population in March 1988 was 20,356.²⁸ Musonoi is also the housing headquarters for Gécamines camps in the Kolwezi area. The camp is connected to the rest of Kolwezi by two gravel roads: one wends its

²⁷Rapport Annuel, 1987, Zone Urbaine de Dilala, p. 44.

²⁸Data derived from the automated files of the Gécamines Directorate Générale Kolwezi and valid as of 17 March 1988.




Figure 3.18. Kolwezi's central urban area.

way for about three kilometers from camp to town through the mines and Gécamines facilities; the other is about five kilometers long, and skirts through open country south of Kolwezi's urban center.

The second camp, about three kilometers due north of Kolwezi's business district, across mine dumpings and brush, is the Cité UZK (Usine Zinc Kolwezi). This small residential area (population 3,475 in March 1988)²⁹ was built to house workers associated with the zinc refinery located about two kilometers north of the worker housing itself. The Cité UZK is connected with the rest of urban Kolwezi by a network of gravel roads which run about four kilometers through mine facilities. A paved road to the urban center skirts north of Kolwezi. Distance from the camp to the central urban area on the paved road is about 8 km.

The third Gécamines camp, located about 10 km due southwest of Kolwezi's business district, across mines and open brush, is the Cité Kapata. This is the largest camp in the Kolwezi area (population 24,244 in March 1988)³⁰ and was built primarily for workers associated with the open pit mines immediately adjacent to the camp. Kapata is connected with the rest of Kolwezi primarily by two gravel roads. The

²⁹Data derived from the automated files of the Gécamines Directorate Générale Kolwezi and valid as of 17 March 1988.

³⁰Ibid.

road distance between this Cité and Kolwezi's central urban area is about 16 kilometers.

The fourth camp, located about 10 km due northwest of Kolwezi's business district, also across mines and open brush, is the Cité Luilu. This camp was built for workers employed in the copper and cobalt refinery of Luilu. (The refinery complex is located about one kilometer due south of the camp residential area.) Camp population in Luilu was 11,418 in March 1988.³¹ The Cité Luilu is connected with the rest of urban Kolwezi primarily by a 16 km paved road that skirts north of the city's central nucleus.

This description has now accounted for all of the disparate "pieces" of urban Kolwezi. These residential areas could be grouped into about twelve separate clusters. Five of these are Gécamines camps located away from the central area. A sixth Gécamines camp abuts the urban area itself on the west. (The distance from the camp [Cité] of Mutoshi in the northeast to the Cité of Kapata in the southwest is about 22 kilometers.) The central urban area consists of three clusters: the business district to the west, the "industrial" (and second former "European" residential) cluster is to the east, and the large former "native" section (Cité Manika) to the southeast. Each of these three "clusters" in the central urban area straddles a

³¹Data derived from the automated files of the Gécamines Directorate Générale Kolwezi and valid as of 17 March 1988.

separate low hill, with valley areas between. More recent urban growth accounts for the last three "clusters." Just north of the central urban area are two of these "new" residential areas. Just south of the central urban area is another "new" residential area.

As is perhaps now obvious, the Kolwezi area can also be defined in terms of major mining company activity. These include first the mines themselves in three major complexes: A huge complex of mines just west of town (the mines of Mupine, Kov, Kamoto and Musonoie), a large complex of mines about 10 km southwest of town (the mines of Mashamba and Dikuluwe) and a smaller mine northeast of town (Mutoshi). Other major mining company activities include the zinc refinery (UZK) about 5 km north of urban Kolwezi and the copper/cobalt refinery (Luilu) about 9 km northwest of urban Kolwezi. We have already noted the six worker camps. Within urban Kolwezi itself are workshops, motorpools, hospitals, schools and administrative offices associated with Gécamines Group West. And of course, much of the European-style housing in urban Kolwezi is owned by Gécamines.

There are at least four features of the central urban area of Kolwezi which would have almost inevitably struck the first-time visitor in 1988: first is the abominable condition of streets and roads, second is the general condition of deterioration and decay evident in most of the

buildings,³² third is the quiet gentility of the tree-shaded former "European" residential areas compared to the hectic bustle of the Cité Manika, and fourth is the emphasis on privacy and security in residential areas (with walls, thick hedges, barred doors and windows).

The town's asphalt streets have not been thoroughly overhauled since the colonial era (which ended in 1960). They are now a mass of deep potholes and uneven patching.³³ Kolwezi drivers typically appear drunk as their vehicles lurch from side to side on the roads to avoid the potholes. In some outlying areas, the asphalt roads have broken apart completely, leaving uneven chunks of asphalt embedded in the dirt road. In other areas, the asphalt has disappeared completely, leaving badly rutted dirt.

There is a surprising amount of vehicular traffic on Kolwezi's main thoroughfare during weekday business hours. Most conspicuous are the large mining company vehicles IVECO (Magirus Deutz) trucks and big Blue-Bird buses, most painted yellow or a bright orange-red. These roar through town,

³²The author spent some time in (colonial) Kolwezi as a youth and vividly recalls the attractive homes, the clean, well-maintained streets and the tidy shops of an era long gone.

³³I have seen sporadic road patching in the city. Materials used (on separate occasions) included asphalt, concrete and soil. The soil quickly washed away. The concrete set in very uneven, bumpy patterns. Despite the repair, the roads remained as bad as ever. Each big rain brought a new series of holes. Kolwezi residents told me that the city streets had been maintained in reasonably good condition until the "6-Day War" (in May 1978).

oblivious to the deteriorated roadway. Prominent, too, are the ubiquitous small white Japanese pickups which mining company white-collar employees drive around town, presumably in pursuit of their official duties. Also plying the roadways are private-enterprise "taxi-buses," van-like vehicles of various makes (and in varying states of repair), usually tightly packed with Zairois of both sexes and all sizes.³⁴ Then there are a host of other vehicles--privately owned and state trucks, passenger cars of European or Japanese make, and occasional motorcycles. These share the roadway with bicyclists and the inevitable "chariot"--the two-wheel, (two-man) pushcarts, loaded with sacks of flour or charcoal, furniture, crates of beer, or whatever.³⁵ Europeans and well-to-do Zairois drive late model cars, but the vast majority of cars in Kolwezi are driven by Zairois of modest means. The cars are often battered, and putter along with bald tires and broken-out lights, smoking badly and characteristically heavily overloaded with people.

³⁴Despite the quantity of traffic in Kolwezi, the available transportation falls woefully short of the residents' requirements. The mining parastatal provides bus or truck service for transport of workers to and from work. Most other Kolwezi residents must walk, ride bicycles, hitch-hike, or wait for the notoriously unpredictable taxi-bus. Transportation is particularly problematical at night or on weekends.

³⁵Although I did not make an authoritative study of the subject, it was my impression that the "chariots" transported at least 50% of the bulk goods ferried around Kolwezi. One indelible impression of urban Kolwezi is that of a chariot being laboriously pushed along a narrow roadway by two sweating youths followed by a long string of furious vehicle drivers, all muttering imprecations.



Figure 3.19. "Taxi-bus" transport in urban Kolwezi. Photos by author.



Figure 3.20. "Chariots" and their drivers. Photos by author.

"Rush-hours" in Kolwezi occur between about 7 AM and 8 AM, then again at about noon, and again between about 4 PM and 5 PM. During these times, traffic on the main road is very heavy, at times almost a solid mass of vehicles. Most of these vehicles are driven by Gécamines cadre going to and from work. At times other than rush hour, vehicle traffic is much lighter. During hours of darkness and on Sundays, vehicle traffic tends to be infrequent, even on the main roadways.

On weekdays between 8 AM and 6 PM, the main thoroughfares and business district of Kolwezi are generally also crowded with pedestrians, at times densely crowded. This reaches a peak of sorts between about 11:30 and 12:30, as crowds of men and women return home from work or shopping and huge gaggles of school children in white shirts and khaki (or blue) shorts and skirts crowd the roadways. As elsewhere in Zaire, general weekday business hours are from 8 AM to 12 noon, and then from 2 PM to 5 PM. Saturday business hours are 10 AM to 12 noon. Hours for mining company employees vary somewhat: some employees are at work by about 6:30 AM, others by about 8 AM. A certain percentage of company personnel work shifts, with correspondingly odd hours. Likewise, school hours varied somewhat. However, it appeared to me that the lunch break at 12 noon was the one point at which virtually everyone was on the move. The business district is also quite crowded on

Saturday mornings between 10 AM and 12 noon. Virtually all businesses close for the weekend at noon on Saturday.

Zairois have a flare for petty commerce. Peddlers of a variety of goods sell merchandise at every intersection along Kolwezi's main thoroughfare and at numerous points in the main business area. Groups of small vendors display their wares on flimsy tables or on the ground at intersections throughout the urban area. The most commonly sold items are food: typically a group of women selling boiled maize, roasted peanuts, roasted manioc, bread, oranges, guavas, or mangos. Male or female peddlers (sometimes children) with small, makeshift stands sell cigarettes, sweets, soap, other toiletries and small items of adornment. Large groups of elderly women displaying fresh vegetables (tomatoes, beans, eggplant, mushrooms, bananas, lettuce and so forth) sit outside food stores patronized by Europeans. Other women take vegetables and fresh fish from door to door in the former "European" residential areas.

On Saturday afternoons and Sundays, urban Kolwezi hosts smaller groups of casual strollers. By late afternoons on the weekends, pedestrian traffic is light, even on main thoroughfares.

Except for the Cité Manika, Kolwezi's streets are very quiet at night, and almost deserted after about 9 PM. Hired watchmen sit beside charcoal burners outside stores and homes of the well-to-do. The nocturnal quiet is due in



Figure 3.21 Roadside entrepreneurs in Kolwezi. Photos by author.



Figure 3.22. The Quartier Biashara: main road through the quartier. Photo by author.



Figure 3.23. A residential neighborhood in the Quartier Biashara. Photo by author.

large part to fear of bands of the military (and, presumably also civilian) bandits who prey on the unwary during the hours of darkness.³⁶

In fact, regardless of the day or hour, the residential areas in the former "European" sections are generally quiet with at most modest vehicular and pedestrian traffic. The shady boulevards here convey an air of domestic calm.

Throughout the day, goats and chickens roam Kolwezi's streets. Whether in the business district, the busiest street, or in the most exclusive suburb, chickens pecking at nearly invisible scraps and goats grazing on available foliage are part of the Kolwezi ambience.

There is one area of Kolwezi that seems to pulse and throb at all hours of the day and night--the Cité Manika. This suburb's large central market is open every day of the week and late into the evening. With its relatively dense population, and many small shops, bars and small discos, "Manika" seems to exert a unique attraction on Kolwezi's adolescent and young adult population. It is the preeminent place for Kolwezi's worldly wise to "hang-out." It is the stereotypical location to find diversion, whether amorous or otherwise, and the alleged haunt of thieves and ne'er do wells. My informants seemed to think of Kolwezi's very best

³⁶When I first arrived in Kolwezi in October 1987, nocturnal theft and acts of violence perpetrated by the military against civilians were an almost daily occurrence. However, by early April 1988, reports of such events were much more infrequent. I had the impression that political authorities in Kolwezi were very concerned about the problem and were attempting to rectify it.

and very worst in terms of "Manika." There are bars, discos and prostitutes elsewhere in Kolwezi, but Manika has all of these in greater abundance and greater concentration.

We might ask at this point about the general appearance of Kolwezi's residents themselves. These are, of course, virtually all Zairois. (Members of the small expatriate community, which include about 1500 "Europeans," are occasionally seen around Kolwezi, but are not a significant presence.)

Many of Kolwezi's male residents would probably not look out-of-place on a city street in the United States. Typical male attire is sport shirts and slacks, generally clean and in good repair. A surprisingly large number of men wear sweaters or light jackets year around.³⁷ Some men wear daishiki-style shirts made locally of Zairian print cloth, and usually bearing designs lauding the President and political party. (These, however, are relatively more expensive and not commonly worn, except on special occasions.) Other men wear coveralls issued by the mining company. Some men also wear the ABACOST,³⁸ though this

³⁷Zairois in Kolwezi often complained of the "cold" if the temperature were less than about 65°F, and complained of the "heat" if it exceeded about 85°F.

³⁸This acronym is derived from the French phrase "a bas le costume" (down with the suit). The ABACOST is a suit with a tie-less, nehru-style jacket, a product of the Zairian "authenticity" drive of the 1970s to eliminate European-style habits. Zairois are forbidden to wear ties, and a man seen wearing a coat and tie in Kolwezi would almost certainly be a foreigner. The ABACOST is normally worn in Kolwezi either on special occasions or by political

attire is rarely seen on the street. Western-style suits and ties are conspicuous by their absence. Boys up to the age of young adolescence are often seen in shorts. Older adolescents and adult males are virtually never seen in shorts, except in sports activities.

Kolwezi's female residents would appear more exotic on an American street. Typical women's attire is the wrap-around print skirt (locally called the "kikwembe") replete with brightly colored patterns. Print blouses or western-style blouses are worn with this skirt. The kikwembe is by far the most common women's garment, and it ranges widely in quality and price. Some women are seen with western-style dresses, usually second-hand purchase. Slacks are forbidden as women's attire, although I saw individual Zairoise in Kolwezi wearing slacks on numerous occasions. (All were young adults or older teenagers.)³⁹

More exotic than the kikwembe are the Zairian women's hairstyles: these range from the braided, spiked "sputnik" effect, to very elaborate contoured braiding, to long, straightened hair on the European model, to the "natural," rather close-cropped style. The variation is endless.

authorities and other elites. Its presence tends to mark a "political" person or state occasion.

³⁹I was told that the daughters of high officials sometimes flaunt their status by wearing slacks, knowing that they will not be harassed. On the other hand, in 1987, a Gabonese woman married to an American was "arrested" for wearing slacks in Kolwezi. (She was assumed by the gendarmes to be Zairoise.) I do not think that a white woman wearing slacks would have been bothered, as I have seen several female Europeans wearing slacks in stores around Kolwezi.

The residents of Kolwezi display a surprisingly high concern for personal appearance, much more so than people in the surrounding countryside. While individuals wearing worn, ragged, and dishevelled clothes are seen in Kolwezi, these are most often the very young, some women of all ages, adults over 30, and the (inevitable) handicapped beggars. Older teenagers and young adults in the urban area generally dress well by European or North American standards.

Kolwezi residents desiring to acquire clothes had several options in 1987 and 1988. The most expensive was that of purchasing new clothes in the latest popular styles imported from Europe or west Africa. These were sold in a number of Kolwezi's shops. There was no shortage of such clothes. A typical shirt might cost Z 2500 (roughly \$18.00 at the March 1988 official exchange rate). A typical pair of long pants might also cost about Z 2500.⁴⁰ A new European-style woman's dress might cost Z 18,000 (\pm \$120).⁴¹

Cheaper new clothes, of lesser quality and less attractive style, might cost about a third less. The least expensive option was to buy the second-hand clothing, imported in bulk from Europe or the United States, and sold

⁴⁰I was told that shirts tended to cost more than pants because of the frequent changes in popular shirt style and (thus) greater consumer demand.

⁴¹While income varied widely in the urban area, the modal household would not have earned more than 5,000 zaires per month. It seemed evident that many of Kolwezi residents were willing to pay a high proportion of their income in order to dress stylishly.

in open-air markets or in small stands along the road.⁴² The disadvantage here was the restricted choice in size and style. The prices, however, were reasonable. A very good shirt might cost Z 400 (\$3), a good pair of pants, Z 600 (\$4) and a European-style woman's dress about Z 1500 (+\$10).

Womens' clothes seemed on the whole considerably more expensive than mens'. A good quality wrap-around skirt (kikwembe) and matching blouse in the Zairoise style might cost as much as Z 14,000 (+\$93). It was not unusual to find such outfits in Kolwezi costing Z 30,000 (\$200).⁴³ At the low end of the scale, a new woman's wrap-around skirt and matching blouse might cost Z 11,000 (\$73). Perhaps not surprisingly, women in Kolwezi seemed to wear older and shabbier clothes than men.

Of course, some Kolwezi residents wore cast-off clothes acquired from Europeans or more affluent Zairois. Likewise, male workers employed by Gécamines would sometimes wear their company-issue uniforms or coveralls and rubber boots as their every-day apparel, on the job and off.

⁴²It was an amusing and not uncommon experience to see male Zairois dressed in T-shirts advertising the Dallas Cowboys, the U.S. Marine Corps, or Budweiser beer. Second-hand clothes were somewhat pejoratively called "mangua ya nkombo" (clothing of scraps) in local Swahili.

⁴³The best quality wrap-around print skirts mentioned by my informants were "hollandais wax," imported from the Netherlands. There was apparently a ban on their import in 1988, which did not seem to affect their availability--but rather served only to increase prices and make smuggling more profitable.

Clothes were a very evident symbol of status in Kolwezi. Merchants told me that they did a heavy business with young Gécamines workers who wanted the latest styles, and paid handsomely for them. Such clothes were often bought on credit. (Three equal monthly payments without interest was the usual procedure). It did not take me long to recognize a man's perception of his own social rank by the general cut and quality of his clothes. Likewise, a well-dressed wife (or girlfriend) was a clear reflection of a man's status.⁴⁴

The most problematical item of apparel for Kolwezi residents was shoes. The stores carried a reasonable variety of quantity and style, but prices seemed very high, ranging from Z 2,500-Z 18,000 (\$17-\$120). Not surprisingly, the condition of people's shoes often seemed incongruously worse than that of their other apparel. But unlike rural Zairois, very few of Kolwezi's residents went barefoot.

⁴⁴Perhaps I can be forgiven for a certain element of male chauvinism, but some of Kolwezi's women were absolutely stunning, with their carefully, artistically braided hair, tasteful gold jewelry, extremely well tailored clothes in the Zairoise style and expensive European high-heeled shoes. I must admit that my male researchers would on occasion fall completely silent in open-mouthed lust and awe. In Zaire, at least, this was the desired effect of such wealth and adornment.

The Research Community: An Overview

General

We come at last to the community of specific interest in this study, the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.⁴⁵ This is, in essence, a compact, densely populated suburb of about one and a half square kilometers, located at the far west end of Kolwezi's central urban nucleus (Figure 3.18, page 205).

Just to the east of the Cité itself (and just outside the Cité's main entrance) is Kolwezi's business district. To the south of the Cité is a huge pit, some 20 acres in size, and overgrown with brush. (This was the first open-pit copper mine developed by the colonial mining industry in the Kolwezi area. It ceased operation in 1950s, but is scheduled to be reopened in the indefinite future, at which point, part of the Cité itself will be demolished to allow exploitation of the mineral deposits.) Directly west of the Cité is a large complex of mining company workshops (called "Atelier Ouest"). West beyond these is a huge area of open-pit mines. (These mines dominate the western skyline of the Cité) North of the Cité are Gécamines facilities: the workshops, the general headquarters for Gécamines in the Kolwezi area, and the Gécamines hospital complex.

⁴⁵Kolwezi residents commonly refer to this community as the "Cité Kolwezi," or "Camp Gécamines" or "Cité Gécamines." There are, of course, five other Gécamines camps in urban Kolwezi, but the others are normally called solely by their place names (i.e. "Musonoie" or "Kapata").

There are two major roads into the Cité; the first enters from the east (directly from the Kolwezi business district); the second enters from the northeast, from the main thoroughfare through Kolwezi. Both roads converge in the northeast corner of the Cité

In the colonial era, access to the Cité was carefully restricted by the Belgian camp administration. The camp perimeter was fenced, and the two access roads strictly guarded. But most of the fencing has long since disappeared, and residents now enter or leave the camp area at will on the main roads and by a variety of footpaths. Even so, most of the foot and vehicle traffic flows in and out of the north and east sides of the Cité. A fenced area still guards industrial installations to the west. And there is little besides brush or mines to the southwest and south of the Cité.

The Community at First Glance

The Cité itself is set back from Kolwezi's business district by about half a kilometer. (This was a deliberate design of colonial origin--to maintain an "appropriate" distance between the black population of the camp and the white population of urban Kolwezi.)

Entering the main access road into the camp, we note the Methodist mission compound on our left (a church and several residences).⁴⁶ To the right is a private sports

⁴⁶The minerals industry of the colonial era did not permit religious activity in the camps other than that of

complex--a theater and various playing fields. (This area is patronized mainly by Gécamines cadre and Kolwezi's more affluent residents.) At the entrance to the camp itself are school complexes on the right and on the left. Both are Gécamines professional schools for girls.⁴⁷ Passing these schools, we enter the camp on the main road, the only paved street in the community. Like all of Kolwezi's streets, it is in bad repair with huge potholes along its length. This road continues on down a gentle incline: the community is built on a hillside. In fact, our road passes through the center of the Cité. (It is called "Avenue du Theater".)⁴⁸

 selected Roman Catholic orders. Catholic clergy also ran the Gécamines school system in the camps until the 1970s (Fabian 1971:58; Fetter 1976:105-106; and Markowitz (1973:42-46). Protestant missions were not allowed to build in the "white" town, that privilege being reserved exclusively for Roman Catholic orders (J. Jeffrey Hoover, 1988: personal interview). Even so, the Methodists built their mission just outside the "white" town and as close to the camp as allowed, a fact which undoubtedly irritated the Catholic clergy in the camp. One of my research assistants (who attended the mining camp schools in Kolwezi in the colonial era) recalls his classmates taunting the students in the nearby Methodist schools: "Nyama ya poli" (Hey, you animals out in the forest . . .). The mining camp schools are no longer controlled by the Catholic Church, although mining camp residents are still heavily Roman Catholic (43% of the adults interviewed claimed to be Roman Catholic compared to 9% for the next largest religious group--the Methodists.)

⁴⁷The girls' professional school features a four-year curriculum intended for prospective mothers and housewives (who will presumably be good wives for Gécamines workers). The curriculum stresses what Americans might call "home economics."

⁴⁸Most of the camp's streets and avenues are named either for ethnic groups (i.e. Rue des Bayeke) or minerals (i.e. Rue du Chrome).




Figure 3.24. The Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

On the left is worker housing. On the right is the official or common area of the camp. (On the far side of the common area is more worker housing.) The common area is one block in width and eight blocks long, running the whole length of the camp. It essentially splits the Cité from east to west. The common area will tell us a great deal about community life.

The first thing encountered in the common area is a large Roman Catholic church, with its associated offices and parish residence. Built of stone and with a high steeple, the church dominates the camp (as it was intended to do). The church complex alone takes up a city block.

But we walk on down the main road past the church and find next a large, impressive school building. This is what might be called the "school section" of the common area. It is about two city blocks in length. The first large building is the camp primary school for girls. Noticeable here are the broken windows, iron bars, and general appearance of decay.⁴⁹ Beyond the girls' school is an athletic field and a block of small, one-room classrooms.

⁴⁹On my first tour of the camp, my tour guide (a Cité authority) explained the severe problem of theft, a topic which surfaced again in almost every discussion of life in the camp. Thieves in Kolwezi and the Cité steal just about everything that can be removed from a building, including windows and roofing. Despite (or perhaps even because of) military guards in the camp, school buildings are particularly subject to vandalism and theft. Cité authorities, and camp residents generally, attributed the problem to unemployed and undisciplined minors of camp residents. But it ultimately seemed clear to me that workers themselves participated in much of the widespread theft.

This is the boys' primary school complex. (Unlike the girls' school, this consists of separated, one-room class buildings.)

Past the boys' primary school is a similar complex of one-room classrooms and sheds. This is the post-primary "Ecole de formation professionnelle" (professional school for men). This school offers a four-year course at the secondary-school level. It is a technical school designed to produce future skilled workers for Gécamines.⁵⁰ The stress here is upon machine-tool and vehicle maintenance skills. (The teachers are themselves blue-collar Gécamines employees.)

Past the schools is what might be called the "recreational" section of the common area. This is roughly two city blocks in length. We first pass two rows of small, one-room buildings used for a variety of recreational activities: singing clubs, amateur theater and so forth. (Most participants in these activities are adolescents: teen-aged minors of workers in the camp.) Past the small buildings, is a soccer stadium, a large, solid, well built, comfortable edifice. Beyond the soccer stadium are

⁵⁰The school is one indication of the colonial era mining industry's policy, developed in the late 1920s, to establish a stable, self-reproducing labor force in a controlled environment. (Until the 1960s, the industry was committed to employing all the male children of its workers, a policy which lapsed in the independent Zaire of the 1970s.) The professional school now accepts students from both Gécamines and non-Gécamines families. In a departure from the practice of the colonial era mining industry, not all of the school's graduates are hired by Gécamines.

basketball courts and a building used for camp conferences and general meetings. And finally, we arrive at a large open-air theater, with banks of cement bleachers. Here, the camp administration offers concerts and similar entertainment on a recurring but irregular basis. This is the end of the recreational section.

Continuing on down the main road, and still observing the common area to the right, we pass a single row of worker houses and then the camp market. The market takes up half of a small block. The market building itself ("soko" in Swahili) is a cement structure with an open interior courtyard. The whole edifice is reserved for small-scale, private enterprise. Individual entrepreneurs (mostly women) have their own small areas of the market, where they display fresh greens and vegetables, seasonal fruit, dried fish, flour, dried edible insects, spices, and various fresh and dried meats. Just outside (and in front of) the cement structure are little stands, usually manned by children, displaying soap, matches, cigarettes, small toiletries and white bread (in small loaves). Outside, on the other side of the structure, adult merchants display used clothing laid out on the ground. The market is open Monday through Saturday.

Past the market is another small block of worker housing, and then the camp administrative building, where the Chef de cité and his staff maintain their offices. This



Figure 3.25. The Catholic church dominates the entrance to the Cité. Photo by author.



Figure 3.26 The Catholic sister who serves as Director of the girls' primary school. Photo by author.



Figure 3.27. Primary school children at sports; the girls' primary school building is in the background. Photo by author.



Figure 3.28. Primary school children; boys' primary school buildings are in the background. Photo by author.



Figure 3.29. The Cité market: top, the main entrance; bottom, vendors and produce. Photos by the author.

is the far end (the west end) of the Cité, and also more or less at the bottom of the hill.

The rest of the camp to the north and south of the common area consists mainly of worker housing--rows and rows of tightly packed, small houses: about 12 city blocks north of the common area, about 41 city blocks south of the common area.⁵¹ The size of the blocks, and number of houses in each, varies widely.

There are 958 separate dwelling structures in the Cité. Most were originally built to house two families (one family at each end of the building). A substantial majority of the dwellings are encircled by thick euphorbia hedges, which assure a measure of privacy, despite the close building spacing. But let us look first at the general appearance of neighborhoods, then return to the individual houses themselves.

Beyond the camp's main road is a grid of gravel and dirt roads. Several of the major avenues are surfaced with fairly smooth gravel and are about two lanes wide. However, most of the Cité's roads are one-lane and gravel-surfaced, with deep ruts and potholes. Vehicle access in much of the

⁵¹There are several other buildings scattered through the residential area which warrant note. For instance, there are three "cantines"--small warehouses which dispense the workers' monthly food rations. There is a large building called the maison de jeunes (youth house) with rooms and dilapidated facilities for recreation: books, table-tennis, chairs, etc. Then there are a number of small flimsy structures scattered here and there for commercial enterprises: drinking parlors, hair-dressing salons, small "stores" with a meager selection of food and toiletries.

camp is at best problematical. Access to some of the housing is by rutted, (and often muddy) dirt footpaths only. The camp drainage is provided by open drains which run alongside the roads. (Drainage is generally good, except at the far southwest end, which is essentially the valley bottom.) Some of the Cité's streets are tree-lined and shady. Most are not. Yet even without the trees, many of the household plots are difficult to see from the roads because of the euphorbia hedging surrounding most residential structures. Goats, chickens, ducks and turkeys roam at will among the Cité's hedges and along the roads and footpaths.

As inferred above, private enterprise flourishes along the camp's roads. There are several small open-air markets in the camp. Small, single stands at various places along the roads sell a variety of cigarettes, food and toiletries. Many camp residents pursue petty commerce in their homes (or in makeshift structures built on their small housing lots). Activities include (among many others) the sale of dried fish and palm oil, small hairdressing salons, several drinking parlors/discos, small tailor shops, and small-machine repair shops.

The Worker Housing

We have considered the general appearance of the camp. The discussion turns now to the actual worker housing.

Like all Gécamines camps, worker housing in the Cité is built of durable materials: walls are constructed of fired

brick or stone, joined by mortar. Houses are built on concrete foundations. Roofs are of tile, fabricated material or galvanized steel. Door and window fixtures were originally built on European models and were solidly constructed.

All the homes in the Cité are electrified, though most lack interior plumbing. Rather, a single (cold water) spigot is located on the side of the house near the rear entrance. This provides the household's fresh water requirements.⁵² (Both the electricity and water are provided to Cité residents free of charge.) A small latrine shed (or "outhouse") is located in the family plot, separated from the house. The latrine empties into a sanitary pit. Over the years, a number of the latrine pits have filled up completely, requiring some families to share latrines with neighbors.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of the homes in the Cité were "modernized" with interior plumbing and interior latrines. But only some 6% of the homes fall in this category. So far as I could determine, there are no plans to "modernize" additional homes in the near future.

While all are very small by U.S. standards, the individual homes, and the size of the lots on which they are

⁵²Gécamines communities provide good water service. The Kolwezi business district just outside the camp suffered fairly frequent water outages. In my time in Kolwezi, the Gécamines camp always had water. During water outages in the town, townsfolk would get water from the nearby Gécamines Cité, carrying it back to homes and stores in buckets.

built, vary considerably in specific detail. This is mainly a reflection of the time at which they were constructed. This is partly also a function of the number of intended occupants. (The different housing designs are named after the year in which they were introduced: for instance, the "model of 1936," the "model of 1952," etc.) As might be expected, the homes of a given model are all co-located along the same street or in the same section along several adjacent streets.

A majority of the homes were originally designed to accommodate two households. About 15% of the homes were designed for single (larger) families. Some 20% of the houses (small, one-room structures) were designed for occupancy by a single worker. There have, however, been considerable modifications (both official and unofficial) to many of the houses. One such "official" modification was the subdivision of some of the two-household homes into four-household homes. About 20% of the houses in the Cité are now intended for four-household occupancy. (Other modifications are mentioned elsewhere.)

The amount of space inside the homes varies according to the model. The most common allocation for one family is three rooms (usually configured as a living room and two bedrooms). About 43% of the families in the Cité have housing of three rooms. Some 18% have housing of only two

rooms. Some 19% have housing of only one room.⁵³ And some 15% have housing of four rooms. (A few houses have five or more rooms.) The size of the rooms varies somewhat, but a typical living room would measure about 4 meters x 4 meters, a typical bedroom about 4 meters x 2 meters.

Most of the worker homes were also built with a kitchen facility. The kitchen comes in two forms: one is a very small room at the rear of the house. The other is a shed, built at the rear of the housing plot, and separated from the house itself. The sheds of the latter variety are generally divided into parts to provide a separate kitchen facility for four (sometimes two) families. Most of those kitchens which are actually attached to the houses have been converted into additional bedrooms. (The wives of camp workers typically prepare food on small, home-made charcoal stoves in the open air outside the house.) Some workers have, on their own initiative, added an additional structure on the end of the house to serve as a kitchen.

While the size of the lot on which a worker house is located varies, a large lot might measure about 30 meters x 30 meters, a small one, 20 meters x 20 meters. Thus, assuming the house contained two families, each family might have as much as 450 square meters (6,338 square feet) of lot space.

⁵³One-room quarters include the bachelor housing mentioned earlier, but a number of married workers with families also live in one-room quarters. The largest family we encountered in a one-room lodging consisted of 8 persons.



Figure 3.30. Typical road scenes in the Cité. Photos by author.



Figure 3.31. Housing in the Cité: duplex with three rooms per household. Photo by author.



Figure 3.32. Housing in the Cité: duplex with two rooms per household. Photo by author.



Figure 3.33. Housing in the Cité: single family dwelling with five rooms. Photo by author.



Figure 3.34. Housing in the Cité: duplex with three rooms per household (note outside spigot). Photo by author.



Figure 3.35. Housing in the Cité: duplex with three rooms per household plus attached kitchen. Photo by author.



Figure 3.36. Housing in the Cité: duplex with four rooms per household (note the plot of maize). Photo by the author.



Figure 3.37. Houses in the Cité are closely spaced. Photos by author.




Figure 3.38. Residents of the Cité: top, wives and children at home (note external latrine in rear); bottom, an industrial worker with two of his dependents. Photos by author.

What individual families do with their "lot" also varies widely. For at least half the families, the lot is just an expanse of bare ground--a gathering place for adults and a playground for children. A few families use their lots to cultivate small garden of maize (or, occasionally, manioc and other vegetables). One family I visited had a pigpen attached to the side of the house. As previously noted, some families use their lots to build small, rather flimsy structures for business enterprises of one sort or another. Several families had built additional mud-brick housing on their lots to accommodate members of the (extended or nuclear) family.

Almost without exception, the exterior appearances of the Cité's houses are worn and dirty. Many have rather badly cracked walls. In a large number of cases, the original tile roofs have been patched with various materials, most often galvanized steel. Many of the glass window panes are cracked, broken or missing completely. Cement porches and foundation fixtures are typically cracked or broken. In short, the external condition of the worker housing has an almost slum-like appearance by North American standards. Even so, people elsewhere in urban Kolwezi consider the Cité housing very desirable. It is important to recall the socio-economic status of the camp inhabitants: a Gécamines worker could hardly afford the luxury of such housing elsewhere in urban Kolwezi. (The deteriorated exteriors of the Cité houses are partly a reflection of the

fact that the mining company no longer provides much in the way of home repair services, and residents have considerable difficulty purchasing repair materials with their limited salaries.)

Internal appearance of houses varies much more substantially than external appearance. About 20% of the homes I visited were dark and dirty on the inside, with peeling paint, filthy, undecorated walls and sparse, rickety furniture: the latter consisting perhaps of an old table and various stools or old, straight-backed wooden chairs and rolled-up mattresses in corners. The interior sometimes smelled very strongly of cooking fires or stale fish and old palm oil.

Perhaps another 20% of the homes were light and airy, with well painted walls and attractive wall decorations. New-looking, stuffed furniture (with a plastic covering) and clean curtains at the windows were common in such houses. Beds were sturdy wooden structures with clean linen. A new-looking television, small refrigerator and other small electrical appliances would characteristically also be present.

The interior appearance of the vast majority of worker homes fell somewhere between these two extremes. The rather attractive stuffed furniture, sturdy wooden tables and wooden beds (all made in small workshops in Kolwezi) were quite common. Small refrigerators, televisions and portable radio/tape-players were also widely distributed in the Cité.



Figure 3.39. "Unofficial" building in the Cité (left): a mud-brick extension to a home. Photo by author.



Figure 3.40. "Unofficial" building in the Cité: a drinking parlor. Photo by author.



Figure 3.41. "Unofficial" building in the Cité: a shelter for selling food and small toilettries. Photo by author.



Figure 3.42. "Unofficial" building in the Cité: mud-brick home for relatives built behind mining-company house. Photo by author.



Figure 3.43. Interiors of homes in the Cité: top, home of an industrial laborer; bottom, home of a primary school teacher. Photos by author.

Wall decorations varied widely. Pictures with religious themes were very prominent, as were photos of family and relatives. Quite a few walls had unframed oil paintings of a type widely sold in Zaire: usually depicting peaceful village or river scenes. Hammered copper artwork was also commonly seen in wall decorations, as were pictures cut out of magazines. The cleanliness and state of repair of internal fixtures likewise ranged from impeccable to despicable.

While the quality of housing in the Cité was very good compared to that available at modest prices elsewhere in Kolwezi, only 61% of our Cité informants said they were happy with their housing. Of those who were discontented with their mining-company housing, the most common complaint centered around the size of the house compared to the size of the family. It is easy to understand this complaint. The mean number of persons living in each family housing unit was 8.4. If we count each room in each house, the average number of persons per room was 2.7, and rooms were small.⁵⁴

But despite such complaints, the demand for housing in the Cité far exceeds supply. Workers who meet the eligibility requirements for Gécamines housing must still

⁵⁴The highest number of persons I encountered in one family housing unit was 20 (in a small three-room lodging). I asked the wife in the family how everyone could be accommodated at night. She carefully explained the complex arrangement of mattresses which occupied all usable surfaces to provide sleeping room--a true work of art and bit of magic.

wait long periods--up to several years in some cases--before housing is available.⁵⁵ While the original mining company practice was to lodge workers in the particular Cité nearest their place of work, the worker housing shortage has resulted in many workers living in one camp and working much closer to another. (For instance, a teacher I knew worked in a school in the Cité, but could find housing only in the camp at Musonoie, several kilometers distant.) Because of its proximity to urban Kolwezi, the Cité is the most desirable and sought-after worker camp in the Kolwezi area.

It is perhaps appropriate to note here that in the early 1980s, Gécamines initiated a policy in which employees are permitted to buy the company homes they now occupy. In this arrangement, the company provides a 10-15 year "loan" which it recuperates in monthly payments from an employee's salary. In the contract, the employee agrees not to sell his home for five years after completing payment. Beyond that date, he can dispose of his house as he desires, including by sale to non-Gécamines buyers.⁵⁶

Recruitment into the Cité

The processes by which residents are added to the Cité are several fold. Most are rather obvious, but all

⁵⁵Among workers we interviewed, there were widespread charges of favoritism in housing assignments. Whether true or not, Cité residents tend to feel that a relative or co-ethnic in the housing assignment office significantly facilitates the acquisition of housing.

⁵⁶One interesting ramification of this arrangement is that after about 1995, Cité houses will conceivably be

warrant at least brief mention here because they bear on belief or behavior discussed later in the study. We shall consider each in turn.

The most obvious means of recruitment into the Cité is exemplified in the case of the mining company employee who meets the criteria for assignment of Gécamines housing and who applies for residence in the community. Such an individual can be male or female, married or unmarried. Housing is supposedly allocated to such individuals on the basis of housing availability. (Obviously, the company cannot move an employee into the Cité without the departure of the occupants of one of the residences.) In 1987, some 20 households relocated into the Cité. This represents an annual "turnover" rate of 1% for the households of the community. Based on our research, the modal length of occupancy for families we interviewed was 9 years. However, almost exactly two thirds (65.7%) of the families had been living in their mining company housing for 10 years or less.

While the reassignment of mining company employees into (and out of) the Cité should not in principle significantly change the overall community population, there has been a substantial increase in the Cité population since the colonial period. This is a result of several factors. One ----- occupied by increasing numbers of non-Gécamines families. I was told that Gécamines will at some point in the future relinquish its current supervision of the camps: these will then become communities essentially indistinguishable from non-Gécamines communities.

is a high birth rate within the community. Obviously, birth into community is a primary method of recruitment. However, it is by no means the sole explanation for the population increase. In fact, another major reason for the growing population is the large number of adult children of mining company families who cannot find gainful employment (or local housing) and who continue to live with their mining company parents.⁵⁷

Another significant factor in the growth of the Cité's population is that of the increase in numbers of household members who are not part of the nuclear family of the head of the household. Some 45% of the Cité's households have such members. (They comprise about 13.6% of the Cité's total population.)⁵⁸ Individuals in this grouping fall into several categories, although most are relatives (or affines) of the nuclear family in the household. Let us briefly consider the more significant of the different categories.

A first grouping consists of dependent minors, often nephews, nieces or cousins of the head of the household or his spouse(s). Others in this grouping include younger brothers or sisters of the head of the household or his

⁵⁷It would have been much more difficult for older dependents to remain with the mining company parents during the colonial era (and until the late 1960s) when the mining company exercised very strict control over community residents. Adult children not in school or not employed by the mining company would have been forbidden to live permanently in mining company housing.

⁵⁸These data are based on a census of the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi conducted by the author, October-December 1987.

spouses. In these cases, the dependent minors are often sent by their parents to live with the mining company families so that the children have access to mining company schooling and food rations. In some cases, the mining company families have taken in orphaned or abandoned relatives.

Another category of household members included relatives of the head of the household or his spouse who are themselves employed by the mining company but who had not (as yet) been issued their own housing. These ranged from children in the nuclear family to a variety of brothers, sisters, cousins, nephews, nieces and (occasionally) grandchildren of the other household members. Most of these were newly engaged workers. (It was my strong impression, based on discussions with a large number of informants, that a Gécamines employee transferred into the Kolwezi area from elsewhere would tend to live in the home of a mining company relative if there were no company housing otherwise immediately available.) Though not common, Cité residents would sometimes share their quarters with other than relatives. So far as I could tell, however, boarders in these situations had generally activated a previous tie of strong friendship, religious affiliation or co-ethnicity to be allowed to share another family's housing. (I found no cases in which mining company families in the Cité were renting or leasing space in their housing to others.)

The Research Population in Profile

As we have seen, there are a total of 958 residential structures in the Cité, ranging from multi-room, single-family dwellings to small structures with four separate one-room apartments (although most of the Cité's dwellings were built to house two "households"). In December 1987, there were some 1,817 households in the Cité.⁵⁹

As we turn to the actual count of people in the Cité, it is necessary to note a discrepancy between "official" population data furnished by the mining company and those collected by our census. According to the data holdings of the Gécamines Group West, in March 1988 the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi contained 12,048 residents.⁶⁰ However, in my count of the population in 95% of the Cité's households, conducted between October and December 1987, I found a total of 15,359

⁵⁹I define a "household" as the group of people inhabiting a residence assigned by the mining company to one worker. (That worker can be male or female, bachelor or married.) Households in this definition can contain more than one nuclear family. However, the salient characteristic here is that the mining company holds one worker responsible for all that transpires in that residential unit--the person who is "chef" of the household. The number of households is based on a specific count by the author during a census of the Cité conducted from October-December 1987. See also Lomnitz (1977:91) for a cogent discussion of the definition of "household" in another urban, third-world context.

⁶⁰These data were obtained by personal interview with the Chef de Service d'Action Sociale, Gécamines-Kolwezi, March 1988. The data themselves were drawn from the automated personnel files of Gécamines Group West and were valid as of 17 March 1988. (There was no large-scale turnover of personnel in Gécamines between December 1987 and March 1988.) As was the case with state documents in Zaïre, the mining company's statistical data in personnel matters are best viewed with a certain skepticism.

Table 3.2. Structure of the population in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

<u>Total Households in the Cité</u>		<u>Gécamines Workers in the Cité</u>		<u>Dependents of Gécamines Workers in the Cité</u>	
1,817		Married male:	1,576	Wives in the Cité	1,579*
		Unmarried male:	114		
<u>Total Households Actually Surveyed</u>		Married female:	78	(Wives outside the Cité:	34**)
1,725		Unmarried female:	85		

			1853	Children of workers:	9,896
<u>Population of the Households Surveyed</u>					
15,359				Dependents of workers other than wives and children:	2,082

NOTES:

* These include wives who are also Gécamines workers.

**This figure is unrealistically low.

Source: Data obtained in 95% of the Cité households by census survey between October and December 1987.

persons. If we assume that the remaining 5% of the households in the Cité contained, on average, the same number of residents as those surveyed, the Cité actually had a total population of about 16,178 persons at the end of 1987. I am confident in my data, so will say here that the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi contained some 16,180 residents in late 1987 and early 1988 (or, in other words, some 4,130 more residents than reflected in the mining company data). A more specific categorization of the population in those households surveyed is provided in Table 3.2.

According to the Gécamines data holdings, there were 1728 Gécamines workers living in the Cité in March 1988.⁶¹ Again, my data paint a somewhat different picture. I found some 1853 workers in my census. If we generalize these census data to the whole community, there should have been about 1954 Gécamines workers in the Cité in late 1987. Thus, I will say that the Cité contained some 1,950 workers at the time of my research (or, in other words, 220 more workers than acknowledged in the "current" mining company data).

Based on the census data, we can further categorize the Cité workers by sex and marital status as depicted in Table 3.3. It is, of course, the married male worker in which we are most interested. I counted 1,690 of these in the Cité during the census. If we generalize to all the homes in the

⁶¹These data were obtained by personal interview with the Chef de Service d'Action Sociale, Gécamines-Kolwezi, March 1988.

community, there should have been about 1,780 married male workers in the Cité in late 1987.

It is probably also appropriate to note here the general proportions of workers and dependents in the Cité. These are depicted in Table 3.4. As that table indicates, at the time of the census, there were roughly eight dependents for every Gécamines worker in the Cité. And married male workers comprised one out of every ten Cité residents. The table also shows that minor and unemployed children of Gécamines workers comprised almost two of every three Cité residents.

We might ask at this point how the totals of population in the Cité compare to those for urban Kolwezi as a whole. Table 3.5 provides an overview. As we can see from that table, the Gécamines employees and their dependents from the entire Kolwezi urban area comprised about 42% of Kolwezi's population in late 1987. Gécamines employees alone comprised about 6.7% of Kolwezi's population.

Table 3.3. Proportions of workers in the Cité categorized by sex and marital status.

<u>Worker Sex and Marital Status</u>	<u>Percentage of Total of Workers</u>
Married males	85%
Unmarried males	6%
Unmarried females	5%
Married females	4%

Source: Census of Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, performed by the author, October-December 1987.

Table 3.4. Proportions of the Cité's population categorized by workers and dependents.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Cité's Population</u>	
All workers	12	%
Married male workers	10	%
Unmarried male workers	1	%
Unmarried female workers	0.5	%
Married female workers	0.5	%
Nonworking wives of workers	10	%
Working wives of workers	0.5	%
Unemployed children of workers	64	%
Dependents of workers		
other than wives and children	14	%

Source: Census of Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, performed by the author, October-December 1987.

Table 3.5. Population of Kolwezi urban area compared to population of Gécamines employees and their dependents in the Kolwezi area.

Population of urban Kolwezi (late 1986)	225,020
Total Gécamines workforce in Kolwezi area	
March 1988	15,059
--Total of Gécamines blue-collar workers	13,973
--Total of Gécamines white-collar workers	1,086
Total Gécamines workforce and dependents	
in Kolwezi area, March 1988	93,533

Sources: Rapport Annuel, Ville de Kolwezi, 1986; Interview with Chef de Service d'Action Sociale, Gécamines-Kolwezi, 17 March 1988; Interview with Director, Direction du Personnel, Gécamines-Exploitation, Lubumbashi, 30 March 1988; Author's estimate of the number of Gécamines cadre dependents in Kolwezi area, March 1988.

We note that the population of our research community itself comprises roughly 5.4% of Kolwezi's urban population, and about 14% of the "Gécamines" population in the Kolwezi area. We further note that married male workers in the Cité comprise some 10% of all Gécamines employees (male, female, married, unmarried, white-collar and blue-collar) in the Kolwezi area. The same married, male workers in the Cité comprise about 1% of the total population of urban Kolwezi.⁶²

Having, then, briefly considered certain general population categories in the Cité, and having related those to the greater Kolwezi urban area, we can now turn to more specific variables within our research population.

⁶²In these comparisons, I am using the March 1988 personnel data for the Cité provided by Gécamines rather than my own, so that the comparisons between the Cité and other Gécamines communities are based on data derived from the same source, valid for the same period and (presumably) obtained by the same methods. While I am not very confident of the absolute accuracy of the Gécamines data, I am reasonably confident that they are close enough to the truth to permit generalizations of the kind made here.

CHAPTER 4 THE ZAIRIAN COPPER INDUSTRY TODAY: AN OVERVIEW

General

The social milieu of urban southern Zaire is one obvious dimension in this study. That dimension has been partially outlined in preceding chapters, particularly as it applies to urban Kolwezi. But a second and equally important dimension is the mining industry itself. While the history (and certain relevant social policies) of that industry have also been noted in preceding chapters, additional detail is important to any assessment of belief and behavior among its employees. The discussion now turns briefly to that detail.

Shaba without the mining industry is almost inconceivable. The three cities of Shaba each owe their origin to colonial era mineral development; and even today, much of life in urban Shaba revolves around the mining industry. To speak of that industry is to speak of Gécamines; and in order to understand life in an industrial community in Shaba, we must have some appreciation for the entity that is Gécamines.¹

¹One measure of the size of this huge parastatal is the fact that it is the second largest single mining entity in Africa, surpassed only by that in neighboring Zambia, which, interestingly, produces roughly the same annual mineral output (ZCCM, 1987).

Gécamines: The Organization

Gécamines is a parastatal organization (a so-called "entreprise publique") consisting of a parent holding company and three daughter companies. The whole organization is tightly controlled by the Mobutu régime (under the auspices of the Commissaire d'état de portefeuille).²

The holding company (Gécamines-Holding) provides general direction, but each of the three daughter companies enjoys considerable internal autonomy. The "Gécamines-Holding" staff is located in Kinshasa, the national capital.³

Of the three daughter companies, only one is directly involved in mineral production--"Gécamines-Exploitation." It is this latter company that now mines and refines the minerals on Shaba's Copperbelt.⁴ This is the company of specific interest to us. We will return to it in a moment.

²The Mobutu regime also achieves practical control by placing carefully selected, loyal supporters in key positions throughout the organization. Like almost all organizations in Zaire, Gécamines has a very "political" dimension.

³My cadre informants in Kolwezi tended to view "Gécamines-Holding" as a nonfunctioning entity, simply a sinecure for incompetents and political hacks. Perhaps this is typical of modern corporations, in which subordinates often question the coherence and competence of higher echelons. It is certainly reminiscent of modern military staff officers who derive great satisfaction in routinely excoriating higher-level staffs for myopia and ineptitude.

⁴In the late 1960s and early 1970s, two consortia involving foreign investors were also granted mining rights




Figure 4.1. Gécamines organization chart.

on the southern Shaba Copperbelt. The first, (Société de Développement Industriel et Des Mines du Zaïre--or SODIMIZA) based largely on Japanese investment, was founded in 1969. Though the concession area was fairly large, only two mines were developed (one at Chinsenda and another at Musoshi on the Zambian border). A concentrator was also built at Musoshi. Mineral production commenced in 1972. The concentrated ore was shipped to Japan for refining. However, the Japanese investors backed out of the deal in 1983, leaving the mine and mineral concentrator in Zairian hands. Subsequently, Gécamines "loaned" SODIMIZA a directing staff and, as of mid 1988, mineral production continued on a small scale. The ore was being shipped to neighboring Zambia for refining. While SODIMIZA was managed by Gécamines personnel, it was still a separate entity, its status and subordination were under review in Kinshasa. The second consortium obtaining mining rights (the Société Minière de Tenke-Fungurume or SMTF) was based on investment partners from the U.S., South Africa, France and Japan. Activity was concentrated on a rich deposit of copper ore at Fungurume, about midway between Likasi and Kolwezi. Preliminary engineering and excavation of the site commenced in 1972, but a convergence of factors caused work to cease in 1976, before any minerals were produced. I was told (in March 1988) that SMTF is now defunct, its concession part of the Gécamines reserves. (Sources: Young and Turner, 1985:301-304; personal interview with Citoyen Kingunza, Directorate of Public Relations, Gécamines-Exploitation, Lubumbashi, 29 and 30 March 1988.)

Of the other two daughter companies, one (Gécamines-Developpement) is concerned solely with agricultural production in Shaba.⁵ It too is headquartered in Lubumbashi. It manages crop farms and stock-raising at various locations in Shaba, and mill complexes in Likasi, Lubumbashi and Kolwezi. The company's products are sold locally. (The Shaba breweries are large consumers of the maize produced by Gécamines-Developpement.)

The third daughter company, Gécamines-Commerciale, has the role of marketing Zaire's mineral products (which also include those Zairian mineral products not produced by Gécamines, such as the diamonds of the Kasai-based parastatal, MIBA, and the gold mined at Kilo-Moto in northeastern Zaire). In actual fact, Gécamines-Exploitation is simply a new name and a new subordination for the older marketing parastatal known as SOZACOM (Société Zairoise Pour le Commercialisation Des Minerais) which had by the early 1980s become notorious for corruption and diverted funds (Young and Turner, 1985:304; 384). Like its predecessor (SOZACOM), Gécamines-Commerciale is headquartered in Kinshasa.

⁵We might well ask how this company comes to be tied to a mineral production organization. The answer lies in the ancillary activities, including agriculture and milling, developed by the mining industry in the colonial period. These continued in various forms after national independence. Gécamines-Developpement is an amalgamation (under centralized direction) of various state-directed agricultural schemes in Shaba.

We now return to the daughter company of primary interest: Gécamines-Exploitation, the essential successor to the Union Minière du Haut Katanga. The headquarters and directing staff of this company are located in Lubumbashi, as was true of the field staff in the colonial period.

The basic function of Gécamines-Exploitation is to mine and refine minerals on the Shaba Copperbelt, the most important being copper. The company also produces significant quantities of cobalt, zinc and cadmium which are refined in Zaire.⁶ A portion of Zaire's copper is rerefined in Belgium to extract silver, gold and several other rare metals. In addition to the metals, Gécamines-Exploitation also mines coal and calcite, the latter for use in metal refining and for production of cement. Recent annual production of various mining products is shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Gécamines production, 1982-1986.

	1986	1985	1984	1983	1982
Copper (MT)	476,000	470,000	465,500	465,800	466,400
Cobalt (MT)	14,518	10,571	9,075	5,360	5,475
Zinc (MT)	63,900	67,900	68,400	62,500	64,400
Cadmium (MT)	95	---	---	---	---
Silver (MT)	34.3	42.8	38	39.5	59.2
Gold (Kg)	24	27	49	43	86
Coal (MT)	96,119	104,300	104,300	99,400	112,700
Calcite (MT)	320,200	360,100	253,400	245,100	254,100

Source: Gécamines-Exploitation, Rapport Annuel, 1986, p. 16.

⁶At one time, the organization also produced uranium ore concentrate from a mine at Shinkolobwe. Uranium production ceased in 1960, although significant reserves remain.

Between 1983 and 1988, Gécamines-Exploitation maintained a workforce which ranged from about 35,800 to about 37,000 persons. This is a very large labor force by central African standards. Moreover, the direct influence of Gécamines over the lives of Shabans extends far beyond the Gécamines employees themselves. The company is peculiarly responsible for the dependents of employees. When these are counted, it can be said that some 236,000 people are directly associated with Gécamines-Exploitation.⁷ These are spread over some twelve communities across southern Shaba. According to official government statistics, the population of Shaba itself in 1987 was only 4,548,264.⁸ Thus, fully five percent of all Shabans are directly associated with Gécamines. (Of course, a very large additional segment of Shaba's population is also dependent on the mining company in less direct, but no less important ways.)

Gécamines-Exploitation is, in essence, a state within a state. It has its own worker communities with their own infrastructure. In these, Gécamines officials serve as the community leaders in both administrative and political (party) roles. The company has its own housing and

⁷Sources: Gécamines-Exploitation, Rapport Annuel, 1986, pp. 44-45, and personal interview with Citoyen Muhau, Director, Division de recrutement, Gécamines-Exploitation main office, Lubumbashi, 30 March 1988. A more specific discussion of personnel categories is provided below.

⁸Rapport Annuel de la Division Régionale d'Administration Territoire du Shaba, 1987. As noted above, all such official statistics should be viewed with a measure of caution.




Figure 4.2. The Gécamines-Exploitation Concession in Shaba.

utilities, its own ration distribution system, its own markets, its own schools, its own hospitals, its own transportation systems, its own internal security system, its own system for redress of community problems. The senior company officials are part of the national elite in their own right.

To exercise effective control over the field operations of this vast enterprise, the company has (since relatively early in the colonial period) been organized into three geographically-defined operational groups, each with their individual management staffs and facilities. These groups are called Group South, Group Center, and Group West, respectively. Company employees are rather freely reassigned between these groups. We will look at each in turn.

Group South, the center of the earliest major colonial mining activity in Shaba, is headquartered in Lubumbashi. Its major production activities are an underground mine and mineral concentrator at Kipushi and a pyrometallurgical copper refinery in Lubumbashi.⁹ (Several abandoned copper

⁹The Kipushi mine now produces copper and zinc ore, which are concentrated and shipped to Kolwezi for refining. The Lubumbashi copper refinery is the oldest in Zaire--and the least efficient. (It first produced copper in 1911.) The refinery chimney and huge mountain of granulated slag, piled beside the refinery, dominate the Lubumbashi skyline. (The slag still contains about 2% copper and is retained against the day when further mineral recovery may be economically feasible.) The factory belches huge clouds of unscrubbed sulfurous pollutants which generally descend on the blue-collar worker community near the factory.

mines are scattered north and east of the Lubumbashi metropolitan area.)

Group Center, headquartered in Likasi, was the second locale of major industrial development in Shaba. (Likasi itself was founded in 1917 as a mineral production community. It is now a city of some 220,000,¹⁰ and its economy still revolves around the minerals industry.) Group Center features two major refinery complexes, both located in the Likasi metropolitan area: a pyrometallurgical copper refinery and a hydrometallurgical refinery for copper and cobalt. This group also controls mines and mineral concentrators in several rather widely scattered locations: an open pit mine at Kamfundwa (near Likasi), an underground mine and concentrator at Kambove, an open pit mine and concentrator at Kakanda, and a calcite mine at Kakontwe (near Likasi). These (rather scattered) mining sites each contain Gécamines communities subordinate to Group Center.

The third operational group, Group West, with its headquarters in Kolwezi, represents the most recent of the Gécamines development complexes on the Shaban Copperbelt. This group underwent its period of heaviest growth in the World War II period. In the years immediately following the war, Group West became the essential center of the Zairian minerals industry.

¹⁰Rapport Annuel de la Division Régionale d'Administration Territoire du Shaba, 1987. The exact figure for Likasi's population at the end of 1987 was 219,534.

Except for the coal mines at Luena, virtually all of Group West activities are concentrated in the immediate environment of urban Kolwezi.¹¹ Mineral production activities in Kolwezi include three major concentrations of open pit mines (and one subterranean mine) and two refinery complexes: one hydrometallurgical plant for refining copper and cobalt, the other for refining zinc and cadmium. The Kolwezi area also features two mineral concentrators and a mineral scrubbing facility. Since Group West is the Gécamines-Exploitation subordinate of greatest interest to this study, a bit of additional descriptive detail is in order.

With some 15,059 employees,¹² Group West contains almost half of all Gécamines-Exploitation employees. In 1986, the mines in the Kolwezi area produced about 75% of all minerals extracted by Gécamines. Kolwezi's refineries processed about 36% of the copper, about 59% of the cobalt, all of the zinc and all of the cadmium refined in Zaire.¹³

But Group West is far more than just workers, mines and refineries. Gécamines employees in Kolwezi had some 78,000

¹¹Luena is located some 150 km northeast of Kolwezi.

¹²These include 13,973 blue-collar workers and 1086 cadre. Information for workers was drawn from the automated personnel files of the Gécamines Directorate Général Kolwezi and valid as of 17 March 1988. Data for cadre was drawn from the automated files of the Gécamines Directorate of personnel in the main office at Lubumbashi and valid as of 30 March 1988.

¹³Gécamines-Exploitation Rapport Annuel 1986, p. 20.



Figure 4.3. The Lubumbashi copper refinery, which dominates the city's skyline and pollutes its air. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.4. Blister copper produced in the Lubumbashi refinery. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.5. Abandoned copper mines just east of Lubumbashi.
Photos by author.



Figure 4.6. A Kolwezi open-pit copper mine. Photo by author.



Figure 4.7. Mine-working equipment in a Kolwezi mine. Photo by author.



Figure 4.8. Luilu copper-cobalt refinery just north of urban Kolwezi. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.9. Tending cathodes in the Luilu refinery. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.10. Cobalt granules produced in Kolwezi's Luilu refinery. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.11. Gécamines hospital, Kolwezi. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.12. A maternity ward in the Gécamines hospital. Gécamines photo, used with permission.

dependents in mid 1988.¹⁴ (In other words, those Kolwezi residents directly associated with Gécamines comprised at least 40% of the urban population. And this percentage does not include employees of subcontractors who work for, but are not paid directly by, Gécamines. Neither does it include merchants whose businesses are directly dependent on mining company consumers nor informal sector activity dependent on stealing and smuggling mining company material.) To house both employees and their dependents, Gécamines Group West supervises seven worker cités (six near Kolwezi, one at Luena) and owns the majority of European-style housing in urban Kolwezi.

Gécamines-Exploitation as a whole also manages some sixty-four primary schools, three six-year secondary schools, some fourteen technical schools at the secondary level and a major technical training institute.¹⁵ About half of these schools are located in the Kolwezi area. The Gécamines establishment in Kolwezi includes a major medical complex (a worker hospital, a nearby cadre hospital, and a large cadre clinic). If this were not enough, the mining company in Kolwezi also supervises such differing activities as a dozen centers for the distribution of flour, oil, fish

¹⁴This is based on specific data for workers' dependents drawn from the automated files of the Directorate-Générale Kolwezi and valid as of 17 March 1988 (12,199 wives and 62,047 children) plus my estimate of totals for cadre wives and children in the Kolwezi area.

¹⁵Gécamines (N.D.:38).

and meat to mining company employees and a vast network of sports and other recreational facilities. To maintain, support and supervise these diverse activities, Group West runs a huge warehouse, workshop and motor-pool complex in Kolwezi and has various offices and facilities scattered throughout the Kolwezi urban area.

In this study, we are primarily interested in the married male workers who live in one of the seven Group West cités--more precisely, in one of the six cités in the Kolwezi area, the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

The Gécamines Workforce

Having looked at Gécamines, the organization, we now turn to a very brief overview of the workforce itself. Our purpose here is to gain an appreciation for the size of the force and some of its structural characteristics. We are also interested here in how it is recruited, paid and administered. Ultimately, of course, we will draw more specific attention to the Gécamines workforce in the Kolwezi area. In all of this, a certain amount of historical perspective is required, and is combined here with information on the present status of the company. As we noted above, the overall size of the Gécamines workforce has varied by about 1,500 persons over the past five years. These fluctuations are due to minor imbalances in retirement, resignations and recruiting: I was told that no

major changes in the force levels are anticipated over the next five years.¹⁶

Within the workforce itself, there are two fundamental categories of personnel: the main d'oeuvre-exploitation (the blue-collar worker) and the main d'oeuvre-d'encadrement (the "cadre," or white-collar supervisor). These two categories reflect a colonial-era distinction between the indigenous laborers and their European supervisors. Though most of the cadre are now Zairois, the ranking and compensation of the workforce are still profoundly tied to these two fundamental categories of colonial origin. We shall consider each in turn; but to do so, we must touch on a very complex system of rankings and grades.

We could begin with what the mining company calls "class." This is the simplest of the various ways in which Gécamines employees are administratively categorized. Each employee belongs to one of nine classes. (These consist of classes 8 through 1 with an extra "super" grade at the top. Class 8 is the lowest.)

The blue-collar workers fall within classes 8-4. The white-collar employees (cadre) fall within classes 3-1 and "S" (super grade). Class 4 is an intermediate class between blue-collar and white-collar workers. Employees in this

¹⁶Interview with Citoyen Muhau, Director, Gécamines-Exploitation, Division of Recruitment, Lubumbashi, 29 March 1988. Except as otherwise noted, specific information in this section is based on this source and upon personal discussion with a wide cross-section of Gécamines employees in Kolwezi and Lubumbashi between 13 October 1987 and 1 August 1988.

class are called "aspirant," and are supposedly awaiting promotion into the ranks of cadre. However, they are still considered blue-collar workers.

While "class" is the simplest of the various ways Gécamines employees are ranked, in itself it does not seem to be the most important category to the employees themselves. When asked their class, for instance, many workers could only respond "class 5-8" or "MOP" (main d'oeuvre personnel, essentially the same thing as class 5-8). The main function of the class ranking, as far as workers themselves are concerned, seems to be to distinguish the three broad categories of worker, cadre, and aspirant.

The next method of ranking applies only to the blue-collar worker. This is a grading called "cote," a very early colonial era institution. The cotes, which theoretically range from 1 to 30, are essentially pay grades.¹⁷ I was told that only cotes 6 through 24 are actually used by Gécamines at this time. A worker's cote

¹⁷ Interestingly, workers we interviewed were far more willing on the whole to provide their class than their cote, and workers knew their cote very precisely. The reluctance to divulge the cote seemed directly related to its indication of a salary level--a very touchy issue in Gécamines. In trying to find the reason for this reluctance, I was told that many workers did not want their wives to know the exact level of their salary (although in a sample of 95 workers 97% of workers we sampled indicated that the married male worker in question discussed his income with his wife). Another reason provided by some informants for reluctance to discuss salary was fear of sorcery perpetrated by jealous family members or neighbors. While the empirical basis for this fear is difficult to judge, the fear itself is very real in the Cité.

does correlate with his class up to a point. (For instance, a class 8 worker will have a cote ranking from 6 to 10. A class 5 worker will have a cote ranking from 21 to 24.)

The correlation between cote and class breaks down at the class 4 (aspirant) level, since workers from the various worker class levels could be chosen as "aspirants." (Once chosen, aspirants do not automatically get a cote promotion to match their higher class. Hence, a "class 5" worker could have a much higher cote than a "class 4" worker.)

While the cadre do not have cotes, they do have a system of rankings which seemed to me more or less analogous (although my informants hastened to assure me that the two systems are fundamentally different. The cadre system is a responsibility ranking as well as pay ranking.) It uses letters, the lowest ranking being J and the top ranking A. It seemed to me that the cadre paid more attention to their letter ranking than to their "class." The letter ranking defines their pay grade and rank in the company much more precisely than anything else.

There are other ways of defining an employee's rank as well. One of these is by function or generalized job title in the company. For instance, among workers, one might find a title of "kapita" (team chief). Although the class and cote of "kapitas" will vary, the individuals themselves are chosen for leadership skills, tend to be senior in age and experience, and are generally respected by Cité residents.

A more specific listing of job titles within the cadre ranks include such as "chef de bureau," "chef de service," etc.

Within the cadre, there are three rather broad functional divisions with internal distinctions. The lowest ranking division consists of employees with important technical skills and experience who have been promoted to the cadre from the ranks of blue-collar workers. These fall into a category called "maitrise." Virtually all are found within the class 3 ranking and are rarely promoted any higher.¹⁸ Within the "maitrise" division are positions for both managers (gestion) and staff personnel (soutien).

The second broad cadre division is labelled simply "cadre." This ranking encompasses most of the company's "middle management." It too is divided into managers (gestion) and staff personnel (soutien).

The highest broad cadre division is called "direction" and consists of top-level managers. This category is further subdivided into the three rankings of "division," "departement/siege," and "direction." The latter is, of course, the highest.

¹⁸Since the "maitrise" individuals generally arrive in the cadre ranks with substantial longevity of service, their salaries are generally much superior to newly engaged, university educated cadre, who are (as a general rule) hired directly at the class 3 level. In time, of course, the university-educated cadre progress through the cadre ranks to the best-paid company positions. It is important to point out that the "maitrise" category affords access to the ranks of cadre by blue-collar workers (who typically lack a higher education). The possibility of a maitrise promotion is a considerable incentive for many workers.

Table 4.2. Gécamines employee grades.

Table 4.2. Gécamines employee grades.				General management
	<u>Class</u>	<u>Cote</u> <u>(workers only)</u>	<u>Pay grade</u> <u>(cadre only)</u>	<u>categories</u> <u>(cadre only)</u>
Cadre	S		A	<u>Direction</u>
			AA	<u>-direction</u>
			B	<u>-department/siege</u>
			BB	<u>-division</u>
	1		C	
			CC	
			D	
			DD	
	2		E	<u>Cadre</u>
			EE	<u>-gestion</u>
			F	<u>-soutien</u>
			FF	
	3		G	
			GG	
			H	
			HH	<u>Maitrise</u>
4	I	<u>-gestion</u>		
	II	<u>-soutien</u>		
	J			
	JJ			
<u>Aspirant</u> (potential cadre)	4			
Workers	5	21-24		
	6	16-20		
	7	11-15		
	8	6-10		

Source: Personal interviews by author with Gécamines personnel management officials in Kolwezi and Lubumbashi, February-April 1988.

In mid 1988, the Gécamines-Exploitation workforce consisted of about 33,000 blue-collar workers (main d'oeuvre d'exploitation) and 3,100 cadre. The cadre included some 520 expatriates, most of French or Belgian nationality.

Within the ranks of blue-collar workers, some 5% were female. Within the ranks of cadre, some 9% were female.

In the Kolwezi area itself (Group West), the Gécamines workforce in mid 1988 consisted of some 14,250 blue-collar workers and 1086 cadre. The Kolwezi-based cadre included some 169 expatriates.¹⁹

As should be evident at this point, the salary of any Gécamines employee depends on his position within the complex system of rankings described above. But the salary itself is only part of a broader range of compensations and perquisites.

As of mid 1988, the lowest base salary for a Gécamines worker was about 7,000 zaires per month (roughly \$47 at the official exchange rate in March). The modal base salary for workers we interviewed seemed to be about 10,000 zaires (\$67). The highest blue-collar worker monthly salaries were in the range of 15,000-16,000 zaires (\$100-\$107). Unlike most other state agencies in Zaire, the mining company paid its employees regularly and reliably. A worker could always count on receiving his salary on payday--the 15th of each month.

In addition to the base salaries, workers received various cash bonuses after completing certain terms of service. These could be quite substantial. (Workers are

¹⁹Data obtained from the automated files of Gécamines-Exploitation, Direction du Personnel, Lubumbashi on 30 March 1988.

generally pensioned at age 60. Those permanently injured in the course of their work are either transferred to lighter duties or pensioned. Informants seemed to consider the pension system to be reasonably equitable.)

Beyond the money itself, blue-collar workers were also entitled to free company housing with utilities (electricity and water)²⁰ and to a free monthly ration of flour, meat, dried fish and oil. The amount of the ration was adjusted to the size of the family. (Unfortunately, the meat, fish and oil ration was frequently disrupted by shortages and transportation difficulties, and could not be invariably counted as a regular compensation.) But the free housing, utilities and rations substantially augmented the worker's base salary. Likewise, all Gécamines personnel received free medical care. For a worker family of four, these various allowances amounted to a value of at least an extra 5000 zaires (\$33) a month in added benefits.²¹

²⁰The blue-collar worker housing, however, was in short supply and did not accommodate the demand in any Gécamines center I visited. Workers who could not be provided housing by the company are given a housing allowance.

²¹In March 1988, I held a series of discussions with my trusted informants to determine what level of salary would be necessary in Kolwezi for a four-member family to live in a small but adequate house with electricity and (one spigot of) water and eat three plain but nutritionally adequate meals per day. We concluded that it would require at least 12,000 zaires (\$80) per month. It appeared to me that no Gécamines employee at the time was compensated at a level lower than this, although (as we shall see below) many workers spent much of their income on things other than the material necessities of life.

The cadre, though now mainly comprised of Zairois, still maintain a level of status and perquisites once reserved for European mining company supervisors. Thus, cadre compensation was considerably more generous than that of blue-collar workers, and again, has to be defined in broader terms than base salary alone. But let us start with that sum. The lowest base salary for cadre seemed to be about 17,000 zaires a month (about U.S \$113 in March 1988). The modal cadre base salary in Kolwezi seemed to be about 20,000-22,000 zaires (\$133-\$146). Most cadre also received a substantial transportation allowance.²² Although this allowance varied based on distance from the workplace, it was often more than the base salary itself, so that it was common to find a cadre with a monthly base salary of (say) 20,000 zaires and a transportation allowance of 22,000 zaires. The transportation allowance, thus, substantially augmented the base salary. (For most cadre, very little of salary seemed to be actually spent on transportation.)

Like the workers, cadre also received free company housing. However, unlike the small, austere quarters of the workers, the cadre housing consisted of comfortable European-style, single-family dwellings in former "European" communities. Such housing was furnished with utilities,

²²For workers, on the other hand, transportation to distant workplaces was provided by the company. Such transport consisted of buses or open flat-bed trucks, which picked up and deposited workers at fixed sites in their Cité or in Kolwezi's residential areas.

including interior plumbing and most of the other conveniences of western life. Although cadre were required to pay for their utilities, they received a utility allowance which offset part of the cost. In the Kolwezi area, cadre housing was plentiful (although it ranged considerably in size and state of repair) and there was no waiting list. Cadre housing was not, of course, given to blue-collar workers.

While cadre were not provided the free food rations enjoyed by the workers, they were permitted to purchase food supplies at considerably reduced prices in company canteens. Like the workers, cadre also received free medical care in hospital facilities staffed by Gécamines employees and (by local standards) well stocked with medical supplies and equipment. And, in fact, there were separate facilities for workers and cadre. Perhaps not surprisingly, the cadre medical facilities were considerably more comfortable and more lavishly equipped.²³

The cadre enjoyed a number of privileges which were perhaps a bit less evident but nonetheless important. For instance, many of the cadre were assigned a personal vehicle for their official duties (often a small Japanese-made pickup truck). While company rules forbade the use of these

²³The differences between facilities for workers and cadre (in both housing and medical care) reflect the colonial-era difference between indigenous blue-collar personnel and European cadre. These substantial differences were maintained in independent Zaire, despite the indigenization of most of the company's management.



Figure 4.13. Blue-collar workers in an underground mine. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.14. Female Gécamines employee, a clerical worker.
Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.15. A cadre (foreground) and blue-collar worker in a Gécamines computer center. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.16. A senior cadre at work. Photo by author.



Figure 4.17. A blue-collar Gécamines worker in the chemical lab. Gécamines photo, used with permission.



Figure 4.18. Blue-collar equipment operators in the mine. Photo by author.

for personal business, the rule was only sporadically enforced (and widely ignored). Likewise, cadre were much less stringently supervised at work: some were clearly able to devote a portion of their "work" time to non company activities. This was not true of blue-collar workers, who were (in general) much more carefully supervised at work.

I should perhaps note here that no cadre I talked to was content with his or her level of compensation.²⁴ Invariably, Zairois cadre believed that they were badly undercompensated for the work they performed. This attitude was exacerbated by invidious comparisons with the salaries provided to Gécamines expatriate cadre (who received much higher salaries, and, moreover, received half their wages in Belgian francs). Interestingly, the Gécamines blue-collar workers tended to view all cadre as "filthy rich" and on several occasions expressed resentment to me at the difference in levels of compensation between workers and cadre.

While on the general subject of employee compensation, it is appropriate to reemphasize the issues of free hospital

²⁴I am here reminded of one senior cadre of Luba-Kasai origin that I knew in Kolwezi. He lived in a very spacious and well-maintained house, lavishly furnished with expensive European furniture and electronic equipment and tastefully decorated with European and African art. He and his family were always impeccably dressed in the latest European fashions. He had two cars: a late model Peugeot and a seven-year-old Mercedes. Yet, he complained bitterly to me that the company did not pay adequately to provide a "comfortable" life style. So he supervised a side business collecting charcoal in the villages and selling it in Kolwezi "just to make ends meet."

care and education of dependent minors. First, the Gécamines hospitals were by some measure the best in southern Zaire. This was true of both the equipment and physical plant on one hand and of the quality of medical personnel on the other.²⁵ While a very high proportion of my informants complained that medical care in Gécamines facilities had deteriorated dramatically since the late 1970s, informants were essentially unanimous in citing the "free" medical care as a major benefit of Gécamines employment.²⁶ There were many residents of urban Kolwezi who had difficulty affording even the 150 zaire (\$1) entrance fee at the other available hospital--that run by the Methodist church.

Likewise, the Gécamines schools were generally considered the best available in southern Zaire at the primary level and among the best at the secondary level. These schools were staffed by Gécamines employees (worker-grades for primary schools, cadre grades for secondary schools). Teachers were hired and paid by the same general criteria as other Gécamines employees. Free access to these

²⁵While Gécamines paid its medical personnel at rates substantially higher than the state hospitals or the religious missions, and thus had first choice of available graduates, I heard many allegations that quality of care in Gécamines hospitals depended on the willingness of patients to bribe the hospital staff.

²⁶Medical care was provided free of charge to Gécamines employees and their "legitimate" dependents. This meant, of course, that certain categories of dependents were excluded. For instance, a number of Gécamines employees were polygynous. The mining company would recognize (and treat, free of charge) only the one "legitimate" wife and dependent minors connected with that union.

schools for dependent minors was a substantial benefit of mining company employment.²⁷ And in fact, a number of worker households in Kolwezi had taken in younger brothers, sisters, cousins, nephews and nieces of workers sent from remote rural areas to live with mining company families so that the children could benefit from the Gécamines educational system.²⁸

All Gécamines employees are members of a "union" which is, in fact, part of one large national union of workers, the Union National de Travailleurs Zairois (UNTZA). But as clearly noted by Young and Turner (1985:199-201), the main function of that union is to support the social and economic

²⁷The Gécamines schools were equipped and maintained by the mining company rather than the state. At the primary level, the schools followed a state-mandated curriculum. At the secondary level, there were two separate "tracks"--one which stressed practical skills and trained skilled workers for mining company applications. The other "track" stressed the conventional state-mandated curriculum leading eventually to the diplôme, the secondary-school diploma granted to those who passed a tough state exam.. Most of the students who pursued this second track aspired to go on to an institut-supérieure (university-level institution). While even the Gécamines schools were austere and underequipped by European or North American standards, they were far better equipped and staffed than the majority of the state schools, and their teachers much better paid. At one time, the mining company absorbed virtually all the graduates of its schools. Unfortunately, by the mid 1980s, it could no longer do so, a cause of much bitterness by workers and their unemployed dependents.

²⁸There are three categories of primary and secondary schools in Shaba: the state schools, the religious schools and the Gécamines schools. Salaries for teachers in the state schools and religious schools are paid by the state. The mining company employs and pays the teachers in its own schools--at salaries much higher than those of the state. As in the case of medical personnel, the mining company gets "first pick" of educational personnel.

policies of the regime.²⁹ While many informants in Kolwezi indicated that individual complaints of unfair treatment in the work place should be taken to the union representative ("syndicaliste"), they also said that union representatives were expected to calm labor unrest and prevent collective action by workers against company management. A majority of my blue-collar worker informants seemed to consider the union itself as either irrelevant or counter-productive to their interests, although union representatives in the work force seemed to be generally respected.

Recruitment of Gécamines employees is an activity that has seen substantial change in the past two decades. As a legacy of the colonial era mining industry worker "stabilization" policies, the company made a considerable effort up until the late 1960s to hire all the male children of its employees; children from mining company families received preferential consideration. That is manifestly no longer the case. Children from Gécamines families now compete on a (presumably) even footing with other Zairois for Gécamines employment.

Because of the general economic malaise in Zaire, and the extremely high rate of urban unemployment (or

²⁹In fairness, however, it should be noted that governments elsewhere in central and southern Africa with far more genuine commitment to the well-being of their citizens have also coopted or circumscribed unions of industrial workers in the interests of labor peace and national development. See, for instance, Maphosa (1985:174-179) for a discussion of union activity among Zimbabwean industrial workers and Ngidi (1985) for a history of the Botswana Mine Workers Union.

underemployment), mining company employment was highly desirable in 1988 and the company is typically besieged with requests for employment. All Gécamines hiring is now centralized at the main headquarters in Lubumbashi.

The hiring process is supposed to work as follows: Gécamines subordinate entities throughout the Copperbelt forward their lists of anticipated personnel shortages to the Personnel Directorate in Lubumbashi. That directorate, in turn, forwards its hiring recommendations to the office of the Président-Délégué-Général (PDG), which authorizes a specific number of persons to be hired. The hiring authorization is provided to the Directorate of Recruiting. At this point, the Directorate of Recruiting advertises the available positions in local media and solicits resumé.

Upon receipt of resumé, a recruiting committee selects the most promising candidates, who are then requested to undergo physical examinations. Based on all these results, the committee makes a final selection. The new employees are then hired on a contract of unspecified duration. Blue-collar personnel have a one-month probation period, cadre a three-month period. (During the probationary period, the employment can be terminated by either the employee or mining company.) Although hired only in Lubumbashi, employees are sent wherever the company needs personnel with the indicated qualifications.³⁰

³⁰This information is based on an interview with the Director of Recruiting, Gécamines-Exploitation, Lubumbashi, 29 March 1988.

There are several aspects of this idealized process which may not be as simple in practice as in theory. First, the demand for employment in the mining company vastly exceeds the "supply" of jobs. The Directorate of Recruitment receives literally thousands of unsolicited resumé's each year. The number of employees hired each year is relatively small as shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3. Gécamines-Exploitation hiring, 1986-1987.

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1986</u>
Number of blue-collar worker positions authorized for hire	704	1244
Number of blue-collar workers actually hired	452	1057
Number of cadre positions authorized for hire	214	186
Number of cadre actually hired	112	107

Source: Personal interview, Gécamines-Exploitation, Directorate of Recruiting, March 1988.

While, in theory, applicants for Gécamines employment are screened to assure that only the best qualified are selected, it was widely alleged by Gécamines employees that the system is subject to bribery and ethnic favoritism. (The allegations were impossible to prove or disprove, but I am inclined to believe that they had some basis in fact.) Likewise, I was told that certain Gécamines employees were hired in Kinshasa (rather than Lubumbashi) and imposed on

the mining company, regardless of qualifications. That, too, was impossible for me to verify. But it is certainly true that there are factions in the company that break down along regional and ethnic lines, and there is considerable basis for a suspicion that authorities in various positions favor co-ethnics in the distribution of available benefits.

The paygrade assigned to newly hired employees is based on educational level. I was told that no one is now hired who has less than a full primary school education (six years). An employee with up to two years of secondary school is hired at the "class 8" (lowest class) level. An employee with the full six years of secondary school (but without the state diploma) is hired at the "class 7" level. An employee with the state diploma is hired at the "class 6" level.

Virtually all individuals hired as cadre are graduates of an enseignement supérieur (college/university level institution). After completing the usual five-year university sequence, an individual would typically be hired as a cadre at the class 3 level. An individual with a significantly higher level of education (i.e. a medical doctor) might be hired at the class 2 level. Certain senior company administrators are appointed into the company ranks (from outside the company) at even higher management levels. Such appointments generally have an overtly political dimension.

Once hired, Gécamines employees are, in theory, promoted on the basis of longevity of service and competence, particularly the latter. My informants were very much divided on the issue of whether or not promotions generally favored the best qualified personnel. Based on careful probing of informants' views, I concluded that at the worker and middle-management cadre level, individual competence was a key promotion criteria in a majority of cases. However, at these levels there are clearly also frequent and blatant cases of favoritism based upon ties of family, ethnicity or friendship.

At the senior cadre level, on the other hand, there appears to be a considerable amount of overt favoritism in promotions. This has a political dimension, to be sure, but it also has an explicit ethnic dimension. At the time of my research, the Président-Délégué-Général (Mulenda Mbo) was of Songye ethnic extraction. He had, by 1988, very brazenly appointed a large number of fellow Songye to key administrative positions. Some of my informants talked darkly of a Songye "mafia."³¹

It is perhaps appropriate to mention here the subject of expatriate cadre. Most of the expatriates are of

³¹A number of non-Songye senior cadre were very bitter about these developments, complaining to me that ethnic favoritism had displaced competence as the mechanism for promotion in Gécamines. I was told that President Mobutu himself (notorious for his own ethnic favoritism) had felt constrained to warn the Gécamines hierarchy against excessive "tribalism."

European origin. Expatriates comprised some 13.6% of all cadre in 1988, and some 15.7% of the cadre in Kolwezi. The percentage of expatriates has been falling since 1981 (when expatriates comprised 31% of Gécamines cadre).³²

Informants indicated to me that the expatriate cadre were generally respected and not particularly resented by Zairois cadre, but that the (much) higher salaries paid to expatriates were viewed with some bitterness. I asked if there was a real need for the European cadre. My Zairois cadre informants told me that Zairois could fulfill virtually all of the company's technical functions, but that European cadre were useful for two reasons: first, they were ethnically "neutral" and could be used to balance tribal tensions in the organization; secondly, they tended to be hard workers dedicated to on-the-job production, and demanded the same of subordinates. They could, in fact, demand more of their Zairois cadre subordinates than other Zairois in the same positions.

³²Data obtained from the automated files of the Gécamines-Exploitation, Direction du Personnel, Lubumbashi on 30 March 1988. The two nationalities most heavily represented among the expatriate cadre are Belgians and French. In Kolwezi, expatriates of these two nationalities have their own schools for dependents (at the primary and secondary level). It was my impression that European cadre rarely socialized with Zairois cadre.

CHAPTER 5
THE PATTERNS OF BELIEF AND BEHAVIOR

General

Having considered the origin and growth of urban Kolwezi, having defined the natural environment and cultural context of the region in which it is located, and having briefly addressed the morphology of the urban center itself, we can now direct a more focussed attention to the research population. The discussion turns to the issues of dominant interest to the study.

The primary unit of analysis is, of course, the married, male blue-collar worker living with his family in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi. This unit of analysis will be emphasized in subsequent scrutiny. However, the focus on belief and behavior will occasionally broaden beyond the population of married male workers, as we touch upon behavioral norms broadly relevant to urban Kolwezi and urban southern Zaire.

It should be evident that a single study performed by a sole researcher can hardly address all social behavior in a research community. Nor will that be attempted here. Rather, several broad domains of behavior have been selected for particular consideration. These domains are rather arbitrary categories which are defined in the discussion itself. Much of the belief and behavior assessed in

each of these categories overlaps others as well; but the salient issue is that the selected categories should enable the reader to acquire a general appreciation for three things: 1) a wide range of belief and social behavior, 2) significant directions of social change, and 3) the major change agents in the research environment.

In this chapter, I will argue that the research population displays behavioral patterns more readily explained by a common urban culture than by such (more or less) independent variables as ethnicity, longevity of family residence in the urban environment, age, or religious affiliation. Even so, the patterns of belief evident in the research population by no means reflect a unanimous acceptance of indetical cultural norms. There are interesting variations, and these variations warrant exploration and explanation. This is a task best accomplished by defining and analyzing several particularly important behavioral variables; and this will be done in the context of the generalized domains mentioned earlier. We shall start, however, with a protrait of the composite married male worker. This "composite" portrait will then be supplemented with additional demographic and descriptive data before the discussion procedes on to the generalized domains of belief and behavior.

The Sample

A brief note on the statistical methodology is warranted here. This chapter calls attention to a

considerable quantity of data, extracted from interview schedules, and arranged in various tables. The size of the sample reflected in these tables will vary, reflecting the fact that the number of married male worker informants decreased slightly over the course of the field research period. Specifically, the first interview schedule series was initiated with 99 married male workers in the sample. By the time the research got around to the second series, one informant was no longer available for interview. By the time the third series commenced, we had lost a total of four informants. Thus, some tables reflect a sample of 99 married male workers, some reflect a sample of 98, and some reflect a sample of 95.

For the fourth interview schedule series, a much smaller sample was selected, so that belief of informants could be probed in more detail and in more sensitive areas. Tables reflecting data obtained from this series will depict a sample of 32 married male worker informants.

Portrait of a Composite Worker

In order to portray the general dimensions of variation in behavioral norms within the research population, the discussion is necessarily divided into separate considerations of categories in patterns of belief and behavior. Such treatment, unfortunately, somewhat distorts social reality by failing to fully depict the interrelationships between behavioral realms which are here partitioned for investigation. The missing detail is

analogous to that harmonious blend of color and shadow in a portrait which subtly interprets an artist's subject. To partially compensate for the lack of such detail, a written "portrait" of a "composite" worker is offered here. While no single composite or type can really do justice to the full range of background, belief and behavior in the Cité, a portrait of a hypothetical, "composite" worker is useful for several reasons. It can cover the "bones" of dry statistics with the more palatable "flesh" of descriptive detail. It can supplement with generalities those domains of belief and behavior not easily amenable to statistical treatment. It can remind both author and readers that a study like this is about people, not specimens. Hence, the consideration will now turn, if ever so briefly, to a portrait of a composite married male Gécamines blue-collar worker. The discussion will include some detail which will not be subjected to later statistical treatment.

So, if we could construct a "typical" worker, what would he be like?

The modal Gécamines married, male blue-collar worker is in his mid 30s, has been working for the mining company for ten years or more, and will probably spend the rest of his productive years in company employ. He has, moreover, seen a significant decline in the scope and quality of company benefits during his years of employment, with little prospect of improvement in the immediate future. Since he has himself been raised in a mining company family, he has

also seen a drastic reduction in the overall standard of living for workers over his lifetime. On the other hand, he has seen an extension of cadre benefits and a hardening of class lines between Zairois cadre and Zairois workers. He feels frustrated because he had every anticipation, upon being hired by the company, of living comfortably, supporting a family with little difficulty, and enjoying the envy of those peers not fortunate enough to win mining company employment. Cadre seem to enjoy these benefits. He does not.

Since the early 1980s, the buying power of his wages have steadily eroded. He was economically better off in 1980 than he is now, despite his raises and promotions. And to add insult to injury, the cadre in the same company work much less and enjoy much greater remuneration (and far greater material benefits) solely because of a (seemingly) arbitrary rank. He is appalled, at times, at the insensitivity of cadre who (he feels) should understand the poor conditions of life of workers and who should be more respectful to their fellow employees. Even so, he hopes desperately that he will eventually be able to move up into cadre rank via the maitrise system, since he sees it as the only real prospect for a significant improvement in his standard of living.

Our typical worker has a good technical education, with some four years of secondary schooling. (He believes that his education suits him for much better pay and more

prestigious rank than he now enjoys. He believes, however, that he has been victimized by favoritism in the work place. He also suspects that jealous coworkers may have used sorcery against him to retard promotions.) He is literate but not widely read. He is generally aware of major political events in the wider world, obtaining news regularly from national television, international short-wave radio, various magazines, and from discussions with friends and acquaintances (Appendix D, Table 13). However, his analytical frame of reference is limited, his perceptions of political leaders and events in the wider world are highly stereotyped and based on facile characterizations widely shared in the community at large. Like most of his peers, he thinks conditions in the world are getting worse.

The parents of our typical worker are retired from the mining company and live in Lubumbashi, another Copperbelt city; but he has relatives in Kolwezi itself: a brother and several cousins employed by the mining company and a sister married to a cadre. Most of his close relatives live on the Copperbelt, and most are associated in some way with the mining company. He enjoys the company of his relatives and visits those in Kolwezi at least once a month. His cadre brother-in-law is a patron which he cultivates carefully against a future need. Irregularly, but about every six to eight months, he visits his parents in Lubumbashi. En route to and from Lubumbashi, he stays with affines in Likasi. He

has a cousin in Zambia which he would like to visit; but to date, he has never left Zaire's Shaba région.

When our worker was young, his parents took him to the rural village of his ancestral origin in northern Shaba, to attend the installation of a regional chief. He found the village exotic and fascinating, but recalls being appalled by the "dirtiness" of rural people, and the difficulty of life without the amenities of urban living. Since that time, he has twice visited his paternal uncles in the village. (He also sends them gifts of money at irregular intervals and contributes, on occasion, to collections for a kinsman's dowry.) He enjoys his relatives' hospitality and their deference to his considerable status as "rich" and "educated." However, he finds village life boring and confining and would never consider permanent residence there. His visits in the village have been short: he is uneasy at the "pagan" customs associated with ancestor invocation and spirit propitiation. He is also afraid of the powerful sorcerers said to be present in rural villages. Too, he is occasionally embarrassed by his somewhat limited fluency in his ancestral language. On those occasions when a rural kinsman or affine visits him in Kolwezi, he spends beyond his means to show his hospitality, his generosity and his status.

While our typical worker enjoys the company of his relatives and affines, he prefers the constant companionship of his two closest friends. One he first met in school

during his youth, the other at work. Both are males, of course. Both are about his age. Neither are related to him by blood or marriage. One is a coethnic, the other is not. They gather during leisure time about every other weekday and almost always on Sundays, and are usually joined by other friends and neighbors. They sometimes attend movies, soccer matches or concerts together, and (from time to time) stroll through town looking at the young women. But most often, they gather in the yard of one or another's house to drink beer and talk. A favorite topic is religion, but discussion ranges widely.

Though single when he was first hired, our typical worker is now married, and has been for about eight years. His wife is a coethnic and seven years his junior. She is the sister of one of his childhood friends who has since been transferred to Kipushi, but her parents live in another Cité in the Kolwezi area. She too was raised in a mining company camp. She has a primary school education.

Our worker is pleased with the growing size of his family of affection. His wife has borne him five children, is pregnant and, God willing, will ultimately bear him at least several more. Her main role is to care properly for the house and his children and to assure that he and his relatives or friends are properly fed. She knows he occasionally visits a "prostitute" in the Cité Manika, but does not make an issue about it. She shows him due respect and the household is generally harmonious.

Our worker is, in fact, considered a good husband and father. He does not drink to excess, and is not in debt. He spends the better part of his salary on household needs. His family eats adequately if not elaborately, and is suitably clothed. He is strict but not angry with his children.

He is also a good relative. Living with him in his small three-room house (in addition to his wife and children) is his younger brother, hired last year by the mining company. The brother will probably not be given housing by the mining company for at least another year, and will continue in his current lodging. He is a welcome family member and is not expected to contribute his income to the family's needs, though he occasionally buys food and beer for the household.

Our typical worker has generally good relations with his neighbors and fellow-workers. He is respectful and generous, and considered a good friend and citizen. His general conduct contrasts sharply with that of one of his neighbors (an older man), who frequently drinks to excess, making considerable noise and beating his wife and children for no reason. Our worker finds this noise offensive, and the man's behavior shameful, but is reluctant to say anything to him because he is an elder.

Like almost all of his mining camp peers, our typical worker was raised as a Roman Catholic. However, as a young man he drifted away from the church. Several years ago, he

was pressured by a friend to attend the services of a strict syncretic sect. He was enthusiastic about this group for a while, but eventually found it too confining. He subsequently tried the local Methodist church and another syncretic sect, but just didn't find a permanent place for himself. He now attends mass several times a month. His entire family attends with him. Under influence of another friend, he is now strongly considering attending the local Branhamist services.

Our typical worker was at one time somewhat active in community political party activities, but has since lost interest, finding them boring and personally unprofitable. He strongly suspects the motives of volunteer party activists, but generally respects political authorities, though he admits that corruption is rampant. He despises the young party thugs who prowl in urban Kolwezi, preying on ordinary townsfolk. He considers these to be simply a variant of the young hustlers and bandits so prevalent among the unemployed in urban Zaire. He is a personal friend of his local chef de bloc and could someday be selected as the chef de rue of his street, a post which he would like to fill. He believes that the political party discriminates against native Shabans, and he believes that high party officials are overly drawn from among the "BaKongo" of western Zaire. These, he considers rude and overbearing. He has vague fears about the future and about events that will follow the President's demise, but hopes for the best.

While our typical worker seems to enjoy life, and finds pleasure with his friends, he often finds himself restless and discontented with overall conditions. He is very frustrated at the deterioration he sees in the company and in the urban area generally, blaming the President and the top national officials for the worsening conditions. He is perplexed and resentful at the wildly escalating prices of consumer goods experienced over the past five years, and is not confident that conditions will improve. More than anything else, he desires three things which he does not now have: first, to be "at ease" economically, able to afford the consumer goods that convey his appropriate status and provide a degree of luxury to his family; secondly, to have good interpersonal relations with all individuals in his social universe and be completely free of situations which provoke rancor, jealousy, and sorcery; and finally, to have an assurance of a close relationship with God, and to be sure of going to heaven when he dies.

The Married, Male Worker: A Profile

Age

In late 1987, the married male workers in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi ranged in age between 18 and 65. And, in fact, for practical purposes, they ranged in age between 22 and 60.¹ The vast bulk of the married male workers were

¹The youngest unmarried male workers encountered in the research were 19 years of age, the youngest unmarried female worker encountered was 26. In contrast, the oldest

between the ages of 27 and 46 (66.8%), but almost a third of married male workers were 46 years of age or older. On the other hand, there were very few workers in the Cité older than 60.

Married male workers represented a population of relatively mature individuals with long-term employment in the mining company. A very high proportion of the married male workers were at least in their adolescence in the boom years of the early 1970s. A reasonably large proportion of this group was at least in early adolescence by the time of national independence in 1960. A substantial portion of the research population has knowingly participated in dramatic changes associated with national independence and its immediate aftermath. Likewise, a substantial portion of the group has experienced the transition in the mining industry itself from heavy-handed (but industrially efficient) Belgian paternalism to the inefficiency, graft and exploitation perpetrated by a venal national elite in modern Zaire.

Generation of Residence

The discussion turns now to a variable whose range proved somewhat difficult to define but which was nonetheless of considerable interest in this study. That variable was an individual's generation of residence in

unmarried male worker encountered in the Cité was 58. The oldest female worker was 52. (She happened to be unmarried.) For detail on ages of married male workers, see Appendix B, Table 1. All of these data are derived from the census of the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi performed by the author between October and December 1987.

industrialized, urban Shaba. It should be evident at this point that we would expect to see a difference in belief and behavior between individuals (on one hand) who migrated into the mining community in late adolescence (or adulthood) directly from a rural village, and those (on the other hand) who spent their entire lives in an industrial community. We could also expect to see differences in belief and behavior between individuals whose parents (or guardians) immigrated directly into an urban industrial environment from a rural village and those whose parents themselves were raised in an urban environment. In other words, the generation of residence in urban southern Shaba should be a variable whose range depicts very interesting aspects of social change. It was a tentative initial hypothesis that this was to be the most important of the key variables in predicting belief and behavior in the Cité. However, the social reality proved much more ambiguous than anticipated.

Specifying the "generation of residence" was also a trickier proposition than it first appeared. Identifying members of the "first generation" posed little problem: it was easy enough to identify those individuals who had left a rural village in early adulthood to obtain employment in an industrial center. However, defining the criteria for "second," "third," and "fourth" generations required substantial care. For instance, if a worker had been sent at age 12 by his rural parents to live in an industrial community with a mine-working grandfather, was he "first,"

"second" or "third" generation? If a worker had been born in a mining camp, but had moved back with his parents to a remote rural area at age 6, then returned to urban Shaba to obtain employment at age 21, was he "first" or "second" generation?

These distinctions turned on two different axes: should "generation" be defined solely in terms of family members who had been employed in urban Shaba, or should "generation" be defined in terms of lifelong residence by an individual and his parents (or guardian) in the urban environment? If the former, then an individual would be "second generation" as long as his father had lived briefly in an industrial center, whether or not the individual himself had done so. And, in fact, why should classification as "second generation" require solely the father's residence in urban Shaba? Why not include, as a sufficient criterion, the informant's mother, father's brother, etc.? Another consideration hinged on the actual employment of the "urbanized" ancestor. For instance, would it be sufficient to count, as an urbanized generation, an ancestor who had worked briefly as a domestic servant or who had simply conducted some petty commerce in the urban area? Or should long-term employment in an industrial work context be required? In other words, need "generation" include a substantive personal commitment to the urban economy and urban social milieu?

In the end, after considerable thought and discussion with informants, it was decided that the criteria for determining "generation" as an analytical variable must include essentially an individual's life-long residence in an industrial urban center. I also elected to specify that the individual representing each generation must have worked for the mining company, though in fact virtually all "ancestors" who had lived their entire lives in industrial urban Shaba proved to have been employed at some point by the mining company. This eliminated, as a "generation," an ancestor who had lived in urban Shaba only as a domestic servant or petty trader, unless the latter had also worked in a mining company activity. However, I did include, as a "generation," an ancestor who worked in an enterprise at the time not part of Union Minière which has since been absorbed by Gécamines. (There were also a few individuals whose forebears had worked in urban Shaba for the railroad company or in the colonial military. Such ancestors were not counted as an "urban-industrial" generation.)

To be "third generation," an individual had to have grown up in the mining company environment, at least one parent or guardian had to have spent the preponderance of his or her working years in that environment, and one of the parent/guardian's parents or guardians would have to have been the first to arrive in the urban, industrial community. "Generation," for the purpose of this discussion, means generation of employment by the mining industry. Hence, a

"third generation" worker would by definition have been immediately preceded by two generations of forebears who had worked for Union Minière or Gécamines. This point warrants further emphasis. "Generation" for the purpose of this study does not simply mean an individual having lived in the urban environment. It does not mean "generation of urbanization." Rather, it means generation of mining company employment. However, the two categories seemed to be coterminous in the overwhelming majority of cases. Table 5.1 provides an overview of "generation" among specific populations sampled in the Cité. As is evident from that table, a majority of Gécamines workers are other than "first generation."

Table 5.1. Generation of residence in a mining company community.

	Proportion of all married male workers sampled	Proportion of all unmarried male workers sampled	Proportion of all unmarried female workers sampled
1st generation	46.5%	19.4%	52.9%
2d generation	43.4%	55.6%	35.3%
3d generation	9.1%	25.0%	8.8%
4th generation	1.0%	0 %	2.9%
	(N=99)	(N=36)	(N=34)

Source: Sampling performed by author, February-April 1988, in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

The Parental Generation

In a sample of ninety-nine married male workers, all informants' fathers had been born in Zaire, except (perhaps) one. (See Appendix B, Table 7.) Some 95% of our informants' mothers were of Zairois birth. Likewise, the vast majority (at least 92%) of paternal and maternal grandfathers were born in Zaire.

Just under two thirds of our informants' immediate forbears were born in Zaire's Shaba Région. About a third of the immediate forebears of informants in the sample were born in the Kasai regions.

Interestingly, only ten percent of our worker informants said that their mothers had been raised in mining company families. (In contrast, some 39% of the wives of workers themselves had been raised in mining company families.) This rather dramatic social change is a result of several factors: first was a demographic imbalance in colonial urban centers and the necessity for indigenous urban males in the colonial period to seek spouses outside the urban areas (Fetter, 1983; Mansila, 1984). A related factor was mining company policy between 1930 and the mid 1950s in which mining officials undertook (in cooperation with colonial officials) to find wives for workers in their home areas and to contribute bride-price payments. Then too, workers are now much more likely to marry across ethnic lines, thus increasing the range of alternatives in urban marital partners. This is a relatively recent phenomenon.

Occupation is another obvious area of change across generations. We can start by noting the principal occupation of workers' immediate male forebears.² There was a considerable shift in occupation between the first and second ascending generation. Obviously, 100% of our informants themselves were now employed in an urban wage-labor environment. Likewise, almost two thirds of informants' fathers had worked principally in occupations which were based on the modernized sector of the state. However, only about 9% of their grandfathers had done so. (In fact, 74% of the grandfathers had been engaged mainly in subsistence cultivation. In stark contrast, only about 28% of informants' fathers had been cultivators.) Thus, in three generations, this population had moved from a rural subsistence-cultivation economy to an urban industrial economy. However, the most dramatic change had clearly occurred between the first and second ascending generation.

Childhood Environment

The upbringing of our informants themselves displayed a remarkably small range of variation in major features. All except one in the sample of ninety-nine

²It is important to stress here that we are talking about principal lifetime occupations, not sole lifetime occupations or all lifetime occupations. As can be expected, many of the individuals in question worked in several types of employment during the course of their lives. To obtain the data reflected here, informants were asked to provide their judgment on the relative longevity and importance of the various types of economic activity pursued by their forebears. See Appendix B, Table 6.

married male workers had been born in Zaire. The remaining worker had been born in Zambia. Almost three quarters of the workers had been born in Zaire's Shaba Région. Almost a quarter had been born in the Kasai régions. (Only two workers in the sample were from regions of Zaire other than Shaba or the two Kasais. One was born in Kivu, the other in Bas-Zaire.)

Virtually all of the workers had lived with their fathers and mothers up to the age of seven. When asked at what age the worker had left his father and mother, about half of the individuals in the sample indicated that they had remained with their parents until the latter's deaths, or that they considered themselves to be still living with their parents. Some 12% had left their biological parents by age 12, some 25% by age 15, and some 32% by age 18.

In the first seven years of their lives, well over half (58%) of the workers had lived in an essentially rural environment. However, between the ages of seven and eighteen, only about a third (35%) had lived primarily in a rural environment. Thus, roughly two thirds of the workers had spent the majority of their youth and adolescence in an essentially urban environment. Further, regardless of region of ancestral origin, the vast majority of our informants had been raised in urban Shaba.

The foregoing data provide a basis for two important conclusions about the research population. A majority of the informants in our sample had been subject to the

influence of their (biological) parents in the home for most of their youth. However, unlike their rural peers, they had also been exposed from an early age to the urban industrial economy, to "city" life and to urban socialization pressures generated by ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods, schools, and churches.

Education

By Zairian standards, the Gécamines blue-collar work force is a well-educated group (Appendix B, Table 4). Only 25% of our sample of 99 married male workers had failed to complete primary school, and only 8% had no formal schooling at all. The majority of workers (59%) had an education which included some secondary school experience. The modal worker (33%) had attained 3-4 years of secondary school. Surprisingly, several workers (3% of the sample) had at least some enseignement-supérieur (university-level) education.

Education was an interesting and obvious area of social change between the generation of our informants and the generation of their parents. Informants indicated that some 47% of their fathers (and some 73% of their mothers) had acquired no formal education.

Longevity of Employment

As shown in (Appendix B, Table 2), the vast majority of married male workers in our sample of 99 had enjoyed relatively long-term mining company employment. Only four

percent had served less than six years. Some twenty-two percent had served over twenty-five years. The longest period of mining company service we found for a single worker was forty-four years. (Only two individuals in our sample had served over forty years.)

Most of the workers had been hired between the ages of 15 and 25. Almost half (49%) of the workers had been hired between the ages of 19 and 22. The modal age for hiring was 19 to 20.

The "bottom-line" here is that the Gécamines work force is remarkably stable. Blue-collar employees are characteristically hired at a young age and remain with the company during the course of their working careers. This is undoubtedly due to the lack of employment alternatives in urban Zaire, and the reluctance of Gécamines employees to reject the security of their one opportunity for a reasonable wage.

Income

Let us turn briefly to the subject of income of workers in our sample. (See Appendix B, Table 12.) This is an issue that can neither be easily researched nor reported with great confidence. As indicated above, the subject of salaries is a touchy one among mining company personnel. Likewise, it became evident that a substantial number of mining company employees derived at least some illicit income from the theft and sale (or theft and use) of mining company

property. So, while base levels of mining company salaries themselves can be presented with some confidence, the real income of workers and their families can be determined only in the most general terms.

The mining company base salaries themselves, as reported by informants in our sample of 99 married male workers, ranged from a monthly low of 6,000 zaires (about \$40 at the official exchange rate in March 1988) to a high of 22,500 zaires (\$150). The vast majority (60%) of workers earned monthly mining company base salaries ranging between 9,000 and 12,000 zaires (\$60-\$80). Only about 8% of the workers indicated that they earned salaries of less than 9,000 zaires (\$60). A further 18% of the workers earned salaries between 13,000 and 15,000 zaires (\$87-\$100). Another 11% earned mining camp salaries between 15,000 and 18,000 zaires (\$100-\$120). Only 3% earned monthly salaries in excess of 18,000 zaires. Thus, we can say that the typical blue-collar worker in our sample earned, at the time of the research, a mining company base salary ranging from about \$60 to about \$100 per month.

For a variety of reasons, that monthly salary does not really, in itself, convey a true picture of household income. For example, it has already been noted that the Cité residents receive free housing, free utilities, free medical care, and free rations of certain food items. These benefits should be seen as significant augmentations to informants' base salaries. Likewise, many mining company

employees were engaged in income-producing activities outside the official purview of the mining company. Finally, in a number of worker families, wives and other dependents also produced income for the household.

As a result of various income-producing activities, household monthly income among our sample of workers ranged from 7,000 zaires to 38,000 zaires (\$47-\$253). (This does not, of course, include the value of housing, utilities, medical care and rations received from the mining company.) Well over three fourths of the workers (82%) said that their monthly household income was above 10,000 zaires (\$67). However, the bulk of the households (65%) had incomes ranging only between 10,000 zaires and 17,000 zaires (\$67-\$113). The modal monthly salary (24% of the total) and the modal monthly household income (17% of the total) were both 10,000 zaires. While these levels of income were high by the standard of Kolwezi's urban population in general, they certainly did not permit a life-style characterized by consumption of luxury goods comparable to European or North American contexts, particularly in view of the large families of workers in the Cité. Even so, a mining company family of two adults and five to eight children should have been able to eat adequately and be clothed adequately, even at the low end of incomes in the Cité. The realities of income usage, however, proved far more complex.

Mining company families had a very high regard for consumer luxury items. Small refrigerators, televisions,

tape-players and other expensive electrical products were prominently displayed in workers' homes. Many homes were also furnished with attractive, locally made furniture--couches and stuffed chairs. These consumer goods were, in fact, difficult to afford on blue-collar mining company salaries. Yet, based on opinions offered by Kolwezi residents generally, blue-collar workers had a reputation in Kolwezi for flagrant materialism. A certain amount of conspicuous consumption was sustained, apparently, by credit.

Although it was forbidden by the party, some workers in the camp made considerable money by lending to other workers. Interest rates were as high as 80% per month, although the standard rate seems to have been 50%. (The practice was called "banc Lambert" or "kongolo ya intérêt".) Generally, the borrower was expected to pay both the principal and the interest on payday. The borrower would deposit a plain I.O.U. or article of value with the lender as an earnest.

It proved impossible to measure the frequency of the practice, although informants said that "many" camp residents were deeply in debt. (Those informants who seemed credible on this subject provided estimates ranging from 10% to 60%.) Very few workers themselves admitted that they were in debt, but workers frequently cited indebtedness in the camp as a serious problem, and alleged that many families could only afford condiments (meat, vegetables) for their

maize staple two weeks out of the month: for the last two weeks, the family would subsist on maize mush alone. The money had reportedly vanished into the kongolo debt.

There were, of course, other options to support purchases of expensive luxury goods besides indebtedness. The pervasive theft of company property has been noted, as has the petty commerce pursued by some workers and their families. A commonly discussed savings arrangement among Gécamines workers was the "kinkurimba"--an agreement among four or five families in which some part of the monthly wages were pooled. Each month, one family in turn received the whole sum. This allowed a family to make a major purchase (such as a television set). Almost identical behavior has been reported in urban third-world contexts ranging from South Africa (du Toit, 1969) to New Guinea (Rew, 1974:160) and Mexico (Lomnitz, 1977:88-89). However, informants in Kolwezi said that the kinkurimba was now much rarer than in previous years because of wild escalations in consumer prices and the difficulty of making ends meet from month to month.

The Daily Routine: Work, Diet and Leisure

Gécamines work hours varied somewhat according to the activity in question, the company itself publishing standard hours as follows:

For office workers		
Monday through Friday	7:30 AM - 12 noon	1:30 PM - 4:30 PM
Saturday	7:30 AM - 12 noon	
For mine workers ("Exploitation" personnel)		
Monday through Friday	7:00 AM - 12 noon	12:30 PM - 4:00 PM
Saturday	7:00 AM - 12 noon	
For shift workers		
1st team	7:00 AM - 3:00 PM	
2nd team	3:00 PM - 11:00 PM	
3rd team	11:00 PM - 7:00 AM	

There were other activities in which hours were less regular. For instance, prospecting engineers and certain construction personnel would work longer hours, or irregular hours, or more days in a row, and would receive longer periods of compensatory time. Likewise, the teachers in Gécamines schools were expected to be at work by about 6:30 AM; their teaching duties tended to end by about 2 PM on week days (and by about 11:30 AM on Saturdays).

The employees of Gécamines, like most of Kolwezi's residents, ate three meals a day. The diet itself, however, varied somewhat from household to household. What did not vary was the responsibility for preparing the food: that fell invariably to the women of the household. Bachelors living in the camp would frequently "borrow" a female relative--a sister, niece, or so forth to prepare their meals. This behavior bears considerable similarity to that noted by Epstein (1981:72) on the Copperbelt of neighboring Zambia in the 1950s.

The morning meal was generally very light--often just (highly) sweetened tea, or tea and white bread. (The bread, baked commercially of bleached wheat flour, was sold in stores and street-side stands in small loaves of European style.) More affluent families purchased pastries or packaged biscuits. Some residents breakfasted on roast peanuts, roasted manioc, roasted maize, or left-overs from earlier meals. The morning meal featured the widest variation of the three daily meals in the behavior of our informants, and was by far the lightest.

The noon meal and the evening meal were typically much heavier, and tended to contain the same major elements. (The majority of our informants seemed to eat more at noon than in the evening). These meals consisted generally of the basic staple--maize or manioc--prepared as a thick porridge and eaten with the fingers, from a common bowl. (The porridge is called "buchari" in local Swahili.) The staple is purchased in the form of flour, which is mixed with hot water and stirred to obtain proper consistency. The usual practice is to mix manioc and maize flour. Proportions vary according to family taste. (The preference has an ethnic dimension. For instance, at one extreme, the Lunda-ARuund are said to prefer undiluted manioc; at the other, the Songye prefer undiluted maize. However, all the buchari I ate in Kolwezi, regardless of the ethnic derivation of my hosts, contained both maize and manioc.)

Along with the buchari are side dishes of condiments into which eaters dip their balls of the porridge. One side dish almost universally present is that of manioc greens boiled in palm oil--a dish called "sombe" in local Swahili. Poorer families often eat only the buchari and sombe.

There are several other common side dishes. One, made of an inexpensive green vegetable called "lenga-lenga," tastes much like boiled spinach. If families can afford it, they will have at least one meat side dish. This is most often fish boiled in palm oil. The fish may be fresh or (less expensively) smoked or dried. Much less frequent is beef or goat meat cooked in palm oil and mixed with other vegetables. And perhaps somewhat less frequent is chicken prepared in palm oil.³ Other side dishes may feature dried caterpillars ("bilulu") or dried termites ("inswa") both either eaten plain, or boiled in water or palm oil. Though perhaps unusual foods by European standards, the caterpillars and termites have a pleasant, rather unremarkable taste. They are inexpensive and a good source of protein.

A variety of different seasonal legumes and mushrooms, often mixed with onions and tomatoes, also appear as side dishes--invariably boiled. But regardless of other options,

³Preparation of a chicken is the penultimate symbol of hospitality in southern Zaire, reserved as a special way to honor a guest. The guest is expected to take and eat the large back portion of the bird.

buchari and sombe are part of the daily fare of most Kolwezi residents.

While our blue-collar informants in the Cité could not have afforded to eat European fare on a regular basis, the cadre in the ville could have done so. Yet, diet seemed to be one domain of behavior quite resistant to extensive Europeanization. Virtually all the cadre I came to know preferred the traditional buchari and palm-oil based side dishes as their basic fare. The key difference between blue-collar and white-collar diets seemed to be the European-style pastries eaten by cadre families for breakfast and the greater amount (and variety) of meat and vegetables eaten with the buchari.

At various times during the day, Kolwezi residents snacked on roasted maize, boiled voandezia, roasted manioc, peanuts or fruit. Fresh fruit in Kolwezi are seasonal: mangos in October, November and December; guavas in February, March, April and May; citrus fruit in April, May and June; a few indigenous wild fruit at various other times of the year.

If residents were affluent, they bought sweets and pastries as well. However, these were not a regular part of the diet of most adults. While typical mining camp diets seemed to be more than adequate in calories and proteins, fresh fruit and fresh vegetables were the foods probably most lacking in the diets of workers and of Kolwezi's residents generally. (It appeared to me that residents of

rural villages in Shaba had access to more fresh fruit and more daily protein than Kolwezi's average inhabitant, although this observation was not verified by scientific measurement.) However, except for the pastry, occasional food of European origin, and minor local peculiarities, the foods consumed by urban and rural Shabans seemed remarkably similar.

One area of change in eating habits warrants note here. This involved the assembly of family members in Cité households for meals. In rural communities, Shaban men have traditionally eaten apart from their wives. Generally, female relatives would prepare food and bring it to the assembly of adult and adolescent males, who would eat together, often in groups of kinsmen and friends. Wives and small children would eat at a separate time or in a different location. Research disclosed a small percentage ($\pm 15\%$) of mining camp households in which men usually ate separately from women and children. In a fairly large number of households ($\pm 35\%$), adults ate together, but apart from the children (often because tables were small and families large). In about half the households, family members all ate together for the main meals.

A majority of the male informants to whom the question was posed said that their fathers had eaten alone, according to tradition. This was true whether the father had been a mining company employee or not. The obvious change in this

behavior seems to emphasize the growing significance of the nuclear family in the Gécamines community.

Leisure activities for married male workers included a large range in the Cité. Some of the younger workers were heavily involved in sports activities, others in music and drama. (This was sponsored by the mining company and provided lieu in the Cité itself). Younger workers were also more inclined to seek regular diversion in discos, dancing, and prostitutes, and in walking around the ville in search of diversion. Some workers were leisure-time entrepreneurs, involved in petty commerce or operating small repair shops. Workers who were inclined to the more vigorous religious groups seemed to spend a great deal of their time in religious activities. A small proportion of the Cité's population was active in volunteer (political) party affairs. The variety was endless.

The preeminent male leisure activity in Kolwezi, was to gather with male friends, talk and drink. The drinks of choice were the locally produced Simba ("Lion") and Tembo ("Elephant") beer. There were five breweries in Shaba (in Lubumbashi, Likasi, Kolwezi, Kamina and Maniema) each producing both brands of beer. Though made of identical ingredients and by identical methods, the beer from each brewery was said to have its own particular taste (to which local partisans were fiercely loyal). These beers are good by European standards, and the breweries seemed to be able to function reliably, despite the malaise in the rest of the

country. Many informants seemed to consider an ice-cold Simba to be the minimum requirement for good hospitality and an absolute necessity to civilized life. The emphasis on fellowship around a mildly alcoholic beverage seems to have deep roots in traditional central African societies, although very few Kolwezi informants preferred traditionally brewed beers (perhaps because these were not in accord with kizungu, ["urban civilization"].)

Men would often gather in small drinking parlors in the Cité or ville, but would more often assemble in the shade of a neighborhood yard. (At night and during a rainy period, men would often gather in one member's house.) This activity tended to be very sedentary. While many male informants of all ages were avidly interested in sports, there seemed to be a general consensus that active involvement was for the young only. Some thirty- and forty-year old men did participate in various team sports, but the vast majority of men over thirty did not participate actively. Individual exercise programs were just not part of the life of married men in the Cité, and I saw individual joggers only about 3 times in my year in Kolwezi.

When male informants gathered with friends, the emphasis was upon camaraderie, and topics of conversation ranged very widely. It was very unusual to find women participating with men in such groups. Married male workers in the Cité did not seem to spend much of their leisure time with wives or with children, although this aspect of

behavior was difficult to measure empirically. The behavior seemed to be very like that found in rural Shaban villages.

The vast majority of married male informants gathered with their intimate male friends at least once every 2-3 days. By far the most common lieu for such gatherings was the Cité home of the informant or his friends, although substantial numbers of informants mentioned religious activities or drinking-places as oft-frequented leisure time locations. Informant's responses in formal interviews about their leisure-time activity generally correlated with what I noted in the course of participant observation in the community.

Of note is the fact that informants tended to find their friends in the mine-working community.⁴ This was clearly reflected in the relatively low frequency with which they visited friends outside the Cité. Many residents disliked leaving the confines of the Cité, beyond which young party thugs harassed Gécamines employees unmercifully. The young party thugs, called JMPR (pronounced "jempair") and CDR (pronounced "cadair") were unpaid party "militants" who subsisted on bribes and fines. They would demand to see the obligatory official documents of hapless citizens and

⁴See Appendix D, Tables 14 and 15. Informants in our sample of 99 married male workers were asked where their three best friends lived. Of the 86 informants who responded to this question, 65% said all of their three best friends lived in the Cité. (Some 18.6% said that one of the three best friends lived outside the Cité, some 12.8% said that two of the three best friends lived outside the Cité and some 3.5% said all three best friends lived outside the Cité.)

would threaten with arrest any citizen missing some required paper or possessing torn or smudged documents. Gécamines employees were considered to be well paid and were thus particularly lucrative victims for this extortion.

Informants were also asked what they and their close friends enjoyed doing most during their leisure time. (A listing of specific answers is provided at Appendix 4, Table 1.) Of the 82 responses received, the vast majority of informants indicated that talking or debating with their friends was their preferred activity. The specific subject of leisure time discussion or activity cited most often by informants (34.1% of all responses) was that of religion or religious issues; this was amply borne out by observation in the research community.

A surprisingly large percentage of the Gécamines families we interviewed owned television sets. Although I did not count the number of television sets in worker homes, it appeared to me that at least 50% of the families we visited had a TV. Typically, workers' homes had small black and white models. A standard retail price in Kolwezi for such sets would have been about Z 22,000 (\$147) in 1988. Virtually every cadre home had at least a moderately fancy color set. (A standard retail price in Kolwezi for a comparable model would have been about Z 99,000 [\$660], but many of the cadre had obtained their sets at cheaper prices abroad.) There were two "video" stores in Kolwezi which rented videocassette movies obtained from Europe, North

America and the Orient. These stores were heavily patronized.

Television offered a surprising variety of programs. Finding a houseful of children and adults transfixed in front of a TV screen was an occasional experience in our research. In 1988, Kolwezi residents had access to one television channel: the state channel. The broadcast originated in Kinshasa, was retransmitted to Lubumbashi and, in turn, to Kolwezi, and was rebroadcast from an automated station in the Kolwezi area. Hours of transmission in Kolwezi were 1:30 PM to 3:30 PM and 6:00 PM to midnight on weekdays and a bit longer on weekends. (The Kolwezi station did, however, suffer from frequent breakdowns.)

Programming on the state channel included a variety of shows: news, sports events, cultural expositions and movies. Movies were of European or American origin, often the latter with French dubbing. It appeared to me that most were made in the 1960s or early 1970s. There was an unmistakable preference for "action" or "adventure" movies in the programming. Most of the features were in French. The news, however, was provided both in French and in the four "official languages" of Zaire--Lingala, KiKongo, TshiLuba and Swahili. International news coverage was sketchy but not particularly biased (so far as I could tell). Presidential activities received a great deal of rather fawning and elaborate coverage. There was also a

substantial amount of boiler-plate praise for the political party.

Despite the constant exhortation of party authorities, it was abundantly clear that the vast majority of informants found the demands of the political party tiresome (Appendix D, Table 12). Very few participated willingly in party activities. The general attitude was articulately expressed by a 35-year-old technical school teacher (a blue-collar worker) who had had been employed by Gécamines for 14 years. He told me very directly that he did the minimum necessary to keep party authorities off his back, that otherwise he had absolutely no interest. I asked him if he knew any "true believers" in the party. He said "no," that all party faithful were merely profit-seekers. According to him, the only reason anyone became a party "militant" was to gain some economic advantage or to harass others. This recalls another young man (age 17) a mine-worker's dependent who cheerfully admitted in an interview that he participated in all available party activities because he fully expected to be able to profit personally and materially from the party's blessing.

One indication of the lack of enthusiasm for the party was the public attitude towards "salongo" (two-hours of voluntary labor all citizens were supposed to contribute to the community each Saturday morning). The most concerted "salongo" I observed in Kolwezi consisted of four sullen men desultorily sweeping a street. These turned out to be

merchants who were forced to perform that labor in order to open their shops. "Salongo" seemed to be observed mainly in the breech. Informants compared it to the corvee labor of the colonial era. One of my research assistants once boasted proudly and publicly that he had never contributed a moment to such foolishness. The rest of the group smiled and nodded.

While there is very little love among common citizens in Kolwezi for the Mobutu regime--which is widely and scathingly blamed for Zaire's many internal woes, a number of informants expressed a deep fear of likely events following Mobutu's death. The most precisely defined worry was that the country will rapidly degenerate into the ethnically-based strife that plagued the Zaire of the early 1960s. One well educated and sophisticated individual of north Shaba origin illustrated this ambivalence rather well: after insisting that only a Shaban (like Nguza Karl-I-Bond) could run the country effectively, he admitted that he dreaded the prospect of Mobutu's death and fervently prayed each day that the President remain alive and in good health.

Although the questioning had to be pursued carefully, informants were asked to speculate on events following the President's demise. The common reaction seemed to be the dread noted above, and a reluctance to consider alternative scenarios. On several occasions, informants offered a proverb, "the husband of my mother is my father." The first time I heard it, the point of the proverb seemed obscure;

when pressed to interpret it, informants described how a widowed or divorced woman in Kolwezi might remarry. The woman's children would have very little say in the decision. While they would hope that the new "father" was kind and just, they were "stuck" with him regardless. Likewise, Kolwezi residents had no sense of control over the political future of their country, and little assurance of ameliorated conditions in the aftermath of the President's death.

Having discussed a number of aspects of the backgrounds and daily life of married male workers in the Cité, we turn now to a consideration of several broad domains of belief and behavior. In these, social continuity and social change will be considered in the context of various independent variables, most particularly those of religion, ethnicity, and generation of residence in Gécamines.

Religion, the Supernatural and World-View

Conceptions of the supernatural, and the aspect of world view that bear on what might be best described as "religious" beliefs, provided a rather wide range in urban Kolwezi. Nor can these be easily isolated from other domains of belief and behavior such as, for instance, the seeming separate issues of health and healing or political mobilization and participation. It is probably most helpful

here to make some rather arbitrary distinctions for analytical purposes, then to draw attention to ways in which norms in these categories ramify into other spheres of behavior.

First, it must be emphasized that this grouping of "religion, world view and the supernatural" was not a category, as such, in the minds of Kolwezi informants. Rather, these were various, somewhat unrelated domains of belief. When they spoke of "religion," (or of "praying"--which was a more common term used for religious activity in general) informants meant participation in a religious activity ultimately derived from Europe or the Near East. Most "religion" in urban Kolwezi was rooted in western Christianity (though frequently "Africanized" in varying degree). Other "religions" of foreign origin included Bahais and Islam, though we found no practicing Muslims in the Cité itself.

It was my strong impression that none of my informants viewed traditional, pre-Christian belief and practice as "religion" in the sense that they now use that concept. Rather, participation in "religion" was seen as one way in which sophisticated, "educated" urbanites differed from the "backward" societies and beliefs of rural villages. The contrast, in other words, was between "religion" and unsophisticated rural ignorance. Participation in "religion" was one tangible indication of urban sophistication. This is not to say, of course, that

Kolwezi's citizens failed to recognize the existence of "religious" (Christian) congregations in rural areas. Many, in fact, came from such environments. Rather, urban informants tended to view the rural village as the preeminent domain of ancestor-invocation, traditional (non-Christian) rites, and sorcery. In their view, these were not "religion."

But here, it is important not to infer that traditional notions of the supernatural were rejected wholesale in the urban environment. They were not. It should be emphasized that in the minds of informants, various manifestations of the supernatural were not necessarily directly related to each other, nor to the domain of "religion." These differing categories should be addressed in a logical way. To do so requires a brief consideration of selected aspects of traditional central African belief in the supernatural. Continuity and changes in these patterns, as seen among informants in urban Kolwezi, can then be identified. (To be able to cite other authorities, we shall have to accede to a tendency to call the pre-Christian beliefs "religion," though Kolwezi informants would not necessarily have done so.)

In his comprehensive essay on traditional African "religion," Mbiti (1969:1) notes that "religion," or at least a concern for supernatural phenomena and processes, is a strong element in the traditional African background, and exerts a continuous and comprehensive influence upon the

thinking and living of the people concerned. In fact, he goes so far as to say that the traditional African lives in a "religious universe" through which virtually all his activities and experiences are interpreted in "religious" terms (1969:5).

This "traditional" religion provides no absolute boundary between the spiritual and material, and physical death is not at all considered an end of existence. Yet these beliefs seem to manifest little concern for the future (particularly the remote future). They focus rather upon the necessities of prosperous living here and now. The past and present are the times of concern. Mbiti (1969:6) describes African worship as "pragmatic and utilitarian rather than spiritual and mystical."

Even as a purely analytical category, it is misleading to speak of traditional central African "religion," since it is hardly codified, has no singular orthodoxy, and is infinitely varied in detail. Yet what is reducible to generalization is the striking similarity in patterns of broadly shared notions about the nature and role of man, the nature of human existence and the nature and role of the supernatural. These notions are such a fundamental aspect of human existence in central Africa, that they transcend and obviate any real interest in specifying a "theology."

We shall briefly note the more relevant of these broad notions.⁵

Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of traditional central African belief is the primacy of man. Zahan (1979:6) describes this view well:

Man is the supreme and irreducible reality; the divinity itself enters his affairs in the same way as do other beings which he is close to and uses . . . when man venerates the divinity, it is not for the glory of God but for his own personal development . . . the primacy of man in relation to the rest of the world is due to his central position in the cosmos.

Man's particular and peculiar domain is the earth. Man in traditional African thought is "completely and inextricably anchored in this world" (Zahan, 1977:7). Man does not come from a divine state, nor does he aspire to a divine state. Even as a spirit, he is inevitably limited to the world.

At the same time, a human being is not invariably defined as such in the sense of a completed whole. True "humanness" (in traditional terms) is more a process of becoming: birth alone does not convey status as a human being. Rather, that condition is often seen as achieved

⁵This is not, of course, a study of "religion" which can be comprehensive in ethnographic background. Nor can it address in detail the various theoretical approaches to the study of African "religion." For the latter requirement, however, MacGaffey (1987), Van Binsbergen and Schoffeleers (1985) and Van Binsbergen (1981) provide useful recent assessments of varying approaches.

over a lifetime (and assuming certain fundamental physical and ritual conditions are met).

An interesting expansion of this theme is provided by Booth (1977:37), who develops the concept of muntu [living person] from Luba belief. He notes "to be muntu is in a sense to be constantly in the process of becoming muntu . . . Becoming muntu begins with birth, but the infant is muntu more in hope than in actuality." In fact, in a number of rural African societies, a child was not traditionally recognized as a person until admitted to that category by ritual or based on physical development.⁶

Tempels, perhaps the most sensitive and gifted European student of religious thought in the Copperbelt regions,⁷ argued that the most important notion in that thought centered around the concept of a "vital force" (force vitale) as the very essence of being: "being is force" (1961:35). According to Tempels' African informants, all beings (in fact, all things) are divinely endowed with their

⁶We can speculate here that a very high infant mortality rate in traditional societies made infants and young children seem exceedingly transient.

⁷Fr. Placide Tempels (died 1977) was a Belgian Franciscan priest whose ministry in Zaire from the 1930s through the early 1960s resulted in a profound understanding of traditional thought. For many years, he taught in the mining camp of Musonoie (a cité in the Kolwezi area). His book, Bantu Philosophy (originally published in Flemish in 1946), has stimulated considerable controversy for a variety of reasons, but remains a classic. Tempels is credited with founding the Jamaa, a charismatic Roman Catholic movement originating in Musonoie and incorporating considerable traditional thought in its teaching. For more detail, see Fabian (1971), De Craemer (1977) and Mataczynski (1986).

own vital force. That force can be increased or decreased.⁸

In the human realm, adversity, failure, illness or death are manifestations of diminished vital force; which is caused by outside agencies (often consciously malevolent). Hence, central Africans are highly concerned with measures to protect, conserve and increase that vital force. This requires supernatural assistance. Booth (1977:33) amplifies this theme in his discussion of the Luba concept of bwanga (plural manga), defined as "all substances intended to heal or relieve human beings" or "the setting to work [of] natural forces placed at the disposal of man by God to strengthen man's vital energy," or "any object or action which can be used to enhance or to diminish human life." He quotes a noted Luba authority to the effect that "bwanga is the primordial ideal for the African, for the prolongation of his earthly existence." As we shall see, the Luba concept of bwanga is analogous to the term dawa used by Kolwezi residents.

Associated with the concept of vital force is that of life and of profound fecundity. De Craemer (1977:22), quoting Tempels' African informants, describes this aspiration:

What we are looking for is fecundity,
paternity, maternity, a great fecundity,
all the fecundity, an intense fecundity,

⁸Epstein (1981:89) provides anecdotal ramifications of this belief in another central African urban context.

not only physical but totally human: to
be father, to be mother, to transmit
life, to survive one in the other, to
communicate our thought to others . . .

The traditional central African who begets children reproduces himself, assures his own immortality as it were, demonstrates vital force. Traditional Africans tend to think of time and life in cyclical (rather than linear) terms. "Existence is a cycle." Offspring are a prolongation of this existence cycle. Perhaps not surprisingly, celibacy and sterility tend to be viewed as contemptible, or even sinister. A person who is not reproducing himself is not living in "real time." And children, preferably many children, are both a manifestation of spiritual power and an investment with tangible future returns. For the traditional African man, an obvious protection against "unproductiveness" is polygyny (Zahan, 1979:10).

Associated with the concepts of life, vital force and fecundity is a traditional African notion of community. Indeed, it can be said that identity in traditional central Africa is often more a social identity than an individual identity. De Craemer (1977:22), again quoting Tempels' African informants, provides the following:

Next, after our desire for total life, for fecundity, what we wish is a vital union, union with other beings, visible and invisible. We cannot live in isolation, isolation kills us . . . If we are left solitary, we are dead; it is as if we did not exist.

Reinforcement of community solidarity is a high priority of rural central Africans, and most activities are, in essence, communal activities. The community aspect of recalled information and of forming opinions was entirely relevant to the research population in urban Kolwezi, and rather well illustrated in the case of a 23-year-old bachelor who had worked for Gécamines for about a year. He was living in the Cité with the family of an older female cousin. An assistant and I were sitting in the cousin's home interviewing him one Saturday morning. The female cousin, a strong-willed, (rather domineering), intelligent woman of about 30 hovered in the background to make sure our informant, a mild-mannered individual, got his facts straight. From time to time the female cousin would take issue with one of his answers. He usually acquiesced. At one point, the female cousin's teen-age daughter, who had been listening (unknown to us) in an adjacent room also intervened to take issue with her relative--in this case over an "opinion" question. The answers we received were clearly subject to the consensus of this small community.

Interviews with individual subjects were often conducted in situations of multiple persons. To demand private interviews would have seemed strange, unreasonable--even sinister. Nor could we have provided conditions of privacy which would have kept our subjects at ease. It was very common to find a male informant at leisure with his friends, or a female informant in her home surrounded by

three or four female friends and a dozen young children. It was also common for the informant to discuss one or more of our questions at length with his or her friends before rendering an answer. Community consensus was very important and these central Africans demonstrated considerable personal deference to community opinion, a "traditional" norm of social behavior still entirely relevant to industrial workers in urban Kolwezi.⁹

One key aspect of relationships with the supernatural in traditional central African rural communities is the link between the first ancestors who cleared (or occupied) the land and the present inhabitants, the latter generally represented by what might be called the "earth-priest," or "lord of the land."¹⁰ The earth-priest is both representative and trustee of the larger kinship grouping descended from the founding ancestors, and from which the land is theoretically inalienable. In response to the ritual mediation performed by the "lord of the land," the spirits of ancestors who first "cleared" the land are expected to provide fertility, rain, good harvests and general community well-being; without it, famine, blight,

⁹Modern western notions of personal privacy strike even members of modern central African elites as odd. See Schuster (1979) for amusing illustrative anecdotes. As a related issue, Turner (1967, 1968) has furnished what is still the authoritative discussion of the role of ritual in building community solidarity in rural central Africa.

¹⁰See, for instance, Packard (1981:29), Reefer (1981:45-46; 1983:168-169), Hoover (1978:102-103) and Van Binsbergen (1981:277).

natural disaster and conflict. The earth-priest is typically the senior lineage elder.

This is perhaps the place to note, in passing, the central African association of political leadership with the physical and spiritual life of the community. One of the most articulate recent (English-language) discussions of the supernatural role of chiefship among central Africans is provided by Packard in his study of the rural Bashu (1981). The Bashu comprise a politically cohesive ethnic group in northeastern Zaire. Although they live well north of the immediate hinterland of the Copperbelt, their ideology of chiefship corresponds with that of other central African peoples, as rather well portrayed by Booth (1977:54-56). Speaking of the Bashu, Packard (1981:32) notes that:

. . . Ritual activity is linked to the developmental cycle of chiefship. Thus, ecological time, the orderly passage of the seasons and the performance of agricultural activities, is subordinated to the temporal movement of chiefship. When chiefly power is strong, ritual control is maintained and ecological time unfolds in regular cyclical movements, there is plenty in the land. Conversely, when chiefly power declines as a result of the death or weakness of a [king] . . . the movement of the seasons is disrupted and agricultural activities are ceased.

Chiefship is an essential aspect of ecological control. Perhaps not surprisingly, as Packard notes, the "continuance of chiefship [is] a vital interest" to Bashu farmers and "explains the primacy of chiefs in Bashu social life"

(1981:4). Likewise, Booth (1977:54-55) notes of the Luba that "the . . . chief . . . [is] the symbol of the health or wholeness of the community . . . when the chief is dead, the society is dead until brought back to life by the installation of a new chief."

Pre-colonial central African political systems could, of course, distinguish between political overlordship on one hand, and the system of earth priests on the other, both of which had their own sources of supernatural power. The Lunda system was particularly adept at accommodating the two in one overarching social dispensation.¹¹ Traditional chiefs in Zaire continue to play a vital (if diminished) role in the economic, social and religious life of their communities.

We may turn briefly and borrow from the inventory of stimulating ideas generated in the analyses of French structuralists. A very prominent aspect of central African thought centers around what might be described as a series of vital dichotomies or paired oppositions (Epstein, 1981:97; Turner, 1967:81) which define relationships between categories of things in central African life. The dualities are variously complementary and antithetical.

One of the more basic dichotomies defines the difference between "culture" and "nature." Packard (1981:3) again provides a good view of this from a Bashu perspective:

¹¹See particularly Hoover (1978:102-196), Bustin (1975:2-3) and Henk (1980:275-311).

. . . [Their] world is divided between opposing spheres of existence. On one hand is the world of the homestead, in which the Bashu live, grow their crops and keep domesticated animals. Surrounding this world, and impinging upon it, is the world of the bush, inhabited by the untamed and chaotic elements of nature, including powerful medicines and spirits . . . [ritual] mediation permits the domestication . . . of certain spirits, medicines and elements of nature, which are essential to the productivity of the household.

These elements of the bush must be "domesticated" by appropriate ritual in order to be used in the sphere of human community life. Other dualities define the essential differences between human and non-human, life and death, solitariness and community, dry and wet seasons, youth and adulthood, "maleness" and "femaleness," ritual purity and impurity, fecundity and sterility. These dualities are very important in understanding behavior of central Africans. Epstein (1981:97) describes why.

. . . Maintenance of clear-cut boundaries [is] of the essence of such a system; behaviour that violate[s] these established boundaries . . . [is] likely to provoke a most violent reaction because the confusion of categories that it introduce[s] [is] seen as threatening the very basis of all order.

Epstein (1981:97) goes on to argue that these dualities are inherent assumptions "operating for the most part below the level of consciousness." Hence, they are very persistent.

". . . for they cannot be easily challenged by opposing sets of ideas which are held consciously."¹²

Having looked briefly at some broad themes in central African thought, we can now turn more specifically to traditional views of the supernatural per se.

Turner (1968:14), describing the traditional "religious" beliefs of the southern Lunda people, lists what he considers to be the four main components. They are general enough to be almost equally applicable to other peoples comprising the residents of Zaire's Copperbelt, and will, therefore, be cited here.¹³

The first component is the belief in an apparently omnipotent creator who now rarely interferes in the natural sphere, though He is thought to have ultimate power of life and death and does, on occasion, punish certain transgressors.¹⁴

¹²De Heusch (1972) weaves this theme into a structural analysis of the "intellectual universe" of savanna peoples, a stimulating if controversial treatment.

¹³S. Yoder (1981:46-53) offers interesting detail on traditional beliefs of the Tshokwe. He also provides a classification of supernatural categories and beings which is widely shared in rural western Shaba. W. MacGaffey (1986) provides a detailed study of belief and "religious" behavior among the BaKongo peoples of western Zaire. In broad outline, this belief and behavior is similar to that of peoples in the Copperbelt hinterlands, but there are numerous differences in specific detail.

¹⁴See also McCulloch (1951:73), Booth (1977:58-63) and Douglas (1963:204). One of the most stimulating discussions of conceptions of a supreme being among a central African people is that by McLean (1962:95-111) in his study of the Bena Lulua.

The second component is that of a preoccupation with an assortment of spirit beings. These can be broadly differentiated into two general (but very different) categories: First, nature spirits, often associated with notable locations or natural phenomena (e.g. rivers, forests, thunderstorms); and second, the spirits of formerly living people, generally considered to live near the community of their earthly life. Spirits in both categories are invoked or propitiated as circumstances warrant. These two categories of spirits are sometimes thought to be the same (Womersley, 1984:5) and sometimes divided into a range of different and mutually exclusive categories. Booth (1977:33) quotes his father's description of a typical community:

To the Bene Samba [a Luba-Shaba sub-group] religion is a means of getting what they want. In groups, the people ask the spirits for victory in conflict, for rain, for fertility in land and animals, for salvation from diseases and wild beasts, for successful hunting and fishing, for the right choices in communal life . . . succession of rulers, etc.

Traditional central Africans consider that ancestral spirits continue to exercise considerable interest in their living kin, particularly in upholding moral order. These spirits are thought to possess considerable power to bless living kin with good fortune or to afflict them with ill fortune. They are invoked or propitiated by descendants to assure blessing and preclude ill.

The relationship between ancestor propitiation and political authority warrants note. Fortes (1965:17) mentions "the structural rule that the primary responsibility in ancestor worship devolves on those who stand in a filial relationship to the ancestor." This leads naturally to "a logical connection between ancestor invocation and the jural institutions related to kinship and descent."¹⁵

The third component is a belief in "the intrinsic efficacy of certain animal and vegetable substances . . . to work harm or good, provided they are prepared and used by qualified practitioners in a ritual setting" (Turner, 1968:14). Preparation, sale and use of charms or "medicine" remains an important activity in rural Africa. It is also commonly encountered in urban settings and is not limited by socio-economic status.¹⁶

A final feature of traditional central African religious belief is the existence of witches or sorcerers, both possessing (or resorting to) inherently anti-social supernatural powers. This source of supernatural power is thought to account for a wide range of misfortunes (Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Krige, 1947; Wilson, 1951; Mitchell, 1965; Hulstaert, 1965).

¹⁵See also Booth (1977:42-45, 52-53), Zahan (1977:49) Schuster (1979:34-35) and McLean (1962:76-93).

¹⁶See also Turner (1967:299-393), Booth (1977:45-52), Epstein (1981:99-100) and Schuster (1979:34, 60). The two latter authors address the behavioral phenomena among Zambian urban populations.

Identification and punishment of sorcerers is a very serious affair, and may be viewed as a social weapon directed against persons whose conduct deviates from expected norms (Nadel, 1952:28). Gluckman offers another perspective: he says that community "witch hunts" contribute to the resolution of problems arising from "conflicts of allegiance" (1956:107-108). This accounts for the observed fact that accusations of witchcraft tend to increase during times of social turbulence, when individuals perceive that traditional roles are not being appropriately fulfilled and when previously sanctioned reciprocal behavior ("order") no longer seems to apply. This is particularly true, as Marwick points out (in his study of the Cewa) in cases of competition for scarce resources, power and status (1965:287-291). Under these circumstances, suspicion that successful opponents are not "playing by the rules"--that is, have resorted to supernatural means--comes easily to societies keenly steeped in traditions of the supernatural.

The communal appeasement, propitiation or invocation of supernatural beings falls into the category of "ritual," and we turn next to that subject.

Traditional central African ritual provides a considerable richness in detail, but we may follow Turner (1967:6-16) in grouping ritual into two general categories which he calls "rituals of affliction" and "life crisis rituals."

The "life crisis rituals" include marriages, initiation ceremonies (for boys and girls), and funeral ceremonies. The rituals of affliction have to do with the appeasement of supernatural harm-causing agents to allay misfortune. (The harm-causing agents may be ancestral spirits, nature spirits or less personalized supernatural agents.) At the same time, among some groups, these rituals provide for the transformation of (formerly) unfortunate sufferers either of spirit displeasure or of those exposed to supernatural harm-inducing agents into adepts of hunting cults (for men), fertility cults (for women) and curative cults (for both). The induction into a cult provides a special measure of supernatural power.¹⁷

Life crisis rituals may apply to communities as well as individuals (Turner, 1967:108-109). This accounts for the very elaborate rituals having to do with installation of chiefs, with the initiation (or consummation) or yearly agricultural cycles, and with "healing" of land or homestead. Fortes has rightly noted that traditional African religious belief "is closely linked with social and political organization" (1965:2).

The discussion turns now (in a consideration of data

¹⁷Turner (1957, 1965, 1967, 1968), of course, furnished authoritative pioneering works in the analysis of cults and rituals of affliction in modern Zambia. Van Binsbergen (1981:256-265), who has studied these phenomena in the Zambia of the 1970s argues that healing cults now found in central Africa serve to mediate the disjuncture--as instruments of "articulation" --between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production.

from Kolwezi informants) to a review of those elements in traditional beliefs regarding the supernatural which have endured or have undergone change in the face of various pressures. This should start with the observation that in urban Kolwezi, it would be difficult to sustain Mbiti's argument (offered evidently with traditional, rural Africans in view) that residents live in a "religious universe." To be sure, more than a majority claimed to participate in some form of organized, recurring religious activity, and religious issues were constant subjects of casual conversation. Yet, this activity was not particularly congruent with traditional notions of the supernatural. A sizable proportion of informants had little interest in any religious activity at all. In fact, the secular distractions of urban life: the bars, prostitutes, "hanging-out" with friends, school, political party activities, and so on, seemed to be at least as important to some informants as any "religious" inclination.

It was my conclusion that urbanization and employment in an industrial context had exerted some secularizing influence, particularly upon those in their adolescence and young adulthood who had grown up in the urban environment. Such individuals obviously lacked the countervailing exposure to rural senior relatives, ancestor veneration and various ritual still prominent in village life. They also lacked the religious indoctrination which had been

characteristic of the mining company educational system in the colonial era.

Even so, it seemed reasonably evident that regardless of relative disinterest in "religious" things on the part of some, informants were anything but militantly secular. Nor were any inclined to deny the existence of the supernatural. Rather (and perhaps in consonance with the tradition noted earlier) "religious" issues became particularly relevant when some crisis occurred and supernatural intervention seemed the only explanation or only alternative. This happened rather frequently in the context of sorcery, a topic which will be considered in due course.

As for Tempels' formulation of "force vitale," this was clearly not a subject which most of our urban informants had contemplated deeply. It seemed evident that those informants who were familiar with the subject also tended to be familiar with Tempels' book. Thus, it was not always clear whether informants were citing Tempels' ideas or their own. While the concept of force vitale seemed to be an apt analytical category and relevant to belief and behavior in urban Kolwezi, it was not a widely articulated emic categorization in itself.

On the other hand, the association of fecundity with well-being seemed strongly entrenched. The birth of children--preferably in large numbers--was bound up in the notion of the self-worth of parents, both male and female.

Informants in a sample of 99 married male workers in the Cité had fathered an average of 7.2 children. In fact, almost three quarters of the workers in the sample (73.7%) had fathered five or more children, and almost exactly a third had fathered ten or more children.

In analyzing the responses of informants, it became clear that there were some variations in patterns of family size based on ethnicity (Appendix C, Table 24). It was also evident that family size decreased slightly with generation of residence in Gécamines (Appendix C, Table 25). Even so, no group of informants in any analytical category produced a mean family size of less than 5 children.

These data furnish an interesting comparison with what informants said about their preferences for family size (Appendix C, Table 26). When asked how many children were ideal, exactly a third said that such matters are "in the hands of God." But both these and their neighbors who provided more direct responses clearly valued large families. The smallest number of children mentioned by informants as ideal was four (8% of the sample). Almost exactly a third of the informants thought that four to eight children were ideal. (Informants almost invariably also suggested that such "small" families were to be preferred only because of the high cost of living.) The rest of the informants in the sample wanted more children. Some 18% of informants thought that ten or more children were preferable.

In the same vein, informants said that an infertile wife was despised and usually divorced. An infertile man (once his infertility was established beyond doubt--and not attributable to infertile wives) was pitied and ridiculed.

This ramified as well into "sexual preference." No informant in Kolwezi would admit to homosexuality (or, for that matter, would acknowledge being personally acquainted with homosexuals). The general response to such questions seemed to be bafflement that such individuals could exist. I concluded that this response indicated the continuation and strength of two almost unconscious but profound vital dichotomies in the minds of informants. These were the unbridgeable difference between maleness and femaleness on one hand and that between fecundity and sterility on the other. (If informants were being less than forthright, the responses would at least suggest the existence of a strong cultural norm.) But let us move on to other issues.

While most informants acknowledged that traditional chiefs still maintained supernatural powers, they were divided on whether or not officials of the modern state possessed such powers. (State officials could, of course, employ powerful sorcerers to do their work, but this was different from traditional chiefly power itself.) Informants seemed to think that President Mobutu either possessed considerable supernatural power, or hired particularly powerful sorcerers.

Related to this was Mobutu's reputation as a poisoner. Many of my most highly educated (university-trained) informants believed that Mobutu had obtained a special poison from either the C.I.A. or the Peoples' Republic of China. The poison was supposedly very slow-acting, but unfailingly lethal. Victims would imbibe the poison (unknowingly, of course) during mandatory toasting of the President. They would then go mad and die some six months later. Allegedly, this had happened to a number of officials which Mobutu feared as possible rivals, and high officials were reportedly terrified of the presidential toasting ceremony. (Unfortunately, I did not interview any high officials and could not pose the question to obtain first-hand refutation or confirmation of their alleged fears. However, poisoning of rivals, or of authorities who outlive their usefulness, has a long and well established tradition in central Africa.)

There was no question that the majority of informants in Kolwezi (like their rural fellow-citizens) believed in a Supreme Being. This was evident, among other things, in the responses to such questions as "what will you do when you leave Gécamines?" and "how many children would you like to have?" A very large number of informants responded that such things were "in the hands of God."

However, unlike pre-Christian patterns of indigenous belief, I had the strong impression that most informants viewed God (in a Christianized context) not as otiose and

uninvolved, but rather as personal, available and essentially approachable through Christianized prayer and worship. While there were many among our informants who did not personally involve themselves in such activity, no informant claimed to reject such belief out of hand.

Thus, in urban Zaire, the reformulation of concepts of the Supreme Being into a Christian format is one very obvious area of change in belief between "traditional" and "modern." This change is a direct reflection of the success of Christian proselytization. However, Christianity's apparent success here may also be attributable in part to a desire to assume westernized and urban modes of behavior associated with kizungu ("urban civilization").

In Kolwezi, I found no one (and heard of no one) who advocated the sole practice of traditional modes of contact with the supernatural. There was, in other words, no analogue in the Kolwezi mining community to the "Red" Xhosa of South Africa's East London (Mayer, 1961:3-4). It should perhaps be noted that (after twenty-eight years of independence) Zairois do not now typically associate Christianity with an oppressive colonial regime, and pre-Christian/non Christian cults have not formed a significant basis for anti-government mobilization since the Simba rebellion of 1964-1965.¹⁸ (In that period, southern Shaba

¹⁸See Fox et al. (1965) for a discussion of the "religious" ramifications of one regional manifestation of the Simba Rebellion and Schatzberg (1988:115-133) for analysis of the political role of religious groups in modern

was not affected by the Simba ideology.) Beyond the belief in a Supreme Being, approachable in a Christianized context of prayer and worship, informants certainly believed in other (more traditional central African) manifestations of the supernatural.

Among informants, belief in the ability of living spirits of deceased ancestors (kambo, plural bakambo in local Swahili) to communicate with their descendants was still strong.¹⁹ (This typically took the form of dreams, usually communicating some sort of warning.) What had changed was the diminution of invocation of the ancestors by the living themselves. In a sample of 98 married, male, blue-collar workers, almost half (47%) of the workers said that they had experienced at least one dream in which the living spirits of their (deceased) ancestors had communicated with them. About a quarter of the workers (24%) in the sample admitted to initiating communication with their ancestors. (Some 58% of the workers in the sample said that they did not communicate with their ancestors and 18% gave ambiguous responses.)

Zaire. The relationship between the rise of cults and independent churches and political protest movements has been much addressed in the literature. See Ranger (1986) for a good recent overview.

¹⁹The term kambo is a general word for a male or female ancestor of the second ascending generation or greater. These can either be living or deceased. Some informants used a more specific term kambalula to designate an ancestor in the third ascending generation (great-grandfather/mother) or greater.

Based on discussion with trusted informants, I believe that a higher proportion of workers actually invoked the ancestors than would admit to it outright. (Many workers were probably reluctant to admit such behavior because of the perceived contradiction between ancestor invocation and its proscription by the vast majority of local churches.) Of those informants who did admit to communicating with the ancestors, 17% (and 4% of all workers interviewed) said that they invoked the ancestors at least weekly, and 4% (1% of the total sample) claimed a monthly contact, 17% (4% of the total sample) claimed a contact at least several times a year and 13% (3% of the total sample) claimed a contact at least once a year. The remaining 29% indicated a frequency of contact ranging from "every several years" to "when circumstances require."

When asked if their ancestors had ever helped or caused difficulty for informants (or their families) some 40% of the workers said that the ancestors had helped. Some 10% said that the ancestors had caused difficulties. In both cases, about 6% of the workers said that they did not know (or provided otherwise ambiguous answers). Less than a majority, in other words, indicated a belief that deceased ancestors had actually intervened in the affairs of the living. This is probably attributable both to proscription of ancestor invocation by the churches and its association in the minds of informants with the "backward" practices of the rural village.

Even so, the comment of one senior Gécamines cadre should be recounted here. He was a thoughtful, well-educated and very articulate individual, and a practicing Catholic. He observed that while the ancestors are no longer invoked to serve as intermediaries between the living and God, he and his co-religionists now invoke the saints to serve the same function. He did not think there was much difference in the principle involved.

A belief in spirit-beings beyond the ancestors was very strong in urban Kolwezi; but such spirits were fundamentally different, having never been human. The range in such beliefs was very wide, and I cannot be confident of describing it adequately or of discerning clear patterns. Here too, informants often seemed vague and unclear in their own beliefs. It appeared that there was a tendency to regard spirits as "evil spirits" or "unclean spirits" (pepo buchafu in local Swahili).²⁰ There seemed to be a great deal of influence here from the Christian churches. Spirits in general tended to be viewed as oppressive and malign, with a propensity to attack and inhabit human beings. A number of the churches had ministries of deliverance from evil spirits, and there were "private enterprise" exorcists in the Kolwezi area. Many informants said that they prayed continually and fervently to escape being troubled by evil spirits.

²⁰ Another general term for "spirit" in local Swahili was muzhimu, although it seemed not to be commonly used. This term was not applied to deceased ancestors.

At the same time, the pre-Christian, indigenous belief in nature spirits still seemed reasonably strong. While the urban environment lacked the mountains, kopjes, rivers and forests which such beings were believed to inhabit, a number of informants claimed that a man-made lake in the southern part of the urban area was inhabited by such a spirit. The spirit's pique was said to account for the drownings which occurred there from time to time. Unlike the case in rural communities, there appeared to be very few residents of urban Kolwezi other than bafumu (see below) who overtly and regularly propitiated such spirits or sought their favor by ceremony and sacrifice.

Some informants believed in beings which were not spirits, and not human, but which possessed supernatural powers. These were forest or bush-dwellers. Some took the form of animals, some of oddly shaped (small) people. Informants provided widely varying views as to the moral qualities of such beings.

The domain of the supernatural which seemed most personal to (and prevalent among) our informants was that of sorcery (bulozhi in local Swahili). The fear of sorcery was almost universally shared. In a sample of 95 married male workers, almost half (48%) said that they were personally acquainted with someone who had been a victim of sorcery. (Two other workers did not know for sure.) Eleven workers (12% of the sample) said that they had themselves been victims of sorcery, and another 9 workers (9%) thought it

possible that they had been victims of sorcery, but were not sure.

Bulozhi could take a number of forms, but in its most general aspect it consisted of one person working ill against another person in a supernatural manner. The commonly cited symptoms of victims of bulozhi were physical illness, mental illness and death.

This was brought home to me in a very personal way during the course of fieldwork. One of my research assistants, a teacher in a local school, fell ill. He was taken to the local mining company hospital. Despite extensive tests, the medical personnel there could not diagnose the illness. He seemed to wither away physically and emotionally over the course of about ten days, and then died. His family, and my other Zairois assistants, were convinced that he succumbed to sorcery.

Bulozhi is perpetrated by sorcerers (balozhi, singular mulozhi). These may be seeking their own ends or working in the employ of others. According to our informants, sorcery is an acquired rather than innate capability except in the case of women.

A number of male informants said that women are born with certain innate powers of sorcery. When asked the kind of sorcery perpetrated by women, a number of male informants described a female sorcerer's power to prevent her victim from defecating. Allegedly, victims required surgery to unblock their alimentary canals. Several informants claimed

to have talked to doctors who had performed such surgery and who had found a tortoise in the victim's stomach (obvious and irrefutable evidence of sorcery). Unfortunately, it was not possible to verify this interesting testimony by personal observation.

Informants were often vague (and offered conflicting views) on the exact mechanics of sorcery. However, two themes reflected widely shared beliefs. Certain natural substances were thought to contain supernatural power. When prepared by sorcerers and placed near a victim (or in his food) these substances would produce the desired result. Likewise, sorcerers themselves were attributed with the ability to leave their bodies and attack others. Perhaps as a departure from traditional beliefs, sorcerers in Kolwezi were also considered capable of attacking victims who were not related to them (and who were not even co-ethnics). A number of informants said that the technological progress of modern times had contributed to the increasing power and capability of sorcerers as well.

It was generally believed in Kolwezi that certain ethnic groups had a greater capacity for sorcery than others. The most commonly cited group in this regard was the Songye. In fact, when informants were asked about ethnic stereotypes, the rather consistent stereotype of the Songye was "large number of sorcerers." Other groups that received frequent mention for containing unusually high

numbers of sorcerers were the Luba-Kasai, the Kete, the Sanga and the Tshokwe.²¹

When asked why individuals resorted to sorcery, the most commonly cited reason was "hate" or "jealousy." This was such a prevalent issue in social behavior in Kolwezi that it warrants further explanation, and I will take a brief detour here.

One important aspect of interpersonal relations in Kolwezi--and in urban Zaire generally, revolved around what might be described as the "dynamic of invidious comparison." While this concept is similar in general outline to Merton's (1968:281-297) notion of "relative deprivation," the dynamic I am describing has a number of peculiar central African dimensions.

Analysis of responses by informants indicated that very few residents of urban Kolwezi were content with their lot in life. The most oft-voiced complaint was inadequacy of income. But it seemed to me that this was based not on absolute need but often upon comparison with other categories of people. The townspeople compared their income to that of Gécamines employees. The Gécamines workers

²¹It has been implied that ethnic groups accused of prowess as sorcerers tend to be marginal to the society in question. This was not particularly evident in the case of the Cité's adult population. The Songye comprise some 7.4%, the Luba-Kasai some 29.2%, the Kete some 2.6%, the Sanga some 5.3% and the Tshokwe some 4%. Though none of the groups are large in themselves, each is among the largest in the Cité. Further, the Luba-Kasai and Songye are very well represented in the management ranks of the mining company.

compared their income to that of Gécamines cadre. The Zairois cadre compared theirs to expatriate cadre. (Expatriate cadre were generally unhappy at their "low" wages compared to colleagues overseas.) Inequities in income were most evident in the accumulation of material possessions--very clear indications of status in urban Kolwezi.

Among the Zairois, the issue revolved around a notion of fairness. To blue-collar Gécamines workers, it seemed bitterly unfair that cadre should work so little and earn so much. To cadre, it seemed bitterly unfair that Zairois with equivalent levels of education should earn less than their expatriate colleagues in the same jobs, or for that matter, less than people with similar educations in Europe or America.

Within the blue-collar work force itself, there were substantial differences in income and material well-being. Even at this level, the differences invited invidious comparison.

The response to these material inequalities ranged across a spectrum. At one end was simple envy. (A successful person might provoke a desire on the part of his colleagues to be like him and share his wealth.) At the other end of the spectrum was outright hate and deep resentment of the successful individual. Between these two extremes was jealousy in varying degree.

It is the more extreme responses which are of interest here, because they were very common and had a significant

bearing on behavior. Let me illustrate. Many respondents had a deep fear of sorcery. When asked why sorcery was practiced in the community, 38% of the married male workers in a sample of 99 attributed it to "jealousy, resentment, or hate."²² This "hate" was most often directed at those who were more successful in promotion or material acquisition than others.

The fear of sorcery cut several ways. For instance, the unsuccessful or trouble-plagued individual would suspect sorcery as the cause of his woe; the relatively successful individual often had a vague fear of unknown enemies who (he thought) must hate him for his wealth and want to apply sorcery against him. Likewise, a very successful person might be himself feared as a sorcerer, since that quality alone could account for his great success. (And sorcerers always achieve their objectives at the hurt of others.)

In rural village contexts, fear of sorcery is probably an effective "leveling device," one of a number of institutions which retard the accumulation of wealth in socially disruptive ways, encouraging and supporting various redistribution. In rural villages and traditional central African societies, the grounds for invidious comparison are

²²The most commonly-used Swahili word was "chuki." In its purest form, chuki is best glossed as "hate." There is another word in Copperbelt Swahili (mukau) which can be more precisely glossed as "jealousy." However, that term now tends to apply to jealousy in the context of sexual relations. Many respondents who used the term chuki seemed to convey in it the concept of jealousy as well.

undoubtedly less than in modern urban environments. Even so, accusations of sorcery are very common. Siegel (1983:93; 393-394) provides a brief but useful discussion of this behavior among rural peoples in neighboring Zambia.

Urban values and urban opportunities have (rather obviously) produced substantial differences in material wealth among Zairois. Like their rural fellow citizens, urban Zairois of all socio-econommic levels fear sorcery. They also fear chuki, which provokes sorcery. And chuki is produced (among other things) by seeming inequities in material well-being.

Vansina (1983:86), describing the traditional forest societies of central Africa, depicts sorcery (witchcraft) in terms relevant to our consideration here:

A belief in witchcraft was the most striking evidence that [societies] were something less than harmonious groups of equals. This admission of inequality lay at the heart of these beliefs. Witchcraft was held to be the root of all outstanding achievement, whether for better or worse. Witchcraft was ambition, hatred or greed. It was a failure to accept equality.

I will take this notion a step further, offering a personal opinion based on observation (and not based on the specific description of the subject by informants). A very large proportion of urban, male Zairois demonstrated (at least on occasion) what can be described as a chuki, an exaggerated form of the dynamic of invidious comparison.

Regardless of their relative economic status, informants tended to aspire to the material well-being of impossibly affluent "reference others," and found strong grounds for feelings of unfair treatment (whether by an exploitative political system, by the American C.I.A., by a mining company hierarchy which promoted employees on the basis of ethnicity and ties of friendship rather than merit, by jealous family members, or by unknown enemies dealing in sorcery). Not surprisingly, university-educated "intellectuals" tended to accept (as divine truth) the center-periphery/underdevelopment paradigm to account for conditions in Zaire (i.e. Zaire remains underdeveloped because of specific collusion of capitalist western countries to exploit the underdeveloped world).

It is, I believe, the overflow of the dynamic of invidious comparison which animates those spasms of violence seen in the Simba rebellion (1964-65) and rebel occupation of Kolwezi (1978) in which many "scores" (including revenge against sorcerors) were settled by summary execution and in which rebels helped themselves to the material goods which they believed they had been so unfairly denied.

Another explanation offered by informants for resort to sorcery was an individual's desire to promote personal wealth or well being. For instance, the individual might seek out the assistance of a sorcerer in order to pass a

school exam or to obtain a promotion at work, or to obtain a job, or to succeed at a business enterprise. If sorcery resulted from chuki, the sorcerer (or his client) would be seeking the direct ill of a designated victim; but if sorcery were perpetrated for personal gain, the sorcerer (or, more commonly, his client) would simply be seeking to promote the well being of the client at the expense of another. (In sorcery, one person's gain can only be procured at another person's cost.) Typically, the client was said to designate a member of his family who would sicken or die in order that his objective be achieved.

The fear of sorcery was very widespread among Kolwezi residents at all economic levels. In this regard, I was a bit surprised early in my research at the comments made by one research assistant, a very bright, capable and well-read young man who would not have been in the least out of place as a student on an American college campus. (His father was a well-to-do merchant of Luba-Kasai origin who owned a fleet of trucks and considerable property in the Kolwezi area.) The assistant explained that he could not visit his ancestral village in the Kasai, despite his great desire to do so. In the 1960s, his father had apparently fallen out with the rest of the family over a large debt. The father's paternal relatives had sworn revenge, and the matter had never been resolved. The assistant and his father assumed that the revenge would take the form of sorcery. In fact,

sorcery was already suspected. Certain of the father's trucks had inexplicable mechanical problems. One truck, for instance, required a new engine every several thousand kilometers. Despite considerable effort, no material cause had ever been found for this problem. Sorcery perpetrated by the aggrieved paternal relatives was the most obvious explanation.

Sorcery overlapped another very common belief--that in dawa, which may be somewhat misleadingly glossed as "medicine." Dawa had a wide range of meaning and usage. Like the Luba concept of bwanga, it seemed to apply to material and immaterial substances which had an essentially supernatural power to promote (or disrupt) the wellbeing of human beings.

A person who wanted "traditional" supernatural assistance for health or success would not necessarily resort to sorcery. He or she would much more appropriately go to a purveyor of dawa.²³ Informants said, however, that this was sometimes risky business, for the seller of dawa could be a sorcerer. If this were the case, the sorcerer might subsequently appear in a dream to his heretofore unsuspecting client and demand a victim from the client's family. The client would be obliged to select a wife,

²³In Copperbelt Swahili, the purveyor was called a mufwanyisha dawa (a maker of medicine) or mufwanya dawa, the French term féticheur was also widely used, as was the Tshiluba mpaka manga. Individuals who commonly resorted to traditional medicine were also called "féticheurs" ("users of fetishes"); this was a somewhat pejorative label.

child, parent, etc., who would subsequently die. If the client refused, he would himself die. Hence, an otherwise innocent client would be forced against his will to participate in sorcery.

Regardless of any risk, the buying and selling of dawa seemed to be very widespread in urban Kolwezi. The dawa itself ranged from more or less traditional treatments for a host of physical and emotional complaints to "medicine" that would attract (or reattract) a husband to "medicine" that would enable its owner to succeed at some enterprise. Dawa was also obtained intentionally (but secretly, of course) from sorcerers. Dawa could be bought from a mufwanyanya dawa or from a special category of dealer in the supernatural called a mufumu (plural bafumu). Let us turn briefly to this latter category.

Kolwezi informants said that a mufumu was the direct counterpart to a sorcerer. He (or she) was a seer that could recognize sorcery and counter its effects. In contrast, a mufwanyanya dawa, as the term implies, was simply anyone who could make some sort of "medicine," including combinations of roots and herbs for relatively minor medical problems and ailments. The mufumu's potential capability was very much greater.

Exactly where and how the mufumu obtained his (or her) power was a subject of varying opinion among informants in

Kolwezi.²⁴ Some informants, obviously influenced by the Christian churches, dismissed bafumu as satanic. Others saw the bafumu as deriving their powers from contact with various categories of spirits (who were otherwise morally neutral). A European clergyman with considerable knowledge of local conceptions of the supernatural also suggested that the bafumu were the main source of a continuing relationship between local residents and their deceased ancestors. Even so, from conversations with informants, I got the impression that the source of bafumu power was not a common topic of local conversation or speculation.

There was one aspect of the power of the mufumu that did emerge fairly frequently: informants equated the mufumu's power with sorcery and said that some aspect of that power was itself sorcery. ("It takes sorcery to fight sorcery.") Informants were sometimes wary of the good faith and moral integrity of the mufumu in his (or her) use of such powers. This ambivalence seemed difficult to reconcile with a simple notion of good mufumu versus evil sorcerer. However, the belief certainly served to enhance the perception of mystery and power surrounding the mufumu.

²⁴An authoritative study of traditional healers in Zaire is that of S. Yoder (1981). His research addressed disease and disease management among the Tshokwe in ethnomedical perspective and he did considerable interviewing of Tshokwe healers. Janzen (1979) also provides a useful study of traditional healing in the far western region of Zaire. However, in this study we are concerned with views of lay persons, not of healers, though in this regard, I found no significant conflict with Yoder's data.

This was, in fact, much like the morally ambiguous supernatural power attributed to traditional chiefs and described so well by Packard (1981:33-46), W. MacGaffey (1986:6-7; 68; 176-180) and Osokonda (1984:114-278).

The mufumu could do considerably more than counteract sorcery, of course; though like any medical professional, a mufumu in Kolwezi tended to specialize in one (or several) subfields. Some bafumu concentrated on exorcism of evil spirits. Others specialized in physical or emotional ailments (particularly impotence and infertility). Still others were said to be able to find lost objects or to determine the guilty party in cases of theft. Virtually all informants who were willing to discuss bafumu and bafwanya dawa said that the most efficacious practitioners and treatments were to be found in rural villages rather than the urban area.

To gain some perspective on the degree to which residents of the Cité consulted bafumu and bafwanya dawa, informants in a sample of 95 married male workers were asked if they or their immediate families had ever consulted practitioners of traditional medicine; and if so, for what ailments. (Responses are analyzed in statistical detail in Appendix D, Tables 16-19.)

Almost exactly half of the informants in the sample indicated that they or their families had, in fact, consulted such practitioners. However, variation in this pattern based on ethnic origin proved interesting: for

instance, fully 80% of the Sanga informants claimed to have consulted a practitioner of traditional medicine, while only 12.5% of the Songye informants said they had done so. Such variations proved difficult to explain: when informants were queried on this issue, they provided a large number of differing and unconvincing answers.

There was also an interesting variation based on generation in Gécamines. Specifically, second-generation informants seemed more inclined to consult practitioners of traditional medicine than either first-generation or third-generation informants. While third-generation informants seemed least likely to have recourse to traditional medicine, these informants were not greatly less inclined to do so than first-generation informants. Perhaps the long-term trend is a rejection of the bafumu in favor of western medical treatment, and prayer in Christian churches, but such a trend is not clearly portrayed in the available data.²⁵

Turning briefly to the subject of ritual, the rounds of daily life in the Cité differed dramatically from those in a rural village, and the varied, recurring rituals characteristic of village life were likewise much attenuated in the Cité. Residents of the Cité would on occasion return to their rural ancestral communities to participate in such

²⁵Du Toit (1980) found analogous patterns among urban Africans in South Africa, noting that western Christianity, western medicine and traditional beliefs in supernatural powers are not mutually exclusive in the minds of African informants.

rites as installation of chiefs, weddings, and wakes. But many Cité residents seemed to feel little compunction to attend these events on other than the most infrequent or momentous occasions.

Within the Cité itself, considerable ritual could attend birth, weddings and wakes. (The most consistent patterns attended births and wakes. Those wedding celebrations involving a public ritual tended to be events sponsored by a local Christian church.) Groups of singing, dancing, clapping women could frequently be seen celebrating a birth into a worker family. Likewise, a "deuil" (mourning) or a "reveille" (the gathering of relatives in the home of a deceased for one or more nights of sleepless watchfulness, beer-drinking and mourning) was a common occurrence. The subsequent funeral procession to the cemetery, including mourners, dancers and spirit chasers (following or preceding the truck carrying the corpse) was also a common sight.

These "rituals," however, were only loosely based on any specific indigenous tradition. Rather, they were generic urban life-crisis rituals, reformulations of ceremony from various traditional sources, and from European practice. In many cases, the ceremony was organized by a local religious congregation. The most dramatic variation in the patterns of life-crisis rituals seemed to have had more to do with the colorful practice of differing (Christian) religious groups than anything else.

Certain traditional notions of ritual responsibilities and obligations were still evident among those whose lifestyle seemed otherwise very "western." This was brought home to me very clearly early in my research. An assistant and I had just returned to Kolwezi from a three-day trip to Lubumbashi. The assistant was living with a cousin in Kolwezi, and we walked together to his cousin's house. (The cousin was a Gécamines cadre). To our surprise, a mourning was in progress. A child in the family had died in our absence. A large group of men (all coethnics--relatives or close friends) were sitting in a circle on the porch. (The women were gathered in the house.) The younger men were sitting silently and glumly. The older men were taking turns telling long, involved stories of personal experiences obviously unrelated to death or mourning. Several men had been staying in the house for the past two days. A very large collection of empty beer bottles was scattered around the porch. We joined the circle and listened. After about an hour, I had to leave. It would have been most impolite to ask about the dead; but assuming it was one of the children of the cousin, I solemnly offered him condolences and apologies and left. Several days later, it became evident that the dead child was the son, not of the cousin, but of another junior relative. This brought an initial rush of embarrassment. However, I was also told that the group had been pleased by my "recognition" that (in this ethnic group) condolences should be offered to the senior

male relative rather than to the biological father of the deceased.

While lacking the data to make this statement for the entire Kolwezi urban area, I could not find cults of affliction (as such) in the Cité itself.²⁶ Individual sufferers did seek out bafumu and bafwanya dawa, but all such activity of which I was aware seemed to involve essentially market transactions.

Here, however, it is necessary to emphasize the role of the churches. Many of the churches had healing ministries with emphasis on the supernatural and miraculous, and prayer for healing was one of the most frequently heard categories of petitions in all the churches.

To be sure, individual sufferers often consulted church, bafumu, the mining company hospital, and private clinics in urban Kolwezi, sometimes simultaneously. But it appeared to me that it was the church group (particularly in the smaller, syncretic sects) that was best able in the industrial worker environment to address the social aspects of disease management. At any rate, having introduced one role of Kolwezi's churches, let us turn more explicitly to the subject of "religion" in Kolwezi.

One surprise which emerged early in the research was the strength and vigor of Kolwezi's (Christian) religious

²⁶ Perhaps Van Binsbergen would argue that the stabilized industrial work force of the mining company has been so thoroughly acculturated to the capitalist mode of production as to obviate any requirement for mediation between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes.

communities. A commonly asked question in Kolwezi was "Where do you pray?" (i.e. Are you religious, and what's your religious group?). This was not an embarrassing question to informants. Most, in fact, were very proud of their religious affiliation and happy to describe it in detail. I was often lectured on religious issues and frequently had the impression of being solicited to join an informant's religious group. In these cases, the Zairois were clearly evangelizing the European. I ultimately concluded that an outsider would never really understand life in urban Kolwezi without a profound understanding of the role of the churches. This variable proved to be far more significant than originally expected.

There were some 44 separate religious groups represented in the Cité itself. A listing of specific groupings, and their numerical representation within the Cité, are provided in Table 5.2. A listing of the larger groups (in order of size) is provided in Table 5.3. The religious groups can be lumped into about four very broad categories.²⁷

The largest single religious group, forming a general category of its own, was that of the Roman Catholics (43% of adults in the Cité). Roman Catholics worshipped in the several large parish churches in the Kolwezi area. (Each Gécamines camp has a Catholic church, as does each other

²⁷There have been a number of efforts to categorize Christian churches in African contexts. See, for example, Barrett (1968) and Hastings (1979).

quartier in Kolwezi.) European clergy were still very prominent in Kolwezi's Catholic community. Of the twenty-five or so active priests in Kolwezi, only seven were Zairois. The expatriates (mostly of Belgian origin) were associated with the three local Catholic missions (Salesian, Salvatorians and Franciscan). Sunday worship services in all the churches were well attended.

Also within the Catholic community were a number of somewhat independent prayer groups (composed of dedicated Roman Catholics who regularly attended mass but who also met in individual homes for prayer and Bible study). It proved difficult to estimate (with any confidence) the numbers of people involved in such Roman Catholic prayer groups, but within the Kolwezi urban area, one could easily have found at least 15 such groups. Those with which I was familiar tended to be associated with the (Catholic) Charismatic Renewal.

The second religious category is that which could be labeled "Western Protestant." This consisted of those Protestant churches which had resulted directly from the earlier mission work of foreign missionaries and which continued the confession of the pioneer church.²⁸ All of the Kolwezi churches in this category had Zairois clergy in

²⁸This category included such groups as:

- Assembly of God in Zaire
- Garenganze (Plymouth Brethren)
- Several separate Pentecostal groups
- Seventh Day Adventists
- United Methodists

1988.²⁹ Despite the American or European antecedents of such groups, much of the worship I observed reflected a very Africanized format.

Some 27% of all adults interviewed in the Cité belonged in this general religious category. The largest single group was that of the United Methodists (9% of all adults). The sizable number of Methodists was partially a result of the long-time work of the Methodist mission just outside the Gécamines camp, and partially due to Methodist inroads in western and southern Shaba as a result of missionary activity commencing very early in the colonial era.

The next general grouping of religions in Kolwezi consists of those independent church groups which had a Christian base, but which were essentially or wholly indigenous to central/southern Africa. Many of these drew extensively on indigenous sources for both theology and practice. However, the theological range in this category was very wide. With more study, this category could undoubtedly have been subdivided it into several more readily defined subgroups, but suffice it to say here that congregations in this category ranged from those which

Baptists
Mennonites
Presbyterians

²⁹Of the six foreign Protestant missionaries in Kolwezi in mid 1988, four were involved mainly in medical work, two in teaching. By nationality and religion, one husband and wife were American Methodists, one husband and wife were Danish Methodists and one husband and wife were British Plymouth Brethren.

(despite a distinctively African flavor in worship) seemed generally within the western Christian theological tradition to groups which were far more syncretic or which drew very heavily on revelation from African prophets.³⁰ (It is hardly necessary to say that to this anthropologist, the churches in this category were by far the most interesting, and the hardest to define.) Some 15% of all adults interviewed in the Cité fell into this broad category.³¹

The final category might best be described as "all others." This includes groups whose belief and practice are

³⁰The syncretic sects in Zaire undoubtedly number in the hundreds, and while few of these are widely known (even in Zaire), several of the larger groups have been rather thoroughly analyzed in the literature. These include the Kimbanguists, the Bapostole and the Jamaa. The most prominent group, that of the Kimbanguists, has been studied by various scholars. Some of the more useful recent studies include those of Asch (1983) and W. MacGaffey (1983). The Bapostole (Postolo) in Zaire have been thoroughly described in a licence memoir by Tshimanga (1977), a Mupostole himself, and by Jules-Rosette (1975, 1979a, 1979b), an American sociologist and convert to the sect. Heimer (1972) provides a very interesting comparison of Kimbanguist and Bapostole theology based on his fieldwork in Kananga (Zaire). The Jamaa, which started as a Catholic splinter group, has further split into a large number of groups displaying considerable theological diversity. The earlier Jamaa movement has been described by Fabian (1971, 1979) and De Craemer (1977). Mataczynski (1986) provides more recent detail.

³¹This category included such groups as the following:

Balondi Ba Yesu
 Martyrs
 Nzambi Malamu
 Eglise Evangélique des Sacrificateurs
 Postolo (Bapostole, Bapostolo, Vapostori)
 Lumpa (a church founded in Zambia by Alice Lenshina)
 Eglise du Christ Sur La Terre par le Prophet Simon Kimbangu
 Eglise Prophétique des Mystères Divins (Basantu)
 Eglise de la Bonne Nouvelle du Seigneur Jesus-Christ
 Various otherwise unaffiliated "prayer groups"

so singular as to require individual mention. In this category are the Jehovah's Witnesses/Watchtower (locally called "Temoins de Jehovah" or more commonly just "Temoins") which warrant a descriptive detour.

While not a large group, there are Jehovah's Witnesses in the Cité. That any Zairois would admit to membership is surprising: the sect is discouraged by the state in Zaire as it is in central Africa generally. The several Jehovah's Witness homes that I visited (knowingly) were something of a shock: in each case, they were very clean, generously furnished with well-maintained furniture, and well decorated. They were also equipped with one or more shelves of books. The residents seemed intellectually and economically above the average subject interviewed: they gave thoughtful, well-reasoned answers to questions. They were serious but cordial in their general comportment. So far as I could tell, they made no effort to hide their religious inclinations. One of my researchers had a Jehovah's Witness background. (He and his parents had converted from Catholicism when he was young, although he himself is no longer an active participant in any group.) He assured me that the appearance of the Jehovah's Witness homes was no accident--Witnesses are expected to be examples of cleanliness and good taste. It is certainly conceivable that we visited other Jehovah's Witness homes unknowingly, and that those visited knowingly were atypical. But I doubt it.

Other religious groups in the "catch-all" category include the Kitawala/Kitabala, as an Africanized spinoff of the Jehovah's Witnesses (Schatzberg, 1988:125-132). Here, too, would be the (Greek) Orthodox community, and the Bahais. All of these groups are very small in Kolwezi. Except for the Orthodox, who still have some Greek clergy associated with a local mission, the leadership is all Zairois. Some 2% of the camp adults fall in this "catch-all" category.

It should perhaps be noted that after the Roman Catholics, the largest single grouping (11% of all adults in the Cité, 15% of adult males) consisted of individuals who said they participated in no religious group. At the same time, no informant claimed to participate solely in "traditional" religious activities, although traditional notions of the supernatural were, of course, still widely held among all categories of informants.³²

Residents of the Cité tended to be regular and frequent church attenders. In a sample of 98 blue-collar married male workers, well over a third (38% of the total) claimed to attend church several times a week, while another 24% claimed to attend church at least once a week.

³²This eclecticism in "religious" belief, combining elements of the traditional and the European Christian is by no means unique to urban central Africa. See Du Toit (1980) for South African analogues. Nash (1979:121-169; 314-320) provides an interesting comparison of beliefs in another third-world industrial context, discussing religious eclecticism in Bolivian mining communities.

Table 5.2. Proportions of adults by religious preference in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, arranged by religious group in alphabetical order.

Religious Group	Male workers married and unmarried		Adult females including married and unmarried female workers		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Adventiste (Adventist)	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Ange de l'Eternel (Angel of the Eternal)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Anglican	2	.12%	2	.12%	4	.12%
Assemblée Spirituelle (The Spiritual Assembly)	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Bahai	4	.24%	5	.3 %	9	.27%
Balondi ba Yesu (Disciples of Jesus)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Catholique (Roman Catholic)	740	43.8 %	718	42.3 %	1458	43.1 %
Eglise de la Bonne Nouvelle du Seigneur Jesus-Christ (Church of the Good News of the Master Jesus Christ)	13	.77%	12	.71%	25	.74%
Eglise du Christ au Zaïre (The Church of Christ in Zaïre)	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Eglise du Christ sur la Terre par le Prophet Simon Kimbangu (Church of Christ on the Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu) [Kimbanguist]	20	1.2 %	20	1.2 %	40	1.2 %
Eglise Evangélique des Sacrificateurs (Evangelical Church of Sacrificers)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Eglise Neo-Apostolique (The New Apostolic Church)	19	1.1 %	18	1.1 %	37	1.1 %
Eglise Pentecôtiste de Macompagne (The Pentacostal Church of Macompagne)	3	.18%	3	.18%	6	.18%
Eglise Prophétique des Mystères Divins (Bansantu) (The Prophetic Church of Divine Mysteries [The Saints])	16	.9 %	17	1 %	33	.97%
Eglise Sabatique du 7e Jour (Seventh Day Adventist)	3	.18%	6	.35%	9	.27%
Eglise Unie du Saint-Esprit (United Church of the Holy Spirit)	3	.18%	7	.41%	10	.3 %
Fidèles de Dieu (The Faithful of God)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Garenganze (Plymouth Brethren)	49	2.9 %	57	3.4 %	106	3.1 %
Groupe de Prière (Prayer Group)	11	.65%	25	1.5 %	36	1.1 %
Jamaa (Family)	39	2.3 %	43	2.5 %	82	2.4 %
Juif (Jewish)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Kitwala (Watchtower variant)	1	.06%	2	.12%	3	.09%
Lumpa (Church of Alice Lenshina)	2	.12%	1	.06%	3	.09%
Martyrs	13	.77%	16	.94%	29	.86%

Table 5.2--continued

Religious Group	Male workers married and unmarried		Adult females including married and unmarried female workers		Total	
	Number 3	% .18%	Number 4	% .24%	Number 7	% .21%
Mennonite						
Message du Temps de la Fin (Message of the End Times)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Méthodiste (United Methodist)	135	8 %	162	9.6 %	297	8.8 %
Nzambi Malamu (God Is Good)	57	3.4 %	84	5 %	141	4.2 %
Orthodoxe (Greek Orthodox)	7	.41%	6	.35%	13	.38%
Pierre Sainte (Holy Rock)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Postolo (The Apostles)	17	1 %	17	1 %	34	1 %
Presbyterien (Presbyterian)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Sango Malamu (Good News)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Tabernacle (Branhamist)	39	2.3 %	51	3 %	90	2.7 %
Témoins de Jehovah (Jehovah's Witnesses)	16	.95%	16	.94%	32	.95%
18e Communauté Evangelique de L'Alliance au Zaïre (18th Evangelical Community of the Alliance in Zaïre)	5	.3 %	5	.29%	10	.3 %
24e Communauté Libre de Maniema (24th Free Community of Maniema)	2	.12%	2	.12%	4	.12%
30e Communauté Pentecôtiste C.M. (30th Pentacostal Community, C.M.)	40	2.4 %	56	3.3 %	96	2.8 %
34e Communauté du Christ (34th Community of Christ)	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
37e Communauté Assemblée de Dieu au Zaïre (37th Community of the Assembly of God in Zaïre)	28	1.7 %	35	2.1 %	63	1.9 %
45e Communauté Evangélique de Pentecôte au Shaba (45th Evangelical Community of Pentecost in Shaba)	11	.65%	17	1 %	28	.83%
49e Communauté Episcopale Baptiste en Afrique (49th Episcopal Baptist Community in Africa)	4	.24%	4	.24%	8	.24%
57e Communauté du Saint-Esprit en Afrique (57th Community of the Holy Spirit in Africa)	8	.47%	8	.47%	16	.47%
Protestante sans précises (General Protestant, no further specification)	87	5.1 %	106	6.3 %	193	5.7 %
Sans participation (No religious observance)	250	14.8 %	113	6.7 %	363	10.7 %
Sans précision (Religious preference could not be determined)	32	1.9 %	46	2.7 %	78	2.3 %

Source: Census performed by the author, October-December 1987.

Table 5.3. Selected religious groups represented in the Cite Gécamines Kolwezi, arranged by size of the group.

Religious Group	Percentage of adults in the Cité who claimed affiliation with the group
Catholique (Roman Catholic)	43.1%
Méthodiste (United Methodist)	8.8%
Nzambi Malamu (God Is Good)	4.2%
Garenganze (Plymouth Brethren)	3.1%
30e Communauté Pentecôtiste C.M. (30th Pentacostal Community, C.M.)	2.8%
Tabernacle (Branhamist)	2.7%
Jamaa (Family)	2.4%
37e Communauté Assemblée de Dieu au Zaïre (37th Community of the Assembly of God in Zaïre)	1.9%
Eglise du Christ sur la Terre par le Prophète Simon Kimbangu (Kimbanguist)	1.2%
Eglise Neo-Apostolique (The New Apostolic Church)	1.1%
Groupe de Prière (Prayer Group)	1.1%
Postolo (Bapostole, Bapostolo, Vapostori)	1.0%
Eglise Prophétique des Mystères Divins (Bansantu (The Prophetic Church of Divine Mysteries [The Saints]))	.97%
Témoins de Jéhovah (Jehovah's Witnesses)	.95%
Martyrs	.86%
45e Communauté Évangélique de Pentecôte au Shaba (45th Evangelical Community of Pentecost in Shaba)	.83%
Eglise de la Bonne Nouvelle du Seigneur Jésus Christ (Church of The Good News of The Master Jesus Christ)	.74%

Source: Census performed by the author, October-December 1987.

This high proportion of residents who were regular church-goers contrasted dramatically with the relatively small number of workers who claimed to attend church occasionally (29%). In assessing the occasional churchgoers, 8% of workers in the sample said they attended church at least once a month, another 4% said they attended at least several times a year and some 16% said that they attended church from time to time.

Exactly two thirds of those workers who claimed to attend church also said that their families regularly attended church with them. Virtually all of the male workers in the sample said that they and their wives agreed on religious issues, and indicated that they thought it was important for husbands and wives to agree on religious issues.

The high level of interest in religion, and the proliferation of religious groups in Kolwezi, has been accompanied by a considerable amount of spiritual searching on the part of married male workers. Almost half of the informants in the sample indicated that they had changed their religion at least once during the course of their lives; of these, over a third had changed churches twice or more.

The directions of movement in religious change were relatively clear. The largest movement was from the Catholic church into a Protestant (or "semi-Protestant") group. Almost a third of the entire sample of 99 married

male workers had left the Catholic church. But of these, only a relative few (6% of the total sample) and joined one of the traditional "western Protestant" churches. Most of those who left the Catholic church had joined either an independent African church or a group like the local Branhamists, the various local Pentecostalist, or the Jehovah's Witnesses, all of which tend to be highly authoritarian in articles of faith and in church discipline.

A much smaller percentage of workers (8% of the total sample) had left a traditional "western Protestant" religious group. Of these, all except two had subsequently joined an independent church. (One had become a Jehovah's Witness, one a Roman Catholic.)

The reasons offered by informants for their change of religious group varied, but several reasons were more prominent than others. Foremost among these was a "search for truth." (Many informants seemed to crave personal religious experience, strong communal participation, solidarity among fellow worshippers, and strict, unambiguous rules of faith and life. In Kolwezi, the sects that offered these features and the additional characteristic of a "healing" ministry seemed to be the most vigorous and rapidly expanding.)

Other reasons offered by informants for change of religion included quarrels within the church congregations, pressure by family members, and discrimination in the allocation of church positions and benefits in the previous

religious group. (Although not acknowledged in such great degree by informants in the Cité, discussion with trusted informants led me to conclude that quarrels within congregations comprised a very significant factor both in the frequency with which Kolwezi residents changed religious groups and in the proliferation of the groups themselves.)

Several comments are warranted here about the role of the churches in Kolwezi. We could start by asking why many informants in the Cité were so obviously committed to religious groups. First, it should be noted that very few of Kolwezi's citizens were entirely outside the orbit of one or more religious groups. (Even those workers who did not participate in religious activities were likely to have at least one parent, friend or wife who did participate. Secondly, it was my strong (but subjective) impression that the church-based network had become far more important for many informants than kin-based, work-based or neighborhood-based networks. This was of course, more true of some religious groups than others. (The Postolo and Branhamists congregations, as examples, seemed to engage a great amount of the time and attention of their adherents. They were also vigorous proselyters.) It seemed that some religious congregations in urban Kolwezi had become substitute kin and substitute parents for adherents, performing many of the same roles that close kinfolk would be expected to perform in a rural village environment. (Church elders, for

instance, could be expected to reconcile estranged spouses and organize assistance for parishioners in special need.)

The churches in Kolwezi provided a forum for religious experience and (in many cases) offered ministries of physical and emotional healing beyond the capabilities of both Western medicine and the traditional healer (mufumu). Too, participation in the church was an obvious commitment to modernity and urban sophistication, and a rejection of the cultural "backwardness" supposedly characteristic of the rural village. Yet, at the same time, the church offered protection against traditional sources of harm which people still feared (such as sorcery, and malign spirits). Finally, churches provided a source of stability in an unstable social and political environment, provided unambiguous explanations for the conditions of daily life, and addressed (as no other institutions could) the deepest questions of the meaning of life.

Religious change in Africa has, of course, been studied from various theoretical perspectives. A very prominent current conger of views in scholarly circles attributes to "religion" the prime role in rationalizing the existence and nature of particular social organization, relations of production or even international economic and political ties.

While these various approaches may have analytical merit, they strike me as egregious oversimplifications of the actual motivation to religious change evident among

seekers, converts and proselytes themselves in Kolwezi. The approaches in academe tend to ignore a very real hunger for spiritual truth among urban central Africans which may or may not have anything to do with rationalization of existing social relations. These approaches also ignore the dramatically transformed lives of many converts: transformations that do not necessarily correlate with traditional central African behavioral norms or the norms of a secularized society with a market economy. (In my view, "superstructural" analytical approaches in particular accord much more readily with the materialist presuppositions of their authors than with social reality in urban Kolwezi.)

It could well be asked what the fastest growing churches in Kolwezi provided to adherents. Informants, of course, offered a wide range of answers. I shall rather arbitrarily group these into four major categories.

First, the churches provided individual access to (and communication with) a personally knowable God. This was a very important issue to many informants. He was a much more appropriate object of veneration than the hopelessly corrupt and incompetent authorities of the modern state. Further, in His omnipotence, He was a source of protection from dangers (i.e. sorcery, evil spirits, sickness, violence) against which no other patron had much power.

Secondly, churches provided clearly defined and eternally unchangeable truth; in other words, they offered stability in a confusing and rapidly changing world. Very

strict church rules and a large list of proscribed behavior was characteristic here. This was particularly important in the realm of interpersonal relationships: the social ambiguity of the culturally heterogeneous urban context was exploited by many of Kolwezi's residents, but disliked and feared by many as well. Churches provided unambiguous rules of life which should characterize relations between men and women, husbands and wives, parents and children, elders and young, employers and employees, citizens and authorities. The fastest growing churches almost unanimously urged wholehearted obedience to the state, its authorities and its directives; although adherents were discouraged from substantive participation in overtly "political" organizations.³³ (I also had the impression that male informants particularly liked strict and restrictive rules relating to appropriate behavior of wives.)

Related to this is the third category. Churches prescribed and promoted community, family, and kin-type reciprocal relations. These crossed ethnic lines and were at once both "modern" and apparently efficacious in meeting material and emotional needs of communicants. While mining company policies emphasized nuclear families and essentially isolated households, churches seemed to fill supportive and redistributive roles perhaps once performed by the extended

³³Schatzberg (1988:115-133) provides a recent analysis and comparison of relations between selected religious groups and the state in Zaire. As he noted, there are significant differences in the ways various religious groups have accommodated themselves to the demands of the state.

family in rural communities. Yet this "community" was achieved in an ethnically heterogeneous environment. Within this category, too, was the feature of public worship and ritual. Communicants could regularly and communally celebrate their faith, fears, joys and bereavements in a manner somewhat reminiscent of traditional communal ritual.

Finally, the churches did provide answers to two questions which concerned many informants: "does my life have any meaning?" and "what will happen when I die?" While many of Kolwezi's residents appeared not to be overly concerned with these questions, those who were concerned seemed to find their answers in churches rather than secular activity or secular organizations.

Ethnicity and Its Ramifications

The discussion now turns to a subject which requires considerable care: the definition of ethnicity among the research population, and the ramifications of that ethnicity for belief and behavior. This is not, of course, an issue untouched by previous scholarship: the past two decades have seen the proliferation of a considerable literature on ethnicity and its theoretical aspects in African urban contexts.³⁴ We need not address that literature in detail

³⁴Among many others, we could cite here the seminal articles of Gluckman (1960) and Southall (1970), a study by Young (1976) which addressed the issue in comparative perspective and included a treatment of ethnicity in Zaire, an edited work by du Toit (1978) with an introduction containing detailed consideration of historical approaches to the study of ethnicity in African contexts, an essay by Epstein (1978) which explores African ethnicity in urban

here, but a description of that domain of social reality in urban Kolwezi subsumed under the rubric of "ethnicity" requires a modicum of prior definition.

First, of course, the interest here is directed more to ethnic boundaries and ethnic stereotypes from the perspectives of the population under study than from arbitrary outsiders' categorizations (Barth, 1969:9-38). The literature reflects a number of differing approaches to the analysis of ethnicity. One trend in recent years has been a more precise definition of what might be called "levels" of analysis. In the political science literature, this has been expressed as the difference between "primordality" and "instrumentality" (Young and Turner, 1985). In the anthropological and sociological literature, a distinction has been made between "cognitive" and "structural" analysis of ethnicity (Mitchell, 1987). The categories are not coterminous, but they reflect an analytical distinction between "ethnicity" on one hand as the content of shared values and normative behavior within a group ("primordial," "cognitive"), and "ethnicity," on the other hand, analyzed as discrete patterns of belief and behavior distinguishing different communities ("structural"),

Zambia, comparing its cognitive aspects to those of two other social environments, a study by Siegel (1983) with a superb assessment of the significance of ethnicity in a rural Zambian Copperbelt context, and a recent work by Mitchell (1987:180-235) which discusses ethnicity as one aspect of social reality in urban Africa. Mitchell (1974) and Cohen (1978) provide a wider discussion of approaches to the subject in the general social science literature.

or as a basis for social mobilization in a culturally plural environment ("instrumental"). In other words, the differing foci of concern turn both on the units of analysis and on the degree to which patterns are measured by insiders' perspectives or outsiders' categorizations. This study is oriented more toward "cognitive" than "structural" perspectives in analysis of ethnicity (Mitchell, 1987:180-242). At the same time, a certain broadness in analytical categorization is essential, since ". . . ethnic boundaries are fluid and flexible. They have social, biological and interactional implications and for that reason may be manipulated to serve given ends at a particular place and time" (du Toit, 1978:9).

If we should want to use ethnicity as a variable in predicting behavior, the mechanics of argument and limitations of time and space suggest that some restriction of the potential range of the variable is necessary. While the cognitive value (in the community under study) is its most salient value here, du Toit (1978:8) has noted, that ethnicity is "a matter of social definition . . . based on ideological criteria. Such a social definition will always involve a self-definition and a categorization by others with whom one is in contact." Some cognitive and some structural aspects of the variable will emerge in almost any consideration. Still, if it is necessary to restrict the range of the variable in attempting to assess its predictive value for other social behavior, we nonetheless want to

capture the essence of its significance (in its own right) among the research population.

It could be asked at this point just what social reality is subsumed within the units of ethnicity relevant to the research population.³⁵ In Zaire, the commonly used term for a distinct ethnic group is "tribe" (French tribu, Swahili kabila). It is certainly true (as many have noted) that "tribal" designations in Africa often owe their origin to the codification and catalyzation of group identities by colonial administrations, and are frequently more the ". . . 'artifacts' of the colonial experience . . . than primordial 'social facts'" (Seigel, 1983:321). Yet regardless of ancient or recent origin, the notion of "tribe" is an unambiguous social fact in the minds of informants in urban Kolwezi. It did, in fact, seem also to ramify into other domains of belief and behavior.

³⁵A note on terminology is warranted here. While there have been attempts to apply the terms "tribe" and "ethnic group" to somewhat different African social reality, I will follow Siegel (1983:329) in using the terms interchangeably. On the other hand, the terms "tribe" and "tribal" have come to connote non-western communities, organized by principles of descent, possessing simple technologies and pre peasant/pre capitalist economies. In Africa, differing social entities (exhibiting a wide variation in social organization, political institutions and economic structures) have inherited the label of "tribe." Not surprisingly, Africans and Africanists have found the term patronizing, pejorative and frustratingly imprecise. As this discussion will indicate, I prefer to use the more generic term for relevant social units: "ethnic group" (Mitchell, 1987:189). While it is appropriate to acknowledge Cohen's (1978) warning that the two terms are not necessarily coterminous, his definition of "ethnic group" seems more applicable to social reality in urban Zaire. Still, when Zairois speak of what I call "ethnic groups," they say "tribe."

When informants specified "tribe" as a social category, what comprised the distinctive criteria? There seemed, in fact, to be two equally important and related factors which distinguished "tribes" in the minds of informants: first and most important was a unique culture history (which was bound up for individuals in their descent groupings and in some continuing relations with urban and rural members of the descent group. This also involved a traditional rural base for any given ethnic group and the fact that most urbanized individuals retained at least some ties to rural kin.) The identity itself was defined in a history, transmitted through culturally relevant symbols, and which conveying the unique values of the group (Epstein, 1978:122-123); Smith, 1981:65-66).

Siegel (1983:331), discussing ethnic distinctiveness in Zambia, described it as a "sense of a unique history and the unique response to that history." Elsewhere (1983:334) he attributes ethnic particularism in Zambia with "historical currency" and posits that "historical enterprise" has the characteristic of encouraging "a people to make sense of the present in terms of their past, as well as to make sense of the past in terms of their present." I found these observations valid for industrial workers in Kolwezi.

The second factor was what informants called "mentalité." This meant that individuals in each "tribe" were thought to have peculiar norms of response to social stimuli which were unique to the tribe. Intimate

communication across tribal boundaries was deemed sometimes problematic. One manifestation of this factor was evident in "tribal" stereotypes frequently cited by informants. The differences in ethnic "mentalité" most often mentioned to me were those that involved relations between husbands and wives and husbands (or wives) and their affines. As Epstein (1978:12-13) noted in urban Zambia, many of the ethnic stereotypes had explicit or inferential sexual connotations.

The belief in a common "mentalité" was also clearly a "convenient means of ordering social relations" for, as noted by Siegel (1983:323) "members of the same ethnic group enjoy a common repertoire of shared understandings which serve, as it were, to grease the wheels of social intercourse." Even so, this latter factor seemed to be diminishing under the forced mixing in neighborhood and school in the research community, as we shall see.³⁶

The knowledge of ethnic traditions and beliefs does diminish in urban context. This was particularly clearly illustrated in the case of a young doctor I met over dinner at the house of another well-to-do Zairois in Kolwezi. The doctor's family was of Lunda-Ndembu (southern Lunda) origin,

³⁶The use of ethnic identity as a primary urban classification mechanism, a behavior perhaps most articulately described by Rhodes-Livingston Institute scholars who studied the Zambian urban Copperbelt in the 1950s (Mitchell, Epstein, Harries-Jones), was perhaps more characteristic of an environment in which the labor force was far less stabilized and contained a much higher proportion of recent rural immigrants. See particularly Mitchell (1956:28-29).

his parents having come from Mutshatsha (on the Zaire-Zambia border, not far from where Victor Turner had done his field work among the southern Lunda). The doctor, however, had grown up in urban Lubumbashi and had never visited his ancestral community. In fact, he had just arrived in Kolwezi, having been assigned to a local hospital after finishing his seven years of medical training in Kinshasa. (He was clearly unhappy about the remoteness and provinciality of his new home.)

The dinner conversation eventually got around to the diverse customs of various ethnic groups. Always the anthropologist, I asked about inheritance ramifications if a Lunda-Ndembu woman (with conceptions of matrilineal descent and inheritance) married a Luba man (who would come from a patrilineal background). The doctor hastened to correct me, avowing that the Lunda-Ndembu were strongly patrilineal. I found this fascinating and probed gently for more information. He was adamant. In fact, the only ethnic group he could think of that traced descent in the matriline were the Bemba (who had been well represented in Lubumbashi and had maintained strong links with rural kin in the nearby Luapula river region). The doctor was oblivious to a key aspect of current social reality in the nearby rural homeland of his own ancestors.

Even so, while the cultural content of the identity diminishes, virtually all informants in Kolwezi retained a strong sense of "tribal" identity. This was true even in

cases in which they did not speak their ancestral languages. While French and Swahili have become the languages of urban southern Zaire (in the home and on the job), these "new" languages have not in themselves measurably undermined the relevance of ethnicity as a component of self-identification.

Siegel (1983:322-336), in his study of ethnicity on the Zambian Copperbelt, seems to agree that "culture history" and what I have described as differing ethnic "mentality" are two factors that give ethnic distinctiveness a continuing relevance in central Africa.³⁷ (I also gather by his discussion [1983:330-336] that he regards the former as perhaps the most significant factor, and I would certainly agree.) Siegel does, however, suggest two other important factors contributing to the persistence of ethnic particularism in Zambia: one being the continuing importance of traditional chiefs, the other being the regional competition for the material resources and benefits of the modern state. Here, it is important to note that Siegel's study was performed in an essentially rural context, though on the industrialized Zambian Copperbelt. His research population was thus different in many respects from industrial laborers in urban Kolwezi. We could expect to see differences between urban and rural components of ethnic distinctiveness.

³⁷Mitchell (1987:216-221) provides additional useful discussion of these issues.

Among residents of the Cité, the importance of traditional chiefs (who rule in a rural area) varied substantially by ethnic group. This variation is well illustrated in the differing cases of the nuclear Lunda and the Luba-Kasai. To many ARuund (nuclear Lunda) in Kolwezi, for instance, the Lunda emperor (Mwant Yav) remained an important cultural symbol, a significant part of the definition of their cultural identity. In contrast, to most Luba-Kasai in Kolwezi, the chiefdoms of east Kasai seemed to have no real authority and little relevance as significant cultural symbols. (Although this should be tempered by the fact that the Kolwezi area borders the current domain of the Mwant Yav, while the homeland of the Luba-Kasai is far distant.)

Ethnic identity in urban Kolwezi was also affected to at least some extent by competition among regionally-based groups for the resources of the modern state.³⁸ This, too, varied in significance by ethnic group. However, there was more to this aspect of ethnic distinction than allocation of resources: individuals in certain ethnic groups expressed a considerable bitterness at (what they perceived to be) overt discrimination and persecution of their co-ethnics by the

³⁸Young (1976:163-215) and Willame (1972) provide analyses of ethnic mobilization and ethnic identity in Zaire through the first decade of Zairian independence, and the ramifications of ethnicity for political alignment and political decisions. See also Schatzberg (1980, 1988) for an analysis of class and ethnicity in Zaire of the 1970s and 1980s.

Mobutu regime. Again, this was particularly evident in the case of the Lunda and the Luba-Kasai.

One very important aspect of political life in Shaba centers around what might be called the "Lunda problem." As we have seen, western Shaba is the heartland of the old Lunda Empire and the rural demographic focus of the nuclear Lunda (ARuund). The ancient Lunda state and its attendant culture remain an important reality to many Lunda in today's Zaire.

The Mobutu regime has demonstrated a considerable measure of suspicion toward the Lunda in general, toward residents of western Shaba in particular, and toward the Lunda monarch in special measure. This is clearly a legacy of the Katanga secession of the early 1960s. The elite of the secessionist Katanga state had a strongly (but by no means exclusively) Lunda complexion. Katanga's president, Moise Tshombe, was of Ruund extraction. (And, in fact, the Tshombe family has filled the Lunda kingship since the 1960s.)

The Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978 were conducted by rebels supposedly consisting of former gendarmes of the secessionist Katanga state. While many of the rebels were far too young to have served in the Katanga gendarmerie of early 1960s, the rebel group seems to have been almost exclusively composed of members of the ethnic groups of western Shaba. However, the rebels were by no means seeking to revive the ancient Lunda empire, nor were they seeking a

renewed Katanga secessionn. Rather, their goal seemed to be the overthrow of the Mobutu regime and its replacement with a vaguely defined socialist government. Rebel relations with the Lunda monarch and his court were at best problematic (Henk, 1980:355-367).

Though there are Lunda officials of the Zairian state, and prominent Lunda activists in the party, Lunda with whom I spoke in Shaba still strongly believed that the regime deliberately and crassly discriminated against them in the distribution of the benefits of the state (in such realms as educational opportunity, political positions, and funding of local economic development), and deliberately committed acts of violence in Lunda areas to terrorize the population. Many Lunda in Shaba considered the Mobutu regime to be a foreign occupying power. (Some of the more charitable Lunda made comments to me on the order of, "we've been recolonized by our brothers . . .")

To some extent, those western Shaba ethnic groups closely related by language and history to the ARuund (such as the Tshokwe and Ndembu) are lumped by other Zairois into the category of "Lunda." But even so, the ARuund are stereotyped as particularly hostile to the existing regime. The Zairian political establishment (and many non-Lunda, even in Shaba) tend to see the ARuund as agitators and troublemakers. There is, not surprisingly, a large and coercive military presence in the region.

The Luba-Kasai, on the other hand, comprise what might be called the "Kasai" problem. They trace their origin to (what is now) the Kasai-oriental Région, some 600 km north of Kolwezi. Because of extensive colonial-era labor recruitment among the Luba-Kasai, members of this ethnic group are now very prominent in the political and economic life of urban southern Zaire, and form the single largest ethnic component of the mining company work force. Many other Luba-Kasai in southern Shaba are aggressive and successful entrepreneurs. Members of this ethnic group seem particularly gifted by genes, culture or historical accident to achieve the highest honors in academia and the most lucrative private sector positions. This is, however, a very mixed blessing. Many Luba-Kasai in Kolwezi believe (with reason) that they are resented by the "native" Shabans. They are in turn bitter about perceived discrimination in allocation of educational benefits, political position and promotions based on merit. In contrast, "native" Shabans told me that they dislike the aggressiveness of the Luba-Kasai, who are (in fact) very well represented in the professions and educational institutions. (There seem, in fact, to be implicit quotas in state positions designed to prevent the Luba-Kasai from entirely dominating southern Zaire.)

The presence of the "Kasaiens" had been a very divisive issue in Shaba in the period immediately following national independence in 1960. One of my research assistants, whose

immediate ancestors had been recruited from the Kasai, had grown up in a mining camp in Kolwezi. He recalls his terror as a youth when, in the immediate aftermath of national independence, enraged gangs of "native" Shabans surged through urban Kolwezi seeking to kill the "foreigners" from other areas (particularly the Kasai) who had (in their estimation) appropriated all the good jobs in the industrial economy. I found no such violent sentiments in the Kolwezi of 1988, but I did hear derogatory comments about the pushiness and "tribalism" of "Kasaiens." Interestingly, when residents of Kolwezi now speak of "Kasaiens," they generally mean the Luba-Kasai. In Kolwezi, the Tshiluba language of the Luba-Kasai (and related groups) is generally called "KiKasai." The Luba-Kasai are most often called simply "BaKasai" (the Kasai people).

The reality of ethnic distinctions in Zaire is tempered by the régime's "party line" which inveighs against "tribalism." "Tribalism" is one of the oft excoriated characteristics (like "colonialism") that is applied pejoratively in a variety of circumstances. (The regime does not seem to deny or discourage cultural pluralism per se, tolerating "tribes but not tribalism." Party authorities consider "tribalism" to be manifested when anti-regime political mobilization has an ethnic complexion.) Many informants in Kolwezi made negative comments about "tribalism," usually when accusing other individuals or other groups of ethnic favoritism.

A few informants in Kolwezi denied that ethnic distinctions had any importance for them and insisted that they had not personally experienced discrimination based on ethnic favoritism. (These tended to be individuals who were attempting to maintain a very "European" lifestyle.) While I do not doubt that these individuals sought to avoid any entanglement with ethnic particularism, the claim that they had not encountered it in Kolwezi warranted some skepticism. It seemed likely that the party line rather than objective reality was being cited. Even so, I could not be sure.

Informants clearly did not want to be labeled as "tribalist" (both because of its proscription by the political party and because of its connotation of backwardness), and on occasion certainly provided less than the whole truth about their beliefs and preferences. Based on extensive discussion with trusted informants, I concluded that many informants tended to be more ethnically particularistic than they would admit in formal interview.

We turn, at any rate, to the ethnic groups actually represented in the Cité. Table 5.4 provides an overview of the ethnic distribution of adults (including married males, unmarried males, married females, and unmarried females). This information was obtained by asking the individual informants their "tribe" of origin.³⁹ This was a question to which all of our informants could respond cheerfully and

³⁹In this question, informants were asked to specify their kabila (Swahili) or tribu (French). We thus obtained ethnic categorization based on self-ascription (Barth, 1969).

Table 5.4. Proportions of adults by ethnic origin in Cité Gécamines Kolwezi arranged in alphabetical order.

Ethnic Group	Male workers married and unmarried		Adult females including married and unmarried female workers		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Aushi	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Babindji	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Bangubangu	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Banyarwanda	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Barundi	3	.2%	2	.12%	5	.15%
Bazimba	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Belande	1	.06%	2	.12%	3	.09%
Bemba (not further specified)	39	2.3%	48	2.8%	87	2.6%
Bembe	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Buyu	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Chisinga	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Goma	0	0	3	.18%	3	.09%
Hemba	32	1.9%	21	1.2%	53	1.6%
Holoholo	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Kaniok	82	4.9%	63	3.7%	145	4.3%
Kaonde	18	1.1%	21	1.2%	39	1.2%
Kete	45	2.7%	42	2.5%	87	2.6%
Kongo	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Kosa	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Kalundwe	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Kuba	2	.12%	2	.12%	4	.12%
Kusu	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Kutu	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Lala	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Lamba	8	.47%	4	.24%	12	.35%
Lokele	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Lomotwa	1	.06%	3	.18%	4	.12%
Luba-Kasai	480	28.4%	508	34.2%	988	29.2%
Luba-Shaba	318	18.8%	311	18.3%	629	18.6%
Luenia	14	.83%	7	.41%	21	.62%
Lulua	63	3.7%	62	3.7%	125	3.7%
Lunda (not further specified)	35	2.1%	40	2.4%	75	2.2%
Lunda (KaRuund)	79	4.7%	81	4.8%	160	4.7%
Lunda (Ndembu)	66	3.9%	76	4.5%	142	4.2%
Lunda (Kazembe)	2	.12%	1	.06%	3	.09%
Luntu	0	0	4	.24%	4	.12%
Luvale	2	.12%	1	.06%	3	.09%
Mbala	1	.06%	2	.12%	3	.09%
Mboma	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Mbudja	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Mbundu	4	.24%	8	.47%	12	.35%
Minungu	9	.53%	8	.47%	17	.5%
Nande	2	.12%	1	.06%	3	.09%
Ntandu	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Nziba	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Ovimbundu	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Rega	1	.06%	1	.06%	2	.06%
Rwanda	2	.12%	2	.12%	4	.12%
Sala-Mpasu	2	.12%	1	.06%	3	.09%
Sanga	84	5%	96	5.7%	180	5.3%
Shinji	0	0	1	.06%	1	.03%
Songye	140	8.3%	110	6.5%	250	7.4%
Tabwa	18	1.1%	17	1%	35	1%
Tetela	6	.36%	8	.47%	14	.41%
Tshokwe	70	4.1%	66	3.9%	136	4%
Tutsi	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Ubwabi	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Wazura	1	.06%	0	0	1	.03%
Yeke	3	.2%	7	.41%	10	.3%
Zela	3	.2%	3	.18%	6	.18%
Individuals specifying a mixed ethnic origin	8	.47%	5	.3%	13	.38%
Individuals for which a specific ethnic origin could not be determined	29	1.7%	46	2.7%	75	2.2%
Totals	1690		1696		3386	

Source: Census performed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, October-December 1987.

unambiguously. However, the responses we received did not necessarily correspond to the various "etic" analytical categorizations of central African ethnic groups. Nor did we obtain consistent categories from those informants who (in our view) shared essentially identical ethnicity. Thus it is important to note here a couple of the challenges faced in compiling this listing. (Table 5.4 is to some extent a product of analysis rather than a mere compilation of data received from informants.)

First, many informants specified an ethnic grouping more restrictive than that which their neighbors would label "tribe." For instance, Luba-Kasai and Songye, when asked their "tribe," would sometimes specify a corporate kinship grouping which we would be more inclined to classify as a lineage or a clan, i.e. Bakwa Lebwe, Bakwa Kalonji. Yet, upon further probing, they would ultimately admit to being part of the larger ethnic group.

Fortunately, my rather large group of research assistants contained members of each of the major ethnic groups represented in the Cité. There was generally very little difficulty in determining the larger ethnic grouping in which a small subgroup belonged.

Secondly, quite a few informants were inclined to specify a general ethnic grouping which could be more precisely distinguished by their neighbors (and co-ethnics) into several separate "tribes." For instance, informants might claim to be "Bemba," when upon further questioning,

they would ultimately admit to being Tabwa or Lamba. Others might claim to be "Lunda," rather than the more specific ethnic (or "tribal") categories of KaRuund or Ndembu. We did, on occasion, fail to press informants giving too broad a classification to specify a more precise ethnic category. But again, such response varied somewhat from informant to informant.

Ethnic identities provided by informants ramified into ethnic stereotypes and prestige. The Lamba, as an example, had a reputation in the Zairian mining community for being lazy and dirty. (Workers who took Lamba wives were often teased for such marital choices.) It seemed likely that Lamba workers would prefer to claim the less disreputable and broader category of (socially similar) Bemba.

Considerations of prestige did not necessarily drive all responses. I was interviewing one worker who had initially claimed to be Sanga. In the course of the discussion, he told me that his grandfather had arrived in the region as a soldier of M'siri (the late 19th century usurper-king of Katanga who established his initial power-base among the Sanga). Surprised, I asked my informant if he were not actually Yeke (like M'siri) rather than Sanga. Yes, indeed he was. And he seemed flattered that a foreigner would know the difference. But he had not volunteered the information at first because the Yeke, though they maintain a separate identity, are very thoroughly integrated into Sanga society.

As noted above, the issue of ethnicity in the Cité (as, indeed, in Shaba as a whole) was intertwined with that of region of origin. In the mining camps, this issue was particularly influenced by the very high proportion of personnel whose origins are in the Kasai regions to the north. Table 5.5 provides a general overview of ethnic origins by region (in the major ethnic groups represented in the Cité). From that table, we note that over 40% of the Cité's adult population belongs to groups whose traditional rural demographic foci are in the Kasai regions. Moreover, the Luba-Kasai ethnic group alone comprises three-fourths of the total population of Kasai origin in the Cité, and is also by far the single largest ethnic group in the Cité. As indicated in Table 5.5, it is noteworthy that well over 90% of the Cité's adult population can be classified into thirteen general ethnic groups, all of which find their traditional rural base either in Shaba or the two Kasai régions.

Very few Gécamines blue-collar workers come from the country's western régions (Bas Zaire, Bandundu and Equateur) but a fairly large proportion of white-collar managers from those regions have been hired by Gécamines (or imposed on Gécamines) in recent years. Many Shabans bitterly resent the fact that the country's top political/economic elite comes from the western part of the country--the generally "Lingalaphone" region. The région (province) of Equateur is reserved for particular scorn, being the home area of the

Table 5.5. Proportions of adults by ethnic origin (selected ethnic groups) in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, arranged in descending order of group size.

Ethnic group	Proportion of the adult population	Traditional demographic focus of the ethnic group
Luba-Kasai	29.2%	Kasai-Oriental
Luba-Shaba	18.6%	Shaba (North/Northeast)
Lunda, general (excepting Lunda-Kazembe)	11.1%	
--Lunda (not further specified)	2.2%	
--ARuund	4.7%	Shaba (West)/Angola (Northeast)
--Ndembu	4.2%	Shaba (Southwest)/Zambia (Northwest)
Songye	7.4%	Kasai-Oriental
Sanga	5.3%	Shaba (South Central)
Kaniok	4.3%	Shaba (Northwest)
Tshokwe	4.0%	Shaba (West)/Angola (East Central and Northeast)
Lulua	3.7%	Kasai-Occidental
Bemba (not further specified)	2.6%	Shaba (Southeast)/Zambia (Northeast)
Kete	2.6%	Kasai-Occidental/Shaba (Northwest)
Hemba	1.6%	Shaba (Northeast)
Kaonde	1.2%	Shaba (Southwest)/Zambia (Northwest)
Tabwa	1.0%	Shaba (Southeast)
	----- 92.6%	

Source: Census performed by the author in the Cite Gecamines Kolwezi, October-December 1987.

President and much of the top national political elite. People from this region are disparagingly dismissed in Shaba as "forestiers" (forest dwellers--inferring that they possess no worthwhile traditions, while displaying uncouth manners and a lack of intelligence). I have heard Shabans joke about the especially long arms and hairy bodies of the "forestiers"--a most unsubtle suggestion of a close relationship with lower primates.

Urban Shabans also tend to call people from the country's western regions (Bas Zaire, Bandundu, Equateur, Kinshasa) "BaKongo," regardless of their actual ethnic identity. To Shabans, "BaKongo" are Lingala-speakers, generally associated with the government, party, or high rank in state enterprises, and also generally feared and avoided. I was told, interestingly, that people in Kinshasa (the so-called "Kinois") tend to label all people from other than Zaire's western regions as "BaLuba"--perhaps in response to the large numbers and aggressive commercialism of the Luba-Kasai in Kinshasa.

Informants in Kolwezi tended to see the régions of Shaba, the two Kasais and Kivu as forming a political block in opposition to the western régions. The remaining région, Haut-Zaire, was described as being like a bat (neither bird nor land creature--tending to swing either of two ways based on convenience).

While Shabans do not like the "forestiers," it was evident that they would not be happy with a ruling elite

from any other single region. I once asked an educated, articulate Shaban for his reaction if the next regime were to be based largely on elites from the Kasai. He was horrified. He said the country "would be lost," that the Kasaiens were "notorious tribalists." Other Shabans later echoed the same sentiments.

Having discussed the issue in general terms, we can now consider (if ever so briefly) some of the more explicit ramifications of ethnicity for belief and behavior in interpersonal relations among our research population of married, male blue-collar workers in the Cité. (It should be recalled that mining-company policy since the late 1920s has been to coopt and subvert ethnicity as mobilizing factor in the work place and in the residential community.)

While we cannot assess all of the many ramifications of ethnicity, it is possible to choose several limited areas which may be illustrative of the importance of the variable as a whole. Hence, the discussion will focus on four such areas: coethnicity and residential proximity, coethnicity and friendship choice, parental preferences in ethnicity of children's spouses, and ethnically-based discrimination in the work place.

In the course of research, workers were individually asked if they preferred members of their own tribe as neighbors in their residential neighborhood. In a sample of ninety-nine workers, the vast majority (83%) said that they cared little or not at all if their immediate neighbors were

co-ethnics. Of the remainder, only 6% said that they would prefer their neighbors to be co-ethnics, and 11% indicated their preference that neighbors not be co-ethnics.

The latter statistic pointed to an interesting inclination. When asked why they preferred not to live near co-ethnics, informants replied to the effect that they did not want interference in their own domestic affairs by "brothers" or that they did not want to be constantly pestered for loans.⁴⁰ It was clear, however, that ethnic differences in the neighborhood were not a major issue of daily concern to residents of the Cité. When asked if neighbors generally became good friends, 28% of the workers in the sample said "yes," 30% said "no," and 41% replied to the effect that other factors were more important in the choice of friends than residential proximity. The relative privacy afforded by walls and hedges enabled workers to avoid constant interaction with neighbors if they so desired.

The next area in which the ramifications of ethnicity were explored was that of close personal friends of workers. Informants in a sample of ninety-nine married male workers were asked to rate the importance of

⁴⁰This attitude was much stronger in the case of close relatives. When asked if they would like their own parents as nearby neighbors, 41% of the sample of male workers said "no." When asked if they would like their wives' parents as close neighbors, 44% said "no." Again, workers who did not want to live near close relatives or affines sought escape from interference in their personal lives and domestic affairs, or wanted to avoid constant demands for assistance.

coethnicity in the choice of friends. They responded as indicated in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6. Married male worker assessments of the importance of coethnicity in choice of a close personal friend.

<u>Response</u>	<u>Number of Informants</u>
Very important	5
Somewhat important	26
Not important	62
Friendship depends on factors other than ethnicity	3
No response	3

Source: Sampling performed by author in 99 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

As indicated in that table, almost two thirds of all respondents said that ethnicity was not important in the choice of a friend. Yet, there were interesting variations by ethnic group. For instance, while only 31% of all respondents said that coethnicity was either very important or somewhat important, this category included 78% of the Tshokwe in the sample, 56% of the Luba-Kasai in the sample, only 23% of the ARuund in the sample, and only 13% of the Songye. The Luba-Shaba, by contrast, reflected the sample mean at 31.5%. These data do somewhat support the popular stereotype that Tshokwe and Luba-Kasai are more ethnically

particularistic than other groups, at least in terms of friendship choice.

At the same time, among those informants who rated coethnicity either very important or somewhat important in the choice of a friend, 35.5% were first-generation Gécamines, 6.5% were third-generation Gécamines, while fully 58% were second-generation Gécamines. This suggests that coethnicity is a more important criterion in friendship choice among informants who had grown up in an industrial urban community than among those who had migrated from a rural home. However, those informants with deepest family roots in this urban industrial community also seemed far less likely to choose friends based on considerations of coethnicity.

An effort was made to correlate what informants said about coethnicity and friendship choice with patterns of actual behavior. Informants in a sample of 98 married male workers were asked to describe their three closest friends. Among the characteristics sought was ethnicity of each friend. (Data extracted from this description are arranged in Appendix D, Table 21.) A majority of informants said that none of their three best friends were coethnics. Only about a third said that one or more of their three closest friends was a coethnic.

However, when these data were analyzed by generation, an interesting trend emerged. Some 39% of all first generation, 35% of all second generation, and 22% of all

third generation workers have at least one co-ethnic among their three best friends. Clearly, the value of coethnicity in friendship choice decreases with longevity of family residence in the urban industrial environment.

Informants were also asked how they met and came to know their closest friends. Data for the single closest friend of informants is collated in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7. Circumstances under which informants came to know their closest friend.

<u>Circumstance</u>	<u>Percentage of informants in in sample</u>
Fellow worker at work place in Gécamines	21.4%
Religious activities	19.4%
Classmate at school during childhood/adolescence	15.3%
Introduced by other friends	9.2%
Residential proximity in neighborhood as adults	8.2%
Sports activities/sports club	6.1%
Residential proximity in neighborhood as children/adolescents	4.1%
Other	3.1%
No close friends/no response	13.3%

Source: Sample of 98 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

So what does this all mean? Responses seemed to suggest that a majority of informants chose their closest

friends based primarily on criteria other than ethnicity. Yet at the same time, informants indicated that considerations of coethnicity influenced friendship choice for about one third of the sample population. The relative importance of coethnicity as a predictor of friendship choice seemed to vary. A majority of Tshokwe and Luba-Kasai were apt to base friendship choice on at least some considerations of coethnicity, unlike (for instance) ARuund and Songye.

Among the minority who did base friendship choice on coethnicity, it is clear from the data that first-generation Gécamines workers were far more apt to base friendship choice on coethnicity than third-generation workers. Yet it appeared that second-generation workers may have been more apt to consider coethnicity important for friendship choice than first-generation workers (although beliefs and actual behavior seemed to diverge). I attribute this anomaly to self-selection for Gécamines employment of first-generation individuals (who, perhaps, in many cases) sought Gécamines employment in order to break away from the bonds of family and kin in rural villages and adopt a more westernized, "modern" lifestyle. Such workers would seem, in my judgment, more likely to reject coethnicity and kinship as essential to choice of friends. "Second generation" informants would (in this explanation) be more conservative. But in the long run, coethnicity would decrease as an important criterion of friendship choice.

Subjective observations from participant observation in the community led me to conclude that informants somewhat understated the importance of coethnicity in selecting close friends. I sat in on too many "bull sessions" comprised exclusively of groups of coethnic "brothers" ("banduku" in local Swahili) to fully believe the results of informant responses in formal interviews.⁴¹ Yet, it was clear from personal observation that many--perhaps a majority--of informants based their friendship choices more on common interests and personal compatibility than upon coethnicity. Informants tended to find their friends in the locations they most frequented: the work place, the school, the church, and the residential neighborhood. The ethnically heterogeneous character of these locations assured a considerable degree of choice, and informants seemed on a whole to find ethnicity less salient in choosing friends than other variables.

Turning next to the subject of marital behavior, we find the domain which informants themselves identified as most affected by considerations of ethnicity. As discussed below, a substantial proportion of informants had married across ethnic lines. (This was a considerable change in behavior compared to the frequency of ethnic intermarriage

⁴¹Too, refinement of the data would undoubtedly disclose clusters of "almost" co-ethnics (for example, a cluster of Lulua, Luba-Kasai and Kaniok or another of ARuund and Tshokwe) which should be factored into a discussion of ethnicity as a basis for friendship choice in urban Shaba.

within the first ascending generation.) Yet a majority of informants indicated that ethnically mixed marriages invariably posed serious problems. The alleged high divorce rate in urban Kolwezi was widely blamed on the frequency of such unions. As noted earlier, the key problem was said by informants to be a difference in "mentality" between ethnic groups.

Upon more detailed questioning, informants suggested that this difference in "mentality" turned on several axes. One was the differing expectations of affines for the dowry ("dot") and subsequent demands for material goods and services. Another was the degree of involvement of affines in the domestic affairs of a married couple. Still another was the behavior of the wife herself.

This ramified into various stereotypes. For instance, Luba-Kasai and Luba-Shaba women were said by male informants to make better wives since they were more submissive, respectful and faithful to their husbands. Hemba wives were said to be a problem because of easily annoyed and vengeful kinsfolk. ARuund, Ndembu, Tshokwe, Kaonde and Sanga wives were thought to be more inclined to argument and infidelity. Sanga and Lamba wives were, in stereotype, inclined to backwardness, laziness and drunkenness. Sanga wives were further excoriated by male informants for a tendency to flee to relatives (with their children). These differences tended to fall along the patrilineal/ matrilineal cultural divide. Not surprisingly, male informants of all groups

demonstrated a slight tendency to prefer wives from ethnic groups which traced descent in the patriline.

Informants in a sample of ninety-nine married male workers were asked to evaluate the importance (to the informants) of their sons and daughters marrying within their own ethnic group. (The results are analyzed in Appendix C, Tables 27-32.)

Several conclusions can be drawn from the data in those tables. First, of course, is the fact that ethnicity is an important variable to the parents and affines of a marital partner. A majority of informants considered it either "very important" or "somewhat important" that their sons marry within their own ethnic group. Likewise, almost half of the informants considered it "very important" or "somewhat important" that their daughters marry within their own ethnic group. On the other hand, sizable percentages (39% and 48%) of informants considered coethnicity irrelevant in the marital choices of sons and daughters.

Differences in opinion on this subject varied considerably by ethnic group. The data are interesting because they suggest patterns of belief and behavior regarding ramifications of ethnicity which are different than in the case of friendship choice. For instance, Luba-Kasai seemed less ethnically peculiaristic when it came to marital choices of their children than in choice of friends, the Ndembu more so; while the Tshokwe data seemed consistent

in both cases. However, the important variables here may be more narrowly defined than ethnicity per se.

Parents were virtually all concerned about such issues as dowry and bride-service. Since expectations varied by ethnic group, this subject held considerable potential for inter-family misunderstanding and conflict in cases of interethnic marriage.

The small size of the sample suggests that caution is appropriate: the data should be used to indicate possible inclinations and tendencies, not to "prove" social facts. Still, it is clear that among informants, ethnicity was relevant to parental preferences for marital choices of their children. Since it was the parents of the husband who paid the dowry (dot) which "legitimized" a marriage, and parents of the wife who received the dowry, parental preferences were a factor of obvious importance in patterns of marital behavior.

It is interesting, again, to note the distribution of views by generation (Appendix C, Tables 31 and 32). The importance of coethnicity as a factor in marital choice (at least so far as parents of brides and grooms are concerned) has not diminished with generation of employment in the industrial community. Here too, it seems likely that "first generation" informants tended more to be self-selected innovators, more open to acceptance of change. Informants in subsequent generations would presumably be more conservative and resistant to change.

We turn, at any rate, to the final domain in which we will assess ramifications of ethnicity: ethnic particularism as informants considered it to be manifested in the work place. This was, of course, a subject of some political sensitivity, and it had to be broached with considerable circumspection.

Informants in a sample of 99 married male workers were asked if individuals in different ethnic groups were better at doing certain kinds of work than others. Initially, some 79% of informants responded with an unequivocal "no." In the course of research, however, various stereotypes emerged. These suggested that informants were not as convinced of the equal capabilities of all men as their initial responses indicated. While the degree to which informants really believed the stereotypes is difficult to assess, and views varied from individual to individual, certain general themes emerged. (Unfortunately, there was no way to gauge these attitudes empirically.)

Many informants said that the Luba-Kasai were particularly gifted at commerce. This was not a terribly profound observation, since Luba-Kasai dominate the economy of urban southern Zaire. But there also seemed to be a strong general belief that "Kasaiens" (individuals whose ancestral origin is traceable to the Kasai regions) were more ambitious and harder working than "Shabiens" (individuals whose ancestral origin is traceable to Shaba.) This is probably a perpetuation of Belgian colonial

attitudes reflected in the somewhat discriminatory recruitment policies of the mining company in the colonial era.

"Angolans" (which seemed to mean Mbundu, not Tshokwe or Lunda) were thought to be more skilled than others as mechanics and chauffeurs. "Rwandais" (individuals who traced their ancestral origin to Rwanda or Burundi) were often said to be particularly good miners. Tshokwe and Kete were said to make better personal servants ("domestiques").⁴² ARuund were thought to be trouble-makers, inclined towards intrigue and nefarious economic enterprise. I was surprised to hear a number of "native" Shabans tell me that the "BaKongo" (people from Zaire's western regions) were naturally gifted as political leaders and top-level managers. (This attitude would reflect the current social reality of power relationships in Zaire and the mining company.)

Certain ethnic groups were singled out for particularly negative stereotypes: in Shaba, these included the Lamba, Sanga and "Bemba," who were said to be inclined to drunkenness. The Lamba (and, to a lesser extent, the Sanga) were characterized additionally as dirty, backward and lazy.

⁴²This was probably intended as a pejorative categorization. "Domestiques" in general certainly made better salaries than most of Kolwezi's residents. Virtually all expatriates and relatively well-off Zairois employed such servants and the positions seemed to be eagerly sought. However, domestiques were cited by informants in the Cité as low-prestige workers (Appendix D, Table 8).

Two small groups from the Kasai, the Kete and the BaBinji were likewise, characterized as "backward."

It would probably be easy to overstress these ethnic stereotypes. The vast majority of informants seemed to indicate (by their responses to initial questioning) that the ideal norm was to disavow stereotypes. Yet at the same time, the stereotypes were widely known among informants and emerged frequently in intimate, leisure-time conversation and occasionally in quarrels within the community.

The questions eventually got around to the sensitive subject of ethnic discrimination in the mining company. Informants in a sample of 99 married male workers were asked if individuals from certain tribes tended to be favored in the work place. Almost exactly half said "no." However, well over a third of informants in the sample (36%) indicated their view that such discrimination did occur. These informants were then asked which ethnic groups were preferred above others. The results are depicted in Table 5.8. It should come as no surprise that the perceived degree of discrimination varied by ethnic group as illustrated in Table 5.9.

Table 5.8 clearly reflects the belief, widely articulated in Gécamines as a whole, that Songye and Luba-Kasai dominate the organization and tend to favor their co-ethnics in distribution of positions and benefits. Both ethnic groups are of "Kasai" origin. The perceived "undue influence" of "Kasaiens," however, seems to vary by ethnic

Table 5.8. Responses to the question "What tribes do you consider to be overly preferred in the place where you work?"

<u>"Tribe"</u>	<u>Indicated group as a percentage of total "yes" responses</u>
Songye	38.6%
Luba-Kasai	34.1%
"BaKongo"	22.7%
Hemba	2.3%
Sanga	2.3%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table 5.9. Ethnic distribution of informants who indicated that individuals from certain "tribes" are overly preferred in the Gécamines work place.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>"Yes" responses as a percentage of total sample of that ethnic group</u>
ARuund	46.2%
Kaniok	28.6%
Luba-Kasai	12.5%
Luba-Shaba	36.9%
Lulua	33.3%
Ndembu	14.3%
Sanga	100.0%
Songye	25.0%
Tshokwe	33.3%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

groups, as indicated in Table 5.9, with individuals in such "Shaban" ethnic groups as the ARuund and Sanga seemingly more sensitive to discrimination than others.

Interestingly, individuals in other Shaban groups (Luba-Shaba, Ndembu, Tshokwe) seem less sensitive to discrimination. The generation of employment in Gécamines did not seem to exert a major influence on perceptions of ethnic discrimination.

We can turn at this point and make several observations. First, while it is clear that ethnicity had continuing relevance for married male workers in the Cité (and for Kolwezi residents in general) the value of this variable in predicting behavior is open to considerable question. Ethnicity was an unambiguous aspect of the self identity of informants, and an important dimension of the cultural heritage of individuals, but it was by no means the most important basis of self identity for many informants. (As a subjective impression, it seemed that religious preference was more important than ethnic origin as a basis of self identity for many informants.) Nor did informants seem to use ethnicity as an invariable classificatory mechanism for others in their environment.

True, there were ethnic stereotypes in the minds of informants. These seemed to emerge most frequently in humor and as epithets in quarrels. But it did not appear that informants considered the stereotypes to be invariably valid or relevant to their interpersonal relations. While

considerations of coethnicity seemed important in friendship choice for some individuals, they were clearly of minor importance to others. Likewise, the incidence of interethnic marriage was clearly rising, despite the widely acknowledged "problems" which such marriages were said to pose.

Informants were quick to impute motives of ethnic favoritism ("tribalism") to the actions of others which they did not favor. However, the inference here was that such favoritism was inherently wrong, an obvious indication of the perpetrators' backwardness. (With the possible exception of the Lunda, I found no ethnic group in Kolwezi with sufficient local cohesiveness and common grievance to offer a substantial basis for immediate political mobilization against the régime.)

Kith, Kin, and Urban-Rural Linkages

Classification and description of African kinship systems have been key features of twentieth century anthropological inquiry. From the 1920s to the 1960s, studies of social reality in African societies rarely failed to address descent groups and kinship-related behavior. Few ethnographies failed to include a "kinship" section. This emphasis was particularly strongly represented by scholarship in the tradition of British social anthropology, and typified by E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1940), Meyer Fortes (1945, 1969), Victor Turner (1957, 1965) and Audrey Richards

(1950). Classic edited works by Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950) and Colson and Gluckman (1951) represented something of a "high-water mark" in the scholarly interest of an era.

Inevitably, the level of interest in kinship and in descent systems waned as scholarly attention turned in the 1970s to other features of African social behavior, or sought other analytical constructs to explain it, or tackled issues with greatly reduced focus. By then, however, identification of African societies had been so loaded with considerations of relevant descent group classification, that scholarly treatment of African social structures could scarcely avoid the issue.

Some scholars, in fact, subtly reinterpreted descent-group ideology to discern patterns of class distinctions based upon relations of production (Meillasoux, 1960, 1975; Rey, 1966, 1969, 1977; and Terray, 1975, 1982). Others analyzed the ideology to find profound implications for male-female relations (Poewe, 1978, 1981). Still others sought to better define the social behavior subsumed in descent-group classification of earlier scholars (W. MacGaffey, 1983).

Descent groups and descent group ideology are not a primary interest in this study, and I will avoid a detailed consideration of regional variations in descent principles, accepting, rather, the generalized categories of "patrilineal" and "matrilineal" applied to the appropriate societies by other scholars. As we shall see, the relevance

of descent groups to Kolwezi informants was at best questionable. However, since this discussion of social behavior is analyzed in consonance with the variable of ethnicity, it is appropriate to provide here a general classification of the traditional descent principle for those major ethnic groups frequently cited in the study:

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Major descent principle</u>	<u>Recommended source of ethnographic information</u>
ARuund	(bilateral)	Hoover (1978)
Kaniok	patrilineality	J. Yoder (1977)
Luba-Kasai	patrilineality	Mukenge (1967)
Luba-Shaba	patrilineality	Mukenge (1967) Verhulpen (1936)
Lulua	patrilineality	McLean (1962)
Ndembu	matrilineality	V. Turner (1957)
Sanga	matrilineality	(author's analysis)
Songye	patrilineality	Merriam (1975)
Tshokwe	matrilineality	Hoover (1978) S. Yoder (1981)

The "patrilineal" societies represented among Cité residents were, for the most part, related to the nuclear Luba and were, thus, quite similar to each other in those structural characteristics pertaining to descent-groups. The matrilineal societies, in contrast, were more varied. Richards (1950) has analyzed and differentiated matrilineal societies in central Africa based largely on the criterion of husbands' rights to determine residency of brides. W.

MacGaffey (1983) has challenged this differentiation, arguing that the societies are but local variations of a single basic system. But regardless of the evident differences, the matrilineal systems in Shaba are similar enough to warrant generalization here.

In this study, we are (of course) interested in the degree to which urban informants maintain unique reciprocal relations with members of their descent groups, however defined. Of particular interest are inheritance of either property (or rights to resources) and reciprocal obligations for mutual assistance. Following Fortes (1969), however, we are also interested in analyzing kinship from the perspective of informants' belief and behavior. (In this latter interest, the analysis addresses itself to ego-centered rather than ancestor-focussed ties of "relatedness.")

The discussion turns now to a brief treatment of selected ramification of kinship and affinity among the research population. The main interest here is in assessing both the importance of kinship in explaining social behavior and the degree to which that importance is being diminished or enhanced in the urban environment. A secondary objective is to examine (if ever so cursorily) the kinship-based links between urban informants and their rural communities of ancestral origin.

As is true of the other broad domains of social behavior considered in the study, the limits of time and

space do not permit an exhaustive investigation. Rather, several subcategories of kinship-related behavior, deemed representative of a broader range of social patterns, will be examined here.

We begin with a consideration of the location of informants' relatives, then examine the nature of informants' contact with kin in urban and rural areas. This will be followed with an inquiry into the ramifications of relatedness for friendship choice. Also assessed will be the patterns evident in the importance (to informants) of various categories of relatives. We will examine commonalities in inheritance behavior and consider informants' attitudes toward reciprocal responsibilities among kinsmen.

Informants in a sample of 99 married male workers in the Cité were asked to identify the location of the majority of their relatives. (Responses are analyzed in Appendix E, Tables 1, 2 and 3.) Several observations can be derived from the data in these tables. First is the fact that first generation workers had substantially less of their relatives in locations proximate to Kolwezi (southern Shaba) than second and third generation workers. Informants who indicated that the bulk of their relatives lived either near Kolwezi or in southern Shaba comprised some 30.4% of first generation, 48.6% of second generation and 55% of third generation workers. For almost a third of informants, the

bulk of their relatives lived in the relatively more distant Kasai regions.

Movement between southern Shaba and the Kasai was neither convenient nor comfortable for informants (whose budgets stipulated a reliance on ground transport) but it was easy to obtain and relatively inexpensive. While the rainy season (mu mvula) made travel on the existing dirt and gravel roads problematic, rural people tended to be most heavily engaged in their agricultural livelihood during the rainy season, so that the time for visiting and travel was during the dry season (mu kipwa) when the roads were generally passable. So, for virtually all informants, neither distance nor road conditions posed insuperable difficulties to visiting rural kin.

Informants in the sample of 99 married male workers were asked if they had ever visited the rural community of their ancestral origin. The vast majority (at least 77.8%) indicated that they had done so. (Of the rest, 16.2% said that they had never made such a visit and 6.1% gave ambiguous answers.) There were, however, some interesting variations in patterns based on ethnicity of informants (Table 5.10) and based upon generation in Gécamines (Table 5.11).

Predictably, the Shaban ethnic groups whose rural demographic foci are proximate to the Copperbelt (i.e. Ndembu, Sanga, Tshokwe and Luba-Shaba) show a relatively high incidence of informants' visits to their ancestral

Table 5.10. Married male worker responses to the question, "have you ever visited the rural community of your ancestral origin." Responses categorized by selected ethnic group.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	"Yes" answers as a percentage of the total sample of the <u>ethnic group</u>	"No" answers as a percentage of the total sample of the <u>ethnic group</u>	Ambiguous answers as a percentage of the total sample of the <u>ethnic group</u>
ARuund	61.5%	23.1%	15.4%
Kaniok	75.0%	25.0%	0 %
Luba-Kasai	71.4%	21.4%	7.1%
Luba-Shaba	78.9%	10.5%	10.5%
Lulua	100.0%	0 %	0 %
Ndembu	83.3%	16.7%	0 %
Sanga	80.0%	20.0%	0 %
Songye	62.5%	25.0%	12.5%
Tshokwe	77.8%	22.2%	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

communities, ranging from 77.8% to 80.0%. One anomaly here, however, was a surprisingly low incidence (61.5%) for the ARuund, whose demographic focus is reasonably close, being somewhat northwest of Kolwezi. Among the groups whose rural demographic foci are in the Kasai regions, variations were even more interesting. While the Luba-Kasai seemed to depict (at 71.4%) an incidence relatively close to the sample norm, the Lulua informants had all visited their

Table 5.11. Married male worker responses to the question, "have you ever visited the rural community of your ancestral origin." Responses categorized by generation of residence in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>"Yes"</u> answers as a percentage of the total sample of the generation	<u>"No"</u> answers as a percentage of the total sample of the generation	<u>Ambiguous</u> answers as a percentage of the total sample of the generation
1	82.6%	10.9%	6.5%
2	76.7%	18.6%	4.7%
3	55.6%	33.3%	11.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

ancestral communities, while only 62.5% of the Songye had visited theirs. It would be very easy to overstate the significance of these data, but they may give very general insights into ethnically-based patterns of informants' relative interest in the rural communities of their ancestral origin. It should be stressed again, however, that a majority of informants in all ethnic groups had rendered at least one visit to rural kin in their ancestral communities.

It was also clear that the incidence of visits to ancestral communities decreased in direct proportion to generation in Gécamines (Table 5.11). Some 82.6% of first generation informants claimed to have visited their ancestral community. Only some 55.6% of third generation

informants said they had done so. However, even for third generation informants, this was more than half the individuals in the sample. Even so, the relevance of that rural community to informants seemed to have diminished with generational longevity of urban residence.

To obtain additional perspective on the importance of ties with rural kin, informants in the sample of 99 married male works were asked if they had ever participated in a ceremony or ritual in their ancestral community. (During the interviews, a special effort was made to assure that informants understood the general range of social behavior which could be classified as a "ceremony" or "ritual." This range included weddings, funerals, circumcisions, installations of a chief, traditional sacrifices to the spirits and ancestors, and various healing rituals.)

A majority (52.5%), said that they had done so. Again, however, wide variations in the patterns were evident when the sample was categorized by ethnicity (Appendix E, Table 7). While the relative strength of kinship ties may be relevant, I suspect that the variation itself is more attributable to a combination of other factors: to the strength and coherence of traditional social organization in the local rural area, for instance, and the extent of Christianization of both informants and their rural kinfolk. Of significance here is the degree to which local traditional ritual has been preserved, and the willingness of informants to participate in it.

An illustrative conger of social patterns which bears rather explicitly on the issue of social change in urban Shaba is the rite of passage associated with the traditional ceremony of male circumcision. (Shabans have no tradition of female circumcision, clitoridectomy or infibulation, although in some groups, the genital organs of girls are manipulated by elder female relatives to cause their enlargement. And it should be noted that a number of ethnic groups in Zaire have no traditional ceremony of male circumcision.)

In the sample of 99 married male workers, 39% indicated that they had undergone the traditional circumcision ceremony in their youth. However, only 13% of the informants said they would like their children to undergo it as well. Only about a quarter (26%) of those who had themselves undergone the ceremony desired that their children do likewise. This is clearly a rite which is disappearing among urban Zairois in Kolwezi. (Many urban males are circumcised in a hospital shortly after birth.) So far as I could tell, traditional circumcision ceremonies are not performed in any urban areas of southern Shaba. This is a rural rite.

When participation in rural ceremony was analyzed by generation of residence in Gécamines (Appendix E, Table 5), a clear trend emerged. The greater their (generational) duration of urban residence, the less likely informants

seemed to be to maintain this specific genre of link with their rural kinfolk.

Informants' incidence of attendance of ceremony is also interesting in the light of what informants said about retention of various kinship-based rights in their ancestral communities. When asked if they had rights to status positions, property or other resources in those communities, only about a third (32.3%) said that they had such rights. As in the case of attendance of ceremony, patterns in the responses varied widely by ethnic origin of informants (Appendix E, Tables 4 and 6).

In general, ethnic groups which reflected a relatively higher rate of individuals' retention of rights (i.e. Lulua, Sanga, Songye and Kaniok) also reflected a relatively high percentage of individuals who had returned to the ancestral community to participate in at least one ceremony. There were, however, anomalies in the cases of the Ndembu and Tshokwe. (It should be recalled that the rural demographic focus of both Ndembu and Tshokwe ethnic groups is proximate to Kolwezi. Hence, for many members of these two groups, a visit to rural relatives was not difficult, time consuming or prohibitively expensive.)

While attendance of ritual in the ancestral community seemed to diminish with generation of residence in Gécamines, this did not correlate with patterns of maintaining rights in those communities (Appendix E, Table 7). Some 34.8% first generation informants maintained such

rights. This dipped slightly to 27.9% for second generation informants. Then it rose dramatically to 44.4% for third generation informants. These data suggest that maintenance of rights in rural communities by urban residents does not necessarily diminish with longevity of urban residence. Though even so, it should be emphasized that less than a majority of informants held such rights, even among third generation mining company employees.

Related to this behavior was the issue of status positions or titles within the traditional social organization of the ancestral society. In the sample of 99 married male workers, 26 said they were eligible for such positions or titles. However, only 4 of these indicated that they planned to claim the status position or title for which they were eligible.

Additional insight into the significance (to Kolwezi informants themselves) of contact with kin can be obtained by an analysis of patterns of visiting. Informants in the sample of 99 married male workers were asked how often they visited relatives outside the Kolwezi area. The results are depicted in Table 5.12.

An interesting inference may be drawn from the data in this table. Whether or not the bulk of their relatives live in the Kolwezi area, many informants were seemingly not motivated to make frequent visits to distant kin. Over 40% of the informants in the sample indicated that they "rarely" or "never" visited relatives outside of Kolwezi. Those who

Table 5.12. Married male worker answers to the question, "how often do you visit your relatives who live outside of the general area of Kolwezi?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of of total sample giving this response</u>	<u>Percentage of only those informants who said the bulk of their relatives live outside the Kolwezi area</u>
Every day	3.0%	3.6%
At least once a week	0 %	0 %
At least once a month	4.0%	4.8%
Several times a year	10.1%	7.1%
At least once a year	27.3%	27.4%
At an interval of several years	7.1%	7.1%
Rarely	30.3%	31.0%
Never	11.1%	11.9%
No response/ambiguous answer	7.1%	7.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

claimed to visit kinfolk outside the Kolwezi area at least once a year (or more often) were a minority (43-44%), although, to be sure, a sizable minority.⁴³

⁴³What these data do not depict, of course, is the frequency with which distant and rural kin visit their relatives in urban Kolwezi. The frequency of such visits were not measured in this research, but participant observation in the community suggested that such visits were very common. Likewise, we have already noted the high number of households (45% of those in the Cité) containing

These gross data, however, conceal several interesting patterns. First, of course, is the fact that there are significant differences in frequency of visits to distant kin based on ethnicity of informants (Appendix E, Table 8). Taking, as illustrative, the percentage of informants in selected ethnic groups who visit distant relatives at least once a year, we find a rate ranging from 22.2% (for Tshokwe informants) to 80% (for Sanga informants). Not surprisingly, these rates correspond rather directly with the extent to which informants in each ethnic group have maintained rights to position, property, or other resources in their ancestral communities (Appendix E, Table 6).

Another interesting (and related) pattern emerges from a consideration of the relative frequency of visits to distant kin in terms of the generation of residence in Gécamines (Appendix E, Table 9). The frequency seems to rise with generation. For instance, taking the proportions (by generation) of informants who visit distant relatives at least once a year or more frequently, only some 34.8% of first generation informants visit that frequently, but the rate among second generation informants rises to 51.2% and that of third generation informants to 55.5%. This, too, seems to correlate with the patterns evident by generation among informants who maintain various rights in their ancestral communities (Appendix E, Table 7).

 more or less permanent residents who were not members of the nuclear family of the head of the household, but usually consisting of kin born to rural parents.

Of course, if we are attempting to assess the relevance of kinship links among informants by considering their visiting patterns, informant contacts with kinsmen in the Kolwezi area must also be assessed. It should be recalled (Appendix E, Table 1) that some 15.2% of the informants in the sample indicated that the bulk of their relatives lived in or near Kolwezi. However, most informants (86.9%) had at least some kin in the Kolwezi area. And in the sample of 99 married male workers, 65.7% indicated that they had relatives living in the Cité itself.

In view of these facts, informants were asked to specify the frequency of their visits to relatives in or near Kolwezi, other than those who were co-resident with them. The results are depicted in Table 5.13. The table contains information only for those 86 informants who indicated that they had relatives living in or near Kolwezi.

As could be expected, the frequency of informants' visits to relatives in or near Kolwezi was substantially greater than the frequency of visits to kin in more distant areas. Over two thirds of the informants in the sample visited relatives in Kolwezi at least once a year or more frequently (compared to only about 44% of informants who visited relatives outside the Kolwezi area that often). In fact, a majority of informants said that they visited relatives in the Kolwezi area at least once a month (or more frequently).

Table 5.13. Married male worker responses to the question, "how often do you get together with relatives who live around Kolwezi, excepting those who live with you?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample giving this response</u>
Every day	10.5%
At least once a week	20.9%
At least once a month	20.9%
Several times a year	14.0%
At least once a year	3.5%
At an interval of several years	0 %
Rarely	14.0%
Never	7.0%
No response/ambiguous answer	9.3%

Source: Sample of 86 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi February-April 1988.

Predictably, again, these data provided interesting variations when analyzed in consonance with ethnicity (Appendix E, Table 10). For instance, Kaniok informants seemed particularly concerned about maintaining regular contacts with relatives: 100% of the Kaniok informants in the sample said that they visited relatives in or near Kolwezi at least once a year or more often. (And, for that matter, over 42% of the Kaniok informants said that they visited relatives at least once a week or more frequently.) In contrast, only 50% of Ndembu informants said that they

visited relatives at least once a year or more often, although fully 33% of Ndembu informants said that they visited relatives at least once a week or more often, a rate not greatly lower than that for the Kaniok. (The frequency with which Sanga informants visited relatives in the Kolwezi area was even lower than that for the Ndembu, but the extremely small size of the sample in that case makes it unwise to generalize.) The frequency of yearly visits among informants in other ethnic groups ranged from about 55% (for the Luba-Shaba) to about 92% (for the Luba-Kasai).

When the data were analyzed in consonance with the variable of "generation" (Appendix E, Table 11), there was not a great amount of difference in the daily, weekly or yearly rates with which informants of the different generations visited relatives. Generation did not seem to be a variable with profound predictive implications for visiting frequency among kin in proximate locations.

It is appropriate to pause here for several observations. First is the fact that the vast majority of urban informants maintained some contact with rural kin in their ancestral communities. However, a clear distinction must be made between the ancestral community as a location and the ancestral community as kinfolk. The degree of interest in the location itself, as partially inferred by informants' visits to the community, participation in ritual, and retention of local rights to position and resources, seemed to vary much more by ethnicity than by

generation of residence in Gécamines.⁴⁴ In fact, while the data could (modestly) support an argument that an interest in the ancestral community actually increased with generation, informants' degree of commitment to the social and economic life of the ancestral community seemed on the whole very low.

This was manifestly not true of informants' interest in kinfolk per se. Although there were significant variations based on ethnicity, a majority (52%) of informants claimed to visit relatives outside the Kolwezi area at least as often as once every several years, while some 41% indicated that they rarely or never visited relatives outside the Kolwezi area (Table 5.12). For those of our informants who had relatives in the Kolwezi area, about 70% claimed to visit their relatives at least once a year. Over half (52%) claimed to visit their relatives at least once a month. About a third (31%) claimed to visit their relatives at least once a week (Table 5.13). Clearly, married male workers in the Cité were concerned about maintaining relations with kinfolk.

If the patterns of visiting provide an obvious indication of informants' commitment to maintaining relations with kinfolk, it remains to define (with somewhat more precision) the details of these relations. Earlier, it

⁴⁴While the samples were far too small to permit generalization, I suspect that there would also have been interesting variations based upon informants' religious inclinations.

was noted that the vast majority of informants did not seem to care particularly if their neighbors happened to be coethnics or relatives. (A small but vocal minority preferred that coethnics and relatives not be neighbors, and a smaller minority preferred to live near coethnics.) We also noted that considerations of coethnicity seemed to play some part in choice of friends for many informants. An initial question here, then, is whether or not informants particularly valued their kinfolk as friends and confidants.

This question was posed to a sample of 99 married male workers. Informants were asked if being related to an individual (as a kinsman) contributed to friendship. They were asked to respond in terms of a three-part scale ("very much," "somewhat," or "little or none"). The results are tabulated in Table 5.14.

Table 5.14. Married male worker responses to the question, "do you think that being related (as a kinsman) contributes to friendship?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of informants providing this response</u>
Yes, very much	16.2%
Somewhat	31.3%
Little or none	44.4%
Perhaps, but friendship depends on other factors	4.0%
No response	4.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

From a manipulation of responses tabulated in Table 5.14, it is evident that informants were fairly evenly divided between those who thought ties of kinship contributed in some degree to friendship (47.5%), and those who thought kinship to be of at best minor importance, or subservient to other factors (48.4%).

Predictably, there were variations in the patterns of informants' responses based upon the variable of ethnicity (Appendix E, Table 12). While some 80% of Sanga informants thought that relatedness was at least somewhat important in friendship choice, only about 32% of the Luba-Shaba informants thought so. Of the other major ethnic groups, Luba-Kasai (57%), and Tshokwe (55.5%) informants put a relatively higher premium on relatedness as contributing to friendship. Those groups in which relatedness seemed less important in friendship choice included Kaniok (38%), Songye (38%) and ARuund (39%).

When informants' responses were analyzed by generation in Gécamines, an interesting distinction emerged (Appendix E, Table 13). Second and third generation informants were more inclined to credit relatedness with importance in friendship choice than were first generation informants. As in previous patterns of belief and behavior, this peculiar first generation characteristic is possibly attributable to the self-selection inherent in the population of workers who were the first in their immediate families to obtain Gécamines employment. It seems likely that such individuals

would be more attracted to "reference others" outside the circle of kin and coethnics.

Even so, this may be one area in which patterns of belief differ somewhat from actual behavior. Many informants obviously thought that relatedness contributed to friendship. Fewer seemed to act on that belief in the choice of their most intimate friends. When informants in the sample were queried at length about their three closest friends, the kinship linkages (if any) in the relationships were also explored. The results are summarized in Table 5.15.

Table 5.15. Frequency with which the three closest friends of married male workers were also kinsmen of informants.

<u>Number of informants' three closest friends who were kinsmen of informant</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample</u>
None	61.6%
1 of 3	3.0%
2 of 3	3.0%
3 of 3	1.0%
No response/ambiguous response	31.3%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Informants typically maintained relations of friendship, of course, with more than three individuals.

But it is interesting to note how few of them chose relatives as their closest friends. As in the case of coethnicity, ties of kinship may have inclined informants to mutual amity, but informants' choice of close friends seemed to depend more on other factors.

Although this is an assessment based on participant observation rather than upon specific statements (or measurable responses) by informants, the value to Cité residents of preserving relatively close interpersonal contact with kin seemed to have much to do with expectations of succour and material assistance. This is not to say, of course, that informants lacked real affection for kinsmen. That was manifestly not the case. Kin (in some cases even rather remotely related) in Cité households were typically privy to the intimate counsel of the nuclear family members and obvious participants in the household's most exclusive emotional bonds. Yet, informants seemed to find their closest, most intimate friendships outside of this context.

One thing that seemed in some degree to distinguish ties of relatedness from ties of close friendship was a continuing sense on the part of some informants of obligation to the material well-being of kin. This was partially illustrated in responses to a question posed to informants that went like this: if you had exactly 1000 zaires,⁴⁵ and both a classificatory brother and your best

⁴⁵At the time of the research, 1000 zaires was worth about (U.S.) \$7.00. It represented about a tenth of an average blue-collar worker's monthly salary.

friend (who is not a kinsman) came to you at the same time, each with a desperate need for 1000 zaires, what would you do? The answers are categorized in Table 5.16.

Table 5.16. Married male worker responses to a hypothetical situation in which the informant had Z 1000 and both a (classificatory) brother and the informant's best friend (not related to informant) came to the informant with a desperate need for exactly Z 1000.

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample giving this response</u>
Give the whole sum to best friend	8.4%
Give the whole sum to brother	15.8%
Share the money between best friend and brother	49.5%
Give no money to either	17.9%
Other responses	8.4%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

As the table suggests, even bonds of close relatedness (i.e. that of "brothers") did not constrain a majority of informants from saying that they would either share the money between the two supplicants or give it to the best friend. However, almost twice as many informants (15.8% of

the total) said they would give all to the brother as those (8.4%) who said they would give it to the best friend.

As can be expected, these data showed varying patterns when analyzed in consonance with the variable of ethnicity (Appendix E, Table 14). For instance, some 37% of the Luba-Shaba and Songye would have given all the money to the "brother" and no informant in these groups proposed giving the whole sum to the best friend. In contrast, some 40% of the Sanga informants and 20% of the Ndembu informants proposed giving the whole sum to the best friend. No Sanga or Ndembu informants proposed giving all the money to the brother. At the same time, two thirds of the Luba-Kasai informants would have shared the money between "brother" and friend. No Luba-Kasai informant proposed giving the whole sum to either "brother" or best friend. These differing patterns were not amenable to simple explanation. They seemed rather to reflect differing degrees of emphasis within the various ethnic groups of obligation to kin, but the dimensions of such pressure were apparently not perceived equally by informants in each group nor are they readily definable here.

Analysis of the data in consonance with the variable of generation (Appendix E, Table 5.15) disclosed additional varying patterns. For instance, no second-generation informants suggested giving all the money to the best friend, while 13% of first generation and 25% of second generation informants did so. Interestingly, while roughly

the same proportion of first and second generation informants (13% and 15%) would have given the whole sum to the "brother," substantially more third generation informants (25%) would have done so. At the same time, the proportion of informants who would have given no money to either supplicant decreased in each generation.

Several factors may be relevant to the differences in patterns by generation. If first-generation informants tended more to acceptance of innovation, this would explain why as many informants in this generation would favor a friend over a "brother" as vice versa. This would also explain why a relatively high proportion of first-generation informants would refuse the request of both "brother" and friend. Third-generation informants, on the other hand, with long family exposure to the heterogeneous urban environment, might perceive somewhat less social pressure to favor a "brother" over a friend.

The same question was posed to informants, but this time, the 1000 zaires was demanded by a classificatory brother from another town and a next-door neighbor. Responses are categorized in Table 5.17, and further analyzed in Appendix E, Tables 16 and 17.

What is immediately apparent from analysis of these data is that the importance of a "brother" is distinctly greater than that of a next-door neighbor. This is true not only in the overall aggregate, but also for the smaller aggregates of informants in each of the major ethnic groups

Table 5.17. Married male worker responses to a hypothetical situation in which the informant had exactly Z 1000 and both a (classificatory) brother and the informant's next-door neighbor (not related to the informant) both came to the informant with a desperate need for Z 1000.

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample giving this response</u>
Give the whole sum to next door neighbor	11.6%
Give the whole sum to brother	35.8%
Share the money between neighbor and brother	27.4%
Give no money to either	18.9%
Other responses	6.3%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

except Sanga and Tshokwe (Appendix E, Table 16). When the data are analyzed in consonance with the variable of generation (Appendix E, Table 17), we find not only a distinct preference for "brothers," but the preference for "brothers" increases in each generation of residence in the urban industrial environment. We can conclude by these data that a "brother" in need is somewhat to be preferred to a friend in need, and much to be preferred to a neighbor in need.

Based on a comparison of what informants revealed about their sense of obligation to "brothers," friends and

neighbors, as well as upon observation in the community, it appeared that many informants have developed some kinship-like relationships with (unrelated) close friends. Such relations were based upon deliberate friendship choices of informants, and not particularly upon residential proximity. What occurred was not the dissipation of kinship-like bonds expressed in emotional and material exchanges. Rather, "kin-like" bonds were being extended to selected non-kin.

This also ramified into complaints of favoritism in the work place, or in the allocation of housing and similar contexts. Complaints were very common. Sometimes, the favoritism was ascribed to "tribalism" (i.e. favoritism based on coethnicity). At other times, informants complained that officials favored their "brothers" (usually meaning close kinsmen, but sometimes also affines) and their "friends." Informants tended to view this behavior as springing from the same sense of obligation.

In any event, the vast majority of informants of all ethnic groups and generations recognized some responsibility to provide for the needs of close kinsmen. This sense of responsibility did not significantly decrease with generation; rather, it seemed to increase. What informants said about perceived obligations in this regard was substantiated by behavior. When married male informants were queried about disposal of income, it turned out that some 52.0% in the sample were regularly providing substantial sums of money to various relatives. Almost half

of the informants said that providing this money imposed a serious hardship on them. (Some 43% of the informants in the sample also indicated that they were regularly providing money to assist people who were not kinsmen or not affines. The largest single group of recipients within this category consisted of fellow church members, at 19% of the total sample.) Some 11% of informants were also providing money on a regular basis to various affines.

Informants in the same sample of 95 married male workers were asked to suppose that a classificatory "brother" in another city in Shaba suddenly acquired a large debt. Each informant was asked if the "brother" would expect the informant to assist him in paying the debt. Fully 82% of the informants indicated that the "brother" would indeed expect such assistance. (Of the rest, 12% said that the brother would not expect such assistance, 5% said that the brother's expectation would be situationally dependent.) Informants were then asked if, assuming they had the means, they would help their "brother" with his large debt. Virtually all the informants said that they would do so.

To see if the sense of obligation extended in equal measure to other categories of individuals in the informants' social universe, we posed the same question, but substituted other individuals. Two are illustrative here. The first was the informant's wife's brother and the second, the informant's next-door neighbor who was not a kinsman.

In the sample of 95 married male workers, 81% said that their wife's brother would expect them to help with a large debt, and some 91% said that they would indeed help if they had the means. Regarding the next-door neighbor who was not a kinsman, 64% of informants said that the neighbor would expect assistance. Interestingly, fully 82% of the Cité informants said that they would help their neighbor if they had the means.

A number of conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. Whether or not informants are as generous to kin, affines and neighbors as they claimed in conversation, they clearly reflected an ethic of obligation to assist needy members of their social universe, whether tied by bonds of blood and marriage or by bonds of friendship, church fellowship, or residential proximity. Even so, the sense of obligation to kin (or, at least, close kin) is measurably higher than that to other categories of individuals in informants' social universe. This sense of obligation does not appear to decline with generation of residence in the urban industrial environment; instead, it may actually increase in modest proportion, although, of course, the focus of the core group is different than that in rural environments.

The discussion turns finally to a brief consideration of what actually constitutes "kin" in the urban industrial context. It should be evident that informants themselves represented societies drawn from a wide range of ethnic

groups with a considerable range of variation in traditional modes of calculating both kinship and descent (and a substantial variation in the nature and relevance of descent groups).

The largest individual ethnic groups in the Cité, the Luba-Kasai, Luba-Shaba and Songye all trace descent in the patriline. Rural Luba have maintained cohesive patriclans. In contrast, the indigenous Copperbelt peoples such as the Lala, Lamba, Lembe, Sanga, Kaonde and Ndembu trace descent in the matriline, though their social organization has distinct bilateral tendencies as well (Siegel, 1983). Rural ARuund social organization is explicitly bilateral, with a higher incidence of matrilineal features in regions bordering neighboring matrilineal societies and a higher incidence of patrilineal features in regions bordering neighboring patrilineal societies (Hoover, 1978). The whole situation is further complicated by Zairian national legislation enacted in the 1980s to define an appropriate kinship-type social organization for all Zairois. (This is legislation which seemed to be little known and generally ignored in urban Kolwezi).

The wide range in traditional, rural social organization suggested that Kolwezi residents had, likewise, a potential for exhibiting a wide range of belief and behavior related to kinship and descent. While the subject as a whole could hardly be investigated comprehensively and

reported here, research provided a number of useful insights into general beliefs and major directions of change.

Informants in a sample of 99 married male workers were asked, over time, a series of questions to better define the relative importance of various relatives. Within this sample, some 55% of the informants were of an ethnic origin which suggested an unambiguous commitment to patrilineality by their forebears. Some 25% were of an ethnic origin suggesting ancestral societies which traced descent unambiguously in the matriline. Some 10% of the informants were ARuund whose ancestral communities probably reflected bilateral social organization. (The remaining 10% of the sample consisted of informants of ethnically mixed ancestries or of ancestries which rendered categorization difficult.)

Informants were asked whether their fathers or their mothers were more important to them personally. The vast majority (85%) said that both parents were equally important. Three informants said that their mothers were more important. (Not surprisingly, each of these latter three informants were first generation and from matrilineal ethnic groups of southern Shaba.) Some 12% of informants said their fathers were more important to them. This category was interesting, since it contained a heterogeneous mix of ethnicities as shown in Table 5.18.

Table 5.18. Categorization of married male workers who indicated their fathers were more important to them than their mothers.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total number of informants who said that their fathers were more important</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of that category</u>
Informants from matrilineal societies	5	20.0%
Informants from patrilineal societies	4	7.4%
Informants from bilateral societies	0	0 %
Informants not classified by descent principle	3	30.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

While only some 7% of informants whose ancestries suggested unambiguous patrilineality indicated that their fathers were more important than their mothers, fully 20% of those informants whose ancestry suggested an unambiguous matrilineal emphasis rated their fathers more important than their mothers. While the strongest inclination was to favor neither father or mother, a small subsidiary trend seemed to be a dramatic increase in the importance of the father among informants with roots in "matrilineal" societies.

Informants were also asked which had more importance to them--the family of their fathers or the family of their mothers. The results are categorized in Table 5.19. While about a quarter of informants in the sample considered the

father's family to be more important, the overwhelming majority of informants clearly considered father's and mother's family to be about equally important.

Table 5.19. Married male worker responses to the question, "which has most importance for you, the family of your father or the family of your mother?"

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample giving this response</u>
Father's family is more important	22.2%
Mother's family is more important	7.1%
Father's family and mother's family are equally important	70.7%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

These data suggest that the importance of traditional principles of descent are at best of modest influence within the research population. Whether informants' forebears came from societies with strong traditions of patrilineal descent or matrilineal descent, the overwhelming majority of informants of all ethnic groups and all generations (Table 5.20) considered matrilateral and patrilateral relatives to be of essentially equal importance.

Moreover, the data suggest that the importance of unilineality as a relevant social distinction declines in consonance with generation. For while about 35% of all

Table 5.20. Married male worker responses to the question, "which has most importance for you, the family of your father or the family of your mother?" Selected responses tabulated by generation.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Father's family is more important</u>	<u>Mother's family is more important</u>
1	28.3%	6.5%
2	18.6%	7.0%
3	11.1%	11.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

first generation informants considered either their father's or mother's family to be more important, this was true of only some 26% of second generation informants and 22% of third generation informants.

In fact, the relevance of lineality itself as an organizing principle is questionable in the urban industrial context of the Cité. This is particularly evident in the area of inheritance (Table 5.21). To illustrate, informants in a sample of 99 married male workers were asked if they expected to receive an inheritance upon the death of their fathers. In response, about a third (34%) said "yes," about half (49.5%) said "no" and some 16% failed to respond or gave other answers. The informants were also asked if they expected to receive an inheritance upon the death of any of their father's brothers. To this, only 4% of the informants answered "yes," fully 89% of the informants answered "no"

and some 7% gave various other answers. Informants were then asked if they expected to receive an inheritance upon the death of any of their mother's brothers. Fully 92% of the informants did not expect to inherit from their mothers' brothers. The only significant category of relatives from which informants expected to inherit was "brothers" (which should be here considered classificatory brothers in most cases, true siblings only in some.) Fully 20% of the informants expected to inherit from a "brother."

In conversations with informants, I heard a number of stories about situations in which a worker had died and his rapacious "brothers" had subsequently descended on the household, helping themselves to the property and leaving the surviving widow and children destitute. The frequency of such behavior was impossible to measure, but I had the impression that informants were repeating the accounts of a relatively few widely-known examples. In all cases, the moral of the story seemed to be, "can you believe the bad conditions of these times in which we live?" Informants in general did not seem to approve of such behavior.

Even so, these stories implicitly emphasized the "rights" of "brothers," and highlighted the special relations which were supposed to exist between close kinsmen of the same generation. The stories also pointed to the modest prerogatives of wives in such circumstances: they were "outsiders" to the process of inheritance of material goods in their families of affection.

Table 5.21. Proportions of married male workers who indicated that they expected to inherit from various categories of relatives. (Some informants indicated their expectation to inherit from more than one relative. Each such relative is listed here as a separate response.)

<u>Category of relative from which informant expected to inherit</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of informants providing this response</u>
Father	34.3%
Father's brother	4.0%
Mother's brother	4.0%
Informants' brother	20.2%
Informants' "cousins"	2.0%
Paternal grandfather	1.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Informants were also asked if they expected their own children to inherit their property when they died. Ninety six out of ninety-nine informants said "yes." Informants were then asked who else (besides their children) would inherit from them. All of these results are categorized in Table 5.22.

What clearly emerges from the data in the foregoing discussion is the importance (in the social universe of informants) of the family of affection and the male sibling group. What is clearly of less significance is the kin grouping (however calculated) of more distant relatives. At least in terms of inheritance, the significance of

Table 5.22. Married male worker responses to the question, "in the event of your death, who will inherit your property?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample providing this response</u>
My children only	83.8%
My children and my patrilineal relatives	6.1%
My children and my wife	5.1%
My wife	1.0%
My "brother"	1.0%
My children and my brother	1.0%
My patrilineal relatives	1.0%
Depends	1.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

patrilineal or matrilineal descent groups among the research population is open to considerable question.

To gain additional insight into the range of views on this subject, informants were again subjected to the question about money: "if you had exactly 1000 zaires and both your father and your mother came to you, each with a desperate need for that amount, what would you do?"

As might be expected at this point, the vast majority (71%) of informants said they would share the money between the two. The next largest group (13%) consisted of informants who would give no money to either. As for the

rest, a rather modest 5% of the informants would have given the whole sum to their fathers, an even smaller 2% would have given the whole sum to their mothers, and 5% of informants offered various other responses.

Informants were then asked to suppose that the two supplicants consisted of their father's brother and their mother's brother. In their responses, about the same number (72%) of informants said that they would share the money between the two new supplicants. However, the number of informants who said that they would give no money to either rose somewhat (from 13% to 18%). No informant proposed giving the full sum to his father's brother. Only one informant proposed to give the full sum to his mother's brother. He was a first generation worker of Lulua ethnicity, presumably the product of a strongly patrilineal society.

Here, we can "relink" the two areas of kinship and descent (Fortes, 1969). The data strongly suggest that informants in the Cité tended to calculate their kinship relationships outward from ego more or less bilaterally, and that the more exclusive obligations inherent in unilineal descent systems are at best greatly attenuated in the Cité.

Informants clearly recognized responsibilities and obligations toward those related by blood to them, and the strength of these bonds may actually be increasing with length of residence in the urban industrial environment. Indeed, for those whose ancestral heritage lies in societies

organized around unilineal descent groups, the significant innovation in urban southern Zaire has been to broaden the category of "kin" by adopting belief and behavior more characteristic of "bilateral" societies; and, for that matter, by endowing some relations of close friendship with "kinship-like" norms. These innovations enable urban Zairois to activate (in cases of need) various ties in different urban and rural environments, a partial antidote to the economic hardships of the 1980s.

While the relevance of ancestral communities as locations may be diminishing in the day-to-day life of informants, it would be a serious error to assert that Cité residents were essentially cut off from their ancestral rural base. That is manifestly not the case. Rather, while informants comprised a relatively stable urban population, and relatively few contemplated a return to a rural home, a high proportion of Cité residents were careful to cultivate and maintain ties with kin in both rural and urban contexts. This seemed to reflect a considerable degree of social adeptness. Informants were skilled at manipulating their social environment to provide both emotional support in family relationships and provision against material deprivation.

Male-Female Relations

Belief and behavior relating to the differing roles of men and women proved an interesting area of both cultural continuity and change in urban Kolwezi.

We have noted that indigenous rural Copperbelt peoples have tended to trace descent in the matriline. While the varying patterns in these descent principles cannot be said to produce an ideology of gender equality, various authorities have argued that central African matrilineal societies generally provide women with more status and prerogatives than neighboring societies which trace descent in the patriline. Poewe (1981:33), discussing Luapulan peoples (which essentially grade into the ethnic groups on the east end of the Copperbelt) attributes this to ". . . female control over reproduction, female control over critical resources, and a matrilineal ideology reinforcing the cultural and structural centrality of women." (Poewe [1981:11] sees descent-based kinship principles as "an ideology which defines the room each of the sexes has to manage its affairs in society.") Schoepf (1985) also describes the prerogatives of women in a matrilineal Copperbelt society, commenting on the relatively enhanced status of women.

It should be noted that several Shaban ethnic groups, notably the Lunda, permitted women to fill chiefly office. Powerful, senior female title-holders in indigenous royal

courts are by no means rare. These issues are addressed in more detail by Lebeuf (1963), and Hoover (1978).

The urban environment in southern Zaire, however, is dominated not by the social and economic ideology of traditional rural Copperbelt peoples, but by a market system based largely upon western capitalist models and (increasingly) by social ideologies heavily rooted in a western historical tradition, drawing heavily from western (Christian) norms, and reinforced by centralized state institutions. At the same time, a high proportion of the population of the urban Copperbelt, including particularly its economic elite, is now drawn from areas of Zaire where populations have strong traditions of patrilineal descent (i.e. from Luba and Songye ethnic groups). Poewe (1981:34) has argued that such environments fundamentally alter the patterns of relative male-female status, for:

Under the combined pressures of the market system, western governmental policies, and Protestant ideologies . . . men increasingly create and control nuclear families and thus also women.

Gough (1961) has long since noted that in matrilineal societies, change associated with accommodation to the western industrial economic systems tends to undermine matrilineality as an organizing principle, a process which we have already noted in patterns of behavior among informants in urban Kolwezi.

So, it may be asked at this point, given the ethnic heterogeneity of the research community, and given its economic complexion, what is the range in beliefs concerning the differing roles of men and women? While the topic is potentially of great breadth, we will arbitrarily confine ourselves to several more limited domains: to the division of labor by gender, including leadership roles in the work place, to the influence of gender on friendship choice, and to sexual and marital behavior. (One cautionary note must be interjected here: because the primary unit of analysis is the married, male blue-collar worker, much of the subsequent discussion will measure belief and behavior on the part of adult males.)

Male-female relations in modern central African urban contexts have already been the subject of a considerable literature. That literature reflects, among others, studies performed on the Zambian Copperbelt in the 1950s (Epstein, 1981) and early 1960s (Powdermaker, 1962) as well as more recent studies of urban Zambia (Schuster, 1979) and peri-urban Zambia (Poewe, 1981). Within Zaire itself, male-female relations have been addressed in Stanleyville (now Kisangani) of the 1950s (Pons, 1969) and 1970s (Verhaegen et al., 1984), Kinshasa of the early 1960s (La Fontaine, 1974) and the 1980s (Kongolo, 1985), and in a rural context on the Zairian Copperbelt in the 1980s (Schoepf, 1985).

One general characteristic of the foregoing studies is an interest in processes of adaptation by a research

population to the changing exigencies of urban life, or to that of capitalist penetration. These studies consider the ramifications of various modernizing influences on traditional notions of male-female relations, relative social status, and economic prerogatives. Several of the studies have underlined the uncertainty and emotional stress in male-female relations resulting from the ambiguous norms of urban societies (Powdermaker, 1962:151-169; Schuster, 1979:66-153; Epstein, 1981:308-339). Epstein (1981:101) summed up this view very explicitly:

I am inclined to believe that the problems of adjustment that Africans on the [Zambian] Copperbelt had to face in these regards were among the most painful and difficult of the many that urbanization had created for them.

Yet the blue-collar mining company work force in the Kolwezi of the late 1980s is not a community of recent rural immigrants. It is comprised of a population that has, for the most part, grown up in the urban environment, and which regards rural kin in village environments as but one limited domain of many in the social universe. It is, moreover, a population which has been significantly and comprehensively exposed to the norms of both western Christianity and western secular life. In view of these factors, let us begin by considering several general aspects of the division of labor by gender as applicable to the research population.

In traditional central African village contexts, the division of labor by gender was presumably well defined and

fairly rigid, with specific detail varying from group to group.⁴⁶ While the daily labor in such contexts has been disproportionately allocated, with women responsible for a generally more labor-intensive, time-consuming regimen than men, the profoundly important role of the woman in the economy of household and village has been widely noted. (Rural women have been, in essence, the critical factor in food production. Men have been in varying but considerable degree thus dependent on women for sustenance.)

Yet the traditional division of labor tended to provide separate and complementary roles for men and women. Some overlap in these roles certainly occurred, and virtually all societies have roles which can be filled without regard to gender. But there were also roles in central African societies which were reserved exclusively for members of each sex. Many of these ramified into the basic distinction between maleness and femaleness, itself one of the most significant of the "vital dichotomies" in central African thought.⁴⁷

⁴⁶Discussion of this issue relevant to peoples in our research population has been provided by Turner (1957:20-23), Cunnison (1959:17-18), Douglas (1963:33-35), Siegel (1983:122-131), McClean (1962:13-22) and W. MacGaffey (1983a). However, even in remote rural contexts, market economies associated with capitalist development have exerted varying pressures and produced, between men and women, considerable redefinition of what Marxists like to call the "relations of production." See particularly Poewe (1981:78-98) and Van Binsbergen (1981, 1985).

⁴⁷Epstein (1981:72, 97) offers a highly relevant discussion of related belief and behavior on the Copperbelt of neighboring Zambia in the 1950s.

Residence in urban southern Zaire has very obviously required a redefinition of male-female roles in the division of labor. In some urban households, women continue to cultivate small plots of maize, manioc or other vegetables. This seems to have been fairly common behavior in the mining camps well into the 1950s. Now, however, while such cultivation continues, it is not common. And, in fact, the economies of urban households tend to depend heavily on the wages of the adult males.

This is especially true of the households in the Cité itself, since mining company wages are paid regularly and reliably. In fact, a number of informants in Kolwezi, not associated with the mining industry, spoke scornfully of Gécamines blue-collar employees: "they don't know how to hustle (se débrouiller) to make a living." The regular wages are thought by other Kolwezi residents to deprive mining company blue-collar employees (and their families) of the restless, aggressive entrepreneurial spirit presumably characteristic of urban Zairois.

The important role performed by rural women in household production is obviated in the mining camp. Nor are there many employment opportunities for women in urban southern Zaire. Urban women are, thus, much more dependent on men for sustenance than are rural women, and the economic leverage of an urban husband seems substantially greater than his counterpart in a rural village. The redefinition of relations of production by gender (so as to disadvantage

women) seemed to be an issue which many informants in Kolwezi could describe in a sophisticated manner. Still, no female informant to which I posed the question desired to live in a rural village.

Some women in Kolwezi did have jobs which provided a regular income; and, despite the limited employment opportunities, some women were employed by the state and by formal economic sector enterprises. A few had attained senior supervisory positions. Women were also numerically dominant in urban petty commerce, and a number of women had been successful enough to move from the open-air market into retail sales in Kolwezi's business district.

An initial question then should address itself to the range in patterns of belief regarding the role of women in the work place, the limits (if any) of a division of labor by sex, and the directions of change in these beliefs.

For insights into these questions, informants in a sample of 95 married male workers in the Cité were asked if men were better suited to certain kinds of work than women. All informants in the sample said "yes." When asked what kinds of work men did better than women, informants provided responses that are summarized in Table 5.23.

Informants were also asked if women performed certain kinds of work better than men. (This question was deliberately not made more specific. It occurred in the course of discussion about work in the mining company.) A considerable majority of the married male workers in the

Table 5.23. Married male worker responses to the question: what types of work do men perform better than men? (Several informants provided more than one response.)

<u>Category of work that men perform better than women</u>	<u>Percentage of informants in sample who provided this response</u>
Technical and/or mechanical work	69.5%
Work in the mines	53.7%
All work/most work	16.9%
Heavy equipment operator/ driver/chauffeur	13.9%

Source: Interview of a sample of 95 married male workers conducted by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table 5.24. Married male worker responses to the question: what types of work do women perform better than men?

<u>Category of work that women perform better than men</u>	<u>Percentage of informants in sample who provided this response</u>
Medical worker/nurse	34.7%
Secretary	31.6%
Housekeeper	20.0%
Office (staff) worker	16.8%
Teacher	6.3%

Source: Interview of a sample of 95 married male workers conducted by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table 5.25. Married male worker responses to the question: what types of work should only be performed by women.

<u>Category of work that only women should perform</u>	<u>Percentage of informants in sample who provided this response</u>
Housekeeper	51.6%
Midwife	11.6%
Secretary	11.6%
Cleaner (of stores, offices, work areas, etc.)	9.5%

Source: Interview of 95 married male workers conducted by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

sample (68%) responded that "yes, women do perform certain kinds of work better than men." When asked to describe that work, informants provided responses categorized in Table 5.24

In the same series of questions, informants were asked if there were certain types of work which only women should perform. Again, an overwhelming majority of informants answered "yes." Specific types of work which married male informants thought that only women should perform are categorized in Table 5.25.

Informants in the sample were asked if they thought that women should be hired by Gécamines. The vast majority (80%) said, "yes, women should be hired by Gécamines." Up to this point, there did not seem to be significant differences in opinion among informants based on age, ethnicity, generation of residence or religion. However, on

the question of whether women should be hired, there were two interesting variations. First, Luba-Kasai informants were more agreed than the other major ethnic groups that women should be hired. Only 8% of Luba-Kasai informants said women should not be hired, compared to the mean for all informants of 16.8%. By contrast, opinion against hiring women ranged in other large groups from 15% (ARuund) to 29% (Kaniok). Secondly, there was a substantial difference in opinion based on generation. This is summarized in Table 5.26.

Table 5.26. Generational variations in married male worker responses to the question: should women be hired by Gécamines?

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Percentage of individuals in sample of that generation that said women should not be hired by Gécamines</u>
1	17.7%
2	12.2%
3	37.5%

Source: Interview of 95 married male workers conducted by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1985.

Responses up to this point had clearly indicated that informants believed there was an appropriate division of labor by gender in formal-sector urban contexts. This belief mirrored, in large measure, the actual roles of

female employees in the mining company itself. The overwhelming majority of married male workers seemed to believe that women should have access to formal sector, wage-labor employment. Appropriate "womens'" work in formal-sector employment was said to be the "light" work performed indoors in offices, hospitals and schools.

Still, as discussion with informants centered on the appropriate types of female wage-labor employment, there was a strong undercurrent of opinion that the appropriate domain for a woman was the home and the kitchen, and that the appropriate roles for a woman were "wife," "homemaker," "cook" and "mother." (These sentiments emerged much more strongly in casual conversation with male informants when the subject of mining-company employment was not also a concurrent topic of conversation. There was, however, considerable variation in opinion, and I was surprised on occasion to hear several informants contradict earlier statements they had made about the appropriate "place" of women.)⁴⁸

An interesting variation in views regarding the division of labor applied to patterns of belief regarding authority over others. All male informants, and virtually

⁴⁸Interestingly, in the course of questioning about the types of work appropriate to each sex, only one married male informant mentioned agricultural labor: he thought it to be work for which women were better suited. The almost total absence of responses about farming or cultivation seems to be a clear indication of the degree to which this rural economic activity has become irrelevant to the daily lives of male mining company employees.

all female informants, seemed to agree that a husband should be the final authority in a nuclear family. (These views were undoubtedly reinforced by the mining company and political party which categorized the "chef de ménage" (the "chief of the household," typically in the Cité the father of a mining company family) as a final link in a chain of authority stretching from the President of the Republic to the household. It was possible for a "chef de ménage" to be a woman, but this was usually the case only when no adult male employee was present in the household.

However, beyond the domain of the household, the views diverged considerably. The range can perhaps be best appreciated in an analysis of responses to the question: do you think a woman could be a good supervisor of men? This question was posed to a sample of 95 married, male workers in the Cité. Within this population, 46.3% said "yes, a woman could be a good supervisor"; almost an equal number (45.3%) said "no, a woman could not be a good supervisor." These general responses are further analyzed by ethnic group, generation, and religious preference in Appendix C, Tables 33, 34 and 35 respectively. Specific reasons offered by informants as to why women would not make good supervisors of men are listed in Appendix C, Table 1.

A number of obvious conclusions and inferences can be drawn from these data. First, of course, is the fact that informants are far from unanimous in their views concerning the propriety of leadership roles for women in the work

place. A substantial proportion--roughly half of the sample--is generally supportive of such roles for women. Another substantial portion (again roughly half) is generally opposed.

There were, however, apparent differences in patterns of belief based on ethnic origin. Predictably, members of ethnic groups of western Shaba with historical traditions of matrilineal descent (or bilateral kinship groups) and of female chiefs seemed more accepting of women supervisors than groups like the (strongly patrilineal) Luba-Shaba and Kaniok, although there were several striking anomalies: only 25% of (patrilineal) Luba-Kasai informants and 37.5% of the (patrilineal) Songye rejected the notion that a woman could be a good supervisor, while fully 60% of the (matrilineal) Sanga did so.

It may be dangerous to leap to firm conclusions here about the predictive value of ethnicity (or traditional social organization) in view of the small size of the sample, but the data do seem to support the local stereotype of Luba Shaba, Kaniok and Sanga ethnic groups as conservative of traditional cultural norms, while Songye and Luba-Kasai appear in these data to be more open to innovation: in this case, the innovation is a division of labor by gender very much unlike that in their "traditional" social organization.

However, the more interesting trend is the (apparent) inverse proportion of informants who approve of women as

leaders in the work place with informants' generation in Gécamines. In other words, the data seem to suggest that male workers with deepest roots in the industrial work force are least accepting of female leadership. While there are many possible explanations for such views, they may be ascribed (among other reasons) to the influence of the churches. It was my subjective impression that local churches in the western Protestant tradition, the Roman Catholic church, and some of the syncretic churches, tended to emphasize the authority of men and the propriety of female submission to male authority.

Those families with longest exposure to this church influence were, quite evidently, those who have lived longest in the urban environment. Part of the process of accommodating to "kizungu," or "urban civilization," is acceptance of an appropriate "religion." It seems inevitable that processes of socialization in the urban context would induce at least some degree of adaptation by informants to the norms of the Christian groups. We have already noted Poewe's argument (1981:34) that "Protestant ideologies" are among the innovations that increase male control of women in matrilineal societies. It would be difficult to escape the conclusion that "Roman Catholic ideology" exerts much the same kind of pressure in urban Kolwezi.

Informants in the same sample were asked if a woman could be a good political leader. A majority (61.1%)

responded with an unambiguous "yes." (Some 31.6% said "no".) These responses also correlated in some measure to informant's views about women as leaders in the work place. (For instance, some 62% of Kaniok informants and 53% of Luba-Shaba informants did not think a woman could be a good political leader.) Likewise, despite some ambiguity in the data, the longer an informant's family had lived in the urban industrial environment, the less likely he was to agree that a woman could be a good political leader (Appendix C, Table 36).

Let us turn again at this point to the subject of friendship choice. This must perforce begin with a brief discussion of another aspect of male-female relations in Kolwezi: the sexual dimension of casual male-female interaction. As a subjective impression, it seemed that many (though certainly not all) male informants in Kolwezi (both married and unmarried), were sexually predatory. I constantly observed encounters between otherwise unrelated males and females in which the seemingly good-natured banter (initiated by the man) was fraught with sexual inferences. It appeared that a high proportion of informants valued women more as potential wives or potential sexual partners than for any other attribute, and were constantly seeking new partners.

Informants in a small sample of (32) married male workers were asked if male supervisors in the work place

generally expected sexual favors of their female subordinates. A majority (59.4%) said "yes," another 18.8% responded to the effect that some supervisors expected such favors. Only 18.8% said that they thought such expectation was not general. Some 50% of the informants in the sample believed that female subordinates generally complied with the expectation. Another 28.1% felt that only some female subordinates complied. When asked what would happen to a female subordinate who resisted her boss's amorous advances, informants responded that the woman would receive bad work reports, that she would not be promoted or that her boss would make her life miserable in the work place.

Informants in a small sample of 14 unmarried female workers were asked if Gécamines supervisors generally expected sexual favors. Only two of the fourteen said "yes." (One said "it depends" and four said they didn't know.) Of the fourteen, only one said she had ever been propositioned by a supervisor. I am frankly very skeptical of the validity of these latter responses. Schuster (1979:74-75) provides observations of related beliefs and behavioral norms in urban Zambia. She noted that "an important function of the work place is to give interested men and women opportunities for meeting new lovers." Men did not, in general, seem to want close personal friendships with women.

These subjective impressions (at least regarding men) were partially confirmed by informants' responses in formal

interviews. Married and unmarried male informants were asked to describe their three closest friends in some detail. Of the 132 informants in that sample, not one indicated that any one of his three closest friends was a woman.

At one point in the interviews, informants in a sample of 99 married male workers were asked if they could conceive of having the same sort of friendship with a woman as with a man. The vast majority (67.7%) said "no." This did not seem to vary substantially by age, ethnicity or religious preference. (Interestingly, it did vary by generation in Gécamines. Roughly a quarter of all first-generation informants thought that such a relationship was possible. Only 9% of second-generation informants, and 11% of third-generation informants thought so.)

Informants in the same sample of married male workers were asked how frequently their spouses accompanied them when they went out with their "friends." The responses are categorized in Table 5.27.

As the table suggests, a majority of male informants in the sample did not seem to classify wives in the same category as male friends. This confirms the subjective impressions derived from observation in the community: men in general did not spend much of their leisure time with their wives or with their girlfriends, preferring the company of other men; although men did, of course, seek out the company of women for sexual gratification.

Table 5.27. Married male worker responses to the question, "how frequently does your wife accompany you when you go out with your friends?" (Informants understood this to mean male friends.)

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of sample</u>
Always/almost always	8.1%
Sometimes	21.2%
Rarely	8.1%
Never	48.5%
No response	14.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

It was my conclusion that male informants in general could not conceive of a platonic relationship with a woman, and could not conceive of a woman as a "sexually neutral" work colleague or close friend. (The possible exception to this general norm may be [classifactory] brother-sister relationships. I occasionally observed males who seemed to enjoy their sisters' constant company as friends and equals.)

It would probably be overly simplistic to claim that informants considered women to be inferior to men in inherent value or capabilities. Rather, it seemed to me that male informants conceived of women as a category of human beings with different roles, characteristics and functions. (There was even an element of misogyny in this:

a number of male informants told me that women have "bizarre" manners.) Men were considered to inhabit one sphere, women another. It was most inappropriate for men to assume womens' roles and for women to assume mens' roles. The vital dichotomy itself was a continuing relevant categorization of belief and behavior. The problem, of course, was that the catalogue of roles for each sex was rendered ambiguous by the westernized urban environment.

One sphere of gender-based distinctions in the division of labor has endured. The division of labor by sex in the home is deep-seated and profound, as indicated by all the evidence in our research. I once asked a group of male workers what they would think of husbands who habitually helped their wives with household chores. There were several snickers. Finally, I was told that people would say of such men, "banaisha kulishwa dawa" (they've been fed "medicine"--they've been bewitched). It is conceivable that the most highly educated and westernized cadre would have been more inclined to share household tasks (though I doubt it), but such people tended to employ servants which obviated the need and which eased the household tasks of the wife.

The discussion turns now to the general category of "marital" behavior. There was a very great range in the patterns of behavior which might be described as "marital." In describing the variety, it is first necessary to specify

certain categories and distinctions relevant to Kolwezi residents.⁴⁹

We will start by considering the status of the "legitimate" wife (femme légitime in French or bibi wa ku nyumba ["wife of the house"] in local Swahili). According to Zaire national law, a man can only be married to one "legitimate" wife at a time. (The state did not recognize additional wives, but did recognize as legitimate the children of a man's additional wives.) However, Kolwezi residents considered a marital partner to be a "legitimate wife" if the dowry had been paid. The dowry, paid by the family of the groom to the family of the bride, signaled both families' approval of the union. In Kolwezi, the dowry was called the "dot" (in French) or "mali" or "mali ya bukweri" (in Swahili).

Assuming the dowry had been rendered, a man's second, third and fourth (etc.) spouses would be popularly considered as having the full status of "wife." The state imposed no specific sanctions against polygynous marriages (other than lack of recognition) and such unions occurred among all categories of informants we interviewed.

I should cite here the case of one of my research assistants. His younger sister had married a Zairois army

⁴⁹Others have grappled with categorizations of marital behavior in central African contexts. Note particularly Powdermaker (1962:151-162) for urban colonial Zambia, Forthomme (1957) and Pons (1969:218-227) in colonial Zaire. La Fontaine (1974) and Verhaegen et al. (1984) provide less profound but useful assessments of urban marital behavior in independent Zaire.

colonel as the second wife in a polygynous household. (Somewhat uncharacteristically, both wives lived with the husband in the same house.) The parents of the bride had been opposed to the marriage, but the brother (my assistant) had carefully evaluated the situation and had given his blessing. He had accepted the "dot" himself and had made all the arrangements appropriate for a bride's family. Thus, with the "family" blessing, the sister could and did marry.

Even though polygynous unions were not rare in Kolwezi, they were not common. Informants said that urban living and dependence of wives on their husband's wages for sustenance caused constant quarrels between jealous co-wives. Further, a man of modest means would have had difficulty maintaining two or more households in urban Kolwezi. On the other hand, affluent men were expected to have more than one wife. (On several occasions, informants were discussing well-to-do businessmen and commented in apparent amazement that so-and-so still had only one wife.) Powdermaker (1962:157-162) offers interesting related insights into patterns of polygynous marriage on the urban Zambian Copperbelt of the early 1960s.

Another category of "marital" union was described locally as "concubinage." In local parlance, people used the French terms "deuxième bureau" (second office), "concubine" and sometimes the local Swahili term "abala" to

describe the female partner.⁵⁰ The defining characteristic here was the dot (dowry). If the dowry had been paid, the woman was a "wife." If the dowry had not been paid, but the union was somewhat long-term and stable, the woman maintained relations with the one man only and (most importantly) if the man assumed financial responsibilities for her, the woman was a "concubine."

The drawbacks to a situation of concubinage were borne mainly by the woman. Specifically, she had very little leverage over the man in the union. If mistreated, she could not generally bring effective pressure to bear against him by appealing to his or to her family. She had no protection against complete abandonment. She could not expect the same emotional or financial succour as a "legitimate" wife. And in fact, in Kolwezi, concubines were often divorcees or unwed mothers who accepted concubinage as a necessity for economic survival, however temporary.

Even so, the man as well as the woman in such a relationship incurred a risk. The dowry (dot) sealed a union in such a way as to legitimize (within a marital union) the normal human conditions of sickness and death. If the female partner in a non-dot cohabitation died, her relatives could (and sometimes did) abuse the surviving "spouse." Typically, they could demand both the dot and a large fine (amande). On occasion, they took the man to court and

⁵⁰The term "abala" had a range of meaning in Kolwezi, but it tended to be applied to women with less than the status of concubine (in other words, almost a prostitute).

forced him to pay a further fine to the state. The implication, of course, was that the man mistreated their female relative and was malicious and irresponsible--as clearly evident in his failure to legitimize the marriage in accordance with custom. (Of course, the opportunity for profit at the expense of the unfortunate survivor may also have been a factor. The poor soul could wind up paying as much as 40,000 zaires--well over \$200--an enormous sum.) Somewhat the same abuse could be applied to a surviving female partner. In this case, she was blamed for causing her partner's death. Informants said that when a partner in a non-dot cohabitation fell gravely ill, the other partner would sometimes flee, lest the ill person die and the survivor fall into the hands of vengeful and grasping relatives.

Some men tried to avoid these eventualities by paying the relatives a certain sum which, while not a true dot, performed somewhat the same function. This was called "mali ya ku funga mlango" (bride-wealth to close the door [of the home]). This appeared to be essentially a bribe to avoid the full responsibilities of marriage, and the necessities of family approval.

Unions involving concubinage were extremely common in Kolwezi, possibly as frequent as those involving a "legitimate" wife. However, informants were far more reluctant to talk about such relationships than to talk about multiple "legitimate" wives. It was my strong

impression that many of the men we interviewed, who maintained a household with a "legitimate wife" in the mining camp (or in the ville), also maintained one or more concubines in a suburb--characteristically in the Cité Manika. Very often, the man concealed the existence of his concubine(s) from his wife. Male informants feared that wives would be unhappy with such relationships. Both the local gossip and women's responses to our query indicated that this fear was well-founded. (It would have been much harder, of course, to conceal the existence of a second "wife.") I heard many tales about wives and concubines who accidentally and unhappily discovered their relationship to the same man--this was a common theme in conversation, and an occasional subject of great hilarity in male conversations.

As noted above, an often heard term for concubinage was the so-called "deuxième bureau" ("second office"). When I asked for the etymology of this term, I was told that a man absent from his work (and presumably visiting his concubine) would be described as at his "second office" ("deuxième bureau"). It was the woman herself who was called the "bureau." A third concubine might be called a "troisième bureau" ("third office"), although that term was seldom used. I was told that the term "deuxième bureau" was once applied exclusively to a concubine. At the time of the research, however, it seemed to be much more inclusive in Kolwezi. Informants sometimes referred to a "legitimate"

second wife living elsewhere as a "deuxième bureau." The term was also applied on occasion to a woman involved in a more casual and short-term relationship.

Many male informants had relations with women who were neither their wives nor concubines. These could be classed in several categories. A "loose woman" in a temporarily stable relationship might be termed an "abala." Women otherwise unattached, who maintained relations with two or more men, were known as "femmes libres" or (more commonly) "ndumba" (plural "bandumba"). Informants were asked if it were conceivable that one woman could have multiple spouses. Virtually all answered in the negative. We then asked the informant what he or she thought of such relationships. Many answered to the effect that the woman would be nothing more than an "ndumba."

The term "ndumba" could perhaps be glossed as "prostitute." It was certainly used as a pejorative label by most of our informants, who seemed to use the word ndumba and the French term "prostituée" (whore) more or less interchangeably.⁵¹

However, an "ndumba" was not necessarily a woman who sold her body to every passerby. A woman could be considered an "ndumba," for instance, if she maintained a small and regular circle of male lovers. A single woman could also be considered an ndumba if she were thought to be

⁵¹La Fontaine (1974) provides a discussion of similar categories in the Kinshasa of the early 1960s.

sexually active with multiple partners, whether or not the relationships had an economic dimension. An unfaithful wife could be labelled an "ndumba." A woman might also be labeled an "ndumba" if she dressed in an artificially "Western" fashion, since she was presumed to be overtly soliciting male attention. So far as I could tell, Kolwezi residents did not have a conception of a male counterpart to the "ndumba." There is a local Swahili word for adulterer of either sex (musherati) but I never heard it used in casual conversation.

Although such assessments are speculative and often dangerous, informants in Kolwezi seemed to regard the "ndumba" more in terms of "party girl" than "prostitute." It seemed evident that going to the Cité Manika and finding an ndumba was a popular male sport in Kolwezi, widely shared by the married and unmarried alike. Unfortunately, this was not a subject to which informants responded freely in formal interview; but based on discussions with trusted informants, I came to believe that a majority of the adult males in the Cité were at least on occasion sexually active with women other than their "legitimate" wives. The female partner was often an unmarried, teenage neighbor rather than a ndumba. (The woman would not be considered an "ndumba" unless she consorted simultaneously with more than one male.) It was, in fact, widely assumed by my male informants that women over the age of about 15 would be sexually active.

In view of the intense international concern for the subject, it seemed appropriate to gauge informants' belief and behavior regarding AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus, or HIV, locally called "SIDA," the French acronym). Because of the sensitivity to this subject by Zairois authorities, research had to be conducted very cautiously. What ultimately emerged was this: only some 10% of the workers interviewed professed to know someone who had been afflicted with AIDS. While most informants had heard of the disease, they seemed to know very little about it. Only one worker in a sample of 99 thought that the Gécamines hospital could treat it effectively. When asked if there were a better way to treat AIDS than the Gécamines hospital, informants provided the following answers:

Yes, with the following:	11%	No:	56.7%
		Don't know:	32.3%
Divine healing:	(4%)		
Traditional healers:	(4%)		
New treatment announced by Zairian government in November, 1987:	(3%)		

An effort was made to assess, in very general terms, the degree to which the threat of AIDS had influenced the behavior of male workers. In the end, I could not speak authoritatively on the subject, but it appeared that very few male informants were personally worried about contracting the disease. Condoms were not used to any great extent in Kolwezi. Further, it did not appear that the threat of AIDS had much specific influence on sexual behavior. When informants were pressed on the subject, they

would often grin and shrug. On several occasions they offered a proverb, "Bati ya muyomba si ya mwipwa" ("The luck of the uncle is not that of the nephew." In other words, such things are inherently unknowable and determined by agencies outside the normal scope of human control.)

Since the subject provides insight into patterns of social change in Kolwezi, it is appropriate here to note briefly those characteristics which men most valued in women with whom they had sexual relations. These varied in consonance with the category of the woman. For example, the ndumba or abala seemed to be most appreciated for physical and sexual attractiveness. In general, sexually provocative western-style dress, artificially lightened skin, and long (usually braided) hair seemed to make some of these women more desirable than others. Bandumba who would drink, dance, socialize and converse forcefully and articulately seemed also to be desirable. Likewise, their ability to make love with rhythmic, skillful hip movement appeared to be valued by informants.

Male informants were very much divided in their views on what features characterized female beauty. Further, it was very difficult for informants to describe specific, individualized features they found attractive. They preferred to point out women they considered beautiful. I had the impression in general, however, that women who informants considered most beautiful seemed also to have somewhat Europeanized facial features and hair styles. Male

informants considered obesity to be ugly, but were critical of the anorexic quality of "European" conceptions of female beauty. (Several informants made derogatory comments about European women "without breasts.") Still, I had the very strong impression the western-style advertising in visual media (television, magazines) had strongly influenced local tastes in this area. Thus, when informants were asked about female beauty, they tended to offer composites of expensive dress, elaborate hair adornment, lighter skin, (at least somewhat) Europeanized facial features which included thinner lips and thinner noses than the norm, and mesomorphic, well-proportioned body features.

Men did not necessarily seek these characteristics of physical beauty in their wives and concubines. A number of informants mentioned that a beautiful wife should be avoided since she would be more attractive to other men and (hence) more likely to be seduced; although at the same time, informants did not want "ugly" wives with whom they would be embarrassed to be seen by others.

Informants in a sample of 99 married male workers were asked to assess the importance they attached to physical beauty in a wife on a three-part scale of "very important," "moderately important" and "unimportant." (The results are analyzed in statistical detail in Appendix C, Tables 8-11.) Almost half the sample (47.5%) rated physical beauty in a wife as only "moderately important." Roughly a quarter of

the sample (24.2%) rated the characteristic as "very important" and another quarter (28.3%) as "unimportant."

There were interesting differences in patterns of responses based on ethnic origin and generation in Gécamines. A majority of informants in all groups except the Luba-Kasai considered physical beauty to be either very important or moderately important in a wife. (Exactly 50% of the Luba-Kasai fell in this category.) However, informants in the differing ethnic groups seemed to attach differing levels of importance. For instance, only about 17% of Lulua informants thought physical beauty was very important in a woman, while fully 50% of Ndembu informants thought so. Only about 15% of ARuund informants considered physical beauty unimportant, while fully 37% of their ethnic neighbors, the Kaniok, considered physical beauty unimportant in a wife. In general, informants from ethnic groups with traditions of matrilineal descent seemed to value physical beauty in wives more than informants with roots in patrilineal societies, though (as in the case of the Songye) there were interesting anomalies.

What did seem to be very evident was the trend exemplified by the variable of generation in Gécamines. As the generation in Gécamines increased (Appendix C, Table 10), so did the relative importance of physical beauty in a wife. I attribute this to longer exposure to westernized cultural norms by informants in long-term mining company families.

Informants in the same sample of 99 married male workers were also asked to assess (on the above-mentioned three-part scale) the value they attached to obtaining sexual pleasure from their wives. (The results are analyzed in statistical detail in Appendix C, Tables 12-16.) Just over half of the informants (53.5%) considered it "very important." Some 39% considered it "moderately important" and some 6% considered it "unimportant." Here, it must be recalled that males in urban Kolwezi had considerable options in the acquisition of alternative sexual partners.

Views of female informants are interesting here. In conversations with female trusted informants, I was told that urban women are likely to demand sexual pleasure from their partners, unlike "ignorant rural women." Female informants also characterized rural men as boorishly unconcerned about a woman's enjoyment of the sexual act. In a sample of 96 wives of married male workers, 59.4% of the informants said that they considered it very important that their husbands give them sexual pleasure, 31.3% considered it at least moderately important. Only 5.2% considered it unimportant. (Two wives, both of Kaniok ethnicity, said that sexual pleasure from a husband should be avoided and two additional informants provided other answers.)

Returning, however, to the sample of married male workers, there were interesting differences in patterns of responses based on ethnic origins of informants. Some 66.7% of Tshokwe informants considered it very important that

wives give them sexual pleasure, while only some 37.5% of Kaniok informants thought so. Correlating with informants' views of the importance of physical beauty in a wife, the relative importance of deriving sexual pleasure from a wife seemed to be higher among groups with traditions of matrilineal descent.

The generation of residence in Gécamines also appeared to be an analytically significant variable. The relative importance attributed to deriving sexual pleasure from a wife increased proportionally (but not dramatically) with each generation. It seems likely that this was a result of long-term mining company and church emphasis on monogamous marital unions, residence in nuclear family households and norms of husband-wife conduct based on western Christianity, including marital fidelity.

Interestingly (as indicated in Appendix C, Table 16), some 63% of Roman Catholic informants in the sample considered it very important that a husband derive sexual pleasure from his wife. This was an obvious indication that married, male Roman Catholics in the Cité did not consider procreation to be the sole end of the sexual act in marriage. (Informants in other religious groups provided widely varying patterns of response to this question. However, the small size of the samples preclude authoritative assessment other, perhaps, than for Catholics and Methodists. In contrast to Catholic informants, only

some 47% of the Methodist informants thought that it was very important to derive sexual pleasure from wives.)

Informants in the sample of 99 married male workers were asked to assess the importance to them of their wife's ability to bear children. (Responses are analyzed in statistical detail in Appendix C, Tables 17-21). Almost three quarters (72.7%) of the informants considered such ability to be very important. Virtually all the remainder (24.2%) considered such ability to be at least moderately important. Clearly, fecundity was an important value in a wife in the estimation of male Cité residents.

There was some variation in the patterns of response based on ethnic origin of informants, but the vast majority of informants in each ethnic group considered a wife's ability to bear children to be "very important." There was remarkably little variation in views on this subject based upon generation in Gécamines, with a possible indication that "third generation" informants were somewhat more likely to value female fecundity than "first" or "second generation" workers. As noted earlier, family sizes diminished slightly with increase of generation in Gécamines, but there was little indication that increased exposure to the urban industrial environment resulted in significantly smaller family size or less emphasis on the importance of fecundity. Thompson (1978) provides an interesting assessment of similar patterns in urban Uganda.

Here, however, it should be noted that the mining company in its early history had made major efforts to encourage large worker families (as a solution to its problem of labor recruitment). Mining company compensation in kind (rations, housing) still subsidized reproduction, though not on the scale of the colonial era.

As indicated in Appendix C, Table 20, the relative importance of a wife's fecundity seemed to increase in proportion to informants' ages. For instance, only 50% of informants aged 20-30 thought it "very important" that a wife be able to bear children, while fully 88% of informants aged 51-61 thought so. This is probably attributable to at least three factors. First, younger workers typically have less rank and seniority in Gécamines and, thus, are provided smaller houses and lower salaries. Particularly in the present economic circumstances, this makes it more difficult to house and pay the expenses of larger families. Too, younger workers have been perhaps more intensively exposed to secularized, "western" urban norms in school and in the general urban environment. Such norms tend to portray smaller idealized nuclear families. Then, younger workers are probably less concerned about providing for their old age, an important responsibility of children in both rural and urban contexts in central Africa.

Informants in the same sample of 99 married male workers were asked which characteristic they thought was most important in a wife. (Responses to this question are

categorized in Appendix C, Table 2.) While there were many different responses, the largest single grouping seemed to be centered around the qualities of "obedience," "submission," and "respect to me." These are consolidated here into one generalized category. Well over half of the informants provided one of the three answers in this category. (The next most cited quality was sexual fidelity--some 24% of married male informants cited this as the most important quality in a wife.)

Informants were also asked to rate the importance of "obedience" in a wife on a three-part scale ("very important," "moderately important," "unimportant"). Ninety six out of ninety nine informants listed obedience as "very important." The other three listed it as "moderately important." Clearly, men in the Cité wanted submissive, obedient and respectful wives.

Those informants, however, who listed "submission," "respect" and "obedience" as the most important qualities in a wife were further analyzed (Appendix C, Tables 3-6). There were interesting variations in patterns of response based on the ethnic origin of informants. Submission and obedience in wives, as the overridingly significant quality, seemed more important to Kaniok (75.0%), Luba-Shaba (73.7%) and Sanga (80%) than to Luba-Kasai (50%), Songye (50%) and Ndembu (50%).

In general, it appeared that the ethnic groups with the most pronounced local stereotype for closed-minded

conservatism of "traditional" cultural values also seemed to contain the informants who were most concerned about wives' submission. These groups included the patrilineal Kaniok, the patrilineal Luba-Shaba and matrilineal Sanga. (To a lesser extent it also included the patrilineal Lulua and matrilineal Tshokwe.) Ultimately, I concluded that in Kolwezi, when an ethnic group was stereotyped as "conservative" and "traditional," the bulk of the stereotype derived from attitudes regarding the role and prerogatives of women. However, it did not require (in the estimate of this outside observer) much variation in patterns of belief for a group to acquire such a label.

The generation of residence in Gécamines also proved an interesting variable. While the range was not great (58.7% to 66.7%), it appeared that obedience and submission in wives was actually more important to second and third generation informants than to first generation informants. This tended to support Poewe's contention, cited earlier, that processes of urbanization in central Africa undermine the ideological basis for traditionally accepted prerogatives of women in general and wives in particular.

An interesting preference in wives had to do with educational level of the woman. Married male workers in a sample of 99 indicated that it was either very important (93%) or at least somewhat important (4%) for their daughters to be "educated." Likewise, men in the Cité indicated a clear preference for "educated" wives. (In a

sample of 99 married male workers, 63% considered it "very important" that a wife be "educated," 31% considered it at least "moderately important.")

However, on more careful examination, it became very evident that the overwhelming majority of men wanted wives with educational levels substantially lower than their own. Male informants were very sure of their views in this area: they did not want wives educated enough to question their authority.

The issue of authority in the household was also widely cited as the rationale in the preference shown by an overwhelming number of male respondents for wives who were younger than their husbands. (See Appendix C, Tables 22 and 23.) Some 97% of male workers in a sample of 90 had married women younger than themselves. (None had married an older woman.) The modal difference in age was 7 years. One result of the study was a finding that many of the Gécamines workers' wives had married at very young ages (12-14). While not surprising in a rural context, this seemed odd for a "westernized" urban environment. Yet Kolwezi informants themselves had suggested that one stereotype of Gécamines workers was their proclivity for marrying young girls. When pressed for reasons, male workers usually gave one of three: first, they wanted to assure that their wives would be virgins; secondly, they did not want their wives to appear older than they in later years; and thirdly, male workers wanted their wives to "respect" them.

In essence, male informants wanted wives who could tend the household, maintain hygienic household conditions, tend the young children and perform the tasks appropriate to purchase of food and minor household necessities (or, occasionally, also perform petty commerce). Men in general did not want a wife to be an intellectual partner or educational equal. In the common view, an "adequately educated" woman was one who had at most finished primary school and the two or three years of domestic "professional school" for women.

In fact, a university education seemed to carry a stigma for a woman. Informants of both sexes were quick to classify female university students as notoriously loose sexually. (It was widely assumed that female students used sexual favors to pay university expenses and buy their grades.) The validity of this stereotype was, of course, impossible for me to verify. (I talked to few university-educated women, and while those few acknowledged the stereotype, I could not discuss the issue freely without embarrassment to all concerned.)

Even so, a result of the stereotype was that university-educated women seemed to have more difficulty than others in securing a marriage as a "legitimate" wife. Informants said that a high proportion of such women were obliged to accept concubinage as the only available marital option. Several female informants said that they would not

even consider pursuing a university education for this reason.

It was very evident in the course of research that the balance of prerogatives in marital relationships was heavily weighted in favor of men. This is perhaps most evident in the issue of marital fidelity. As noted above, it seemed likely that a high proportion--perhaps more than a majority--of married male workers were sexually active with women other than their "legitimate" wives. This was manifestly not behavior, however, that was tolerated in wives.

Some 86% of informants in a sample of 99 married male workers rated absolute marital fidelity of wives as "very important." Almost exactly 50% of the same informants said that infidelity was the single most important characteristic to avoid in a wife. (Married women informants were also concerned about the marital fidelity of their husbands. In a sample of 96 wives of married male workers, some 61.5% rated it as very important, 17.7% as moderately important and 10.4% as unimportant.)

There were, however, different ranges of community norms for males and females. A number of informants of both sexes said that the existing patterns of behavior reflect the natural order of things, that men are by nature incapable of being faithful to a single woman and that women are by nature inclined to be faithful and submissive to a single husband, although otherwise weak-willed and incapable

of resisting a man's amorous advances. Interestingly, in the sample cited above, four women said that a rigorously faithful husband should be avoided--as he is too demanding of his wife's time.

That men were actively concerned about the fidelity of their wives was very evident in casual conversation. This concern was exacerbated by the urban milieu in which neighbors were often relative strangers, many of which were (presumably) sexually predatory. Unlike the case in rural communities, the worker in the mining company camp did not usually have a large group of close relatives nearby to assure a measure of surveillance of his wife. A large number of informants said that men in the Cité were keenly worried about their wives' faithfulness.

However, the threat of divorce or abandonment was a powerful sanction against the infidelity of a wife in the urban environment. Divorce was easy for a man. Finding another woman was also easy in Kolwezi. On the other hand, a woman's economic options in urban Kolwezi were severely constrained. There were few employment opportunities for women in the modern formal sector. A large percentage of the urban married women had no close relatives in the area to which they could turn. Very few were willing to live in a rural village.

A divorced wife was very often obliged to turn to prostitution to make a living. At best, she might hope to establish a relation of concubinage with a man--as the so-

called "deuxième bureau"; but her chances of becoming a man's first or "legitimate" wife (recognized as a wife by the state) were very slim. This was especially true, informants said, if she had already given birth. Thus, a woman's stake in her own marital fidelity was far greater than the mere retention of her husband's affection. It had a stark economic dimension as well.

Cadre wives seemed to fare little better than workers' wives in this regard. Many cadre came from areas of the country other than Shaba and had fewer local family ties than blue-collar workers. I was told that cadre wives derive their friends almost exclusively from among the wives of their husband's close friends, and that it would be highly unusual for a cadre wife to maintain friendships with males or females in any other category. (When a cadre wife is divorced, she is reportedly no longer welcome in the home of her former female friends, who, presumably, fear that she will seduce their husbands). Several male cadre told me in separate conversations that a divorced wife is lost and without hope ("Elle est perdue").

A woman whose husband was unfaithful had some recourse. Legal options were negligible, and many wives seemed resigned to the situation unless the marriage itself was threatened.⁵² People in Kolwezi chuckled at stories of

⁵²A new Zairois legal dispensation, the "Code familiale" provides some basis for a change in legal options of women. It is, however, far too early to expect significant amelioration in womens' situations based on this legislation.

unhappy wives who locked the house door on a late-returning, philandering husband, angrily ordering him to return to his lover elsewhere to spend the night; or of other wives who refused to continue feeding the younger brothers of cheating husbands. A wronged wife might turn to a relative--either her's or her husband's--to mediate. (This was the traditional approach.) Informants frequently said that aggrieved wives in Kolwezi now turn to religious groups for support and mediation, and that such groups play an important and increasing role (replacing, in essence, the function once performed by relatives.)⁵³

However, the ultimate resource of the wife was to turn to supernatural "medicine" (dawa) or sorcery (bulozhi).⁵⁴ There was obviously no objective way of measuring the frequency of such usage, but it was often a topic of frequent conversation. I surmise that the mere threat of sorcery exerted some measure of influence on husbands' behavior.

A wronged wife in Kolwezi could pursue a number of strategies in the use of "medicine." First, of course, was the necessity of finding a medicine dealer or a sorcerer

⁵³ Individuals active in Kolwezi churches told me that the three issues prayed about most were (in order of frequency): unfaithful husbands, lack of employment, and fear of sorcery. A reliable and knowledgeable source, a European Catholic clergyman with long experience in Zaire, added the prayer subjects of fertility and healing.

⁵⁴ See also Schuster (1979:39, 94, 108) for interesting insights into similar usage among westernized urban women in neighboring Zambia.

(presumably, in the latter case, an older woman). The resulting medicine could be designed to do one of several things. First, it could be directed toward making the wife herself more attractive to her husband or making the husband want to return to his wife. Another strategy would be that of harming the other woman, or rendering her charms ineffective. (Medicine to reattract a husband, to make his wife irresistible, or to counter the charms of another woman was not necessarily "sorcery." Such charms could be purchased from purveyors of traditional medicines.) A more drastic strategy would be the "revenge option," designed to punish the errant husband himself, perhaps by making him sick or even killing him. A variation on this theme was use of poison (rather than sorcery per se). An irreconcilably aggrieved wife might seek a poison to kill her husband. Informants assured me that each of these options was chosen on occasion. (It was, of course, difficult to measure the frequency of such behavior.)

Having, then, addressed various distinctions in "marital" behavior, we can proceed to a consideration of the domestic situation of informants in a sample of 99 married male workers (Appendix A, Table 8). Almost two thirds (60%) of the informants in the sample were single when first hired by the mining company. Just over a third (36%) of the workers were married and living with their wives at the time they were hired. (Two workers had been divorced, one had been living apart from his wife.) No

worker admitted to having more than one wife at the time of engagement by mining company.

All the workers in the sample had (of course) acquired at least one wife by the time of the research. Almost three quarters (73%) of the total sample consisted of workers who had married one wife only. Almost a quarter (22%) of the workers had married a total of two wives. (Three workers had married three wives each, and two workers had married four wives each.)

However, of the sample of 99 married workers, ninety-three claimed to be currently married to one wife only. Six informants were currently married to two wives. All of the wives in the six polygynous unions should be viewed as wives (femmes légitimes) and not concubines. I hasten to add that the foregoing discussion probably badly understates the level of sexual activity within our research population. No informant admitted to being married to more than two wives at the time of our research.

The incidence of polygyny was an area of social change in the research population. The frequency of polygynous unions had been substantially higher among fathers of the informants. As indicated in Appendix B, Table 8, some 26% of that group had maintained polygynous unions. The highest number of wives maintained simultaneously by one individual among the informants' fathers was seven (a traditional chief). Eight individuals among the informants' fathers had maintained more than two wives simultaneously.

In the sample of 99 workers, the vast majority (68%) had married for the first time between the ages of 20 and 26. (Another 13% had married between the ages of 18 and 19.) In general, workers seemed to have postponed marriage until they had established some economic security. For most, this occurred in their early to mid 20s.

Over three quarters (79%) of the workers in the sample were still married to their first wife. Another 15% had divorced their first wives. In four individual cases, the workers' first wife had died. (As we have noted, six workers were currently married to two wives--6% of the sample.)

The processes by which workers found their wives were interesting. We could note two very broad distinctions: the first consisting of marriages in which the worker took it upon himself to find his own wife; the second consisting of marriages in which relatives brought the two partners together. A substantial majority (73%) of all marriages reported by informants fell in the former category. Likewise, an almost identical 72% of workers' first marriages fell in the same category. Clearly, workers in the sample were inclined to make their own marital choices, whether for their first or their subsequent marriages.

However, this first categorization should be accompanied by a second basic distinction: those workers (on one hand) who obtained their marriage partners from an urban environment, and those (on the other) who obtained

theirs from a rural village. Workers in the sample found some two thirds (67%) of all wives in an urban environment (compared to a very similar 65% for their first marriages only.)⁵⁵

We can combine these distinctions and articulate them in this fashion: In the 73% of marriages in which workers found their own wives, two thirds (67%) of the workers found their wives in an urban environment, one third in a rural village environment. In the 27% of the sample in which relatives had found wives for workers, two thirds (66%) of the wives were likewise found in an urban rather than rural environment. Among the workers in the sample, there was a clear preference for wives who had grown up in an urban environment. This was partly due to the obvious differences in availability of women: those in the town were "here, now." On the other hand, a number of informants expressed a preference for urban women as wives because they were "educated" and "clean" (unlike "ignorant" rural people) and presumably better able to care for households and children.⁵⁶

Related to the processes of finding a wife was the issue of interethnic marriage. Without belaboring the

⁵⁵Some 39% of all the wives of workers in our sample had grown up (to age 18) in a Gécamines camp. Another 17% had grown up in a city in Shaba but not in a Gécamines camp. Only 21% of the wives of our 99 informants had grown up outside of Shaba.

⁵⁶Epstein (1981:321) noted similar preferences by young men on the urban Zambian Copperbelt of the 1950s.

ramifications here again, the incidence of interethnic marriage had risen dramatically in one generation. In the sample of 99 married male workers, only 24 (24%) were themselves the issue of an ethnically mixed marriage. However, of the marriages contracted by informants, some 39% of first marriages were ethnically mixed, and 44% of all marriages were ethnically mixed. While interethnic marriage was frequently cited as a source of problems (and an explanation for marriage failure) the proportion of interethnic marriage was clearly rising in urban Kolwezi.

The types of marriage ceremony undergone by workers provided a glimpse of several aspects of social continuity and change in Kolwezi. A majority of workers in the sample had been married by a traditional, indigenous ceremony only. (This was true for 60% of the workers' first marriages, 59% for their most recent marriages.) In contrast, some 55% of the sample of workers said that their parents had been married in a traditional ceremony only. Thus, in comparing informants with the first ascending generation, the percentage of marriages sealed by a traditional ceremony alone seemed to have increased modestly.

While 9% of the workers' parents had undergone only the Christian (Catholic or Protestant) marriage ceremony, some 13% of the workers themselves had undergone only the Christian ceremony for their first marriages (11% for their last marriages). Hence, the incidence of the Christian

marriage ceremony (without the traditional ceremony) seemed also to be increasing, but on a very modest scale.

While the parents of some 28% of the sample of workers had undergone both a traditional and a Christian marriage ceremony, the incidence of this pattern was much lower among the workers themselves (9% for first marriages, 12% for last marriages). However, 5% of the workers indicated that they had undergone another form of dual ceremony: a traditional marriage ceremony and a civil (state) ceremony. Even so, while incidence of the traditional marriage ceremony alone seemed to be increasing modestly, incidence of a dual-ceremony pattern seemed to be decreasing.

Some 13% of the workers indicated that their marriages had been concluded without a ceremony (compared to a 1% incidence of this pattern among their parents). Of course, to establish the marriage, a dowry (dot) had to be paid to the wife's family.

The subject of the dowry (dot) was another area in which interesting aspects of social continuity and social change were evident. "Legitimate" marriages in Kolwezi were sealed by the dot, and this was usually a two-step process. The initial step comprised an engagement, typically established by a "pre-dot" (generally a gift of very nominal value, often consisting merely of a case of drinks). The prospective bridegroom (in many cases accompanied by male relatives) took the pre-dot to the woman's family. Both

groups shared in drinking and fellowship. The actual dot was specified by the bride's relatives and was paid later.

In a sample of 99 married male workers interviewed in the Cité, all except three had sealed their marriages by providing their wives' families with a dot. (One informant had paid no dot for one of his two wives, two other informants had rendered the pre-dot but not the dot itself.)

Informants in the sample were asked to describe the dot rendered for their wives. Of the 99 informants, 76 mentioned specific items which had been provided as part (or all) of the dot. Table 5.28 lists the items mentioned.

Informants in the same sample of married male workers were asked if they intended to demand a dot for their own daughters. Of the 99 informants, 80 said that they did intend to demand a dot. Sixteen of the remaining informants said that their intention to demand a dot would be dependent on circumstances (or family decisions) in the future. One informant said he would not demand a dot, and two informants did not respond to the question.

Informants who indicated their intention to demand a dot were further queried as to what they considered to be an appropriate dot. The answers are listed in Table 5.29.

In analyzing the data reflected in informants' responses on the subject of the dot, three general conclusions may be drawn. First, the dot remains the primary mechanism in the community for establishing the legitimacy of marriage. That does not appear to be changing in discernible degree.

Table 5.28. Items mentioned by married male workers as part (or all) of the dot rendered to their wives' families. (Note, a number of informants mentioned more than one item. Each mentioned item is treated as a separate response.)

<u>Item mentioned</u>	Percentage of informants in sample who mentioned <u>indicated item</u>
Money (varying amounts)	74.7%
Bed covers	7.1%
Skirt (<u>kikwembe</u>) for bride's mother	5.1%
Suit for bride's father	1.0%
Plates/kitchenware	1.0%
Goats	10.1%
Drink	4.0%
Palm oil	1.0%
Firearms	2.0%
Miscellaneous goods (not further identified)	14.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Second, while the patterns are not entirely clear, it appears that there are significant variations in expectations about the dot based on the ethnicity of informants. For instance, Luba-Kasai informants seemed inclined to require more dot than informants from the matrilineal and bilateral societies of southern Shaba. Third, there seemed to be a difference in mean values

Table 5.29. Married male worker responses to the question, "what do you intend to demand as a dot for your daughter?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of informants in total sample who provided this response</u>
Money (unspecified amount)	4%
A little money	1%
Money (specified amount)*	14%
Z 500 (+\$3.50)	1%
Z 1500 (+\$10.00)	1%
Z 1500-2000 (+\$10-13.50)	1%
Z 2000 (+\$13.50)	1%
at least Z 3000 (+\$20)	1%
Z 3000 (+\$20)	3%
Z 5000 (+\$33.50)	2%
Z 5000-10000 (+\$33.50-66.50)	2%
Z 12000 (+\$80.00)	1%
Z 20000 (+\$133.50)	1%
Goods and money (otherwise unspecified)	2%
A goat and money (otherwise unspecified)	1%
Goats, drinks and money (otherwise unspecified)	1%
Goats, chickens and clothes	1%
Clothes (otherwise unspecified)	2%
Goods and money (specified amount)	
A case of beer and Z 2000 (+\$13.50)	1%
A skirt (<u>kikwembe</u>) and Z 2000 (+\$13.50)	1%
A skirt, bed covers, and Z 3000 (+\$20.00)	1%
A skirt, four chickens, a goat and Z 10000 (+\$66.50)	1%
Goats, suits and Z 12000 (+\$80.00)	1%
As little as possible	1%
Something symbolic	1%
Cultivation (bride service)	1%
<u>Dot</u> will be dependent on husband's means	1%
<u>Dot</u> will depend on future circumstances/ on future family decisions	36%
<u>Dot</u> will be determined by custom	10%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

*At the time of interviews, the official exchange rate was approximately Z 150 to the U.S. dollar.

between the dots which informants rendered for their wives and those which they said they would demand for their daughters. Even when adjusted for recent economic turbulence, the dot seems subject to inflationary pressures.

In assessing the domain of male-female relations as a whole, several observations can be offered. First, the economic role of the rural woman is not at all duplicated in the urban industrial environment. In Kolwezi, women's roles in formal sector employment are limited, and women's traditional rural roles in food production have no real urban analogue. The division of labor which categorizes a woman's role as keeper of the home and tender of the children, and a man's role as provider and "lord of the home," is if anything, emphasized and reinforced in the urban context. Still, male informants in Kolwezi did believe that women played an appropriate role in the formal-sector economy, though typically in subordinate positions involving light, indoor work or cleaning.

Next, men preferred to relate to women as bosses, husbands, and lovers, and preferred not to relate to women as subordinates, close friends, partners and social or intellectual equals. A wife's function was seen more in the related context of providing and caring for offspring (preferably in large numbers) and assuring that the husband's physical needs were met.

While the incidence of polygyny was relatively low (more so for informants than for their fathers), the range

of patterns in marital relations was broad, with a significant proportion of informants involved in unions locally described as "concubinage." Likewise, a large proportion of male informants were sexually active with women other than "legitimate" wives, and this seemed to be generally accepted behavior in the community. Whether this behavior was undergoing major change is difficult to say. As a subjective impression, the range and scope of accepted sexual activity in proximate rural environments seemed distinctly less.

Various factors were at least partially responsible for patterns of belief and behavior in the domain of male-female relations in urban Kolwezi. First, the wage-labor economy of western origin provided one model of division of labor by gender, and informants had selectively borrowed norms from that model. This was particularly true in terms of the predominant male role in the industrial work place, and the emphasis on the nuclear family as a primary residential unit. Related to this was the teaching of Christian churches. Here, too, informants had borrowed norms selectively. In general, this had resulted in an emphasis on the authority of males, particularly in the home, and the appropriate submission of wives to the authority of husbands. Then, there were the (perhaps artificial) portrayals of "modern" life in the local media: television, magazines and popular music. These tended to depict women as sex-objects, and men as justified in availing themselves

of womens' favors. It appeared that men had found opportunity in the urban industrial environment to restructure the gender-based "relations of production" and had arrogated to themselves a measure of authority not characteristic of their traditional rural counterparts. Whether conscious or not, a manipulation and selective adaptation of norms from various contexts had obviously occurred.

What had seemingly endured in male-female relations in urban Kolwezi was the notion that there are fundamental differences between men and women, manhood and womanhood, and that (though modern life occasionally blurs the domains in which these categories are imposed) the peculiar roles of each sex should be fulfilled exclusively by members of that sex.

Language Usage

Language usage in the Cité, as in urban southern Zaire generally, is a complicated issue. Any useful attempt to explain it must start with a brief overview of language usage in Zaire (in historical perspective).⁵⁷

The central African colony which took shape as the Congo Free State at the end of the 19th century, and which retains the same borders as today's Republic of Zaire, was

⁵⁷Language use and language policy in Zaire has been described by a number of scholars. The most useful studies include those of Bokamba (1976), Polomé (1963, 1968a, 1972), Robinson (1978), Sesep (1978), Yates (1980) and Fabian (1983, 1986).

and is culturally heterogeneous. The heterogeneity certainly extends to language; so that depending somewhat on how the various languages are categorized, Zaire's citizens speak as many as 250 separate, indigenous languages.

At the beginning of the colonial era (in the 1880s), there were several vehicular languages used over broad areas of central Africa, although none of these was spoken over more than a small region of what is now Zaire. Still, those authorities seeking a language policy for colonial administration could have chosen between a number of alternatives: they could, of course, have used one or both of the two Belgian languages (French and Flemish). They could also have selected one of the indigenous vehicular languages already present and have (essentially) imposed it on peoples to whom it was not familiar. They could have recognized multiple official languages--attempting to endow various linguae francae with an official status. As a somewhat bizarre option, they could have adopted all of these alternatives. In colonial Zaire, the ultimate choice was "all of the above." Of interest here is how this bears on language usage on modern Zaire generally, and on urban southern Shaba particularly.


We should note first that Zaire now has a "national" language--French--and four "official" languages of indigenous origin: Lingala, Swahili, KiKongo and TshiLuba. Each of the four official languages is a lingua franca with a regional base. Each of the five languages has interesting

ramifications for language use in urban southern Zaire (Yates, 1980).

Reluctant to use French for all administration, the early Belgian colonial establishment reserved that language for higher echelons of colonial government. (Flemish was, of course, not used as an official language, though it was the mother tongue of many colonial officials and European residents.)

During the colonial era, educational instruction in Zaire was generally the responsibility of the European religious missions (Markowitz, 1973; Schatzberg, 1988). These typically taught their Zairois students in local indigenous languages at the primary level and, ultimately, in French at the secondary level (Fabian, 1983). Zairois eventually came to regard French as the language which distinguished the westernized, urbanized "évolué" or "intellectual" from the unsophisticated rural peasant. Not surprisingly, independent Zaire retained French as the national language. That language is now the medium of instruction in the schools at all levels.

Virtually all urban Zairois in southern Shaba now speak at least some French. Most young urban males speak it quite well, although, of course, Zairois in rural areas display considerably less fluency in the language. Typical conversations among individuals in urban Shaba switch back and forth between French and local indigenous languages. Urban Zairois speaking indigenous languages use many French



KIKONGO — K

SWAHILI — S

LINGALA — L

TSHILUBA — T

Figure 5.1. The general range of Zaire's major indigenous vehicular languages. Source: author's estimate.

words and phrases in the course of conversation. In some cases, the French is reformulated with local (Bantu) morphology.⁵⁸ From observation in Kolwezi, it seemed that males with secondary school (or higher) educations often used French in casual conversation, though no Zairois I knew used it exclusively. French tended also to be used on formal occasions--speeches by dignitaries, official announcements and meetings, and so forth.

French was clearly the prestige language in urban southern Zaire, and its use was considered a measure of education and sophistication. Its skillful manipulation was admired as the mark of an "intellectual," and informants in Kolwezi considered French to be an essential ingredient to upward mobility in formal sector economic environments or in state service. Perhaps not surprisingly, regular use of French as a language in the home increased with generation in Gécamines as depicted in Table 5.30.

In a sample of 99 married male (blue-collar) workers in the Cité, only 2% said that they used French as the most common language in their homes. However, a very large percentage (43%) said they regularly used at least some French for casual conversation in the home. On the other

⁵⁸Zairois in Kolwezi might mix local Swahili and French, saying "Donc, alirudia très tard" (Therefore, he returned very late) or "Inafaa kuremplir reservoir" (It's necessary to fill up the tank) or "Anakwenda ku Lubumbashi parceque bibi yake ana maladi" (He's going to Lubumbashi because his wife is sick) etc. So far as I could determine, there are no fixed rules for such usage.

hand, fully two thirds of the (white-collar) cadre (in a sample of 20) indicated that French was the primary language used in the home (Tables 5.32 and 5.33).

French was more common as the work language. Some 39% of the married male workers in the Cité (in a sample of 99) and 95% of Gécamines cadre (in a sample of 20) said that French was the language they used most at work.

Table 5.30. Variations by generation of married male worker usage of French as a language used regularly in the home.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of that generation in which French is regularly used in the home</u>
1	39.1%
2	51.2%
3	55.6%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Let us turn at this point to the second language of interest here, Lingala. The Congo Free State of the 1880s and 1890s, with its original base along the lower Zaire River, early favored the use of a local riverine trade language. In somewhat simplified and modified form, it became the most prominent indigenous language of the Free State, then of the Belgian colonial government and the

colonial military. That language was, of course, Lingala. It has remained the language of the military in Zaire ever since. Over time, use of the language as a lingua franca slowly spread throughout western and northwestern Zaire and (eastward) upstream along the Zaire River as far as Kisangani.

In the independent Zaire of the 1970s and 1980s, the use of Lingala has expanded phenomenally. There are at least four major reasons for the spread. First is the preference of the country's President (Mobutu) for the language, Lingala being the only indigenous vehicular language which he speaks fluently. It is no secret that Mobutu would like to endow the language with a preeminent status in Zaire (Young and Turner, 1985:154-155).

My colleagues in Zaire reminded me frequently of a 1974 national conference in Lubumbashi charged with "selecting" an appropriate indigenous national language. The Kinshasa delegation apparently expected that delegates from other regions would quickly acquiesce to the selection of Lingala; but to their surprise, the representatives from the Swahili and TshiLuba-speaking regions were adamantly opposed. In fact, it was argued by some that TshiLuba was the only truly "authentic" Zairian language of those proposed--a fact which must have sent shivers up the spines of all the non-Luba present. No single indigenous language was chosen. When recounting these events, my Zairois colleagues reflected an incredulous attitude which can best

be stated: "Can you believe the effrontery of that man (Mobutu)?" Additional insight on this issue is provided by Sesep (1978).

Partly because the President has surrounded himself with courtiers from his home region, Lingala has become the language of the top political and economic elite. Lingala-speaking administrators and soldiers are assigned throughout the Republic. The language is frequently used in "official" and semi-official contexts.

Related to these reasons for Lingala's spread is the fact that it has also become the vehicular language of the nation's capital. Many of the country's rich and powerful, regardless of region of origin, spend time in Kinshasa. As in many countries other than Zaire, the capital has a disproportionate influence on the country's political, economic and social life.

In Shaba, the Kinshasa cultural dominance was particularly evident in popular music. Most of the country's popular music was recorded in Kinshasa, and most of it was recorded in Lingala. The majority of the country's top artists gravitated to Kinshasa and ultimately catered primarily to a "Lingalophone" audience. Thus, even artists (as, for instance the internationally known Tshala Mwana) who came from non-Lingala speaking regions, and occasionally recorded music in languages other than Lingala, tended to favor that tongue. A very high proportion

(perhaps as much as 70%) of the popular music heard in Kolwezi was recorded with Lingala lyrics.⁵⁹

Besides the popular music, Lingala was also prominent on the national television station (which was received in Kolwezi). In the small amount of television I watched in Kolwezi, most of the programming was in French, but most of the advertising was in Lingala.

Many informants in Kolwezi said that they understood Lingala; but in a sample of 99 married male workers, only 22% said that they could speak it. This phenomenon has a political dimension in Shaba. Lingala is the language of an often despised political administration. (A number of informants said that Lingala was used as a language of "terror." When local people heard Lingala spoken, they assumed its speakers were part of an oppressive ruling elite.) Several of my Zairois colleagues who considered themselves "intellectuals" said they refused to speak Lingala out of a general dislike for its patrons.

Besides Lingala, the three other "official" languages of Zaire are Swahili, KiKongo and TshiLuba. We can ignore Swahili for a moment and note the usage of the other two. First, KiKongo (with its several dialects) is spoken by the BaKongo and related peoples in the far west of Zaire, an area comprising the régions of Bas Zaire, Bandundu (and, of

⁵⁹About 20% of the popular music I heard in Kolwezi was in English. A lot of popular music is played. The downtown area throbbed with it during daylight hours. All of the music was provided by cassette tapes or shortwave radio. (There were no AM or FM radio stations which served the Kolwezi area.)

course, portions of the immediately adjacent countries of Angola and the Republic of Congo). Since Zaire's national capital (Kinshasa) is located in the KiKongo-speaking area, KiKongo is the mother tongue of many Kinshasa residents, and is widely heard in Kinshasa. However, KiKongo is not well represented in Shaba, and relatively few people speak it in Kolwezi. (Only one of all the adults counted in the census of Cité, and 5% of the cadre sampled in the Ville, were of BaKongo origin. Of these, none indicated that KiKongo was the language now used primarily in the home.) As noted above, informants in Shaba tended to label all persons from the western régions (Bas Zaire, Bandundu, Kinshasa and Equateur) as "BaKongo" regardless of actual ethnic origin. However, in the Shaba stereotype, the "BaKongo" are Lingala (not KiKongo) speakers.

TshiLuba, the third "official" language of Zaire, is the mother tongue of a large population in the régions of Kasai-Oriental and Kasai-Occidental, just north of Shaba. The use of TshiLuba accompanied the immigration of TshiLuba-speakers (primarily Lulua and Luba-Kasai) from their home regions, so that the language is now spoken all over Zaire. This is particularly true of the urban areas of the country, and is perhaps nowhere more pronounced than in Shaba. In Kolwezi, the TshiLuba language is generally called "KiKasai" ("the Kasai language").

The widespread use of TshiLuba is due in large part to the dispersal from (what is now) the Région of

Kasai-Oriental of large numbers of Luba-Kasai. As discussed early in this study, many Luba-Kasai had been recruited over the years by the mining industry. So much so, that they now form by far the largest single ethnic component within the Gécamines labor force. Many more Luba-Kasai have settled in urban southern Zaire generally, drawn by private commercial opportunities or state employment or by relatives already settled in the area.

Informants of Luba-Kasai origin seemed to be somewhat more inclined than other ethnic groups in Kolwezi to preserve the use of their ancestral tongue (Table 5.33). Still, it was very clear from research that the majority of Luba-Kasai who had been raised from infancy in the mining camps could speak TshiLuba very poorly if at all, though most could understand it when they heard it.

In Kolwezi, TshiLuba is most often heard in stores, in the markets and in like commercial activity. This is due to the large numbers of Luba-Kasai engaged in these environments--often groups of relatives in a related enterprise. (As a subjective impression, it appeared to me that the Luba-Kasai entrepreneurs had stronger ties to their communities of ancestral origin than did their co-ethnics in Gécamines worker camps. This may explain in some measure their more concerted preservation of the maternal language.)

The discussion turns finally to the fourth of Zaire's "official" languages--Swahili. This is the language most used in urban southern Shaba, and is the principal language

spoken in the homes of the vast majority of Kolwezi informants. It is also the primary work language for the Gécamines blue-collar labor force (Table 5.31).⁶⁰

Table 5.31. Swahili usage among male Gécamines employees.

	Primary language in home at this time	Not primary language, but also used in home	Primary language at work	Not primary language, but also used at work
Married male blue-collar workers in Cité (sample of 99)	88.9%	8.1%	60.6%	33.3%
Married male cadre living in the Ville (sample of 20)	30.0%	65.0%	5.0%	75.0%

Sources: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988; sampling conducted in urban Kolwezi, February-July 1988.

It is necessary to emphasize here that the Swahili spoken in southern Shaba is very different from the Swahili spoken in eastern Zaire (the latter being reasonably close to East African standard Swahili). Needless to say, the Shaban Swahili is vastly different from East African Swahili. There is no "standard" Swahili in Zaire. Shaban

⁶⁰Shaban Swahili has been described in some detail elsewhere. See particularly, Polomé (1968b, 1971a, 1971b) and Fabian (1986).

Swahili is spoken primarily in urban southern Shaba and among small groups of people elsewhere in Zaire who have emigrated in recent years from southern Shaba.

The Swahili of eastern Zaire was introduced in the 19th century by Arab and Afro-Arab slavers and traders from the east coast. This variant of Swahili is spoken primarily in the several Swahili-speaking centers clustered along Zaire's eastern border from northern Shaba to Haut-Zaire.

Fabian (1986:6-11) has argued convincingly that the Swahili of Shaba, in contrast, was a simplified language of command imposed by the Belgian colonial minerals industry in the early 20th century on a labor force of diverse ethnic origin most of which did not come from Swahili-speaking areas. The resulting language lost much of the rich Bantu morphology and much vocabulary found in other Swahili dialects. In time, Shabans relexicalized the language with borrowings from other Bantu languages and from French and English.

It is even a bit misleading to infer that there is a "standard" dialect known as Shaban Swahili. There are substantial variations in pronunciation, morphology and syntax in various Swahili-speaking contexts in Shaba, and considerable (but uneven) borrowing from other Bantu languages, particularly TshiLuba. Nor are there any pressures toward standardization. So far as I am aware, there is no literature in current Shaban Swahili, and only one radio station (located in Lubumbashi and with limited

range) which broadcasts in the language. At one time, there were at least two Swahili-language newspapers published in Shaba: Mwana Shaba (Child of Copper), published by the mining industry and Mujumbe (Messenger), a private-enterprise daily. By the 1988, the former had ceased publication, the latter was printed only in French. Even when they had been published in Swahili, both newspapers used the "good Swahili" (KiSwahili bora) of eastern Zaire rather than the Shaba variety.

All of the mining company instructions and signs I saw that were written in Swahili used a somewhat self-consciously "purer" Swahili than that commonly spoken in southern Zaire. Likewise, the Protestant churches in Shaba had a Swahili Bible (and other literature) which was much more aligned with the Swahili of eastern Zaire than with local usage.

Except for those Shabans with long experience in a church environment, I doubt that many could follow the "KiSwahili-bora." This was rather well illustrated to me by one of my researchers, a Roman Catholic and a university graduate, who asked to borrow a Swahili Bible written in "KiSwahili-bora." After two days, he gave up, saying that he just couldn't follow the text. He asked for a French Bible instead. To him, the Swahili of eastern Zaire was probably more difficult than the original text of the Authorized (1611) Version Bible would be to most Americans.

It seemed very clear from research that Shaban Swahili had essentially displaced all other indigenous languages as the mother tongue of residents in the Cité. This was true of the overwhelming majority of informants in all ethnic groups and of all generations in Gécamines, and can be ascribed to the forced mixing in neighborhood, work and school, a legacy of deliberate mining industry policy in the colonial era to "detrribalize" communities of industrial workers. (The nature of this change is graphically illustrated in Table 5.32.)

Table 5.32. Changes in language use (Swahili and French) in the homes of married male employees of Gécamines.

	Percentage of the total sample in which Swahili was the primary language in the home during childhood	Percentage of the total sample in which Swahili is now the primary language in the home	Percentage of the total sample in which French was the primary language in the home during childhood	Percentage of the total sample in which French is now the primary language in the home
Blue-collar workers (sample of 99)	33.3%	88.9%	0 %	2.0%
Cadre (sample of 20)	60.0%	30.0%	0 %	65.0%

Source: Interviews performed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi and Kolwezi Ville, February-July 1988.

It would be wrong to claim that the other indigenous languages (besides Swahili) have disappeared in the Cité. That is evidently not the case. Rather, other indigenous languages have been relegated to more particular, more limited, roles. Several generalizations are appropriate here. First, a significant percentage of the Cité's

Table 5.33. Usage of selected languages in the homes of Gécamines employees in the Cité and the Ville.

A. In the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi (based on a sample of 99 married male workers).

Language	Primary use in home (as a percentage of total sample)	Not primary, but also used in the home (as a percentage of total sample)	Understood in the home but not spoken (as a percentage of total sample)
French	2.0%	43.4%	3.0%
Lingala	1.0%	0 %	31.3%
Swahili	88.9%	8.1%	0 %
Tshiluba (Language of Luba-Kasai and Lulua)	2.0%	18.2%	31.3%
KiLuba (Language of Luba-Shaba)	2.0%	9.1%	32.3%
KiSongye	1.0%	4.0%	9.1%
Tshokwe	1.0 %	6.1%	11.1%
URuund	0 %	11.1%	18.2%

B. Among cadre in the Ville (based on sample of 20 cadre homes).

Language	Primary use in home (as a percentage of total sample)	Not primary, but also used in the home (as a percentage of total sample)	Understood in the home but not spoken (as a percentage of total sample)
French	65.0%	30.0%	5.0%
Lingala	0 %	20.0%	40.0%
Swahili	30.0%	65.0%	5.0%
Tshiluba (Language of Luba-Kasai and Lulua)	0 %	0 %	30.0%
KiLuba (Language of Luba-Shaba)	0 %	0 %	20.0%
KiSongye	0 %	0 %	5.0%
Tshokwe	0 %	0 %	0 %
URuund	0 %	0 %	0 %

Source: Interviews conducted by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi and in Kolwezi Ville, February-July 1988.

residents continue to use their maternal tongues as one of two or more languages in the home (Table 5.33).

Secondly, informants regularly conversed in various indigenous languages with relatives and co-ethnics. Parents (or other relatives) visiting from a rural village would characteristically be addressed in their maternal language. (Several Gécamines cadre of Luba-Kasai origin did, however, mention to me that they were embarrassed that their children could not converse with their grandparents in their ancestral tongue.) Small, intimate groups of friends, if they happened to be of the same ethnic group, would often converse in the maternal language.

Thirdly, most of Kolwezi's churches had an ethnic dimension at one time. While Kolwezi religious services in 1988 were generally conducted in Swahili, some of the churches emphasized one or another of the indigenous languages. The Luba Shaba were reputed to be the most conservative in retaining the use of their language in their religious activities. By way of contrast, a sect known as the Bapostole took another tack. In their Kolwezi worship services, the Bapostole had Bible reading and preaching in all the major languages of members and visitors present. In one service I attended in Kolwezi, for instance, the group read and preached in French, Swahili, TshiLuba, KiLuba and Tshokwe. (There were also a number of popular religious songs in several languages which all the Protestant-based churches seemed to use, regardless of the specific ethnic

complexion of the congregation. In one Sunday-morning service in a small independent church, I heard songs in Swahili, TshiLuba, and KiLuba.)

It is appropriate to note here, as a final observation, the high degree of intercommunicability afforded by the close relationships of various indigenous languages in southern Zaire. Informants whose maternal language was TshiLuba, for instance, seemed to be able to follow conversations in KiHemba, KiLuba and Kaniok with little difficulty, and in KiSanga and Kaonde with somewhat more difficulty. Many informants whose maternal language was URuund seemed able to follow conversations in Tshokwe and Ndembu.

As an overall assessment, the nature and direction of language change in Shaba seemed relatively clear. The important vehicular languages were French and Copperbelt Swahili. Swahili seemed to be displacing other indigenous languages as the mother tongue of the urban population. French was the language of formal sector business and of state functions, promoted by its role as the exclusive medium of teaching in the schools. A small but growing number of urban Zairois were also using French as the primary language in the home, though this was much more true of the educated elite than of blue-collar workers.

The skillful use of French is valuable for social mobility and economic opportunity in southern Zaire, though this could be easily overstressed. (Kolwezi's indigenous

merchant elite, the most affluent local group, seemed to have achieved its wealth without particular reliance upon either extensive schooling or upon French language communications skills.) Vwakyanakazi (1982) apparently arrived at a similar conclusion in his study of indigenous entrepreneurs in Butembo, eastern Zaire.

The most profound value of French to informants seemed to lie in its connotations of urban sophistication. Use of French was the very essence of kizungu (European-style "civilization"), unambiguously distinguishing the worldly-wise, educated urbanite from the unsophisticated rural peasant. While informants did not seem to believe that fluency in French in itself guaranteed prosperity or promotion, the "reference others" which many informants sought to emulate were rich, influential, stylish and French-speaking.

Manners, Status, Interpersonal Relations,
and the Good Life

The discussion now turns to a highly subjective domain of belief and behavior in which empirical measurement is of limited usefulness. Here, our primary interest involves several related issues: that of determining relative distinctions and categories of social status in the community, determining important community norms of interpersonal relations, and determining the fundamental beliefs that seem to energize behavior related to these norms.

We could start, of course, by an analysis of social class; seeking to determine social distinctions in urban Kolwezi based on "relations of production" and upon control of material resources. Yet such a point of departure almost inevitably carries the hidden baggage of profound and empirically unverifiable ideological assumptions about the nature of man in society. To begin at this level of analysis would not really be helpful to an understanding of how Cité residents think and relate to others in their social universe.⁶¹ Rather, an appropriate point of departure would be to divide up that universe into the invariably overlapping social categories described by married male workers in the Cité. This we will do, threading our way carefully through the inherent ambiguities.

To Cité residents, the most obvious social distinction in Kolwezi was that between Gécamines blue-collar workers on one hand, and Gécamines white-collar managers (cadre) on the other. This difference was the frequent topic of spontaneous conversation among blue-collar informants. Moreover, Cité informants saw the same distinction in other public sector and private sector enterprises.

⁶¹Various scholars have endeavored to distinguish classes in Zairian society. The most original and credible authority on the subject is probably the Zairian sociologist Mwabila (1973, 1979). Others who have investigated urban social reality in Zaire in terms of class have included Nzongola (1984) and Schatzberg (1980, 1988). Young and Turner (1985:100-137) provide a good analysis and synthesis of existing scholarship.

To gain some empirical insight into the nature of this perceived distinction, informants in a small sample of 32 married male workers were asked if workers consider themselves fundamentally different from cadre. Virtually all of the informants in the sample provided an unambiguous "yes." Informants were then asked if they thought cadre considered themselves fundamentally different from workers. Again, virtually all informants in the sample answered "yes." The ways in which workers considered themselves different from cadre, and cadre were thought (by workers) to consider themselves different from workers are listed in Appendix D, Tables 2 and 3.

Cadre themselves, when asked how they thought they differed from workers, seemed in general very uncomfortable with the issue. Answers that went beyond merely restating the obvious tended to stress the cadres' superior education and (I believe) implicitly, the cadres' greater intellect. Similar reactions (and discomfiture) seem to have been encountered by Schatzberg (1980:159) in his conversations with state bureaucrats in Lisala, Zaire.

Workers in the sample were also asked their general opinion of cadre. (Specific responses are listed in Appendix D, Table 4.) There were, not surprisingly, significant differences in opinion among informants. However, three broad categories of opinion emerged from the aggregate. First, blue-collar workers were painfully conscious of a substantial differential in authority: cadre

had preserved in considerable measure the authority once enjoyed by the European mining company supervisors. (This included a mentality of relative disrespect for the sensitivities of blue-collar workers.) Secondly, blue-collar workers perceived a vast difference in the level of remuneration accorded workers and cadre. (This was a considerable sore point, since many workers were obliged to work harder and for longer hours than their cadre supervisors; and workers considered their contribution to the company as important as that of cadre they observed). Thirdly, some workers explained worker-cadre differences in explicit terms of social class, an analytical achievement of which they were clearly capable.

Yet, while blue-collar workers were generally unhappy at their treatment by cadre, and vocally unhappy with the differential in benefits, there was little obvious hatred of cadre as a class. Cadre were much more envied than disliked. Many workers aspired to become cadre via the "maitrise" system. Most workers were personally acquainted with cadre who had actually been promoted from the ranks of workers by this process, and who continued to maintain strong relations with blue-collar worker friends. For that matter, many blue-collar workers were themselves related by blood or marriage to cadre in Kolwezi (or elsewhere on the Copperbelt).

Informants in a sample of 32 married male blue-collar workers were asked if workers and cadre socialized on a

regular basis outside of the workplace. Well over two thirds of the informants said that such interaction occurred frequently. Often mentioned as specific events which brought cadre and workers together were births, funerals, sports activities, religious activities, drinking (bars), and family reunions. The validity of these responses was confirmed by participant observation in the community.

An example is illustrative. One of my trusted informants in Kolwezi was a 3d class cadre who had been promoted from the worker ranks. He had been raised in a blue-collar mining company family. Both of his two wives had also been raised in blue-collar mining company families. At his home, I invariably encountered his blue-collar mining company friends, kinsmen or affines. This was common among such cadre, though relatively more rare among individuals who had entered the company as cadre, rather than being advanced from the ranks of workers (as was my friend).

Most blue-collar informants were envious of the unimaginably high standard of living they thought cadre enjoyed. But they did not seem to blame the local cadre for the material inequity. (Local cadre controlled some valued resources, but they manifestly did not own the "means of production." In fact, they could not even hire new workers.) Special ill will was, however, seemingly reserved for the more amorphous category of the "société" (mining company) which treated workers so "unfairly". Resentment was also directed at the régime itself and (in the case of a

few workers) the rich foreign capitalist countries which presumably supported the regime and its social policies.

Beyond the general category of "cadre," some blue-collar informants distinguished ordinary cadre from the top local cadre managers, but this did not seem to be a readily definable categorization in the minds of most worker informants.

Informants were also asked their views on the European (expatriate) cadre. In a sample of 32 married male workers, 78% said that European cadre are fundamentally different from the Zairois cadre. About half of this group (12 individuals) described the difference mainly in terms of the higher salaries and more generous benefits accorded the expatriates. Interestingly, 22% of the total sample expressed a preference for European cadre, describing them as less arrogant, more honest, harder working, and more understanding than their Zairois counterparts. Only one informant commented negatively on European cadre, calling them harsh and disrespectful. In general, it appeared that the expatriate contract workers hired as cadre by the mining company enjoy reasonably good working relations with blue-collar workers. Even so, it was my strong impression that informants thought of whites in general as a category essentially outside the Zairois blue collar-white collar distinctions.

Moving beyond the worker-cadre differentiation, the other more or less distinct social groups (in the view of

Cité informants) included the rich merchants, the top state officials (including officers of the state, of the party and of the various security forces), the underemployed and unemployed (chômeurs), the criminals (bandits, petty thieves, prostitutes, party thugs and security forces) and the rather undifferentiated mass of townsfolk.⁶² These are portrayed in tabular form in Figure 5.34.

The salient criteria in informants' views on social categorization seemed to be fourfold, encompassing the (often overlapping) characteristics of coercive power, relative wealth, social prestige and presence or absence of overtly criminal behavior. This warrants some illustration.

The political/state official or a local army general would have been categorized as "top bosses" regardless of moral character, purely on the basis of their control of the state's coercive power. A rich merchant owning a string of local shops, whether or not he had any direct leverage over state authorities, would (on the basis of his wealth) also be respected and considered powerful and important.⁶³ Yet

⁶²Of course this entire categorization is a very broad generalization of views expressed by informants. Some informants would have seen professional clergy as a distinct, separate group. Others would have distinguished such categories as mid-level and lower-level state officials, post office and telephone office employees, and railway company employees in one or more separate groups. Some informants would have distinguished educators (primary and secondary school teachers) as a separate grouping.

⁶³It is, however, hard to imagine a rich merchant in Kolwezi who would not also maintain various relations of clientage with state authorities.

Table 5.34. Generalized reconstruction of married male workers' view of distinct socio-economic groupings in urban Kolwezi.

Relative social prominence	Grouping
Highest	
1	Top bosses (<u>les grands chefs</u>) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Top state officials and senior staff at the level of the <u>sous-région</u>, <u>zone</u>, and (perhaps) <u>quartier</u> - Top state officials of the A.N.D. (secret police) and A.N.I. (immigration agency) - Top security officials (army and police) - (Perhaps) top local Gécamines officials and officials of railway, post office and telecommunications - [Europeans]--(somewhat outside the normal social universe of most informants)
2	Rich merchants
3	Cadre and similar professionals (i.e. doctors), possibly including mid-level state officials and (perhaps) secondary school teachers
4	Blue-collar workers in major enterprises, both state-owned and private sector. Primary school teachers.
5	Undifferentiated mass of townsfolk
6	Unemployed and underemployed (<u>chômeurs</u>)
7	Criminals: bandits, petty thieves and riff-raff (<u>voyou</u>), smugglers and traffickers, party thugs (JMPR, CDR) and predatory free-lance security forces
Lowest	

Source: Author's analysis.

an equally rich malachite smuggler and trafficker (on the basis of presumed immorality) would not generate the same respect as the "legitimate" merchant. By contrast, the local Catholic Bishop and Methodist District Superintendent, though not wealthy on the scale of the rich merchant, would be considered at least equally important and worthy of respect because of the social prestige inherent in their offices.

Earlier, we noted that the most fundamental social distinction for blue-collar worker informants was that between blue-collar "worker" and white-collar "cadre." Other social categories seemed more amorphous and less definable in the minds of informants, the one possible exception being that of political authorities. Here, informants tended to distinguish the "big bosses" (state officials of the sous-région, zone and [perhaps] quartier) from the poorly paid lower-echelon bureaucrats, party volunteers, opportunists and "militants" at lower echelons.

To gain some empirical insight on the range of views, informants in a small sample of 32 married male workers were asked if Kolwezi residents considered government officials to be fundamentally different from other people. Well over half of the informants (59%) said "yes." (Some 22% said "no," 6% said "it depends on the individuals concerned," and some 13% did not answer, perhaps out of self-preservational caution.) The reasons offered by informants for this fundamental difference are listed in Appendix D, Table 5.

While the political "big bosses" were viewed as a separate category, their salient characteristic was seen as coercive power. In general, they were respected but not liked. They were feared but not particularly hated by Cité residents. (There were, of course, a number of individual exceptions among informants).

It is worth noting that the residents of the Cité were somewhat shielded by the mining company administrative structure and by their residential location from corruption and other abuses endured at the hands of authorities elsewhere in urban Kolwezi. This was partially illustrated by informants' responses to the question, "is it easy to obtain justice here in the Cité?" In a sample of 32, informants were almost evenly divided between those who said "yes, it is easy to obtain justice" and those who said "no." Most of those who said "yes" indicated that they would pursue their case in the Cité itself, relying on administrative authorities of the Cité to render justice, and thus obviating a need to rely on the hopelessly corrupt state judiciary outside the mining company camp.⁶⁴ (Specific responses are listed in Appendix D, Table 6.)

Having discussed informants' perceptions of general social categories in the Kolwezi area, we can narrow our focus to the Cité itself. There were, of course, clear differences in perceived status within the Cité based on a

⁶⁴See Schatzberg (1988:99-144) for a useful overview of the Zairian judiciary.

number of variables. We have already discussed gender-based differences. These can be cursorily readdressed here by noting that men in the Cité tended to be treated with substantially greater deference than women of the same age, all other things being equal. Older women, and women in responsible positions (i.e. a female chef de rue) seemed to be treated with increased deference, though no more so than men of equivalent age or position.

Position within the administrative hierarchy also enhanced the status of individuals in the Cité. A chef de rue (or avenue), a chef de bloc or a chef de cellule clearly obtained more than usual deference. (Those I came to know in the Cité seemed to be natural community leaders: perhaps their fellow residents would have turned to them for leadership even without the formal titles. This "grass-roots" leadership consisted typically of dignified, mature and intelligent individuals and seemed to command genuine respect.) Esteem also accrued to individuals in supervisory positions in the work place, the kapitas or "section chiefs." These too appeared to be selected for their maturity and leadership skills.

Cité residents were inclined to respect individuals in positions of authority, however modest. Nor did these positions, in themselves, necessarily command large salaries. Informants in a sample of 95 married male workers were asked if the pay-grade (cote) in itself bore upon status in the community. In other words, all else being

equal, were workers of higher cote more respected in the community than those of a lesser cote? Some 61% of the informants in the sample said that respect would depend on other factors besides pay grade alone. (Some 27% of informants said increased pay-grade in itself would indeed incur increased respect and some 11% said it would not.)

Beyond gender and administrative position, research interest was directed to other characteristics or qualities which bore on relative status in the community. One such characteristic was clearly that of wealth. However, it is appropriate to precede scrutiny of this issue with a brief discussion of the importance of money as an indicator of status in urban Kolwezi generally.

Informants in a sample of 95 married male blue-collar workers were asked how the "rich" are generally regarded in urban Kolwezi. Their responses are tabulated in Table 5.35.

Informants in a smaller sample of 32 married male workers were asked if it necessarily followed that "important" people have much money. Exactly half (50%) said "yes." About a third said "no." Informants were then asked if rich people in Kolwezi are important because of their money. This time, well over half said "yes." Informants in a sample of 95 married male workers were also asked if a worker in the Cité becomes more important if he receives more money. Again, over half said "yes," while about a third said "no." We can conclude that money is an important variable in perceptions of status in the community.

Table 5.35. Married male worker views regarding the common perception of rich people in urban Kolwezi. (A number of informants provided answers in more than one category. Each such answer is counted as a separate response.)

<u>Category of response</u>	<u>Percent of total sample providing this response</u>
The rich are generally feared	77.9%
The rich are generally respected	65.3%
The rich are generally considered sympathetic	25.3%
The rich are generally considered disagreeable	11.6%
Other/No opinion	4.2%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

When these data are analyzed by ethnicity, generation in Gécamines and age (Appendix D, Tables 22, 23, 24) several interesting patterns emerge. There were very wide differences in the patterns of response by ethnic group. For instance, some 69% of the ARuund informants agreed that an individual's importance in the community correlated directly with the amount of his money, while only 20% of Sanga informants indicated this view. (Informants themselves did not recognize the ethnic patterns, and when informed of the findings, and asked for possible explanations, provided a range of unconvincing answers and demonstrably inaccurate stereotypes.) Moreover, these

patterns did not seem to correlate with variations in traditional social organization or with informants' interests in their ancestral communities. The patterns could possibly reflect differing norms regarding the importance of material wealth in rural communities of the individual ethnic groups, but this analysis lacks the data for such assessment. Even so, I ultimately concluded that ethnicity itself was less relevant than other factors.

When the data were analyzed by generation in Gécamines (Appendix D, Table 23), the results were likewise somewhat ambiguous. Second generation informants were least likely to agree that an individual's importance correlated with his money. Third generation informants were most likely to do so. Here, however, it is appropriate to propose again the argument that first generation Gécamines employees are (almost by definition) more inclined to acceptance of innovation. Third generation employees reflect somewhat greater potential for change from traditional rural norms due to a longer exposure to the westernized, urban environment. If this assessment is correct, then second generation informants should often exhibit the least "westernized" values. This seems to be the case here.

When the data were analyzed by age of informants (Appendix D, Table 24), the one clear trend emerged (though even here there was an anomaly in one age group). In general, the older the informant, the more likely he was to

agree that an individual's importance correlated with his money. At the same time, the older the informant, the less likely he was to dismiss money as a measure of individual importance. To be sure, the older the informant, the larger salary he was likely to have.

This pattern is probably best attributed to the socialization pressures associated with longevity of employment in the mining company itself. More specifically, the longer a worker spends on the job, the longer he and his colleagues compare themselves to their cadre supervisors (who live at a considerably enhanced socio-economic level). This argument is supported by the fact that when informants were asked what distinguished workers from cadre, a large proportion of workers cited salary or material advantages.

It was very obvious that (blue-collar) worker and (white-collar) cadre informants considered material possessions to be self-evident symbols of status. Typical worker's conversations on this subject would invidiously compare the house, car and clothes of the cadre with those of the worker. While few workers could afford large homes or automobiles, they could (and did) invest in clothes, furniture, televisions and radio-cassette players as "prestige goods." When asked what they would change in their lives given the opportunity, the majority of workers replied to the effect that they would significantly enhance the material conditions of their lives.

It seems likely that such obvious indications of status would be relevant to social distinctions in the Cité itself. And indeed, as we have already noted, more than a majority of informants agreed that (in the Cité) an increase in money brought a increase in status. It was abundantly clear that the overwhelming majority of informants considered money (preferably in large quantity) to be essential to happiness in life. This issue will be readdressed in due course.

In view of the long-term mining company emphasis on education, it seemed appropriate to assess relative educational level as a measure of status in the Cité. In one effort to gauge this empirically, informants in a sample of 95 married male workers were asked if workers with greater education were more respected in the Cité than those with lesser education. A minuscule 4% of the sample said that a worker with greater education would not be more respected. However, only a modest 38% said that such a worker would, in fact, be more respected. The majority (54%) said that whether an "educated" worker is more highly respected depends on other factors.

This was also true when responses were analyzed by age group (Appendix D, Table 27). However, when responses were analyzed by informants' ethnicity (Appendix D, Table 25) and generation in Gécamines (Appendix D, Table 26), there were interesting variations. For instance, fully 60% of Sanga informants agreed that additional education in itself brought greater respect in the community, while only 20%

of their Ndembu neighbors thought that to be the case. Again, the variations in patterns of responses based on ethnicity proved difficult to explain satisfactorily, and I concluded that other variables were probably more important.

What the data did seem to indicate, however, was that longevity of family residence in Gécamines (i.e. generation) had some consistent effect on belief. (While only 40% of first generation and 37% of second generation informants thought education in itself enhanced an individual's status, fully 50% of third generation informants thought so.) Also, while patterns of belief varied between the various age groups, the oldest workers (ages 51-61) seemed significantly more inclined to credit education with the ability to enhance an individual's status. While the basis for this belief remains obscure, it may well reflect the fact that education was much more useful in obtaining good employment in times past than is the case in the Zaire of the 1980s (Schatzberg, 1988:140).

Although more relevant to cadre than to blue-collar workers per se, it seemed evident that a significant social distinction in Shaba revolved around the category of "intellectual" and around the presence or absence of an enseignement supérieur (university-level) education. The two concepts were not necessarily coterminous in the common view, but they certainly overlapped in great degree. The concept of the "intellectual" in Zaire has been discussed in detail elsewhere (Vwakyanakazi, 1982; Young and Turner,

1985:113-117). To residents of Kolwezi, an intellectual was a person who had completed at least most of his (or her) secondary school education, and had an interest in the affairs of the wider world. (One frequent characteristic of a young "intellectual" in my experience was an insistence on the use of the French language, and at times, an exaggeratedly formal French.) The term "intellectual" was generally used as a mark of respect. It was rarely applied to Gécamines blue-collar workers by Kolwezi residents.

I am reminded here of a long discussion in a Kolwezi suburb in March 1988 with an elder of a religious group. Although I had not asked the question, the elder (himself a university-trained economist) took great pains to assure me that there were many "intellectuals" in the ranks of his religious group. We laboriously searched a long list of members, while he pointed out various doctors, professors, colleagues and other "intellectuals." It was very important to him that I understand that his group included its fair share of "intellectuals."

The social gulf between Zairois males who have obtained an enseignement supérieur education and those who have not is very wide. This was evident in two contexts. First, most of the cadre positions in Gécamines required such an education. Persons filling these positions were typically hired as young university graduates, who started work at the lowest cadre grade (class 3) and worked their way up. There were, however, quite a few cadre who were initially hired as

blue-collar workers but who had been advanced from the ranks of workers. These typically lacked an enseignement supérieur education. Virtually all of these remained at the lowest cadre grade (class 3). Informants said that the university-educated cadre were often very condescending in their attitudes toward their fellow cadre who lacked such education, and that the members of the two groups rarely enjoyed close social relations.

There are of course exceptions. I was familiar with a group of men (aged about 35-40) who were members of a basketball team in Kolwezi. They were also good friends who frequently enjoyed each others' company in casual social events in each others' homes. All the members that I knew were Gécamines cadre or "professionals" (i.e. secondary-school teachers). The cadre members, however, included several who were not enseignement supérieur educated.

A second example of this difference was the almost unconscious assumption by most of the university-trained Zairois researchers with whom I worked that their university education automatically entitled them to more privilege and more money. Several research assistants, for instance, insisted that their university training entitled them to higher salaries than the other research assistants who did not have such education, though the work was exactly the same for all. Likewise, on several occasions, "educated" Zairois informants made disparaging remarks about "uneducated" (but very well-to-do) merchants. The general

attitude seemed to be that the merchants, lacking a university education, were somehow not entitled to their wealth.

This latter attitude was exacerbated by economic conditions in Zaire. Purchasing power of the salaries of state employees (such as government administrators and school teachers) had been badly eroded by inflation in the 1980s. In a social environment in which status was conveyed by symbols of material wealth, many "educated" public servants had seen a sharp decline in their apparent status. On the other hand, some merchants had continued to prosper. The comparison was painful to many informants.

In view of the respect normally afforded to the elderly in rural central Africa, research effort was directed toward determining whether age itself increased an individual's status in the urban industrial community. Participant observation in a wide range of contexts suggested that deference to age was indeed a community norm. One obvious exception to the norm; however, was the situation in which the social status of the junior was markedly superior to that of the senior. A high state official, for instance, or a young but senior Gécamines cadre, would occasionally treat an older man with obvious contempt. But this was rather uncommon in my experience.

One interesting observation in research was the strikingly different manner of responding to questions on the part of informants in different age groups, particularly

among male subjects. Younger workers and dependents would characteristically respond to simple questions with short and relatively to-the-point answers, although responses of minors and very young workers were often frustratingly vague. In contrast, many of the older workers, particularly those having had a rural childhood, were very loquacious, even when the question seemed to require a limited, concise response. Typically, the older informant would consider the question from several perspectives, often citing personal experiences which might or might not appear directly related to the issue at hand. Sometimes we had to very carefully and patiently pry out the older man's final answer on the subject.

Among other things, this is probably a reflection of cultural norms in which elders are expected to dominate conversations and juniors are expected to hold their peace. (I have, however, heard young men in Kolwezi speak very disparagingly about the pointless rambling of ignorant old men. Individuals with "education" did expect to be treated with deference solely as a result of that education, regardless of their age.)

Informants in a sample of 95 married male workers were asked if older workers were more respected in the Cité on account of their age. Not unexpectedly, a majority (52%) of informants said that respect for individuals in the Cité required qualities other than age alone. However, an impressive 41% of informants agreed without further

qualification that increased age brought increased respect. Informants in a smaller sample of 32 married male workers were asked if older workers are respected more than younger workers in the work place. Patterns in these answers were slightly different as shown here:

Yes, older workers get more respect--47% of sample

No, older workers don't get more respect--22% of sample

Enhanced respect depends on other factors--31% of sample

As in the case of "education," and "money," there were wide variations by ethnic group in patterns of informant response to these questions (Appendix D, Table 28). Likewise, there were differences in patterns of responses offered by informants in different generations (Appendix D, Table 29). Still, roughly the same number of informants in each generation (50-53%) agreed that enhanced respect for individuals required other qualities than advanced age alone.

When the data were analyzed by age group (Appendix D, Table 30), one reasonably clear trend emerged. The younger the informant, the more likely he was to believe that old age alone brought increased respect. The older the informant, the more likely he was to deny the validity of this assertion. (These phenomena seem so typical of the human condition as to require no further comment here.)

Informants in a sample of 95 married male workers were asked if certain kinds of work brought more respect than others. Just over a quarter (26.3%) of the informants

answered to the effect that no work is inherently less prestigious. Several informants observed that "respect is given to the man, not to the work." Others quoted the Swahili saying "muntu ni muntu" ("man is man"--i.e. deserving respect for that status). However, the majority of informants clearly envisioned certain kinds of work as more prestigious than others.

When asked what types of work generate the most respect, informants mentioned those listed in Table 5.36. The salient characteristics of the most respected work were (in general) some combination of high salary, relative autonomy and considerable education. Interestingly, informants were less apt to mention (as prestigious) the kind of position whose incumbent wielded coercive power, and more apt to mention positions in which the incumbent served as a patron upon whom others depended for disbursement of valued services.

Informants in the same sample were asked what kind of work generated least respect (Table 5.37). Again, a substantial percentage (33.7%) replied to the effect that no work is in itself less prestigious, or that all work (or all men) are worthy of respect. The majority of responses, however, suggested that the types of work involved in the rather servile rendering of services (particularly cleaning services), and the lowest-paid positions requiring least education and skills, were also the positions commanding least respect for their incumbents. This ramified into

Table 5.36. Married male worker responses to the question, "what types of work generate the most respect?" (A number of informants provided more than one type of work in their response. Each type is listed separately below.)

<u>Type of work</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample providing this response</u>
No work generates more respect than others/all work (or all men) are worthy of equal respect	26.3%
Medical workers	18.9%
Doctors	14.7%
Directors/chiefs/team chiefs	16.8%
Office workers	11.6%
Teachers	11.6%
Skilled workers (electricians, carpenters, masons, etc.)	10.5%
Engineers	9.5%
(Private enterprise) entrepreneurs	8.4%
Senior political authorities	4.2%
(Mining company) industrial guards	3.2%
Secret police (<u>securité</u>)	2.1%
Cadre	2.1%
Gécamines employees in general	2.1%
Mine workers	2.1%
Cantine clerks	2.1%
Party workers	2.1%
Chauffers	2.1%
Artisans/artists	2.1%
Well-paid work in general	2.1%
<u>Chefs de rue</u>	1.1%
<u>Chefs de cité</u>	1.1%
Union representatives	1.1%
Work requiring long study	1.1%
Independent skilled workers	1.1%
Cadre inspectors	1.1%
Storekeepers	1.1%
Food distribution work	1.1%
Don't know/no response	11.6%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table 5.37. Married male worker responses to the question, "what types of work generate the least respect?" (A number of informants provided more than one type of work in their response. Each type is listed separately below.)

<u>Type of work</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample providing this response</u>
No work generates less respect than others/all work (or all men) are worthy of equal respect	33.7%
Cleaners	22.1%
- toilet cleaners	- 10.5%
- street cleaners/drain cleaners	- 7.4%
- cleaning personnel	- 4.2%
Manual labor/unskilled labor	20.0%
Maintenance work	7.4%
Door keepers (" <u>plantons</u> ")	6.3%
Personal servants (" <u>domestiques</u> ")	5.3%
Canteen clerks	3.2%
Taxi-bus organizers	3.2%
Smugglers/thieves	3.2%
<u>Chariot</u> pushers	3.2%
Teachers	3.2%
Poorly paid positions	2.1%
Office workers	1.1%
Mine workers	1.1%
(Mining company) industrial guards	1.1%
Medical workers	1.1%
Vehicle drivers	1.1%
Sentinels	1.1%
Amateur actors	1.1%
Roadside peddlers of (usually stolen) gasoline (" <u>kadhafi</u> ")	1.1%
No response/don't know	12.6%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

local conceptions of the division of labor by gender: informants frequently noted that cleaning up after others was "women's work." This also ramified into relative levels of salary and material conditions of life.

In the course of research into the status-producing implications of relative wealth, education, and social position, informants frequently hastened to warn that it was not these things which primarily determined whether a man was "respected" in the Cité. Rather, informants insisted that personal qualities--moral qualities--were more important. Eventually, of course, the research got around to assessing informant's views on this subject in a somewhat more empirical manner. A sample of 95 married male workers was queried as to which type of person received most respect, and least respect, in the Cité. (Informant's replies are listed in Appendix D, Tables 7 and 8.) Likewise, informants in a smaller sample were asked what individual qualities were least appreciated in the Cité. (Their replies are listed in Appendix D, Table 9.)

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the data presented in these three tables. First, of course, is the fact that personal moral qualities do seem to play an important role in the degree of respect informants say they accord to others in the community.

Residents of the Cité clearly valued the qualities of dignity and maturity. They also valued respectful, generous people. In this, their responses in formal interview were

very much in accord with the general patterns of behavior observed in the community. Likewise, those who drank to excess, were noise-makers and brawlers, or thieves were all characteristically excoriated in the conversations of Cité residents. (The Cité had an abundance of individuals who fit each of these categories.) Cité informants seemed to maintain a view that "youth" and "responsible adulthood" were two very distinct categories. For a mature adult to indulge in the excesses of youth (in excessive drinking, brawling and overt whoring) seemed to be particularly shameful.

Informants' views regarding relative status and respect in the community also hinged around wealth and social position--perhaps to a greater degree than they consciously realized. Additional respect was, in fact, accorded to the wealthy (although perhaps this respect depended on a conjunction of wealth with certain norms of expected behavior).

This latter inclination is illustrated in the case of a local notable. When informants were asked to describe the three most important individuals in the Kolwezi area, many mentioned a merchant named Mutatshi, who owned a chain of general goods shops. While Mutatshi's presumed great wealth certainly enhanced his prestige, he was also reputed to care about the wellbeing of his customers by offering merchandise at lower prices. I had the impression that this latter

behavior contributed as much to his reputation as the wealth itself.

Respect also clearly accrued to individuals with some rank in the local social or political hierarchy. At the same time, many informants seemed to believe in an ethic of egalitarianism (i.e. men are valuable as men, regardless of wealth or position, and all are deserving of respect) but this was at best an idealized norm. Still, the residents of the community put a premium on establishing and maintaining good interpersonal relations with those around them. Individuals whose behavior particularly promoted such relations were respected and admired.

The relative importance of good interpersonal relations and of money is partially seen in informants answers to the question, "what makes life agreeable?" (Appendix D, Table 10). In a sample of 95 married male workers, 11 individuals (11.6% of the sample) made some reference or inference to the criticality of good relations with other people. On the other hand, 66% of the sample either made specific mention of money as essential to an "agreeable life," or alluded in some way to the necessity of money.

This was amplified by the responses provided later in a smaller sample. Informants were asked if they were generally happy with their lives. Some 28% replied that they were, while some 59% of the informants said they were not. (Specific responses are listed in Appendix D, Table 11.) When asked to explain their answers, the vast majority

either directly or indirectly expressed their desire for more money. Lack of money was the overwhelmingly critical factor in their discontent.

Informants in the sample of 95 married male workers were asked how they would change their lives if afforded the chance. Some 56% made direct, specific mention of a change in the material conditions of life. No other single category of response was even close. (Within this group, some 23% said they would build a bigger house, smaller numbers indicated they would improve their diets, purchase automobiles, send their children to better schools, or clothe themselves more elaborately.)

In sum, several conclusions are warranted based on the foregoing discussion. First is the fact that boundaries of social class are ambiguous in the beliefs of our informants, other than in terms of the distinction between blue-collar workers and cadre. The primary basis for this latter distinction is material wealth. The seemingly incomparably (and unjustifiably) greater wealth of the cadre is greatly envied and somewhat resented by many blue-collar workers.

Within the Cité itself, differentials in status derive from gender, age (to a certain extent), education (to a certain extent), type of work, relative wealth and position in the hierarchy of the mining company or political party. While male blue-collar workers in general tend to believe that moral qualities are key to an individual's status, and

that is borne out in observation of community behavior, the importance of money itself is difficult to overlook.

The vast majority of blue-collar workers were quick to express a strong sentiment of deprivation. An oft-heard phrase was "je souffre" ("I suffer"). Even so, what seemed to be suffering most was not the flesh, but the self-esteem of informants. They were frustrated in their desire to achieve a standard of living to which they believed they were entitled. This "deprivation" was relative. With their homes, utilities, medical care, food rations, regular salaries, and expensive consumer goods, the Gécamines blue-collar workers maintained a standard of living considerably superior to that of the vast majority of their urban fellow-citizens elsewhere in southern Zaire.

However, the blue-collar worker tended to compare his situation not to that of the underemployed day laborer in one of Kolwezi's poorer suburbs, but to the Gécamines cadre with his comfortable home and car in the ville, or the affluent Kinshasa family portrayed in advertisements on Zairian television. These "reference others" had seemingly obvious and unlimited access to the critical tool necessary to exploit the cultural environment of urban Zaire: money.

CHAPTER 6
CONSIDERATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTARY

General

The discussion now turns to a generalized consideration of the Gécamines blue-collar workers in their cultural milieu, and to a brief assessment of the relevance of patterns of belief, behavior and social change evident in that population.

As we have seen, the Gécamines worker is part of an industry that first coalesced in central Africa in this century, in the years just prior to World War I. That industry began to acquire a stabilized work-force only in the 1930s. However, the European authorities of the colonial minerals industry pursued the establishment of a stable urban labor force with considerable vigor and intelligence. By the mid 1950s, they had clearly succeeded. The copper mining industry, almost solely responsible for the urbanization of the Copperbelt, had created a large industrial workforce of indigenous Zairois.

Much of this success was due to deliberate mining industry policies designed to strip employees from their rural cultural base and inculcate new values and loyalties suited to the demands of Western-style heavy industry. This resulted in practices which were at best authoritarian, at

worst, starkly coercive. Socialization of employees occurred in work contexts, in schools, in the camp churches, and even in the residential neighborhood. Not only did the company pursue the "hearts and minds" of workers, but those of their wives and (especially) of their children as well.

The ability of the mining company authorities (and, for that matter, their desire) to continue such policies lapsed in the independent Zaire of the 1970s. By that point, the industrial labor force had comprised a stable urban population for more than a generation, and had absorbed the relevant values in considerable degree. While the mining company has continued to hire employees with no previous family commitment to life in urban southern Zaire, the majority of mining company employees today are themselves the offspring of mining company employees.

In colonial times, the degree to which the Belgian-run copper mining industry sought to transfer employee loyalty to the company was probably unique in the underdeveloped world, as was the sheer scale of various support systems imposed on employees and their dependents. Neither the Bolivian mining companies described, for instance, by Nash (1974) nor even the copper mining companies in nearby Zambia (Chizinga, 1982) provided a management so concerned for the ideological development and material well-being of its indigenous employees. To be sure, this was not a reflection of sheer humanitarianism. The basic motivation was profit, but the result was an urban population subjected to long-

term and pervasive socializing pressures. These pressures promoted and emphasized norms of belief and behavior more characteristic of urban, industrial Belgium than of rural Zaire.

The unique nature of the copper mining company socialization processes, applied to generations of employees, suggests that dynamics of culture change in this population may be different in degree (if not in kind) from social dynamics evident elsewhere in urban Africa. While that difference cannot be explored here, future theoretical treatment may well find Kolwezi's cultural milieu better contrasted with "company towns" in Europe or North America (Pope, 1942; Walker, 1950; Lentz, 1958; Allen, 1966; Garner, 1984) than with non industrial urban centers elsewhere in Africa. Even so, the social reality of the urban Zairian Copperbelt is matched in considerable degree by urban centers elsewhere in Zaire (Nzongola, 1975; Schatzberg, 1980; J. MacGaffey, 1987).

The cultural diversity of the mining company work force in Kolwezi warrants specific note. While the rural communities from which indigenous mining company employees were drawn shared many similarities in economy and other institutions, there were profound cultural differences as well, extending through such fundamental domains as community history, social organization, and language. Moreover, some of the communities had traditions of substantial mutual antagonism; others had traditions of

political and cultural dominance over their neighbors. Still others had traditions of fierce resistance to domination by other groups. The creation of an industrial labor force required not only an accommodation on the part of rural central Africans to selected norms of western European urban behavior, but a profound adjustment to local cultural heterogeneity as well.

While labor recruitment in the early years of the mining company was very coercive, such coercion diminished in the 1930s. To be sure, colonial policies pursued up to the time of national independence were designed to push able-bodied males into European wage-labor employment (Fetter, 1983). Yet, by the mid 1940s, the mining company was only one of many wage-labor alternatives, and it is difficult to sustain an argument against the proposition that recruitment was essentially voluntary by that point.

Mining company employment seemed to offer sufficient incentives to draw prospective employees from considerable distances. A substantial proportion of those employees remained with the mining company beyond their initial three-year contracts. (For that matter, when they left the employ of the mining company, many settled with their families in urban southern Zaire.) Despite the authoritarian social policies of the colonial mining industry, perhaps even because of them, employee acceptance of innovation occurred across a very wide spectrum of behavior. The durability and

finality of this acceptance of innovation was self-evident in the population growth of urban southern Zaire.

When research for this study was conducted in Kolwezi (in 1987 and 1988), the overall objective was not to identify the motivation for urban migration, but to assess belief and behavior in the existing social milieu of a mining company camp, a community encompassing an essentially stable urban population. We turn now to a consideration of that population, with emphasis on the primary unit of analysis--the married, male blue-collar worker. This is done in consonance with the general domains of behavior selected for particular emphasis in the preceding chapter. However, discussion will be preceded by a more general assessment of agents and processes of change.

The Major Change-Inducing Pressure

The imposition of the European colonial state also required a redefinition by African populations of their social universe and its attendant institutions. Some populations were affected more rapidly and more profoundly than others, but all had to adapt in some measure to new political and economic dispensations. While the colonial state imposed limits on certain types of previously accepted behavior, it also provided heretofore unavailable alternatives. This was certainly true in the economic realm.

Development of Western-oriented colonial economies challenged the relevance of various traditional norms, undermined redistributive networks and monopolies previously controlled by high-status members in traditional societies, and provided alternative (achievement-based) symbols and media of status. All of these issues have been thoroughly addressed elsewhere (Van Binsbergen and Geschiere, 1985) and need not be recapitulated here, other than to note that the process was neither uniform in time and space nor were the innovations willingly accepted by many in the early years (Boyd, 1982).

Among the major early challenges presented to colonial mining company authorities were those of finding indigenous employees, then of inducing them to adapt to unfamiliar work regimens, non-traditional patterns of authority and novel compensations and incentives for labor. In the Belgian colony, the earliest strategies relied heavily on coercion. Predictably, the results were disappointing: rates of death and desertion were high and individual output was mediocre at best. Employee acceptance of innovation was grudging and temporary. Very few were willing to endure more than one short stint in the mines and refineries.

The various changes in mining company practice associated with the stabilization policy of the late 1920s also (eventually) brought far more effective incentives to acceptance of innovation. These included, particularly, a substantial enhancement in the material conditions of life

for employees and their families. At the same time, ideological conditioning stressed the material, technical and social superiority of a European way of life, "kizungu."

The life-style associated with "kizungu" was duplicated (in some small measure) in company provisions for indigenous employees. Lest there be any doubt of the attractiveness of kizungu, the company's European employees represented kizungu in its most materially alluring aspect. They lived in huge homes in racially segregated neighborhoods in almost unimaginable wealth and luxury, attended by black servants. The ideological conditioning was reinforced by the mining company schools (administered mainly by Belgian Roman Catholic clergy) and by the Roman Catholic churches in the camps--the only churches allowed in the worker communities (Markowitz, 1973).

While the mining company's various practices certainly did not produce communities of happy, "black European" laborers, company employees and their families did adapt quickly and thoroughly to the unique, communitarian wage-labor environment; perhaps too well to suit company management. Between the mid 1930s and mid 1940s, there was a considerable degree of labor unrest on the Shaban Copperbelt with primary complaints revolving around the inadequacy of remuneration (Higginson, 1979, 1988; Perrings 1979).

Even so, the demands of insufficiently compensated industrial workers served to illustrate the fact that mining

company employees accepted in increasing degree the premise that an "agreeable" lifestyle included the amenities of urban living on the model of western Europe or North America. This required money, material goods and European-style services as symbols of status. Both self-esteem and prestige had come to be measured in the relative opulence of the life-style.

Nor do the activities of rural villagers hold much attraction for today's urban industrial workers in Shaba. Hyden (1980:162) cites a 1965 survey of industrial workers in Kenya and Uganda which determined that about three-fourths of respondents maintained their own agricultural plots ("shambas"). The figure for Zairian mining company workers in the Kolwezi of 1988 was no more than 15-20%.

It should not be assumed, however, that the various innovations were manufactured out of whole cloth. While traditional central African societies lacked the European-imposed differential in sheer material wealth, status in traditional contexts was nonetheless bound up in the control of resources, and conveyed in possession of symbolic objects (W. MacGaffey, 1986; Van Binsbergen and Geschiere, 1985). This afforded sufficient prototype for innovation.

The quest for enhanced status evident among individuals who assumed European behavioral norms is hardly unique to the Shaban Copperbelt, having been noted in on the Zambian Copperbelt of the 1950s (Epstein, 1959; Mitchell and Epstein, 1959; Mitchell, 1966a) and in the urban Zaire of

the 1950s (Pons, 1969). It warrants emphasis that the Zairian copper industry work force has been more deliberately and intensively subjected than most to such change-inducing pressures. Moreover, that pressure continues, being now applied by advertising media and school experiences and the general urban milieu. These all exert a persistent (if subtle) influence.

The change-inducing pressure has been so successful that Gécamines worker communities lack an analogue to the "cholla" (traditional Andean) subculture found in Andean mining communities (Nash, 1974). I would conclude that the quest for status and the "good life" bound up in "kizungu" (perhaps now best glossed as "modernity") is the most powerful change-inducing pressure in the Cité.

The second most important pressure is, in fact, related to (sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting with) the first. This is the conger of pressures associated with the norms of Western Christianity.

A prevalent current view in academic circles, drawing inspiration from materialist models of social reality, posits that African religious belief exists, and changes, to rationalize social organization or relations of production (Horton, 1971, 1975a, 1975b; Fabian, 1971; Van Binsbergen, 1981; W. MacGaffey, 1986). However, such views do not (in my estimation) explain, among Kolwezi informants, a very real hunger for spiritual experience, for ultimate truth, for practical directions in decisions of life and for a

"community" free of corruption, deception, jealousy, hate and sorcery.

The "religious" innovations in belief among Kolwezi informants drew their prototypes from various sources: from traditional beliefs in a Divine Being and traditional explanations for supernatural phenomena, from traditional views of the role of chiefs, from idealized notions of social relations in traditional kinship-based communities.

A large proportion of the Cité's residents were regular, active participants in Christian religious groups of various sorts. For many of these, church activities were the primary preoccupation in life outside the work place, but even those who were not regular participants frequently justified their behavior in terms of Christian norms, or condemned others for failure to adhere to such norms.

Other ideologies of foreign origin exerted some influence on behavior in Kolwezi. Occasionally, an informant displayed an interest in Marxist thought, or in other less secular religions. Still, the "Christian" sects and churches seemed to dominate this domain of the thinking of Cité residents, and seemed to be increasing in size and prominence. The significance of this change-inducing pressure may be unique to southern Zaire. (It was my subjective impression from very limited observation in the mining communities of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe that the prominence and vigor of the Christian churches were

distinctly less, though I had no way to verify such impressions by empirical measurement.)

Having addressed the two major change-inducing pressures, the discussion turns to brief overviews of the direction of change in several domains.

World View, Religion and Change

While the Christian churches have come to dominate the realm of "religion" in urban Kolwezi, and have provided an idealized Christian-based ethic of interpersonal relations, they have not eliminated traditional notions of the supernatural. Rather, some "Western" Christian notions and some traditional central African notions have been at least partially reformulated into a new synthesis. Among Kolwezi informants, religious beliefs from both traditions coexist in the same minds. Informants seemed able to appropriate components of either system, (or both systems) with little difficulty. This phenomenon has, of course, been reported in other African urban settings (du Toit, 1980). Let us consider some specific examples in Kolwezi itself.

From the "Christian" system, informants have adopted a perception of the Supreme Being as a personalized God, personally accessible in prayer and worship. This is an improvement in access over the otiose, generalized, inaccessible Supreme Being reflected in the beliefs of many traditional central African societies. Acceptance of the

innovation offers obvious advantages, but a prototype for a Supreme Being clearly existed in traditional belief.

A personalized relationship with God reduces dependence on other supernatural powers for intercession or assistance. Hence, contact with the living spirits of deceased ancestors and nature spirits is rendered less important. This direction of change in belief was strongly encouraged in Kolwezi by the teachings of the churches, which excoriated much traditional belief as "primitive," "backward," and "satanic," the opposite of "kizungu." Still, informants wrestled with the widely-held notion that the power of spirits of deceased ancestors and nature spirits provided more satisfying explanations for certain supernatural phenomena, and that access to these beings can be occasionally useful. One obvious alternative among Kolwezi residents was to redefine nature spirits as the evil spirits described in the Bible. Again, this is an innovation which could be built upon the preexisting prototype of spirit-beings, allowing both explanation and accommodation to "kizungu."

Neither Western Christianity nor Western medicine provided much assistance in alleviating the horrifying condition of infertility or in ameliorating certain other physical conditions. Desperate individuals would risk being labeled "backward heathen" ("féticheurs") to obtain relief through the ministration of a mufumu (traditional healer). This was also particularly true in informants' quests for

protection against sorcery. Likewise, an individual who lacked other apparently effective leverage over the affection of a marital partner (where relatives, church elders or the state offered little recourse) might well have considered supernatural "medicine" (dawa) to retain or restore that affection, or to punish the individual responsible for the intolerable situation.

One "problem" for which Western Christianity clearly had limited solutions in Kolwezi was that of increasing disparities in material wealth. Neither could the Christianized ethic of interpersonal relations suppress the dynamic of invidious comparison. This resulted in a profound fear of sorcery, a traditional pattern of belief which may actually have acquired greater relevance and power in the urban, industrial context. While the threat of sorcery seemingly did little to promote large-scale redistribution of wealth, it prevented many possessors of wealth from feeling secure and contented. Of course, a portion of these sought divine protection in the Christian churches. Others resorted to more traditional protective measures.

A strong fear of sorcery, even among highly educated and westernized populations, is certainly not unique to southern Zaire. Beliefs and behavior relating to sorcery have been long recognized as important aspects of African social reality, both in urban and in rural situations (Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Krige, 1947; Wilson, 1951; Nadel,

1952; Hulstaert, 1965; Marwick, 1965a, 1965b; Mitchell, 1965). Dynamics of this behavior have also been described in world-wide contexts ranging from native societies of North America (Kluckhohn and Leighton, 1962) to industrial worker populations in the Andes (Nash, 1974) to urban New Guinea (Rew, 1974). In the peculiar social circumstances of present day Zaire, we may note Nadel's (1952) perceptive observation that accusations of witchcraft (sorcery) permit the continuance of maladjusted institutions by deflecting tensions and aggressive impulses.

Besides concern for sorcery, the aspects of traditional world-view that seemed most durable among male informants were the "vital dichotomies" that were not directly challenged by western Christianity. For instance, the distinction between "maleness" and "femaleness" and that between "fecundity" and "sterility" (Epstein, 1981).

As we have seen, in the former case, the churches may have substantially assisted in an urban redefinition of male and female roles. The belief in the separateness of the roles remained profound, regardless of informants' longevity of urban residence. As for the issue of fecundity, informants clearly desired large numbers of children, even in cases where economic security of aged parents was not an issue. Nor did longevity of family residence in the urban industrial environment challenge this ideal. Similar belief and behavior has been reported in other African urban contexts (Thompson, 1978).

The vigor and influence of the Christian churches in Kolwezi was an aspect of behavior that had not been adequately anticipated prior to commencing this research. In fact, evaluation of "religion" as a key independent variable in predicting behavior could have been a singularly valuable contribution of the study. Unfortunately, the sample of informants developed early in the study lacked sufficient depth in the various religious groups to permit confident generalization. Still, when dependent variables were correlated with religious grouping, there were substantial variations in belief and behavior.

Ethnicity, Kinship and Change

The relevance of ethnicity to social behavior in Zaire has been over-emphasized to the point of stereotype. While ethnicity was certainly a prime basis for political mobilization in the periods immediately preceding and following national independence, the likelihood that ethnicity could play the same role again is open to question (Young, 1976; Schatzberg, 1980; Young and Turner, 1985; Willame, 1972).

Even so, we noted that ethnicity does bear upon behavior in the Cité. To residents themselves, ethnicity is an important aspect of individual self identity. Informants, in general, were very much inclined to apply "tribal" labels to themselves. (Similar behavior has been reported in neighboring Zambia, Van Binsbergen, 1985:199.)

Coethnics were also said to partake of a distinct "mentality" which provided a common social frame of reference and seemed to facilitate communication. Too, there were widely shared stereotypes of supposed peculiarities inherent in the individuals of the different ethnic groups.

When belief and behavior were assessed in consonance with the variable of ethnicity, we noted variations in patterns in a wide range of dependent variables (i.e. friendship choice, urban-rural linkages, male-female relations, and status-producing characteristics). Yet, it would be very easy to overstate the degree of cultural variation based on ethnicity. The most that can be said about the variations in belief and behavior measured in the Cité is that informants in certain ethnic groups had a somewhat higher incidence of particular inclinations than informants in others. In most cases, the "center of mass" of informants' belief and behavior was very similar, if not identical. When it came to actual behavior in such telling categories as friendship choice, considerations of coethnicity seemed clearly subordinate to other factors.

Mining company social policy since the late 1920s has been deliberately crafted to deemphasize ethnicity and to transfer ethnic loyalties to the mining company itself. The ways by which this was done included the deliberate mixing of workers of differing ethnicity in the work place,

residential neighborhood and school, and the imposition of a new vehicular language.

While no informant in the Kolwezi of the late 1980s claimed to be of the "Gécamines tribe" (and most would have found such a label amusing) the industry had certainly succeeded in creating a population of employees who shared far more formal ties within the employee population than with any external societies or ethnic groupings. The shared values and commonalities in patterns of behavior went beyond the mere manifestation of similar reactions to routinely encountered urban situations. The common culture extended from childhood experience in the camp neighborhood and school, to a common language in the home, neighborhood and work place, to common economic roles for adults of each gender, to common religious experience and expression, to a shared community authority structure, to shared grievances. Despite the ethnic heterogeneity, the cultural homogeneity in the Cité was striking. The degree to which differing ethnic traditions influenced behavior seemed, in the main, remarkably low.

There were continuing incidents of favoritism in the camp and in the work place based upon ethnic discrimination. Even so, the majority of informants (whether or not they practiced such favoritism) clearly indicated that such practices were "wrong" and bitterly resented being victimized by them. Likewise, while ethnic stereotypes persisted, informants were very self-conscious in repeating

them, unless driven by intense emotion or in jovial exchanges among close comrades.

Informants tended to view ethnic particularism as "backward" and essentially incompatible with "kizungu." (Interestingly, the racism and ethnic particularism of Europeans themselves were not preserved in the locally redefined norms of western behavior subsumed by "kizungu.) It is, however, important to note that neither belief and behavior regarding this aspect of social reality, nor behavior itself, were necessarily consistent among informants.

Industrial workers in urban Kolwezi continued to value bonds of close kinship. The significance of such relationships did not seem to diminish with longevity of family residence in the urban, industrial environment--it may even have been enhanced. However, the structure and substance of such relationships had certainly undergone profound redefinition, departing dramatically from rural models.

Lineal descent as an organizing principle seemed to have diminished to the point of irrelevance for most of the urban population. The roles that corporate kinship groups may once have played in rural areas: regulation of marriage, control of land and land use rights, hunting and fishing rights, access to other renewable resources and access to the local ancestral spirits, were just not germane to the daily life of Cité residents. Informants had little

interest in high-status posts in the rural social organization of their ancestral communities, and virtually no expectation of inheritance from kinfolk in ascending generations (other than biological "fathers").

Yet, informants in the Cité clearly recognized personal responsibilities for mutual assistance among relatives. Moreover, such relatives were generally defined bilaterally, outwardly from ego, with no clear tendency to favor father's or mother's line. This manner of reckoning relations tended to assure that informants had large, dispersed personal networks of relatives, some in rural areas, others elsewhere in urban Zaire. Informants could activate these relationships to accommodate a variety of personal needs. To a degree, informants developed kin-type bonds and expectations of mutual assistance with their closest friends, most of whom were not kinsmen but many of whom were co-religionists.

Church assemblies seemed to be performing many roles traditionally expected of close kin. These phenomena are not unique to Zaire. Charsley (1974), for instance, describes what might be called "retribalization" of otherwise ethnically heterogeneous populations in western Uganda around Pentecostal religious groups. Similar behavior has been reported among Zionist sects in Southern Africa (Sundkler, 1976) and independent churches in West Africa (H.W. Turner, 1965). Nor are such phenomena exclusive to Africa. Roberts (1968) has attributed the impressive growth of Pentecostal sects in urban Guatemala to

efforts by individuals to attain kin-like social relations in an urban milieu.

The prototype for belief and behavior regarding kinship-type reciprocal responsibilities may have originated in the rural village, but social innovation in urban Zaire had allowed its extension to address the needs of relatively mobile individuals living in nuclear family units and irreversibly tied to an industrial economy, yet unable to assure personal economic self-sufficiency.

Male-Female Relations and Change

The changes of belief and behavior having to do with descent groupings (and related social organization) clearly ramified into the domain of male-female relations. Overlapping (and, to an extent) stimulating these changes was the redefinition of gender-based roles in the economy of household and community.

The general trend seemed to include a dramatic diminution of female participation in household production and increase in the status and authority of males. These trends were more, not less, pronounced among informants whose urban roots were deepest. Likewise, though females were considered by male informants to play a legitimate role in formal sector employment, the "appropriate" roles for women were typically said (by men) to be those which were subordinate and ancillary to men and involving light, indoor work.

It could be argued that women in the urban, industrial milieu of the Cité had fewer prerogatives, less status, and less economic and social leverage over their cultural environment than their analogues in rural villages of southern Shaba. Such an argument would be supported by observations elsewhere in urban and peri-urban central Africa (Epstein, 1981; Poewe, 1981).

While the predominance of men in central African wage labor has historical roots in colonial-era labor recruitment, the advent of national independence in Zaire does not seem to have fundamentally altered the pattern. To be sure, some women had achieved prominent positions in the party, in the state, and in public or private enterprise. Party propaganda did, on occasion, emphasize the equality and presumed opportunity for women, although the proportion of women actually represented in high state positions or in the mining company work force suggested tokenism at best. If significant change in beliefs about the role of women in the work place was occurring, it was certainly not readily evident in local behavior.

The realm of marital behavior, likewise, suggested a continuance of certain rather durable patterns. Perhaps the most evident of these was the continuing importance of the dow (dowry) in legitimizing marriage. The significance of the dow was apparently increasing in urban Kolwezi, with more emphasis on its material value. (The rural traditions of some ethnic groups, like the ARuund, required dots of

very nominal value, in contrast to current behavior among all groups in the Cité.)

Increases in the value of dowries demanded by urban families have been noted elsewhere in central Africa, particularly in Zambian industrial contexts. Mitchell (1961) attributed this phenomenon to the possibility that marriage was more stable in urban environments. Kapferer (1973) suggested that a wife's domestic work was of increased value in an urban milieu. I lack the data to evaluate Mitchell's proposition, but would agree with that of Kapferer in its relevance to urban Kolwezi.

Neither male nor female residents of the Cité married primarily to obtain profound companionship. Rather, marriage provided husband and wife an enhanced social status. A household also furnished an environment in which physical needs could be met in sanctioned ways, and in which children (preferably many) could be born and raised. If husband and wife became close, personal friends they were probably an exception to the general rule.

These patterns seem to prevail in rural and urban central Africa. However, the urban husband in Kolwezi probably enjoys more authority in the home than his rural equivalent. His enhanced role as economic provider is one reason, while another is the influence of the Christian churches. Related to these is the waning influence of traditional, rural-based social structure in the urban context. Another factor is the portrayal of idealized

families in advertising on national television--the pervasive influence of putative "kizungu."

The norms of sexual behavior in urban Kolwezi certainly differed between men and women. Informants accepted patterns of behavior in which men were sexually active with multiple women. Community opinion did not accept as "normal" a failure of a wife to be sexually faithful to one man. The degree to which this conformed to norms in rural communities was difficult to assess, although the urban environment certainly provided men with more options (and, perhaps, fewer negative sanctions) than village environments. There is no question that Western-style advertising gave considerable warrant to belief and behavior of urban males in this regard. As clearly portrayed in television, movies, magazines and billboards, young, beautiful and available women are a presumed aspect of the "good life" in kizungu.

Status and Interpersonal Relations

The results of long-term socializing pressures in the urban, industrial environment was perhaps nowhere more evident among informants than in the realm of personal status in the community. It was very clear in the minds of community residents that status was heavily (though not exclusively) bound up in material wealth. Status was conveyed in modern symbols of material wealth: European-style houses, automobiles, expensive electronic appliances

and stylish apparel. Important people had money, and people who had money were important.

Like wealth itself, most other obvious status-producing factors were based on individual achievement rather than ascription: upon rank in the party, government or corporation for instance, or upon high levels of education. Status also accrued, in some measure, from the nature of an individual's employment (although this category overlapped that of relative wealth and education). An individual who acted somewhat in the role of patron, furnishing valuable services to others, tended to be highly respected. (Medical personnel were a case in point.) An individual whose role demanded an obsequious service in a subordinate role to others (a street-cleaner, for instance, or a door keeper) tended to be less respected.

Although the importance of wealth and position in the estimation of status could hardly be overlooked, there was a strong undercurrent of opinion that all men are inherently deserving of respect, and that all work should be honored. While this might be a theme derived from central African tradition, it was also an aspect of behavior strongly recommended by the local Christian churches.

There were certain human qualities which seemed to be particularly valued in the Cité, regardless of other status-producing factors. Those who possessed these characteristics were almost invariably respected and sought out for advice. Of these, dignity and good manners--respect

for others--were clearly preeminent. When combined with advanced age, their possessors received considerable deference. I was somewhat surprised at the depth and prevalence of such beliefs. While analogous behavior was typical in the remote rural villages I had known in youth, the various pressures of the urban industrial environment seemed more likely to emphasize the value of hedonistic youth. Such was not the case here.

Language and Change

As we have seen, the most dramatic trend in language usage in the Cité involved the adoption of (Copperbelt) Swahili as the primary language in the home, neighborhood and work place. Even so, French, as the prestige language, was widely understood and used in urban Kolwezi. Use of French seemed to be increasing, both in the work place and in the home. (This latter trend was, however, more evident among elites than among Kolwezi residents generally.) Ancestral indigenous languages, while still widely used, were declining in importance and usage, although their disappearance was hardly imminent.

Similar trends have been noted in other African and third-world contexts. (Der-Houssikian [1968] has described linguistic change among rural immigrants to Mombasa, Kenya, noting a progression from monolingualism in the ancestral language to bilingualism with the vehicular language [Swahili] to monolingualism in the vehicular language.)

Copperbelt Swahili, imposed initially in the 1920s by mining company hierarchy as a language of control (Fabian, 1986), eventually became the vehicular language in the mining camp and urban neighborhood as well (and, ultimately, of urban southern Zaire generally). At one point it would have been the language of the sophisticated, urban elite, its use, a badge of elite status.

Swahili's widespread acceptance was probably also facilitated by the fact that it was "ethnically neutral" (Scotton, 1982). No resident of the mining camp interviewed in our census came from an ethnic group whose ancestral language was Swahili. Yet, Swahili was generally similar to the ancestral Bantu languages of mining company employees and could be learned rapidly by newly recruited workers. By the 1980s, it had become the maternal language of a large and growing urban population.

French is now the primary linguistic "badge" of elite status in Zaire (Yates, 1980). The infatuation with "kizungu" provides a corresponding infatuation with French, sometimes to the point of caricature. French is the language of "progress" and "opportunity" in Zaire. It seems likely that the use of French will continue to grow for these reasons. Language usage in the Kolwezi of the 1980s continued to be (as Scotton [1982] found in Kenya) somewhat differentiated along class lines: individuals in the lower socio-economic groupings spoke mainly Swahili; a significant

proportion of individuals in the higher socio-economic grouping spoke mainly French.

Class Consciousness and Change

The issue of "class" in Zaire is complicated by a host of local peculiarities and varying definitions. Under the influence of such scholars as the sociologist Mwabila Malela, many university-educated Zairois are inclined to categorize Zairian social reality in rather classical Marxist terms. In fact, "intellectuals" in Zaire delight in arguing this issue, revelling in the most arcane distinctions. Few medieval theologians could rival them.

However, the same is not true for the majority of mining company employees in Kolwezi. Schatzberg (1980:16-27) has rightly noted that analysis of African societies by class criteria is problematic. That is true in both emic and etic terms. While scholars have sought to find roots of class consciousness among Zairian industrial workers in the early years of the mining industry (Higginson, 1979; Perrings, 1979), there is at this time very little tangible "foliage" from such presumed "roots."

Informants in the Cité were instead inclined to divide their social universe into several vague and overlapping groups which turned on the axes of coercive power, wealth and social prestige. These resulted in groupings which may perhaps be somewhat analogous to such abstractions as "bourgeoisie," "proletariat," and "lumpenproletariat," but

class consciousness was missing. The "classes" did not necessarily possess boundaries corresponding to the social reality perceived by their presumed members. Further, they were extensively cross-cut by ties of kinship, affinity and personal friendships. Nor was it possible to find unambiguous "class" conflict over material resources in the Marxist sense. What was found, rather, were continually changing coalitions of patrons, brokers and clients (Boissevain, 1974) which "mined" the cultural milieu for political advantage, economic advantage and protection.

Like their fellow industrial workers in Zambia (Kapferer, 1978), blue-collar workers in urban southern Zaire perceived a considerable social and economic differentiation between themselves and the white-collar managers (cadre). The social position and material advantages of the cadre were much envied. Rather than class solidarity in striving for a share of the benefits, however, the situation produced either an effort on the part of workers to seek cadre rank or a grudging acceptance of the status quo. Assuredly, local officials in the state security apparatus would have viewed any effort to mobilize workers as anti-regime activity. Reprisals would undoubtedly have been swift and brutal.

Epilogue

It is appropriate to ask in closing if any of the significant independent variables: ethnicity, generation,

age and religion provide particularly useful insights into the nature and processes of social change in urban Kolwezi. Each of these variables has certainly offered opportunities to measure belief and behavior from differing perspectives. Each has disclosed interesting variations in patterns.

"Religion," alas, lacked sufficient samples to be adequately evaluated. "Ethnicity" disclosed considerable variation. Often, however, when belief and behavior were both measured in consonance with this variable, the difference was puzzlingly large. Here it is perhaps useful to recall MacGaffey's (1986:2) warning that

. . . the anthropologist can rarely say what anybody believes and has reason to think that belief varies not only from one individual to another but also from one situation to another.

Generation and age, on the other hand, seemed to be variables that provided more credible correlations between stated belief and observed behavior, but none of the variables could, in itself, be fully trusted to disclose reality.

Still, in the glow of satisfied fellowship around the half-empty pot of buchari, men share with their friends what is on their hearts. In the warm afternoon shade, over bottles of Simba beer, men cannot hide what is in their souls. It is my humble hope that I have accurately transcribed both.

APPENDIX A

DATA ON RESEARCH ASSISTANTS

Table A.1. Individual Zairois research assistants who conducted the research reflected in this study: relevant background data.

Age	Marital status	Education	Raised in a mining family?	Employment
<u>Males</u>				
22	married	diplomé	no	primary school teacher
23	single	diplomé	no	private tutor
27	married	diplomé	yes	store manager
28	single	licencié	no	secondary school teacher
29	single	licencié	no	secondary school teacher
30	single	licencié	no	secondary school teacher
30	single	licencié	no	secondary school teacher
31	married	G-3	no	secondary school teacher
32	married	diplomé	yes	primary school teacher
41	married	licencié	no	secondary school teacher
<u>Females</u>				
22	single	A-3	no	unemployed
22	single	diplomé	yes	primary school teacher
23	single	diplomé	yes	primary school teacher
24	single	diplomé	no	unemployed
25	married	diplomé	yes	secondary school teacher
26	single	licencié	no	secondary school teacher
27	married	licencié	no	housewife
31	married	3 yrs secondary	no	housewife

Legend of educational status:

Diplomé - Finished secondary school and attained the state diploma

Licencié - Finished five years of institut supérieure/university and attained licence degree

A-3 - Finished three-year technical school at secondary level

G-3 - Finished three-year course at institute supérieure/university level

Father's ethnicity	Mother's ethnicity	Spouse's ethnicity	Maternal language	Language now used at home
Luba-Shaba	Luba-Shaba	Luba-Shaba	KiLuba	French
Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	N/A	TshiLuba	Swahili
Luba-Shaba	Luba-Shaba	(1) Luba-Shaba (2) Luba-Kasai	KiLuba	Swahili
Luba-Shaba	Luba-Shaba	N/A	KiLuba	Swahili
Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	N/A	TshiLuba	Swahili
Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	N/A	TshiLuba	Swahili
KaRuund	KaRuund	N/A	URuund	Swahili/URuund
Luba-Shaba	Luba-Shaba	Luba-Shaba	KiLuba	Swahili
Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	Ndembu	TshiLuba	Swahili
Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	TshiLuba	Swahili
Luba-Shaba	Luba-Shaba	N/A	KiLuba	KiLuba
KaRuund	KaRuund	N/A	URuund	Swahili
Songye	Songye	N/A	KiSongye	Swahili
KaRuund	KaRuund	N/A	URuund	French
Ndembu	Ndembu	Luba-Kasai	Ndembu	Swahili
Luvale	Ndembu	N/A	Ndembu	Ndembu
Lulua	Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	TshiLuba	Swahili
Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	Luba-Kasai	TshiLuba	Swahili

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY DATA IN TABULAR FORM:
MARRIED MALE WORKERS IN THE
CITÉ GÉCAMINES KOLWEZI

Table B.1. Ages of married male workers in the Cité
Gécamines Kolwezi.

<u>Workers' Ages</u>	<u>Percentage of Married Male Workers (n=1569)</u>	<u>Workers' Ages</u>	<u>Percentage of Married Male Workers</u>
18	0.1	18-25	2.8
19	0	26-30	16.6
20	0	31-35	20.2
21	0.1	36-40	17.0
22	0.4	41-45	13.2
23	0.5	46-50	10.8
24	0.6	51-55	10.5
25	1.1	56-60	8.5
26	1.7	61-65	0.4
27	2.5		
28	3.8		
29	4.0		
30	4.6		
31	5.0		
32	3.7		
33	3.7	18-26	4.5
34	4.0	27-46	66.8
35	3.8	47-65	28.7
36	3.2		
37	3.7		
38	3.5		
39	3.7		
40	2.9		
41	3.0		
42	2.5		
43	3.0		
44	2.1		
45	2.6		
46	1.5		
47	1.9		
48	2.9		
49	2.8		
50	1.7		
51	2.4		
52	2.4		
53	2.0		
54	1.6		
55	2.1		
56	1.3		
57	3.2		
58	1.5		
59	1.7		
60	0.8		
61	0		
62	0.2		
63	0.1		
64	0		
65	0.1		

Source: Census of Cité Gécamines Kolwezi performed by
author, October-December 1987.

Table B.2. Years of work for married male Gécamines workers.

Years of Gécamines/ UMHK employment	Number of workers (n = 98)	Percent of total sample
3	1	1
4	1	1
5	2	2
6	1	1
7	2	2
8	4	4.1
9	9	9.2
10	4	4.1
11	1	1
12	2	2
13	4	4.1
14	4	4.1
15	4	4.1
16	4	4.1
17	5	5.1
18	4	4.1
19	0	0
20	3	3.1
21	2	2
22	1	1
23	3	3.1
24	7	7.1
25	8	8.2
26	1	1
27	4	4.1
28	0	0
29	1	1
30	1	1
31	2	2
32	1	1
33	1	1
34	2	2
35	1	1
36	3	3.1
37	1	1
38	0	0
39	2	2
40	0	0
41	1	1
42	0	0
43	0	0
44	1	1
1-5	4	4.1
6-10	20	20.4
11-15	15	15.3
16-20	16	16.3
21-25	21	21.4
26-30	7	7.1
31-35	7	7.1
36-40	6	6.1
41-45	2	2

Source: Sampling in 98 households in the Cite Gécamines Kolwezi performed by author, February-April 1988.

Table B.3. Ages at which present married male Gécamines workers were hired.

Age of worker at time of hiring	Number of workers (n = 98)	Percent of total sample
15	2	2
16	4	4.1
17	7	7.1
18	4	4.1
19	13	13.3
20	14	14.3
21	10	10.2
22	12	12.2
23	4	4.1
24	3	3.1
25	6	6.1
26	3	3.1
27	3	3.1
28	1	1
29	1	1
30	1	1
31	4	4.1
32	1	1
33	1	1
34	1	1
35	1	1
36	1	1
37	0	0
38	1	1
15-20	44	44.9
21-25	35	35.7
26-30	9	9.2
31-35	8	8.2
35-38	2	2

Source: Sampling in 98 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi performed by the author, February-April 1988.

Table B.4. Educational levels attained by married male workers in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

Years of school Attendance	Number of workers (n = 99)	Percent of total sample
0	8	8.1
1	0	0
2	3	3
3	4	4
4	5	5.1
5	6	6.1
6	7	7.1
7	3	3
8	4	4
9	9	9.1
10	10	10.1
11	10	10.1
12	15	15.2
13	11	11.1
14	2	2
15	1	1
16	0	0
17	1	1

Level of schooling attained	Number of workers (n = 99)	Percent of total sample
None	8	8.1
Primary 1-3	7	7.1
Primary 4-5	11	11.1
Completed primary	9	9.1
Secondary 1-2	12	12.1
Secondary 3-4	33	33.3
Secondary 5-6	13	13.1
Completed secondary (diplômé)	3	3
Some <u>institute supérieur</u>	2	2
Completed <u>institute supérieur</u> (gradu��)	1	1

Source: Sampling in 99 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi performed by the author, February-April 1988.

Table B.5. Ages at which married male workers left father and mother.

Age at which worker left his father and mother	Number of workers (n = 99)	Percent of total sample
1	2	2
2	1	1
3	0	0
3	0	0
5	0	0
6	1	1
7	1	1
8	1	1
9	1	1
10	4	4
11	1	1
12	5	5.1
13	2	2
14	6	6.1
15	1	1
16	4	4
17	2	2
18	9	9.1
19	3	3
20	2	2
21	3	3
22	3	3
23	0	0
24	0	0
25	0	0
26	1	1
Still living with parents	46	46.5

Source: Sampling in 99 households in Cité Gécamines
Kolwezi, performed by the author, February-April 1988.

Table B.6. Principal occupations of immediate male forebears of married male workers in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

Occupation	Father		Paternal Grandfather		Maternal Grandfather	
	Number (n=99)	% of Total sample	Number (n=99)	% of Total sample	Number (n=99)	% of Total sample
Subsistence cultivator/ agricultural peasant	28	28.3	72	72.7	74	74.7
Industrial worker/miner	26	26.3	3	3	5	5.1
Laborer, general	9	9.1	1	1	2	2
Personal servant	8	8.1	0	0	0	0
Artisan/craftsman	6	6.1	2	2	1	1
Medical worker (European medicine)	4	4	1	1	0	0
Office worker	3	3	1	1	1	1
Teacher	3	3	1	1	0	0
Entrepreneur	2	2	2	2	0	0
Religious worker	2	2	0	0	0	0
Traditional chief/ official of traditional chief	2	2	9	9	6	6.1
Government agent/ official	2	2	0	0	0	0
Military/police	1	1	1	1	0	0
Labor supervisor	1	1	0	0	0	0
Hunter/fisherman	0	0	1	1	4	4
Don't know	2	2	5	5.1	6	6.1

Source: Sampling in 99 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi performed by author, February-April 1988.

Table B.7. Birthplace by country and region of selected relatives of married male workers in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

Location of Birth	Father		Mother		Paternal		Maternal	
	Number (n=99)	% of sample	Number (n=99)	% of sample	Grandfather Number (n=99)	% of sample	Grandfather Number (n=99)	% of sample
Angola	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Tanzania	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Zambia	0	0	3	3	1	1	4	4
Zaire	(98)	(99)	(94)	94.9	(92)	92.9	(92)	92.9
Shaba	60	60.6	56	56.6	54	54.5	56	56.6
Kasai-Oriental	24	24.2	23	23.2	27	27.3	24	24.2
Kasai-Occidental	12	12.1	13	13.1	9	9.1	10	10.1
Kivu	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bas Zaire	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Don't know	1	1	1	1	4	4	2	2

Source: Sampling in 99 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi performed by author, February-April 1988.

Table B.8. Comparison of marital status, married male workers in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi and their fathers.

Total number of wives	Married male workers (n = 99)	Fathers of married male workers (n = 99)
1	72	61
2	22	27
3	3	4
4	2	3
5		1
6		2
7		1

Number of wives actually living with indicated men at one time	Married male workers (n = 99)	Fathers of married male workers (n = 99)
1	93	73
2	6	18
3		4
4		1
5		1
6		1
7		1

Source: Sampling in 99 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, performed by author, February-April, 1988.

Table B.9. Age at the time of first marriage of married male workers in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

Age of worker at time of first marriage	Number of workers (n = 99)	Percent of total sample
13	2	2
14	1	1
15	0	0
16	2	2
17	0	0
18	6	6.1
19	7	7.1
20	14	14.1
21	7	7
22	9	9.1
23	8	8.1
24	9	9.1
25	9	9.1
26	11	11.1
27	4	4
28	2	2
29	2	2
30	0	0
31	1	1
32	0	0
33	1	1
34	1	1
35	0	0
36	0	0
37	0	0
38	0	0
39	1	1
Don't know	2	2

Source: Sampling in 99 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, performed by author, February-April, 1988.

Table B.10. Worker fecundity in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

Children fathered	Number of married male workers who have produced indicated number of children		Number of married male workers with indicated number of children who are alive today	
	Number (n=98)	Percent of total sample	Number (n=98)	Percent of total sample
0	2	2	4	4
1	3	3	4	4
2	9	9.2	7	7.1
3	7	7.1	9	9.2
4	5	5	8	8.2
5	10	10.2	8	8.2
6	11	11.2	14	14.3
7	7	7.1	5	5
8	8	8.2	7	7.1
9	3	3	6	6.1
10	10	10.2	10	10.2
11	3	3	3	3
12	9	9.2	9	9.2
13	6	6.1	1	1
14	1	1	0	0
15	1	1	1	1
16	1	1	0	0
17	1	1	1	1
18	1	1	1	1

Source: Sampling in 98 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, performed by author, February-April, 1988.

Table B.11. Periods of occupancy of mining company quarters in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

Years of occupancy of same housing	Number of workers	
	Number (n=98)	Percent of total sample
1	5	5
2	7	7.1
3	5	5
4	7	7.1
5	7	7.1
6	7	7.1
7	7	7.1
8	3	3
9	12	12.2
10	5	5
11	1	1
12	2	2
13	3	3
14	3	3
15	1	1
16	1	1
17	2	2
18	2	2
19	1	1
20	1	1
21	4	4
22	3	3
23	4	4
24	2	2
25	1	1
26	0	0
27	1	1
28	1	1

Source: Sampling in 98 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, performed by author, February-April, 1988.

Table B.12. Monthly salaries and household income of married male workers in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

Amount in zaires	Number of workers who specified indicated amount as their mining company monthly salary		Number of workers who specified indicated amount as total monthly household income	
	Number (n=95)	Percent of sample	Number (n=95)	Percent of sample
6000	1	1.1	0	0
7000	2	2.1	2	2.1
7500	1	1.1	1	1.1
8000	1	1.1	2	2.1
8500	2	2.1	2	2.1
9000	16	16.8	10	10.5
10000	22	23.2	16	16.8
11000	2	2.1	3	3.2
11500	4	4.2	4	4.2
12000	12	12.6	7	7.4
13000	5	5.3	6	6.3
13500	0	0	1	1.1
14000	5	5.3	7	7.4
15000	7	7.4	6	6.3
16000	4	4.2	6	6.3
17000	4	4.2	4	4.2
18000	2	2.1	2	2.1
19000	0	0	2	2.1
20000	2	2.1	5	5.3
21500	0	0	1	1.1
22000	0	0	2	2.1
22500	1	1.1	0	0
24500	0	0	1	1.1
25500	0	0	1	1.1
33000	0	0	1	1.1
38000	0	0	1	1.1
No response	2	2.1	2	2.1

NOTE: During the time of data collection, the official exchange rate increased from about 145 zaires to the dollar to about 160 zaires to the dollar. The black market rate increased from about 165 zaires to the dollar to about 200 zaires to the dollar.

Source: Sampling in 95 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, performed by author, February-April, 1988.

APPENDIX C

MALE-FEMALE RELATIONS:
DETAILS OF INFORMANTS' RESPONSES

Table C.1. Responses by Gécamines married male workers to the question, "why would a woman not be a good supervisor of men?"

<u>General response</u>	<u>Demographic data of informants</u>			
	<u>Age</u>	<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Gener- ation</u>	<u>Religion</u>
Women lack sufficient natural force	50	Kaniok	1	Nzambi Malamu
	25	Luba-Shaba	2	Methodist
	48	KaRuund	2	Methodist
	38	Luba-Shaba	3	Roman Catholic
	27	Songye	3	Roman Catholic
	27	Kaonde/Lamba	3	Roman Catholic
	28	Bemba/Yeke	1	Roman Catholic
	28	KaRuund	2	Tabernacle (Branhamist)
	29	Luba-Shaba/ Sanga	2	Basantu
	39	Songye	1	Catholic
	56	Sanga	1	Garenganze (Plymouth Brethren)
There would only be disorder	38	Tshokwe	2	Pentecostal
Women are inferior	40	Ndembu	2	Jehovah's Witness
	57	Luba-Kasai	2	Methodist
Women have an inferiority complex in the presence of men	45	Yeke/Bemba	1	Tabernacle (Branhamist)
	30	Lulua	2	Nzambi Malamu
	29	Sanga	1	Pentecostal
Women lack the capability and competence to lead men	40	Bemba	4	Methodist
	41	KaRuund	2	Roman Catholic
Women should not command men	32	Kaniok	3	Roman Catholic
	31	KaRuund	1	Methodist
	39	KaRuund	1	Bapostole
Men would be irritated	50	Kaniok	1	Nzambi Malamu
Women would not be respected by men	31	Luba-Kasai	1	None
	46	Kaniok/Luba-Kasai	1	Malemba

Table C.1--continued

<u>General response</u>	<u>Demographic data of informants</u>			
	<u>Age</u>	<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Gener- ation</u>	<u>Religion</u>
Men want to be led by men	30	Luba-Shaba	3	Pentecostal
It is contrary to ancestral tradition	49	Luba-Shaba	1	Baptist
Women are ignorant of proper behavior	26	Luba-Shaba	2	Pentecostal
Women are insufficiently respectful	61	Kaniok	2	Roman Catholic
Women have bizarre manners	25	Luba-Shaba	2	Roman Catholic
	44	Lulua	1	Methodist
Women are malicious and insensitive	53	Luba-Shaba	1	Methodist
	48	Sanga	1	Methodist
Women do nothing	27	Lulua	2	Roman Catholic

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.2. Married male worker responses to the question, "what is the most important characteristic in a wife?"

<u>Response</u>	Percentage of total sample of informants giving this response (See note below)_____
Obedience	34.3%
Submission	16.2%
Respect to me	14.1%
Respect to my family	1.0%
Adapting to my behavior	1.0%
Fidelity (sexual)	24.2%
Generosity	9.1%
Good conduct	5.0%
Courage	4.0%
Ability to bear children	3.0%
Strength	3.0%
<u>Savoir-vivre</u>	3.0%
Gentleness	3.0%
Hard worker	2.0%
Understanding	2.0%
Love for me	2.0%
Hospitality	2.0%
Amiability	2.0%
Good cheer	1.0%
Wisdom	1.0%
Honesty	1.0%
Intelligence	1.0%
Education	1.0%
Cleanliness	1.0%
Strong personality	1.0%

*Note: a number of informants gave two or three "most important characteristics." Each of these is listed here as a separate response.

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers sampled by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.3. Categorization by (selected) ethnic group of married male informants who considered obedience, submission or respect to be the most important characteristic in a wife.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of that ethnic group</u>
ARuund	61.5%
Kaniok	75.0%
Luba-Kasai	50.0%
Luba-Shaba	73.7%
Lulua	66.7%
Ndembu	50.0%
Sanga	80.0%
Songye	50.0%
Tshokwe	66.7%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.4. Categorization by generation in Gécamines of married male informants who considered obedience, submission or respect to be the most important characteristic in a wife.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of that generation</u>
1	58.7%
2	65.1%
3	66.7%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.5. Categorization by age of married male informants who considered obedience, submission or respect to be the most important characteristic in a wife.

<u>Age</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of that age group</u>
20-30	70.0%
31-40	58.1%
41-50	56.5%
51-61	68.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.6. Categorization by (selected) religious group of married male informants who considered obedience, submission or respect to be the most important characteristic in a wife.

<u>Religious group</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of that religious group</u>
Roman Catholic	54.3%
Methodist	70.6%
Pentecostal	85.7%
Nzambi Malamu	25.0%
Kimbanguist	50.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.7. Married male worker responses to the question, "what characteristic should be most avoided in a wife?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of the total sample of informants giving this response (See note)</u>
Infidelity	49.5%
Disobedience	19.2%
Impoliteness	6.1%
Lack of respect	6.1%
Lack of submission	3.0%
Theft	8.1%
Lying	2.0%
Dishonesty	1.0%
Greed	5.1%
Laziness	3.0%
Pride/egoism	2.0%
Exaggerated beauty/ tendency to preen	3.0%
Quarreling	5.1%
Slander	1.0%
Provocation	1.0%
Turbulence	1.0%
Garulousness	3.0%
Disorder	1.0%
Lack of seriousness	1.0%
Alcoholism	1.0%
Sorcery	1.0%
Sterility	1.0%
Weakness	3.0%
Exaggerated generosity	1.0%
Bad conduct	5.1%

*Note: A number of informants gave two or three most "important characteristics to avoid." Each of these is listed here as a separate response.

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.8. Importance of the characteristic of physical beauty in a wife.

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample</u>
Very important	24.2%
Moderately important	47.5%
Unimportant	28.3%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.9. Importance of the characteristic of physical beauty in a wife. Informant responses categorized by informants' ethnicity (selected ethnic groups).

<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Physical beauty is very important</u>	<u>Physical beauty moderately important</u>	<u>Physical beauty is unimportant</u>
ARuund	15.4%	69.2%	15.4%
Kaniok	37.5%	25.0%	37.5%
Luba-Kasai	21.4%	28.6%	50.0%
Luba-Shaba	15.8%	47.4%	36.8%
Lulua	16.7%	50.0%	33.3%
Ndembu	50.0%	33.3%	16.7%
Sanga	20.0%	60.0%	20.0%
Songye	12.5%	75.0%	12.5%
Tshokwe	22.2%	55.6%	22.2%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.10. Importance of the characteristic of physical beauty in a wife. Informant responses categorized by generation in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Physical beauty is very important</u>	<u>Physical beauty moderately important</u>	<u>Physical beauty is unimportant</u>
1	19.6%	45.7%	34.8%
2	25.6%	51.2%	23.3%
3	55.6%	22.2%	22.2%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.11. Importance of the characteristic of physical beauty in a wife. Informant responses characterized by age.

<u>Age</u>	<u>Physical beauty is very important</u>	<u>Physical beauty is moderately important</u>	<u>Physical beauty is unimportant</u>
20-30	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%
31-40	13.3%	53.3%	33.3%
41-50	20.8%	50.0%	29.2%
51-60	28.0%	44.0%	28.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.12. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that your wife gives you sexual pleasure?"

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample</u>
Very important	53.5%
Moderately important	39.4%
Unimportant	6.1%
Other	1.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.13. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that your wife gives you sexual pleasure?" Responses categorized by informants' ethnicity (selected ethnic groups).

<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Moderately important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>
ARuund	61.5%	38.5%	0 %
Kaniok	37.5%	50.0%	12.5%
Luba-Kasai	57.1%	42.9%	0 %
Luba-Shaba	52.6%	31.6%	15.8%
Lulua	50.0%	33.3%	16.7%
Ndembu*	50.0%	33.3%	0 %
Sanga	60.0%	40.0%	0 %
Songye	37.5%	50.0%	12.5%
Tshokwe	66.7%	33.3%	0 %

*Note: 16.7% "other responses"

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.14. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that your wife gives you sexual pleasure?" Responses categorized by generation in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Moderately important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>	<u>Other</u>
1	50.0%	43.5%	6.5%	0 %
2	55.8%	34.9%	7.0%	2.3%
3	66.7%	33.3%	0 %	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.15. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that your wife gives you sexual pleasure?" Responses categorized by informants' age.

<u>Age</u>	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Moderately important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>	<u>Other</u>
20-30	50.0%	35.0%	15.0%	0 %
31-40	56.7%	33.3%	6.7%	3.3%
41-50	54.2%	41.7%	4.2%	0 %
51-60	44.0%	56.0%	0 %	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.16. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that your wife gives you sexual pleasure?" Responses categorized by selected religious groups.

<u>Religious group</u>	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Moderately important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>
Roman Catholic	62.9%	34.3%	2.9%
Methodist	47.1%	52.9%	0 %
Pentecostal	57.1%	28.6%	14.3%
Nzambi Malamu	25.0%	50.0%	25.0%
Kimbanguist	75.0%	0 %	25.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.17. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that a wife be able to bear children?"

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Percent of total sample</u>
Very important	72.7%
Moderately important	24.2%
Unimportant	3.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.18. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that a wife be able to bear children?" Responses categorized by informants' ethnicity (selected ethnic groups).

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Moderately important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>
ARuund	69.2%	23.1%	7.7%
Kaniok	75.0%	25.0%	0 %
Luba-Kasai	71.4%	21.4%	7.1%
Luba-Shaba	68.4%	31.6%	0 %
Lulua	83.3%	16.7%	0 %
Ndembu	83.3%	0 %	16.7%
Sanga	80.0%	20.0%	0 %
Songye	87.5%	12.5%	0 %
Tshokwe	77.8%	22.2%	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.19. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that a wife be able to bear children?" Responses categorized by informants' generation of residence in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Moderately important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>
1	73.9%	21.7%	4.4%
2	72.1%	25.6%	2.3%
3	77.8%	22.2%	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.20. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that a wife be able to bear children?" Responses categorized by informants' ages.

<u>Age</u>	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Moderately important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>
20-30	50.0%	50.0%	0 %
31-40	67.7%	22.6%	9.7%
41-50	82.6%	17.4%	0 %
51-61	88.0%	12.0%	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.21. Informant responses to the question, "how important is it to you that a wife be able to bear children?" Responses categorized by selected religious groups.

<u>Religious group</u>	<u>Very important</u>	<u>Moderately important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>
Roman Catholic	80.0%	20.0%	0 %
Methodist	58.8%	35.3%	5.9%
Pentecostal	71.4%	28.6%	0 %
Nzambi Malamu	50.0%	50.0%	0 %
Kimbanguist	100.0%	0 %	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.22. Comparison of husbands' ages with wives' ages in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

<u>Male informant</u>				<u>Age of male informant's wife</u>
<u>Age</u>	<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Generation</u>	
25	Tshokwe	Methodist	2	18
25	Luba-Shaba	Methodist	2	21
26	Luba-Shaba	Pentecostal	2	23
27	Lulua	Catholic	2	20
27	Songye	Catholic	3	22
27	Kaonde-Lamba	Catholic	3	20
27	Luba-Kasai	None	1	27
28	Songye	Catholic	2	22
28	Bemba-Yeke	Catholic	1	23
28	KaRuund	Branhamist	2	22
29	Minungu-Ndembu	None	2	29
29	Lulua	Catholic	2	21
29	Luba-Shaba/ Sanga	Basantu	2	24
29	Sanga	Pentecostal	1	21
30	Babuyu	Methodist	1	29
30	Luba-Shaba/ Songye	Branhamist	1	21
30	Ndembu	Catholic	2	22
30	Luba-Shaba	Pentecostal	3	27
30	Lulua	Nzambi Malamu	2	24
31	KaRuund	Methodist	1	23
31	Luba-Kasai	None	1	24
32	KaRuund/Ndembu	Methodist	2	29
32	Kaniok	Catholic	3	25
33	Luba-Kasai	Catholic	2	26
33	Luba-Kasai	Jehovah's Witness	1	29
33	Luba-Shaba	Pentecostal	2	25
33	Luba-Shaba	Methodist	2	23
35	Luba-Shaba	None	1	30
36	KaRuund	Catholic	1	34
36	Luba-Kasai	Catholic	2	29
36	Ndembu-Sanga	None	2	30
36	Songye	None	2	26
37	Hemba-Luena	Branhamist	2	36
37	Luba-Kasai	Catholic	3	34
37	Luba-Shaba	Pentecostal	1	21
37	Luba-Kasai	Catholic	2	34
38	Luba-Shaba	Catholic	3	36
38	Tshokwe	Pentecostal	2	29
38	Tshokwe	Basantu	2	21
39	Tshokwe	Kimbanguist	2	32
39	Songye	Catholic	1	32
39	Luba-Kasai	Catholic	1	32
39	KaRuund	Postolo	1	30

Table C.22--continued

<u>Male informant</u>				Age of male informant's wife
<u>Age</u>	<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Generation</u>	
40	Bemba	Methodist	4	33
40	Songye	Kimbanguist	1	32
40	Luba-Kasai	Catholic	2	36
40	Ndembu	Jehovah's Witness	2	28
41	KaRuund	Catholic	2	28
42	Minungu	Kimbanguist	2	32
42	Batandu	Catholic	1	21
43	KaRuund	Methodist	1	27
43	Luba-Shaba	Pentecostal	2	29
44	Lulua	Methodist	1	38
44	Songye	Catholic	1	35
44	Lulua	Catholic	1	40
45	Tshokwe	Methodist	1	34
45	Yeke-Bemba	Branhamist	1	41
45	Ndembu-Kaonde	Postolo	3	38
46	Kaniok/Luba-Kasai	Malemba	1	41
47	Kaniok	Catholic	2	43
48	Kaniok	Catholic	1	40
48	Luba-Shaba	Jamaa	1	45
48	Ndembu/Kaonde	Plymouth Brethren	1	40
48	KaRuund	Basantu	2	27
48	KaRuund	Methodist	2	22
48	Sanga	Catholic	1	38
49	Luba-Shaba	Baptist	1	33
50	Sanga	Nzambi Malamu	3	33
50	Kaniok	Nzambi Malamu	1	37
51	Kete	Branhamist	2	48
51	Luba-Kasai	Catholic	1	44
51	Luba-Shaba	Assembly of God	2	47
52	KaRuund/Kalundwe	Plymouth Brethren	3	52
52	KaRuund	Kimbanguist	1	35
53	Kaniok	Jamaa	1	39
53	Luba-Shaba	Methodist	1	49
53	KaRuund/Minungu	Catholic	2	27
56	Kaniok/Luba-Kasai	Jamaa	1	46
56	Luba-Shaba	Basantu	1	42
56	Sanga	Plymouth Brethren	1	38
56	Luba-Kasai	Nzambi Malamu	1	40
57	Luba-Kasai	Methodist	2	55
57	Tshokwe	Catholic	1	31
57	Songye	Jamaa	1	47
58	Tshokwe	Methodist	1	36
58	Lulua	Catholic	1	30

Table C.22--continued

<u>Male informant</u>				Age of male informant's wife_____
<u>Age</u>	<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Generation</u>	
58	Tshokwe	Methodist	2	45
58	Ndembu	Plymouth Brethren	2	51
59	Luba-Shaba	None	2	52
60	KaRuund	Catholic	1	37

NOTE: Nine informants in the sample provided no response or ambiguous responses.

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers and their spouses interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.23. Differences in age, between married male workers and their wives in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi. (In all cases, husband is same age as, or older than, wife.)

<u>Difference in age in years</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample</u>
0	3.0%
1	2.0%
2	4.0%
3	7.1%
4	8.1%
5	5.1%
6	5.1%
7	17.2%
8	7.1%
9	4.0%
10	6.1%
11	1.0%
12	1.0%
13	2.0%
14	3.0%
15	0
16	4.0%
17	3.0%
18	1.0%
19	0
20	0
21	2.0%
22	1.0%
23	1.0%
24	0
25	0
26	3.0%
27	0
28	1.0%
No response/ambiguous response	9.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers and their spouses interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988. (Data for nine informants were incomplete and could not be compared here.)

Table C.24. Mean number of children fathered by married male workers, categorized by selected ethnic group.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Mean number of children fathered by informants in the sample</u>
ARuund	7.38
Kaniok	9.87
Luba-Kasai	7.36
Luba-Shaba	7.0
Lulua	9.4
Ndembu	8.17
Sanga	6.0
Songye	7.0
Tshokwe	5.78

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.25. Mean number of children fathered by married male workers, categorized by generation in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Mean number of children fathered by informants in the sample</u>
1	8.46
2	6.45
3	5.78

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.26. Married male worker responses to the question,
"what is the ideal number of children?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent of sample</u>
Such things are in the hands of God	33.0%
4 children	8.1%
5 children	6.1%
6 children	11.1%
7 children	2.0%
8 children	5.1%
10 children	4.0%
12 children	8.1%
15 children	3.0%
30 children	1.0%
100 children	2.0%
No response/don't know	16.2%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.27. Informant responses to the question: "How important is it to you that your son marry a member of your own tribe?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of informants in the total sample</u>
Very important	21.2%
Somewhat important	34.3%
Unimportant	39.4%
No response/other	5.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.28. Informant responses to the question: "How important is it to you that your daughter marry a member of your own tribe?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of informants in the total sample</u>
Very important	12.1%
Somewhat important	34.3%
Unimportant	48.5%
To be avoided	3.0%
No response/other	2.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.29. Ethnic distribution of informants who considered it "very important" or "somewhat important" that their sons marry within their own ethnic group.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Percentage of respondents compared to total sample of that ethnic group</u>
ARuund	46.2%
Kaniok	85.7%
Luba-Kasai	57.1%
Luba-Shaba	57.9%
Lulua	33.3%
Ndembu	83.3%
Songye	50.0%
Tshokwe	66.7%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.30. Ethnic distribution of informants who considered it "very important" or "somewhat important" that their daughters marry within their own ethnic group.

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Percentage of respondents compared to total sample of that ethnic group</u>
ARuund	46.2%
Kaniok	14.3%
Luba-Kasai	28.6%
Luba-Shaba	42.1%
Lulua	16.7%
Ndembu	50.0%
Songye	0.0%
Tshokwe	66.7%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.31. Distribution by generation of employment in Gécamines of informants who considered it "very important" or "somewhat important" that their sons marry within their own ethnic group.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Percentage of all informants of that generation</u>
1	47.8%
2	62.8%
3	55.6%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.32. Distribution by generation of employment in Gécamines of informants who considered it "very important" or "somewhat important" that their daughters marry within their own ethnic group.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Percentage of all informants of that generation</u>
1	39.1%
2	51.2%
3	44.4%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.33. Selected distribution by informants' ethnicity of married male worker responses to the question: "do you think a woman could be a good supervisor of men?"

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Percentage of sample that said "yes"</u>	<u>Percentage of sample that said "no"</u>	<u>Percentage of sample that said "it depends"</u>
ARuund	53.8%	38.5%	7.7%
Kaniok	37.5%	62.5%	0 %
Luba-Kasai	58.3%	25.0%	16.7%
Luba-Shaba	26.3%	68.4%	5.3%
Lulua	50.0%	50.0%	0 %
Ndembu	80.0%	20.0%	0 %
Sanga	20.0%	60.0%	20.0%
Songye	50.0%	37.5%	12.5%
Tshokwe*	55.6%	22.2%	11.1%

*11.1% "don't know"

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.34. Distribution by informants' generation in mining company of married male worker responses to the question: "do you think a woman could be a good supervisor of men?"

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Percentage of sample that said "yes"</u>	<u>Percentage of sample that said "no"</u>	<u>Percentage of sample that said "it depends"</u>
1*	53.3%	37.8%	6.7%
2	43.9%	48.8%	7.3%
3	25.0%	62.5%	12.5%
4	0 %	100.0%	0 %

*2.2% "don't know"

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.35. Distribution by informants' religious preference of married male worker responses to the question: "do you think a woman could be a good supervisor of men?"

<u>Religious category</u>	<u>Percentage of sample that said "yes"</u>
Roman Catholic	46.9%
Western Protestant	37.1%
Syncretic Christian groups of indigenous origin	50.0%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table C.36. Distribution by generation in the mining company of informants who did not think that a woman could be a good political leader.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>"No" responses as a percentage of the sample of that generation</u>
1	33.3%
2	26.8%
3	50.0%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

APPENDIX D

TABULATED GENERAL PATTERNS OF BELIEF AND BEHAVIOR
AMONG MARRIED MALE WORKERS IN THE CITÉ GÉCAMINES KOLWEZI

Table D.1. Married male workers' responses to the question, "what do you like to do most when you get together with your friends during your leisure time?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Number of informants (out of 82) who provided that response</u>
Talk	10
Debate the problems of life	1
Talk about our country	1
Talk about current conditions	2
Talk about our private life	1
Talk about everything	1
Give each other advice	2
Listen to music and talk	1
Listen to music and debate the problems of life	1
Talk and drink	1
Talk about sports	1
Talk about sports and about work	1
Talk about work	4
Talk about life, work, and the past	1
Talk about work and our families	2
Talk about problems in the family and at work	2
Give each other advice about family situations	1
Talk about our families	1
Talk about family problems	1
Talk about the future of our children	1
Speak of the future	1
Talk about the church and about making money	1
Talk about religion	1
Talk about religion and about work	1
Talk about God	3
Talk about the word of God	5
Talk about the divine message	1
Debate religious issues	2
Talk about the religious life	2
Talk about religion or about sport	1
Talk about the religious life and current conditions	2
Pray	1
Pray and work	1
Pray and talk	1
Pray at church	1
Pray for others	1
Read the Bible	1
Visit the sick and talk about the word of God	1
Visit the sick	1

Table D.1--continued

<u>Response</u>	<u>Number of informants (out of 82) who provided that response</u>
Visit members of the church	1
Visit Christ	1
Adore Christ	1
Talk about the career of teaching	1
Drink	1
Drink and talk about sports	1
Drink and watch sports or entertainment events	1
Football (soccer)	2
Sports	1
Athletics	1
Watch sports matches	1
Talk and walk around town	1
Walk around town	1
Sing	1
Watch films	1
Conduct petty commerce	2

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.2. Married male worker responses to the question, "in what ways to you consider yourself different from Gécamines cadre?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent of of total sample providing this response</u>
Workers consider cadre to be bosses	6.3%
Workers are the ones who must submit to/ execute orders	12.5%
Workers consider themselves inferiors or underlings	6.3%
Workers consider themselves inferiors and must respect the cadre	3.1%
Cadre conform to their advantageous social position	3.1%
Cadre conform to their social status	3.1%
Cadre live and progress in another milieu	3.1%
It is clearly a system of social classes. Cadre work very little.	3.1%
Workers and cadre are different in every respect	3.1%
It's always a case of advantages	3.1%
Cadre benefit from many advantages	3.1%
Workers are not favored and have few advantages	3.1%
Workers have a minimal salary	3.1%
Workers make less money	3.1%
Worker remuneration is much inferior	3.1%
Workers are badly lodged and fed	3.1%
Workers cannot afford luxury as can cadre	3.1%
Workers lack many things	3.1%

Table D.2--continued

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent of of total sample providing this response</u>
The poor workers have nothing, are badly treated by the company, and are considered to be much inferior to cadre.	3.1%
Workers have inferior salaries to cadre and are under cadres' orders	3.1%
It is the workers that must submit to hardship in the company	6.3%
A worker with lots of money could do better than a cadre	3.1%

Source: Sample of 32 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.3. Married male worker responses to the question, "what makes you think that cadre consider themselves different than workers?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent of the sample giving this response</u>
Cadres' manner of treating workers	3.1%
Cadre mistreat workers	3.1%
Cadre regard workers as slaves	3.1%
Cadre put workers in their place	3.1%
Cadre are the bosses	3.1%
Cadre consider themselves bosses	6.3%
Cadre consider themselves to be bosses and their workers to be underlings	3.1%
They give orders and never have to submit to them	3.1%
Cadre are well paid and well fed and enjoy all the advantages and honors	3.1%
Cadre have lots of material things and much money	3.1%
Cadre make lots of money	6.3%
They have lots of money, nice houses, cars	3.1%
Cadre have what workers cannot have	3.1%
Cadre have advantages which others do not	3.1%
Cadre get many privileges	6.3%
Cadre direct (others) and have many advantages	3.1%
Cadre want to distinguish themselves and consider themselves white	3.1%
Cadre consider themselves more intelligent than others	3.1%
Cadre consider themselves more advanced ("evolué") than others	3.1%

Table D.3--continued

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percent of the sample giving this response</u>
Their studies and social position are greater	3.1%
Cadre live and progress in another milieu	3.1%
Cadre have a higher level of study, good homes, and responsible positions: hence their pride.	3.1%
Cadre conform to their social status	6.3%
It's a distinction of social class	3.1%
Their general behavior is different	3.1%

Source: Sample of 32 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.4. Married male worker responses to the question,
 "what do you think of cadre in general?"
 (Single responses except as indicated)

Some are competent, others are not and are unjustly promoted

Some are good, some are bad

Some are competent and worthwhile, others are not

They are conscientious and fair

They are fair and authoritative

They are superiors/bosses (two individual responses)

They are unjust and consider workers as mere underlings

They are proud (two individual responses)

They are above all unjust

They're dishonest despite their high pay

They're well off, privileged and sometimes haughty

They are the happy ones in the company, we work for them

They're well cared for and it is they who benefit from the company

They're well paid and well cared for by the company

They're well paid and well equipped to make out

They are the privileged ones

They are fortunate

They have a good life

They have great advantages and eat well

They live at a higher standard of living

They have light work and are well paid

They are overly advantaged by the company

They're well off in society

They live well and are the "spoiled brats" of the company

They don't deserve the position they have

Table D.4--continued

They are what they should not be

There's a difference between us and them: they're well off

They're like us but they live a bit better than we do

They're a bit more favored than we, but not much

They live a life that we used to think of as middle class,
but life is now tough for them too

Source: Sample of 32 married male workers interviewed by
the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.5. Married male worker responses to the question, "in what ways are government officials different from other people here in Kolwezi?"

<u>Response</u>	Percentage of sample (of 19 individuals) offering <u>this response</u>
Government officials are different by their function	10.5%
Government officials have everything to say	21.1%
Government officials think they have everything to say	5.3%
Government officials think they have power over everyone	5.3%
Government officials have the power to direct and decide	5.3%
Government officials are the directors	5.3%
Government officials are there to execute the law and others can do nothing	5.3%
Government officials consider others to be underlings and sometimes destroy their property	5.3%
Government officials think themselves bosses and want to destroy the property of others	5.3%
Government officials think themselves superior and don't want to respect others	5.3%
Government officials think themselves superior and like to lead others astray	5.3%
Government officials can create problems for people	5.3%
Government officials can cause trouble	5.3%
Government officials serve the party	5.3%
Government officials are much sought out	5.3%

Source: Sample of 19 individuals interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.6. Informants' responses to the questions, 1) "is it easy to obtain justice here in the Cité if you have a problem or a dispute?" and 2) "how do you go about getting justice?"

Responses: Is it easy to obtain justice?	Responses: How do you go about getting justice?	Percentage of total sample giving this response
Yes, it is easy	One must take the difficulty to the <u>chef de rue</u> , who will resolve it.	15.6%
	You take the problem to the <u>chef de rue</u> . He calls in the judges (his senior advisors) and the problem will be correctly resolved.	3.1%
	You take the problem to the <u>chef de rue</u> . He will judge based on counsel from others.	3.1%
	You take the problem to the <u>chefs d'avenue</u> or <u>Chef de cité</u> .	3.1%
	The <u>Chef de cité</u> can provide justice.	6.3%
	When the problem gets to the <u>bureau de camp</u> (office of the <u>Chef de cité</u>) it can be justly resolved, since an investigative committee is convened to determine the fault.	3.1%
	You find the people who can resolve the problem.	3.1%
	The two parties take their case to competent authorities.	3.1%
	You must be in the right or have a real problem.	3.1%
	If you're in the right and have witnesses, you get justice.	3.1%
It depends.	All depends on the problem. Justice in the Cité is not for condemnation but to promote unity. Justice depends on the competence of the judges.	3.1%
	There are many factors involved.	3.1%
	All depends on the manner in which you take the necessary actions.	3.1%

Table D.6--continued

Responses: Is it easy to obtain <u>justice?</u>	Responses: How do you go about <u>getting justice?</u>	Percentage of total sample giving this <u>response</u>
No, it is not easy.		
	You must bribe people and manipulate kinship ties.	3.1%
	You have to know someone or resort to bribery.	3.1%
	You must have money or be related to the authorities.	3.1%
	You must be a kinsman of the <u>Chef de</u> <u>cité</u> or pay a bribe.	3.1%
	You must have money or be a "brother" of the <u>Chef de cité</u>	3.1%
	You must know someone and have "pull," or bribe the judges.	3.1%
	Favoritism, corruption and tribalism play a primary role	3.1%
	It is he who has the most money that gets justice.	3.1%
	You have to bribe (" <u>Glisser quelque</u> <u>chose</u> ").	3.1%
	You must have and use money.	3.1%
	You must have money.	6.3%
	Today, all are unrighteous. There is no justice in Zaire. Money determines all.	3.1%
No response.		3.1%

Source: Sample of 32 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.7. Married male workers responses to the question, "what type of person receives most respect in the Cité?" (A number of informants mentioned several qualities or categories, each of which is here treated as a separate response.)

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample providing this response</u>
All are respected/no one receives more respect than others/everyone has value	8.4%
Dignified and mature people	20.0%
People who respect others	12.6%
People having proper comportment/good conduct	2.1%
People who don't act in childish ways	1.1%
Older men who do not harass others	1.1%
Serious people	2.1%
Chiefs/bosses in general	8.4%
<u>Chef de cité</u>	16.8%
<u>Chef de cité</u> and his staff	1.1%
<u>Chefs de cellule</u>	4.2%
<u>Chefs de rue</u>	4.2%
Party activists	12.6%
Medical personnel	11.6%
Teachers	3.2%
Union representatives	8.4%
Smugglers	1.1%
Entrepreneurs	1.1%
Cadre	2.1%
Christians/religious group faithful	2.1%
Workers who have side businesses	1.1%
Skilled workers	1.1%
Cantine workers	2.1%
Industrial guard	2.1%
Older people	2.1%
Rich people	3.2%
Educated people	2.1%
Workers with high <u>cotes</u>	1.1%
Miners	1.1%
Depends on personality	2.1%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.8. Married male worker responses to the question, "what type of person receives least respect in the Cité?" (A number of informants mentioned several qualities or categories, each of which is here treated as a separate response.)

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample providing this response</u>
All are respected/no one receives less respect than others/everyone has value	14.7%
Undignified people	4.2%
Disrespectful people	7.4%
Undignified and disrespectful people	24.2%
Impolite, disrespectful people	1.1%
Less serious people	1.1%
People who act like the young	1.1%
Drunkards	10.5%
Rioters/brawlers	5.3%
Thieves	9.5%
The dishonest	1.1%
Backbiters	1.1%
Liars	1.1%
Gossips	1.1%
Adulterers	4.2%
Prostitutes	1.1%
Unemployed	1.1%
The heavily indebted	2.1%
Low ranking people	4.2%
Workers with low pay-grades (<u>cote</u>)	1.1%
People who don't make much money	4.2%
Manual workers	5.3%
Personal servants (<u>domestiques</u>)	2.1%
Door keepers (<u>plantons</u>)	1.1%
(Mining company) industrial guards	2.1%
Female workers	1.1%
Everyone is respected according to rank	1.1%
Everyone is respected assuming good conduct	2.1%
Don't know	7.4%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.9. Individual married male worker responses to the question, "what are the characteristics of the man who is least appreciated in the Cité?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Number of informants (out of 32) who provided this response</u>
I don't know	5
No one is less appreciated here	4
He is disrespectful and disrespectful of others	1
He doesn't respect others and their property	1
He is undignified and does not respect others	2
He is not serious, is disrespectful, disrespectful, uneducated or constantly in need	1
He causes problems for others	1
He is a drunkard and lacks respect for others	1
He is a thief and a drunkard	1
He is a thief, a drunkard or a social misfit	1
He is a drunkard	1
He is a heavy drinker, dishonest, a thief, or an excessively jealous person	1
He is a drunkard, illiterate, a brawler, or a thief	1
He is a drunkard, a beggar or ungenerous	1
He is impolite, a brawler or a thief	1
He is a thief, liar or troublemaker	1
He is a quarreler	1
He is unsociable	1
He is unemployed	1
He is an unemployed, young delinquent	1
He is lazy, parasitic, impolite or illiterate	1
He has pagan characteristics	1
This depends on personality	1
I am a Christian and do not concern myself with such things	1

Source: Sample of 32 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.10. Individual married male worker responses to the question, "what makes life agreeable?"

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample providing this response</u>
Money	25.3%
Much money	1.1%
Enough money	1.1%
Enough money to be at ease materially	1.1%
Education and money	2.1%
Money and the ability to manage what one has	1.1%
Money and leisure time	1.1%
Work in order to have money	1.1%
A job that provides money	1.1%
Money for good food and material things, and to have good friends	1.1%
Work, education and money	1.1%
To have money and good relations with people	1.1%
To always have money when needed	1.1%
Money and the Word of God	1.1%
To believe God, to have good relations with people and to have money	1.1%
Well-paid work, money, and joy in the household	1.1%
Good health and work to gain money	1.1%
Eat well, be in good health and have money	1.1%
Riches: money, goats, chickens, cows, etc.	1.1%
Money and stock raising	1.1%
To be able to provide for all one's needs	1.1%
To have enough and not be in need	2.1%
To be at ease in life	1.1%
To be at ease and not have many problems	1.1%
To have work and a sufficient salary, to eat well	1.1%
Peace, health and work	1.1%
To be well fed and have a good job	1.1%
Work, a good household, and to succeed in one's career	1.1%
Work to support a family	1.1%
Work and children	1.1%
Work, children and peace in the home	1.1%
Work	3.2%
To have good relations with people and to work	1.1%
Work, preferably as an entrepreneur	1.1%

Table D.10--continued

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample providing this response</u>
Work in Gécamines	1.1%
Work, protect oneself from ill, and be organized	1.1%
Prayer, understanding, love of neighbor, and work	1.1%
Work, good relations with brothers, and prayer	1.1%
Work, prayer and good works	1.1%
The Word of God and work	1.1%
The Word of God	1.1%
Above all, to hear the Word of God	1.1%
To believe God, to have good relations with people	1.1%
To have eternal life on the earth	1.1%
Prayer	2.1%
To be a believer	1.1%
To be a Christian	1.1%
To follow the good news of God	1.1%
To be in contact with the Spirit of God	1.1%
To have a good relationship with God	2.1%
To conform one's life to the Holy Scriptures and to be married	1.1%
The elimination of sickness, death, and the hope given us in the Bible	1.1%
To avoid debts and avoid lies	1.1%
To have good relations with people	1.1%
To have good relations with people and avoid problems with others	2.1%
To find solutions to the problems of life	1.1%
To live the family life together	1.1%
Music, lectures, walking around town with friends	1.1%
A good education	1.1%
Good health	2.1%
Leisure-time entertainment	1.1%
To have good reasoning ability	1.1%
Power	1.1%
To succeed at what one undertakes	1.1%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.11. Individual married male worker responses to the questions, "are you generally happy with your life?" and "why or why not?"

Yes, I am generally happy	I have no problem with people
	I feel happy and have few problems
	I don't depend on anyone
	I eat well and support my family
	I make myself look at the better part of each situation
	Because of what God has done for us
	Despite the bad situation in Gécamines, I am satisfied and have no worries because of God's Word.
	I am generally satisfied but not totally because the cost of living is steep.
No, I am not generally happy	I don't have a good salary.
	I'm not satisfied with my salary.
	I don't have much money, a decent house, or a car.
	I don't make enough money to live in an agreeable manner.
	I don't have what I'd like to have.
	I can't realize my goals for lack of money.
	I don't have the money to satisfy my needs.
	I can't satisfy my needs.
	I live miserably; I don't have all that I want.
	I suffer; I have nothing and work for a company that does me wrong.
	I suffer and waste my time in Gécamines and get nothing out of it.
	I can't adequately support my family.
	I suffer; I don't have enough money to support my family.
	I suffer; I lack much money to support my family well.
	I have trouble supporting my family.
	I suffer much; I don't have enough to adequately feed my family.
I am neither happy nor unhappy	I would like the power to achieve more.
	I can never achieve my goals.
	I would like to be in another social class.
No response (3 individuals)	It's not all bad but I need more money.
	I'm not entirely satisfied: there is still much to do.

Source: Sample of 32 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.12. Married male worker responses to the question, "in what political party activities do you participate?", how often?" and "why?"
Individual responses are cited here.

<u>Party activity</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Reason for participation or non-participation</u>
Work place party rally (" <u>animation</u> ")	Twice weekly	It's an obligation
Work place party rally (" <u>animation</u> ")	Twice weekly	It's required
Salute to the flag	Twice weekly	It's an obligation
Salute to the flag	Twice weekly	It's required
<u>Chef d'avenue</u>	Daily	To serve our country
MOPAP secretary for the avenue	Daily	To serve my country
Salute to the flag, various party meetings, <u>salongo</u>	Several times a week	I'm a party militant
Party meeting	Twice weekly	It's a way of being important here in the company
Party worker	Twice monthly	To know what the party wants done
JMPR meeting; party rally	Monthly	To try to sensitize others to the problem of theft and destruction of the company
Production brigade	Monthly	It's my duty
MOPAP meeting	Monthly	It's my choice
JMPR worker	Irregular	I render to Caesar what is Caesar's
None		I'm not interested
None		I'm not interested
None		Nothing about it interests me
None		I don't find it important
None		Who can do anything with this old stuff?
None		I don't have time
None		I don't have time
None		I don't have time
None		I don't have time
None		I would lose prayer time
None		I attend to religious affairs and find that sufficient
None		I'm busy and most "activists" are just opportunists
None		I'm not concerned, and don't want to be bothered; but if it is imposed, I'll do it

Table D.12--continued

<u>Party activity</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Reason for participation or non-participation</u>
None		(No specific responses)
None		(No specific responses)
None		(No specific responses)
None		(No specific responses)
None		(No specific responses)
None		(No specific responses)

Source: Sample of 32 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cite Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.13. Married male worker responses to the questions, "do you regularly hear the news of the world?", "how frequently?", and "by what means?"
Individual informant responses are cited here.

<u>Do you regularly hear the news of the world?</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Information medium</u>
No (9 individuals)		
Yes	Daily	Radio and television
Yes	Daily	Radio and television
Yes	Daily	Radio and television
Yes	Daily	Radio, television, magazines
Yes	Daily	Radio, television, magazines
Yes	Daily	Radio, television, magazines
Yes	Daily	Television
Yes	Daily	Television
Yes	Often	Radio, television, magazines
Yes	Often	Radio and television
Yes	Regularly	Radio
Yes	Regularly	Radio, magazines
Yes	Regularly	Informed by my children
Yes	Weekly	Television
Yes	Weekly	Television
Yes	Sometimes	Radio, television, magazines
Yes	Rarely	Radio and television
Yes	Rarely	Television
Yes	Rarely	Radio
Yes	Rarely	Radio
Yes	Occasionally	Radio, television, magazines
No response (2 individuals)		

Source: Sample of 32 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, July 1988.

Table D.14. Married male worker responses to the question,
 "how often do you get together for leisure-time
 activities with your friends?"

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Percent of sample</u>
Every day	39.4%
Once every 2-3 days	27.3%
Once every 4-5 days	5.1%
Once a week	11.1%
Depends	6.1%
Never/no response	11.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by
 the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April
 1988.

Table D.15. Married male worker responses to the question, "when you get together with your friends in your leisure time, where do you normally go?" (Many informants provided multiple answers. Each answer is counted here as a separate response.)

<u>Places where informants generally go during leisure time with their friends</u>	<u>Percent of sample indicating this location</u>
Informant's house	40.4%
Informant's friend's house in Cité	36.4%
Informant's friend's house outside Cité	10.1%
A place to drink	21.2%
Musical or theater events	9.1%
Religious activity	29.3%
Various different places	43.4%
Sports	1.0%
Political (party) activity	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.16. Married male worker responses to the question, "have you or any member of your immediate family ever consulted a practitioner of traditional medicine?"

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Percent of informants in sample</u>
Yes	49.5%
--Treatment was effective	--43.2%
--Treatment was ineffective	-- 6.3%
No	49.5%
No response	1.0%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.17. Married male workers who indicated that they or their immediate family had consulted a practitioner of traditional medicine. Categorized by selected ethnic group.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Percent of total sample of that group having consulted a practitioner of traditional medicine</u>
ARuund	75.0%
Kaniok	62.5%
Luba-Kasai	46.2%
Luba-Shaba	52.6%
Lulua	16.7%
Ndembu	40.0%
Sanga	80.0%
Songye	12.5%
Tshokwe	44.4%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.18. Married male workers who indicated that they or their immediate family had consulted a practitioner of traditional medicine. Categorized by generation in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Percent of total sample of that group having consulted a practitioner of traditional medicine</u>
1	43.2%
2	57.1%
3	37.5%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.19. Married male worker responses to the question, "for what problem did you or your immediate family consult a practitioner of traditional medicine?"

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Number of times problem was mentioned (in a sample of 95)</u>	<u>Number of cases in which informants considered treat- ment to be effective</u>
Athsma	3	3
Cough	1	1
Chest disease	1	1
Tuberculosis	2	2
Bad dreams	1	1
Epilepsy	1	1
Paralysis	1	1
Evil spirits	2	2
Sorcery	1	1
Fever	1	1
Headache	3	3
Hemorrhoids	2	2
Hepatitis	1	1
Impotence	1	1
Infertility	2	2
Sterility	1	1
Lack of vitamins	1	1
Madness	3	1
Mental trouble	1	0
Malaria	1	1
Scabies	1	1
Stomach/ intestinal ailment	6	5
Wasting	2	2
Venereal disease	7	7

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.20. Number of friends which informants preferred to have around them during times of leisure.

<u>Response</u>	<u>Percentage of informants</u>
One friend only	23%
Two or three friends	40%
Four to seven friends	11%
Eight to ten friends	3%
More than ten friends	8%
No response	14%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.21. Responses to questions about ethnicity of best friends in a sample of 98 married male industrial workers in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi.

<u>Response</u>	<u>Number of informants</u>
I have no close friends	12
None of my three closest friends is a co-ethnic	51
At least one of my three closest friends is a co-ethnic	35
Only one of my three closest friends is a co-ethnic	22
Two of my three closest friends are co-ethnics	8
My three closest friends are all co-ethnics	5

Source: Sampling performed by author in 98 households in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.22. Married male worker responses to the question, "does an individual in the Cité become more important when he gets more money?"
Categorized by (selected) ethnic group.

Responses as a percentage of the total sample of each ethnic group				
<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Yes, he becomes more important</u>	<u>No, he does not become more important</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>	<u>No response</u>
ARuund	69.2%	30.8%	0 %	0 %
Kaniok	50.0%	25.0%	25.0%	0 %
Luba-Kasai	58.3%	16.7%	25.0%	0 %
Luba-Shaba	36.8%	47.4%	15.8%	0 %
Lulua	66.7%	16.7%	16.7%	0 %
Ndembu	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%	0 %
Sanga	20.0%	20.0%	40.0%	20.0%
Songye	62.5%	37.5%	0 %	0 %
Tshokwe	77.8%	11.1%	11.1%	0 %

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.23. Married male worker responses to the question, "does an individual in the Cité become more important when he gets more money?" Categorized by generation in Gécamines.

<u>Responses as a percentage of the total sample of that generation</u>				
<u>Generation</u>	<u>Yes, he becomes more important</u>	<u>No, he does not become more important</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>	<u>No response</u>
1	55.6%	24.4%	17.8%	2.2%
2	48.8%	39.0%	12.2%	0 %
3	62.5%	37.5%	0 %	0 %

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.24. Married male worker responses to the question, "does an individual in the Cité become more important when he gets more money?" Categorized by age.

<u>Responses as a percentage of the total sample of that age group</u>				
<u>Age group</u>	<u>Yes, he becomes more important</u>	<u>No, he does not become more important</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>	<u>No response</u>
20-30	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%	0 %
31-40	57.1%	35.7%	7.1%	0 %
41-50	47.8%	30.4%	21.7%	0 %
51-61	62.5%	25.0%	8.3%	4.2%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.25. Married male worker responses to the question, "is a worker in the Cité with more education given more respect because of his education?" Categorized by (selected) ethnic group.

Responses as a percentage of the total sample
of each ethnic group

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Yes, an educated worker is more respected</u>	<u>No, an educated worker is not more respected</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>
ARuund	38.5%	0 %	61.5%
Kaniok	50.0%	0 %	50.0%
Luba-Kasai	41.7%	0 %	58.3%
Luba-Shaba	21.1%	10.5%	68.4%
Lulua	50.0%	0 %	50.0%
Ndembu	20.0%	0 %	80.0%
Sanga	60.0%	0 %	40.0%
Songye	50.0%	0 %	50.0%
Tshokwe	44.4%	11.1%	44.4%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.26. Married male worker responses to the question, "is a worker in the Cité with more education given more respect because of his education?" Categorized by generation in Gécamines.

<u>Responses as a percentage of the total sample of that generation</u>			
<u>Generation in Gécamines</u>	<u>Yes, an educated worker is more respected</u>	<u>No, an educated worker is not more respected</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>
1	40.0%	8.9%	51.1%
2	36.6%	0 %	63.4%
3	50.0%	0 %	50.0%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.27. Married male worker responses to the question, "is a worker in the Cité with more education given more respect because of his education?" Categorized by age grouping.

<u>Responses as a percentage of the total sample of that age group</u>			
<u>Age group</u>	<u>Yes, an educated worker is more respected</u>	<u>No, an educated worker is not more respected</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>
20-30	30.0%	5.0%	65.0%
31-40	42.9%	0 %	57.1%
41-50	30.4%	4.3%	65.2%
51-61	54.2%	8.3%	37.5%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.28. Married male worker responses to the question, "are older workers more respected in the Cité on account of their age?" Responses categorized by (selected) ethnic group.

Responses as a percentage of the total
sample of that ethnic group

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Yes, older workers are more respected</u>	<u>No, older workers are not more respected</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>	<u>No response</u>
ARuund	38.5%	7.7%	53.9%	0 %
Kaniok	12.5%	0 %	87.5%	0 %
Luba-Kasai	41.7%	0 %	50.0%	8.3%
Luba-Shaba	42.1%	10.5%	42.1%	5.3%
Lulua	66.7%	0 %	33.3%	0 %
Ndembu	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	0 %
Sanga	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%	0 %
Songye	25.0%	0 %	75.0%	0 %
Tshokwe	44.4%	11.1%	44.4%	0 %

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.29. Married male worker responses to the question, "are older workers more respected in the Cité on account of their age?" Responses categorized by generation in Gécamines.

Responses as a percentage of the total sample of that generation

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Yes, older workers are more respected</u>	<u>No, older workers are not more respected</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>	<u>No response</u>
1	35.6%	6.7%	53.3%	4.4%
2	46.3%	2.4%	51.2%	0 %
3	37.5%	12.5%	50.0%	0 %

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table D.30. Married male worker responses to the question, "are older workers more respected in the Cité on account of their age?" Responses categorized by age group.

Responses as a percentage of the total sample of that age group

<u>Age group</u>	<u>Yes, older workers are more respected</u>	<u>No, older workers are not more respected</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>	<u>No response</u>
20-30	50.0%	0 %	45.0%	5.0%
31-40	42.9%	0 %	57.1%	0 %
41-50	27.3%	13.6%	59.1%	0 %
51-61	37.5%	12.5%	45.8%	4.2%

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

APPENDIX E

KITH, KIN, AFFINITY, AND FRIENDSHIP BEHAVIOR

Table E.1. Married male worker responses to queries regarding the location of the majority of their relatives.

<u>Location of the majority of relatives</u>	<u>Percentage of total sample of informants giving this response</u>
In or near Kolwezi	15.2%
In southern Shaba	25.3%
In Shaba other than southern Shaba	18.2%
In Kasai-oriental or Kasai-occidental	28.3%
In Zaire other than Shaba or Kasai	2.0%
In Zambia	3.0%
Ambiguous answers/ no response	8.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.2. Location of the majority of informants' relatives categorized by generation of residence in Gécamines, and expressed in terms of specific numbers of informants in each category.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Responses</u>				
	<u>Shaba</u>			<u>Zaire</u>	
	<u>Ambiguous responses</u>	<u>In or near Kolwezi</u>	<u>Southern Shaba</u>	<u>(excluding Kasai oriental/occidental & Kasai)</u>	<u>Shaba & Kasai</u>
1	6	2	12	8	16
2	2	13	8	8	10
3			5	2	2
4					2
					1

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.3 Location of the majority of informants' relatives categorized by generation of residence in Gécamines and expressed as a percentage of informants in each generation.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Responses as a percentage of the total sample of each generation</u>					
	<u>Ambiguous responses</u>	<u>In or near Kolwezi</u>	<u>Southern Shaba</u>	<u>Shaba (excluding southern Shaba)</u>	<u>Kasai Oriental/ Occidental</u>	<u>Zaire excluding Shaba & Kasai</u>
1	13.0%	4.3%	26.1%	17.4%	34.8%	2.2%
2	4.7%	30.2%	18.6%	18.6%	23.3%	0 %
3	0 %	0 %	55.6%	22.2%	22.2%	0 %
4	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	100.0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.4. Married male worker responses to the question, "have you ever participated in a ceremony or ritual in your ancestral community?" Responses categorized by selected ethnic group.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	"Yes" answers as a percentage of the total sample of the ethnic group	"No" answers as a percentage of the total sample of the ethnic group	Ambiguous or "no response" answers as a percentage of the total sample of the ethnic group
ARuund	53.8%	46.2%	0 %
Kaniok	62.5%	37.5%	0 %
Luba-Kasai	28.6%	64.3%	7.1%
Luba-Shaba	47.4%	47.4%	5.3%
Lulua	83.3%	16.7%	0 %
Ndembu	16.7%	66.7%	16.7%
Sanga	60.0%	40.0%	0 %
Songye	50.0%	50.0%	0 %
Tshokwe	55.6%	44.4%	0%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.5. Married male worker responses to the question, "have you ever participated in a ceremony or ritual in your ancestral community?" Responses categorized by generation of residence in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	"Yes" answers as a percentage of the total sample of the <u>generation</u>	"No" answers as a percentage of the total sample of the <u>generation</u>	Ambiguous or "no response" answers as a percentage of the total sample of the <u>generation</u>
1	63.0%	37.0%	0 %
2	46.5%	51.2%	2.3%
3	33.3%	44.4%	22.2%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.6. Married male worker responses to the question, "do you retain any rights to position, property or other resources in your ancestral community?" Responses categorized by (selected) ethnic group.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	"Yes" responses as a percentage of the total sample of that <u>ethnic group</u>	"No" responses as a percentage of the total sample of that <u>ethnic group</u>	"Don't know" responses as a percentage of the total sample of that <u>ethnic group</u>
ARuund	15.4%	84.6%	0 %
Kaniok	50.0%	50.0%	0 %
Luba-Shaba	31.6%	68.4%	0 %
Luba-Kasai	21.4%	71.4%	7.1%
Lulua	83.3%	16.7%	0 %
Ndembu	50.0%	50.0%	0 %
Sanga	60.0%	40.0%	0 %
Songye	50.0%	50.0%	0 %
Tshokwe	22.2%	77.8%	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.7. Married male worker responses to the question, "do you retain any rights to position, property or other resources in your ancestral community?" Responses categorized by generation of residence in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	"Yes" responses as a percentage of the total sample of that <u>generation</u>	"No" responses as a percentage of the total sample of that <u>generation</u>	"Don't know" responses as a percentage of the total sample of that <u>generation</u>
1	34.8%	63.0%	2.2%
2	27.9%	72.1%	0 %
3	44.4%	55.6%	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.8. Married male worker responses to the question, "how often do you visit your relatives who live outside the general area of Kolwezi?" Responses categorized by (selected) ethnic group.

Responses as a percentage of the total sample of each ethnic group									
Ethnic group	Every day	At least once a week		At least once a month		Several times a year		At least once a year	
		At least once a week	At least once a month	At least once a month	Several times a year	At least once a year	At least once a year	Rarely	Never
						At interval of several years			No response/ambiguous answer
ARund	7.7%	0 %	0 %	0 %	7.7%	15.4%	0 %	46.2%	23.1%
Kaniok	12.5%	0 %	0 %	0 %	12.5%	25.0%	0 %	25.0%	25.0%
Luba-Kasai	0 %	0 %	21.4%	7.1%	7.1%	28.6%	7.1%	28.6%	0 %
Luba-Shaba	0 %	0 %	0 %	10.5%	31.6%	5.3%	16.7%	31.6%	15.8%
Lulua	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	33.3%	16.7%	50.0%	0 %	0 %
Ndembu	16.7%	0 %	0 %	16.7%	0 %	33.3%	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%
Sanga	0 %	0 %	0 %	20.0%	60.0%	0 %	20.0%	0 %	0 %
Songye	0 %	0 %	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%	0 %	12.5%
Tshokwe	0 %	0 %	0 %	11.1%	11.1%	22.2%	33.3%	0 %	22.2%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi February-April 1988.

Table E.9. Married male worker responses to the question, "how often do you visit your relatives who live outside the general area of Kolwezi?" Responses categorized by generation of residence in Gécamines.

<u>Responses as a percentage of the total sample of each generation</u>									
<u>Generation</u>	<u>Every day</u>	<u>At least once a week</u>	<u>At least once a month</u>	<u>Several times a year</u>	<u>At least once a year</u>	<u>At interval of several years</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>No response/ambiguous answer</u>
1	0 %	0 %	6.5 %	8.7 %	19.6 %	8.7 %	32.6 %	13.0 %	10.9 %
2	4.7 %	0 %	2.3 %	11.6 %	32.6 %	4.7 %	32.6 %	9.3 %	2.3 %
3	11.1 %	0 %	0 %	11.1 %	33.3 %	11.1 %	11.1 %	11.1 %	11.1 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.10. Married male worker responses to the question, "how often do you get together with relatives who live around Kolwezi, excepting those who live with you?" Responses categorized by (selected) ethnic group.

Responses as a percentage of the total sample of each ethnic group									
Ethnic group	Every day	At least once a week		At least once a month		Several times a year		At least once a year	
		At least once a week	At least once a month	At least once a month	Several times a year	Several times a year	At least once a year	At least once a year	At interval of several years
ARound	0 %	18.2%	45.5%	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	18.2%
Kaniok	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %
Luba-Kasai	25.0%	16.7%	33.3%	16.7%	0 %	0 %	8.3%	0 %	0 %
Luba-Shaba	11.1%	16.7%	11.1%	11.1%	5.6%	0 %	33.3%	11.1%	11.1%
Lulua	0 %	33.3%	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%	0 %	0 %	0 %	16.7%
Ndembu	16.7%	16.7%	0 %	16.7%	0 %	0 %	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%
Sanga	33.3%	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	33.3%	0 %	33.3%
Songye	0 %	33.3%	16.7%	33.3%	0 %	0 %	16.7%	0 %	0 %
Tshokwe	0 %	33.3%	33.3%	16.7%	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	16.7%

Source: Sample of 86 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.11.

Married male worker responses to the question, "how often do you get together with relatives who live around Kolwezi, excepting those who live with you?" Responses categorized by generation of residence in Gécamines.

<u>Responses as a percentage of the total sample of each generation</u>									
<u>Generation</u>	<u>Every day</u>	<u>At least once a week</u>	<u>At least once a month</u>	<u>Several times a year</u>	<u>At least once a year</u>	<u>At interval of several years</u>	<u>Rarely</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>No response/ambiguous answer</u>
1	11.4%	22.9%	20.0%	14.3%	0%	0%	8.6%	5.7%	17.1%
2	7.1%	19.0%	23.8%	16.7%	4.8%	0%	16.7%	7.1%	4.8%
3	25.0%	12.5%	12.5%	0%	12.5%	0%	25.0%	12.5%	0%

Source: Sample of 86 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.12. Married male worker responses to the question, "do you think that being related (as a kinsman) contributes to friendship?" Responses categorized by selected ethnic group.

Responses as a percentage of the total sample
of each ethnic group

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>	<u>Yes, very much</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Little or none</u>	<u>No response</u>
ARuund	15.4%	0 %	38.5%	38.5%	7.7%
Kaniok	12.5%	0 %	37.5%	50.0%	0 %
Luba-Kasai	0 %	21.4%	35.7%	42.9%	0 %
Luba-Shaba	0 %	15.8%	15.8%	57.9%	10.5%
Lulua	16.7%	50.0%	0 %	33.3%	0 %
Ndembu	0 %	0 %	50.0%	50.0%	0 %
Sanga	0 %	0 %	80.0%	20.0%	0 %
Songye	0 %	12.5%	25.0%	62.5%	0 %
Tshokwe	0 %	22.2%	33.3%	33.3%	11.1%

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.13. Married male worker responses to the question, "do you think that being related (as a kinsman) contributes to friendship?" Responses categorized by generation of informants.

Responses as a percentage of the total sample
of each generation

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Depends on other factors</u>	<u>Yes, very much</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Little or none</u>	<u>No response</u>
1	6.5%	17.4%	19.6%	47.8%	8.7%
2	2.3%	16.3%	39.5%	41.9%	0 %
3	0 %	11.1%	44.4%	44.4%	0 %

Source: Sample of 99 married male workers interviewed by author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.14. Married male worker responses to a hypothetical situation in which the informant had exactly Z 1000 and both a (classificatory) brother and the informant's best friend (not related to the informant) came to the informant with a desperate need for exactly Z 1000. Categorized by (selected) ethnic group.

<u>Responses as a percentage of total sample of that ethnic group</u>					
<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Whole sum to best friend</u>	<u>Whole sum to brother</u>	<u>Share</u>	<u>No money to either</u>	<u>Other*</u>
ARuund	7.7%	7.7%	61.5%	23.1%	0 %
Kaniok	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%
Luba-Kasai	0 %	0 %	66.7%	25.0%	8.3%
Luba-Shaba	0 %	36.8%	36.8%	10.5%	15.8%
Lulua	0 %	16.7%	33.3%	33.3%	16.7%
Ndembu	20.0%	0 %	60.0%	20.0%	0 %
Sanga	40.0%	0 %	60.0%	0 %	0 %
Songye	0 %	37.5%	50.0%	12.5%	0 %
Tshokwe	11.1%	11.1%	77.8%	0 %	0 %

*Responses categorized here as "other" ranged widely, but the two most common were: "I'd give the money to the one with the greatest need," and "I'd give just a little to both."

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.15. Married male worker responses to a hypothetical situation in which the informant had exactly Z 1000 and both a (classificatory) brother and the informant's best friend (not related to the informant) came to the informant with a desperate need for exactly Z 1000. Categorized by generation of residence.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Responses as a percentage of total sample of that generation</u>				
	<u>Whole sum to best friend</u>	<u>Whole sum to brother</u>	<u>Share</u>	<u>No money to either</u>	<u>Other</u>
1	13.3%	13.3%	48.9%	20.0%	4.4%
2	0 %	14.6%	53.7%	17.1%	14.6%
3	25.0%	25.0%	37.5%	12.5%	0 %

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.16. Married male worker responses to a situation in which the informant had exactly Z 1000 and both a (classificatory) brother and the informant's next door neighbor (not related to the informant) both came to the informant with a desperate need for exactly Z 1000. Categorized by (selected) ethnic group.

<u>Ethnic group</u>	<u>Responses as a percentage of total sample of that ethnic group</u>				
	<u>Give whole sum to next door neighbor</u>	<u>Give whole sum to brother</u>	<u>Share the money between neighbor and brother</u>	<u>Give no money to either</u>	<u>Other</u>
ARuund	15.4%	46.2%	23.1%	15.4%	0 %
Kaniok	25.0%	25.0%	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%
Luba-Kasai	8.3%	33.3%	25.0%	25.0%	8.3%
Luba-Shaba	0 %	47.4%	31.6%	15.8%	5.3%
Lulua	0 %	16.7%	33.3%	33.3%	16.7%
Ndembu	0 %	60.0%	20.0%	20.0%	0 %
Sanga	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	0 %	0 %
Songye	25.0%	62.5%	0 %	12.5%	0 %
Tshokwe	22.2%	22.2%	55.6%	0 %	0 %

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

Table E.17. Married male worker responses to a situation in which the informant had exactly Z 1000 and both a (classificatory) brother and the informant's next door neighbor (not related to the informant) both come to the informant with a desperate need for exactly Z 1000. Responses categorized generation of residence in Gécamines.

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Responses as a percentage of total sample of that generation</u>				
	<u>Give whole sum to next door neighbor</u>	<u>Give whole sum to brother</u>	<u>Share the money between neighbor and brother</u>	<u>Give no money to either</u>	<u>Other</u>
1	15.6%	31.1%	28.9%	20.0%	4.4%
2	7.3%	36.6%	26.8%	19.5%	9.8%
3	12.5%	50.0%	25.0%	12.5%	0 %

Source: Sample of 95 married male workers interviewed by the author in the Cité Gécamines Kolwezi, February-April 1988.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Daniel W. Henk is a career officer in the U.S. Army, having served continuously on active duty since 1970. He currently holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. His military service has included assignments in the United States, South Vietnam, the Federal Republic of Germany and Grenada. In recent years, his military duties have required him to perform extensive travel in Africa.

Born to American missionary parents in 1949, LTC Henk spent most of his childhood in rural central Africa (now the countries of Zaire and Zambia). He received his early schooling in mission schools, returning to the United States in 1964 to complete high school. He subsequently studied under an ROTC scholarship at the Citadel, in Charleston, S.C., and was graduated from that institution in 1970 with a bachelor's degree in history and a commission in the Regular Army.

In consonance with training for his military specialty as a Foreign Area Officer, LTC Henk studied at the University of Florida in 1979 and 1980, and was awarded a master's degree in anthropology. In 1986, he returned to the University of Florida (under Department of Defense auspices) to pursue his doctorate. In the course of those

studies, he conducted anthropological field research in southern Zaire.

LTC Henk has been married since 1970 to (the former) Eva Claire Ackerman of Orangeburg, South Carolina, and is the father of two teenage sons.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Brian M. du Toit, Chair
Professor of Anthropology

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